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MORAL     AGENCY. 


A  N 

ESSAY 

O  N 

MORAL     AGENCY 


CONTAINING 


Remarks  on  a  late  anonj'mous  Publication, 


ENTITLED! 


An  EXAMINATION  of  the  late  President 
EDWARDS'S  INQUIRY  on  FREEDOM 
of  WILL. 


BY    STEPHEN    WEST,    d.  d. 

PASTOK,    OF    THE    CHURCH    IN    STOCKBRIDGE. 


Thy  peopU  jiiall  be  willing  in  the  day  of  thy  power. 

Psalm  ex.  5. 


I  ^HE    SECOND    EDITION. 

TO     WHICH     IS     ADDED, 
AN 

APPENDIX, 

BY    THE    AUTHOR. 


SALEM: 

J'RINTED    BY   THOMAS    C.    GUSHING. 
1794. 


PREFACE. 


THE  dotTtrincs  of  divine  prefciencc,  and  of  the: 
liberty  and  freedom  of  the  creature,  have  been 
thought,  by  many,  to  be  involved  in  lb  much  darknefs 
and  uncertainty,  efpecially  when  confidered  in  their 
mutual  relation  to  each  other,  and  the  afpeft  which 
the  one  necelTarily  hath  upon  the  other  ;  that  it  hath 
been  efteemed  a  mark  of  modefly,  good  fenle,  and  in- 
genuity, frankly  to  confefs  our  ip;i!orance  in  points  of 
ilich  depth  and  myilery,  and  yield  them  up  as  perfectly 
incapable  of  being  reconciled,  even  in  idea,  the  one 
with  the  other.  With  this  view  and  apprchenfion  of 
tilings  are  the  minds  of  iome  fo  entirely  and  perfectly  ^ 
pofTeired,  that  the  very  thought  of  its  being  in  the 
power  of  man  to  reconcile  t\\c  foreknowledge  of  God, 
with  the  liberty  Gfxvill  in  creatures,  is  iirongly  repel- 
led ;  and  the  knowledge  of  any  attempt  to  fliev/  the 
confiflency  of  the  one  witii  the  other,  received  witii 
lenfible  uneahnefs  and  difpleaiure.  And  yet  thefe  are, 
both,  points  of  undoubted  certainty  and  truth  ;  and 
that,  by  the  acknowledgment  of  mod  of  thofe  in  whole 
apprehenlions  they  are  fo  exceedingly  myflerious,  ir- 
reconcilable and  incomprehenfible.  This  (if  I  may 
be  permitted  to  fay  it)  to  me  appeareth  remarkable. 
That  we  (liould  firmly  believe  dodlrines  which  in  our 
own  view  are  perfeftly  incapable,  by  any  human  un- 
derftanding,  of  being  reconciled  together,  is  like 
yielding  our  aiTent  to  both  parts  of  a  contradiction . 
And,  not  only  fo,  but  that  we  fliould  eifeem  them  both 
of  fuch  importance  as  to  make  them  articles  of  our 

rcli^iGus 


vi  PREFACE. 

religions  f.uth  and  beliefs  and  yet  be  fo  efFe (finally  per- 
fuaded  of  their  inconfillency  with  each  other,  as  to 
look  upon  every  attempt  to  reconcile  the  liberty  and 
freedom  of  men  in  their  anions,  with  that  indiflblu- 
ble,  infallible  connexion  of  all  events  with  fome  ante- 
cedent cauie,  reafon  or  ground  of  their  exiftence, 
which  is  necelTarily  implied  in  the  dodtrine  of  the  full 
and  perfe£t  prefcience  of  God  ;  to  me,  I  confefs,  ap- 
peareth  rather  an  argument  of  the  pov.'er  of  prejudice, 
and  of  an  unreafonable  attachment  to  fome  pre-con- 
ceived  opinion,  than  of  real  modefty  and  true  great- 
iiefs  of  mind.  However,  the  bed  of  men  are,  doubt- 
lefs,  liable  to  prejudice  and  miftake,  and  incident  to 
error  :  and  very  far  would  I  be  from  cenfuring  thofe 
who  differ  from  me  in  opinion,  refpefting  the  points 
principally  treated  on,  in  the  following  EfFay,  as  ei- 
ther diftionefl  or  weak.  What  I  would  by  thefe  ob- 
fervations,  is  to  make  it  appear  that  the  confiftency  of 
human  liberty  with  the  prejcie7'/ce  of  God,  is  a  fubjeft 
fit  a-nd  proper  to  engage  the  attention  of  men;  and  that 
to  evince  this  confiftency  cannot  be  unworthy  of  the 
f.iiempt  of  fuch  as  profefs  themfelves  advocates  for 
both,  and  to  have  a  firm  perfuafion  of  the  truth  and 
importance  of  them,  whatever  appearance  there  may 
be  of  inconfiftency  between  them.  By  this  means  and 
in  this  way  would  I  befpeak  tlie  candour  and  engage 
the  patience  of  the  reader  ;  hoping  that  thefe  obfer- 
vations  may  raife  and  awaken  his  attention,  to  what  \ 
have  written  on  the  fubjed:. 

From  fuch  whofc  minds  are  foured  and  prejudiced 
againft  every  thing  that  is  ?ieiv^  and  who,  even  them- 
felves, will  be  bitter  againft  the  bitternefs  of  difpute, 
I  have  little  favour  to  expeft  :  with  them  I  look  for 
little  fuccels.  No  arguments  w^ill  adminifter  convic- 
tion to  them.  Nothing  can  be  clear — nothing  perlpi- 
cuous  enough  to  enlighten,  convince  and  perfuadc 
them.  Such  as  are  refolved  to  embrace  the  reigning 
fentiments  and  the  fafhionable  opinions  j    or  who  take 

their 


PREFACE.  vii 

their  principles  upon  truft^  without  examining  for 
thenirelves  and  feeing  with  their  own  eyes  j  will  prob- 
ably receive  little  or  no  improvement  from  the  fol- 
lov/ing  EfTay,  even  though  tiie  defign  of  it  Ihould  be 
judiciouily  executed.  'Theje  (if  any  fuch  there  are) 
are  the  adverfaries  from  whom  I  am  mod  apprehen- 
five  of  danger.  I'hefe  cor^nxoxxXy  make  ufe  of  weap- 
ons, againft  which  there  is  no  defence. 

But  if  tliere  are  any  who  are  impartial  lovers  of 
trath  ;  who  are  difpofed  to  careful  and  critical  exam- 
ination ;  who  are  ready  to  admit  aiiy  point  upon 
proper  evidence,  even  though  it  be  neiu^  and  oppofed 
by  the  flrong  current  of  prevailing  opinion  ;  to  them 
I  beg  leave  humbly  to  commend  theperufal  of  the  fol- 
lowing Eifay  :  to  their  judgment  and  corre^Sion  I 
cheerfully  fubmit  it  :  from  them  I  hope  for  inftruiftion 
and  improvement,  and  by  them  I  hope  to  be  fet  right 
in  points  wherein  it  Ihall  appear  that  I  am  wrong. 
Nor  am  I  without  hopes  of  affording  fome  pleafure, 
entertainment  and  improvement  to  them. 

To  what  I  have  written  upon  that  mofl  important 
fubje£t  of  the  divine  agency  rejpeding  the  event  of  inoral 
evil^  I  earneftly  and  particularly  requell:  the  careful, 
critical  and  candid  attention  of  the  reader.  Here  I 
have  purfaed  fomewliat  of  an  unbeaten  path  ;  and  not 
without  great  fears  and  apprehenfions  left  1  Ihould  fay 
lomething  diflionourable  and  reproachful  to  Hii\r,  the 
honour  of  whofe  glorious  government  and  name  I 
have  humbly  endeavoured  to  vindicate  and  defend. 
Here,  in  many  things  I  have  faid,  I  pretend  not  to  be 
pofitive — to  be  certain  :  and  any  air  of  peremptorinefs 
which  my  arguments  may  be  thought  to  carry  in 
them,  1  humbly  requefl  may  be  confidered  as  intended 
and  meant  to  give  the  argument  its  greateft  advan- 
tage, and  not  to  exprefs  the  confidence  I  have  in  my 
own  fentiments  and  opinion.  I  have  written  notliing, 
however,  but  what  appeared  to  m.e  to  be  the  truth. 

Objeclions 


Viii  PREFACE. 

Obje£lions  I  have  endeavoured  (hoiild  appear  to  ad- 
vantage, and  in  their  full  ftrength  :  and  whether  I  am 
to  be  accufed  of  giving  lueak  anflvers  to  Jlrong  objec- 
tions, the  intelligent  reader  muft  judge.  After  all,  if 
the  fcheme  of  doftrine  and  fentiments  here  advanced, 
fhall  be  found,  upon  careful,  flrift  examination,  to 
imply  any  thing  inconfiitent  with  the  mofl:  perfccTt  pu- 
rity and  holinefs  of  God,  and  his  utter  and  infinite 
hatred  of  all  moral  evil  ;  or  any  thing  inconfiflent 
with  the  ideas  of  defert  of  punifliment  in  the  fmner  ; 
I  will  cheerfully  give  it  up,  and  heartily  condemn  and 
abjure  it  :  and  fliall  think  myfelf  obliged  to  make  my 
moit  grateful  acknowledgments  to  any  one,  who  fhall 
be  at  the  pains  of  detecting  the  weaknefs  and  fophiflry 
of  thofe  arguments  by  which  I  have  urged  a  fpecial 
divine  agency  and  difpofal,  giving  certainty  to  the  ex- 
iftence  of  moral  evil  in  the  iyflem.  Yet  I  cannot  but 
exprefs  my  hopes  that  the  reafons  and  arguments 
which  I  herewith  humbly  offer  to  the  public,  in  fup- 
port  of  the  doftrine  I  have  prefumed  to  advance,  will 
be  a  means  of  diffuhng  fome  new  light  on  this  impor- 
tant fiibjecft ;  and  Vv^ill  invite  fbme  one  of  a  more  nice 
difcernment  and  jufl  and  comprehenfive  view  of  things, 
more  carefully  to  examine  and  thoroughly  to  fcan  and 
canvais  the  fubjeft. 

A  vindication  of  Mr.  Edwards,  the  reader  wall  ea- 
fily  difcern,  hath  Kot  been  an  object  fo  particularly  in 
view  in  the  following  EfTay.  His  character  is  but  of 
fmall  importance,  compared  to  that  of  the  caufe  of 
truth:  but  if  it  was,  it  appearcth  not  to  need  any 
fupport  which  the  author  of  the  following  fheets  is  ca- 
pable of  giving  it.  For  although  it  may  be  true  that 
the  author  of  the  Exami?intion  of  his  Inquiry^  Sec.  hath 
detected  fome  lefTer  errors  in  that  very  maflerly  tra(ft  ; 
yet  the  grand  pillars  of  his  doftrine,  I  am  humbly  of 
opinion,  flill  ftand  firm  and  unfkaken  ;  and  that  juflly 
celebrated  performance  remaineth  as  a  brazen  wall 
againfl  the  prevailing  errors  of  the  day.     This  great 

man's 


P  R  E  i!"  A  C  E.  ix 

man's  writings,  though  doubtlefs  in  many  refpc^s  im- 
perfed^  have  yet  left  a  favour  in  his  name,  vvhicii  will 
make  it  remembered  with  g;ratitude  and  pleafure  by 
the  lovers  of  truth,  and  friends  of  free  inquiry. 

^  That  fo  important  a  fubjeft  as  that  of  Liberty  and 
urgency  (a  fubject  which  hath  engaged  the  attention 
and  employed  the  pens  of  the  greatelt  Geniiifes  in  the 
feveral  learned  nations,  in  almoil:  ail  ages  of  the  world) 
ftiould  be  undertaken  by  fo  young  and  inexperienced  a 
writer,  may  be  thought  by  many,  perhaps,  arrogant 
and  prefumptuous.  This,  however,  it  is  hoped,  will 
not  prejudice  the  reader  againft  the  arguments — the 
reajons  which  are  exhibited  in  fupport  of  the  leading 
fentiments  of  the  following  Ejfay^  and  the  fcheme  of 
dod:rine  contained  in  it.  Th.^  fry le  and  manner  are, 
doubtlefs,  in  many  refpedls  very  defetStive,  and  need 
the  candour  and  patience  of  the  reader  ;  which,  ac- 
cordingly, are  humbly  requefted.  But  to  ail^  any  fa- 
vour to  the  argument^  would  be  doing  injuflice  to  the 
caufe  of  truths 

Many  things  in  the  Examiner^  which  appeared  to  me 
to  be  exceptionable,  have  been  paficd  unnoticed  ;  they 
not  falling  fo  diredly  within  the  defign  of  the  follow- 
ing E[]ay.  But  the  arguments  which  appeared,  to  me, 
to  be  of  principal  weight  in  fupport  oi  \.\\-3it  frcedo7/i  of 
will  for  which  he  profeiTeth  himfelf  an  advocate,  I 
have,  according  to  my  ability,  examined  and  coniider- 
ed.  I  have  not  defigned'y  mifunderflood  or  pervert- 
ed his  meaning,  nor  knowingly  wreftcd  his  words 
from  their  mofl  plain  and  obvious  import,  by  f^srced 
and  unnatural  conftru6lion.  But  whether  I  have,  ill 
any  thing,  corrected  him,  and  ihown  his  rcafonings  to 
be  inconclufive  and  unjuil,  1  mull  leave  to  the  judg- 
ment of  the  candid  and  intelligent  reader. 

I  have  only  to  requeft  a  patient,    fair  and  impartial 

hearing  ;  and  humbly  to  afl-;:  the  imited  prayers  of  all 

\  B  the 


zi  PREFACE. 

the  lovers  and  friends  of  truth,  to  the  great  foUntam 
and  Father  of  lights ^  for  larger  and  more  abundant 
meafures  to  be  given  of  that  bleffed  5/77r/7  which  lead- 
eth  and  guideth  into  all  truth  ;  that  all  error,  igno- 
rance and  darknefs  may  be  done  away,  and  light  and 
truth  prevail  and  fhine  more  abundantly,  to  the  Glory 
ofGod^  here  in  our  dark  world. 


.^tockbridgc, 
27th  March,  1772* 


INTRODUCTION. 


INTRODUCTION. 


■•<i= 


INQUIRIES  of  this  nature,  which  can  be  ufeful  to 
mankind  only  as  they  ferve  to  illuftrate  the  nature 
of  that  moral  agency  which  is  elFential  to  virtue  and 
vice,  as  far  as  I  have  had  opportunity  to  obferve, 
have  generally  been  expreiUy  upon  the  point  of  liber- 
ty :  a  term,  in  fome  refpeds,  of  more  doubtful  and 
various  fignification  than  that  agency  itfelf,  in  order  to 
a  right  underftanding  and  juft  explanation  of  which, 
Liberty  hath  been  the  iubjedt  of  inquiry  and  alterca- 
tion. 

Moral  Ap^^ency  is  what  every  one  acknowledgeth  to 
be  elfential  to  virtue  and  vice,  reward  or  punifliment. 
But  liberty^  in  the  fenfe  in  which  the  term  is  many 
times  ufed,  is  not  eflential  to  either  ;  but  may  or  may 
not  be  pofTeiTed,  and  yet  the  fubjecl  in  c|ueltion  have 
proper  defert  of  puniflmient,  or  reward. 

Liberty^  as  the  term  is  ufed  in  common  language, 
tmdoubtely  meaneth  a  power  of  doing  as  jue  plca/e. 
This,  1  believe,  is  its  moll:  common  and  natural  figni- 
Jication.  But  a  little  attention  will  convince  any  one 
that  this  definition  of  liberty  doth  not  contain  the  moft; 
effential  and  important  ideas  of  that  agency  and  free- 
dom which  necelFarily  imply,  in  them,  defert  of  praife 
or  blame,  reward  or  puniflmient.  A  power  to  do  as 
luc  phafe^  implietli  a  dilHntniion  between  the  pleafurc 
of  the  will,  and  the  doing  or  aclion  of  the  perlon  :  or, 
at  Icail,  plainly  admits  it.     This  definition,  tliciefore, 

B  2  of 


xii  INTRODUCTION. 

oriiberty,  placeth  it  in  fomething  entirely  diftin^t 
from  the  pieafure  of  the  mind — the  exercifes  of  the 
niill :  though  it  is  very  manifeil:  that  the  pleafure  of 
the  mind  itielf,  M'hich  is  the  fource  of  our  actions,  and 
is  the  fountain  from  whence  they  proceed,  is  morally 
beautiful  or  dei'ormed,  and  hath  in  it  proper  defert  of 
praifc  or  blame,/  According  to  this  definition  of  it, 
therefore,  liberty  is  not  an  elfential  ingredient  of  that 
agency  and  exertion  of  which  we  may  properly  predi- 
cate virtue,  or  vice.  There  may  be  fuch  exercifes 
and  exertions,  as,  in  the  common  eilimation  of  men, 
carry  in  them  defert  of  praife  or  blame  ;  and  yet  the 
fubje<ft  of  thefe  exercifes  be  utterly  deftitute  of  that 
liberty  which  confideth  in  a  power  of  doi?ig  ns  ive 
pleafe.  The  heart,  the  affedtion,  may  be  right — the 
whole  of  the  interned  exercife  may  be  virtuous  and 
commendable,  and  fuch  as  every  one  mufl;  judge  to  be 
v.'orthy  of  refpe«^t  and  elleem  ;  while  the  perfon  is  en- 
tirely retrained  horaany  Qiittuard adion  ;  being  bound 
down  by  fetters  and  cords.  In  this  cafe  it  is  appar^ 
ent,  as  Paul  fays,  2.  Cor.  viii.  12.  that  Jf  there  he firfl 
a  "willing  mind^  it  is  accepted  accordintj  to  that  a  man 
hath\  and  not  according  to  that  he  hath  tiot.  So,  on 
the  other  hand,  there  is  nothing  irrational  or  incon- 
gruous, in  fuppoilng  that  men  may  be  guilty  of  great 
and  abominable  wickedncfs,  while  they  are  forcibly 
rellrained  from  any  outward  excefs  :  their  internal 
exercijes  being  fuch  (could  they  be  known  to  man- 
kind) as  would  be  univerfally  cenfured  and  condemn- 
ed. In  fuch  a  cafe  as  this  it  is  very  manifellly  true, 
accordijig  to  the  obfervation  of  the  wife  man,  that  yls 
a  man  thinkcth  in  his  heart  ^fo  is  he.     Pro  v.  xxiii.  7. 

It  is  unnecefTary,  therefore,  in  an  inquiry  into  the 
nature  of  that  moral  agency  which  is  elfential  to  vir- 
tue and  vice,  rev/ard  and  punilhment,  precifcly  to  af- 
certain  the  nature  and  bounds  of  Liberty^  in  the  vari- 
ous fenfes  in  which  the  term  is  ufed  among  mankind  ; 
or  exprciliy  aud  particularly  to  define  it.     it  is  enough 

if 


INTRODUCTION.  xiit 

if  wc  can  gain  a  clear,  full  view  of  tiiat  agency  of 
mankind  v/hich  hath  in  it  proper  deiert  of  praife,  or 
blame,  and  wliich  is  neceilarily  either  virtuous  or 
vicious  ;  for  in  fuch  an  agency  as  this  is  comprehend- 
ed all  that  liberty  which  digniiie.th  human  nature,  and 
diftinguifaeth  moral  beings — accountable  agents. 

And  if  we  can  difcover  particularly  and  precifely 
what  that  is,  which  is  moft  diredly  obedience  or  diib- 
bedience  to  the  will  and  commands  of  God  ; — what  it 
is  that  He  looketh  upon  with  efteem  and  approbation, 
or  with  abhorrence  and  deteftation  ; — what  is  truly 
morally  beautiful,  or  really  and  abfolutely  deformed  ; 
tiie  queftion  concerning  Liberty^  as  far  as  it  refpefTts 
ethicks  or  morality,  will  be  fufliciently  decided. 

Whatever  be  the  true  idea  or  definition  of  Liberty ^ 
as  applied  to  morals  ;  we  may  reft  fatisfied  that  the 
jalc  and  good  God  will  never  either  reward  or  puniili 
any  of  his  creatures,  for  any  of  their  actions  which 
were  not  free  to  all  intents  and  purpofes,  with  that 
kind  of  freedom,  which,  in  his  view,  is  efTential  to  the 
nature  of  virtue  and  vice.  We  may,  likcwife,  con- 
fide in  it,  that  nothing  will  be  efteemed,  by  mankind 
in  general,  either  morally  beautiful,  or  deformed — 
meriting  either  commendation,  or  cenfure  ;  which 
hath  not  all  that  liberty  and  freedom  in  it  and  predi- 
cable  of  it,  which,  in  the  common  eftimation  of  men, 
is  elFential  to  moral  action — to  our  being  accountable 
creatures,  and  proper  fubjecis  of,  eitlier  punilhment, 
or  reward. 

If  I  (Iiould  be  To  happy  as  properly  to  define  moral 
agency,  and  illuftrate  the  nature  and  afcertain  the  idea 
of  it,  in  the  following  EfTay  : — if  I  fhould  fi^.y  any 
thing  which  may  refledl  any  new  light  upon  this  im- 
portant fubjeft  J  or  open  a  track  which  maybe  purfu-- 
ed  to  advantage  by  ibme  abler  genius,  to  a  farther 
dilcovery  of  truth  and  a  fuller  illuflration  of  the  im- 
portant 


xiv  INTRODUCTION. 

portant  fubje£l  before  us  ;  I  fhall  think  myfelf  amply 
rewarded  :  and  conceive  that  I  do  a  greater  fervicc 
to  mankind,  and  to  the  caufe  of  truth  in  general,  than 
if  1  Ihould  particularly  and  accurately  define  the  term 
Liberty^  in  its  feveral  and  various  fignifications  ;  al- 
though when  ufed  in  a  moral  fsnfe^  I  mean  not  to  leave 
it  undefined. 

How  I  fucceed  in  an  undertaking  which,  it  feems, 
hath  not  hitherto  been  executed  to  the  entire  fatisfac- 
tion  of  mankind  (uotwithflanding  the  ability  and 
judgment  with  which  the  fubje(ft  has  been  treated)  the 
impartial  public  mufl  judge.  I  have  only  to  crave 
their  attention,  and  candid  conflrud:ion  of  what  I  may 
offer  upon  the  fubjedl. 


CONTENTS. 


CONTENTS. 

PART     I. 

Sect.    I. 

K/fORj^L  agency  defined^  and/hown  to  confi/f  in  the  ex- 
ercifes  of  the  will.  Page   17-— 27« 

Sect.    II. 
0  F  P  0  IV  E  R.  P.  37—58. 

Sect.    III. 

ty herein  the  nature  and  influence  of  Motives  are 
carefully  examined  and  explained,  P.  58 — 75*, 

Sect.  IV. 
TV  herein  virtue  and  vice  arefnown  to  confifl  in  the  nature 
of  the  internal  difpofitions  and  inclinations  ofmen^  in 
diftindian  from  their  caiife.  P.  75—88. 

Sect.    V. 

In  vjhich  is  inquired  whether  there  is  not  an  antecedent 
certainty  of  the  exifience  of  QWCTy  event  which  ever 
taketh  place,  P.  88—104. 

Sect.    VI. 

PVherein  the  notion  of  a  power  of  felfdet  ernti  nation 

in    the  will^    or  of  originating  motion  in  ourfelves, 

is   carefully  confidered^    and  the   inconfiflency  of  it 

fiown.  P.   104—129. 

Sect.    VII. 
tV herein  it  is  fliown  that  the  doCirine  of  an  infallible  pre-- 
vious  certainty  of  all  hu7nan  volitions^  doth  not  implv 
that  mankind  are  hut  fnere  7nachines.     P.    129 — 137. 

Sect.    VIII. 
IVherein  the  Ex — r^s  reafonings^  in  fever  nl  parts  of  his 
performance  which  have  ?iot  yet  been  taketi  notice  of 
are  particularly  confidered,  P.   137—166. 

PART  II. 


xvi  CONTENTS. 

PART     II. 

Wkercin  the  divine  agency  and  difpofnl  refpeflin^  ihii 
taking  place  of  Jin  in  the  J'yjlem^  are  humbly  and  care- 
fully inquired  into ^  and  particularly  confidered. 

p.    i66— i69i 
Sect    I. 

tVhere.in  it  is  inquired  whether  the  exiflence  and  takijig 
place  of  moral  evil  are  not  the  occafion  of  more  and 
gi-eater  good,  in  the  fyfem^  than  could  otherwije  have 
been  effcded  and  produced.  P.    169 — 1 99* 

S  E  C  T.      II. 

Shewing  that  it  w.'is^  upon  the  whole^  a  defirable  things 
that  moral  evil  fliould  come  into  exiflence. 

P.    199 — 211. 

Sect.    III. 

IVherein  it  is  fliown  that  fuch  a  pofitive  divine  agency 
and  difpofal  as  would  qive  infallible   certainty    that 
moral    evil  fliould  cojne  into  exiflence  in  the  Jyjlem , 
are  not  inconfijlent  with  the  purity  and  holinefs   of 
Cod.  P.   211— 221, 

Sect.    IV. 

Objetiions  confidered  and  refuted.  P.   221 — 234* 

Sect.    V. 

Containing  fome  Icriptiirc-evidence  of  a  fpecial  divine 
agency  and  difpojal  giving  infallible-certainty  to  the  ex-^ 
ificKce  of  moral  evil.  P.   234 — 25'2, 


APPENDIX. 


PART  I. 


(I***  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *     if 

%      *  *  *  *  »  *  *  *  *     ,^     *     ,.      ft 


PART       I, 


Section    I. 


Moral  Agency  defined^  and fiewn  to  con/ijl  in  the 
ExerciJ'es  of  the  Will. 

ORAL  AGENCY  (without  any  metaphyfical 
fubtilty  or  refinement)  conllileth  in  Spontane- 
ous^ Voluntary  Exertion.  Whenever  M^e  do  any  thing 
voluntarily,  and  of  free  choice,  we  perform  a  moral 
aftion — an  aftion  meriting  cenfure  or  commendation. 
He  vv^ho  afteth  eleftively,  or  putteth  forth  an  a<ft  of 
will,  is  herein  a  moral  agent,  and  a  proper  iubjed:  of 
reward  or  punifhment,  praife  or  blame.  All  the  exer- 
cifes  of  our  wills,  our  hearts  and  affedions,  are  of  a 
moral  nature.  This  is  the  agency  which  rendereth  us 
accountable  creatures  ;  thefe  are  the  aftions  for  which 
we  are  rewardable  or  punifliabie  in  the  light  of  God. 

'T\i2t  J pontaneous.,  voluntary  exertion  isfuch  an  agen- 
cy as  hath  moral  defert  in  it,  and  is  that  whereof  it  is 
proper  and  fitting  that  we  fliould  give  an  account, 
feems  to  be  a  dictate  of  natural  reafon,  and  the  com- 
mon fenfe  of  men  ;  and  is  what  muft  be  on  all  hands 
allowed.  Even  they  who  plead  for  a  power  of 
j elf' determination  in  men,  an-d  who  urge  that  afts  of 
the  will  are  felf -originated^  or  that  they  fpring  from 
their  own  internal  energy  and  activity  ;  yet  concede, 
that  thefe  ads  of  the  ivill^  thefe  voluntary  exertions^ 
have  moral  defert  in  them,  and  really  render  us  fit 
fubjeifts  of  punifliment,   or  reward.     And    it   mufl  nc- 

C  ceiTarily 


i8  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  L 

cefTlirily  be  fo  :  for  from  v/hatevcr  caitje  the  afts  of 
the  will  are  fuppofed  to  arife  ;  let  it  be  either  internal 
or  external ;  let  it  be  from  fomething  peculiar  to  the 
•nature  of  volition,  or  from  fome  foreign,  extrinfic 
caufe  ;  it  is  unreafonable  to  look  into  the  cauje^  for  that 
agency  itfelf  \v\i\z\\  is  direcrly  and  immedkttely  the  ob- 
ject of  difefteem  "or  approbation.  If  there  is  a  power 
in  men  to  orinpiaie  volition,  or  to  produce  voluntary 
exertion  ;  tiiis  power  itfelf,  whenever  it  is  exercifed, 
\s  voluntary :  and  in  this  fjjontaneous,  free,  voluntary^ 
exertion  of  this  fuppofed  power,  the  advocates  for  it 
place  that  liberty  and  agency  which  are  fuppofed  to  be 
eifential  to  virtue  and  vice.  If  the  exertion  of  this 
fuppofed  power  is  not  voluntary^  it  is  of  courfe  invo- 
limtary^'^  or  necejjary  ^\\\v  a  natural  necelfity  ;  and 
therefore  cannot,  confidently  with  common  reafon  and 
fenfe,  be  taken  for  moral  agency^  or  fuch  an  effeft,  op- 
eration or  exertion,  as  is  capable  of  being  confidered, 
with  the  lead:  propriety,  as  the  objeft  of  praife  or  blame. 

That  moral  agency  cannot  confift  in  any  fuch  power 
as  may  be  conceived  to  exid  previoufly  lo  its  being  put 
forth  into  action,  and  exerted  for  the  producHiion  of 
volition,  is  evident  from  this  fingle  confideration,  viz. 
That,  by  the  fiippofition,  there  is  no  agency  or  aOAon 
in  it. 

When  we  talk  of  moral  agency,  we  talk  of  fome  kind 
of  aO.ion  or  exertion  ;  and  not  merely  of  fomething 
which  may  be  2.  foundation  for  atTrion,  and  is  yet  per- 
fec^tly  and  entirely  didinft  from  it.  When  w^e  fpeak 
ofaperfon,  or  moral  being,  as  the  fubjeft  of  puniili- 
ment  or  reward,  or  as  having  in  him  defert  of  praife 
or  blame,  it  is  agreeable  to  the  common  fenfe  and  un- 
derftanding  of  men,  to  confider  him  as  in  exercife — at 
lead  as  having  put  forth  fome  motion  or  exertion.  It 
is  not  common  for  men  either  to  commend  or  blame 
any  thing  which  is  merely  paflivc  and  without  any  ex- 
ercife or  exertion.     It  is  certainly  agreeable  to  reafon 

to 

*  The  word  i>t\>o!urtary  I  lierc  ufe.  rot  as  denoting  any  opprjition  made  to  the 
•will,  as  the  term  moil  generaliy  implicth  ■,  but  merely  as  being  •uithcut  -wilU  anj 


Sect.  I.  MORAL    AGENCY.  19 

to  look  for  fome  real  conformity,  in  a  moral  agcnl,  to 
Ibme  rule  or  law  which  is  obligatory  on  him,  or  fome 
poritive  oppofition  to  It  as  a  proper  ground  of  praife  or 
blame,  cenfure  or  commendation.-  Where  there  is 
no  exercife  of  v/ill — no  aifecftion  of  mind,  there  is  no- 
thing;, in  a  moral  fenfe,  cither  beautiful  or  deformed. 

Whatever,  therefore,  maybe  the  powers  of  man- 
kind in  refpeft  to  the  froduCiion  of  volition  ;  what-sver 
be  the  caiifs  out  of  which  voluntary  exertion  arifeth  ; 
whether  it  be  internal  or  external  ;  whether  fuch  ex- 
ertion is  fclf-ori0nated^  or  arifeth  as  an  effeft  out  of 
fome  foreign  caufe  ;  ftill  where  fuch  an  effeft  is  formed, 
there  is  moral  agency  ;  and  where  it  is  not,  there  it  is  in 
vain  to  look  for  moral  quality — either  virtue  or  vice. 

Ynjpontaneous^  voluntary  exertion  is  all  the  freedom 
which  it   is  poffible  for  any  one  to  enjoy.     Here  is"  all 

C   2  the 

*  Againft  this  propofitio.n  it  may  poUlbly  be  obje£led,  that  «'  W.mt  of  con- 
formity" to  the  divine  law,  is  finfiil — IVmU  of  love,  or  not  lo-ving  Godi  is  c.rimi- 
ral  ;  and  therefore,  (it  may  be  urged)  it  is  unreafonable  to  place  that  moral 
agency  which  rendereth  vis  capable  of  virtue  and  vice,  and  makes  us  the  fit  fvib- 
jects  of  leward  or  piinilhment,  altofjcther  \n  fpoiitaficor/s.,  ■voluntary  exertion.  Sucli 
an  objector  I  would  aik.  In  whom  is  >'  a  -want  nf  conformity,"  or  v-iant  f  love, 
iinfiil  ? — !n  trees,  or  in  br\iles  ?  Tliis  will  not  be  pretended.  That  want  of  love 
to  God  v/hich  is  to  be  found  in  the  brutal  creation,  or  in  the  vegetable  worlds 
cannot  be  criminal.  Wliy  then  {hould  want  of  love  to  God  be  criminal  in  ma;i  — 
ualefs  it  be,  ihat  in  all  that  luant  of  lo-,i^  toward  God  or  our  fcilovz-Lreatiives,  i;u 
which  we  are  chargeable  with  wickedneis  in  the  eye  of  the  divine  law,  there  is 
ioxne  p'fiive  oppofition  to  Itive — fome  aJfeSllon  of  mind  inconfillent  v»'itlt  love  r  Jt 
is  true,  that  when  we  exercife  our  allcdion,  it  ought  to  be,  not  in  oppofition,  but  in 
pofitive  love,  to  God.  To  exercife  any  allcdion  refpecting  tlie  Deity  whicli  is. 
vvlioUy  without  love,  is  infinitely  wrong  and  criminal,  in  fuch  a  fcnfe  as  t'lis,  it 
is  morally  evil  not  to  love  God.  But  that  which  is  me.-el-/  reg^tivi;,  hath  no  quality 
in  it — nothing  predicable  of  it-  Where  there  is  no  uiiection  inconfillent  with 
love — no  exercife  of  heart  carrying  in  it  any  oppofition  to  God,  or  refiedion  upon 
liim  unworthy  of  his  own  infinitely  excellent  and  glorious  charader,  tjiere  is  no- 
thing criminal  or  ofTenfive  to  Cod.  That  ivant  of  love  which  i.-;  criminal,  is 
fomething  which  liatli  undutifulncf  in  it  towards  God  :  it  .invariably  implieth 
fome  mental  exercife  or  aitedion  which  is  inconfilient  with  love,  and  which  con- 
tain:th  in  it  difrrfpcEl  to  God,  and  pouvelh  contempt  upon  him.  It  is  not  a- 
fjrceable  to  the  piadice  and  conniion  fenfe  of  men,  to  cenfure  and  condemn  any 
thing  which  is  negative,  in  any  other  fenfe  than  this.  If  we  ftel  ourfelves  iit 
great  diftrefs,  or  in  imminent  danger,  and  one  of  our  fellowuien  fnould  ftand 
by  and  refufeto  lend  us  his  aifdlance,  we  (hould  have  iull  rcalbn  to  caft  blame 
and  cenfure  upon  him  :  but  if  he  was  fallen  into  a  fwoon,  or  burled  in  a  deep 
I'eep,  we  Ihouid  entertain  no  hard  thoughts  of  him.  Tiie  rcafon  ii  plain  :  hi^ 
Ttot  ajjijling  us,  in  the  former  cafe,  containeth  in  it  a  criminal  indijf<.rei!ce  to  our 
iafety — fme  exercife  of  heart  inconfillent  with  a  proper  concern  for  it  ;  in  tb.c 
latter,  it  doth  not.  For  this  reafon  we  jufUy  blame  in  the  one  cafe,  and  not  in 
the  other.  So  that  "want  of  love  to  God  which  only  is  criminal,  is  a  want  of  love 
which  containeth  in  it  fome  pofitive  oppofition  or  difaitrdion  to  God,  or  fuch  in» 
diilerency  of  mind  toward  hiiu,  aa  is  inconfillent  with  lo>c- 


20  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Parti, 

the  moral  liberty  which  is  any  wsys  efTentlal  to  rcr 
ward  or  piinifhment,  virtue  or  vice.  Whoever  act- 
eth  voluntarily,  acteth  in  the  view  of  motives  :  and 
in  the  volitions  of  agents  which  take  place  and  are  ex-r 
crted  i:i  the  veiw  of  motives,  is  all  the  influence  vrhich 
motives  have,  on  intelligent  minds.  lie  v/ho  exerteth 
volitions,  and  ci-icrcifeth  affections,  in  the  view  of  mo-^ 
tives,  a<[l:eth  like  a  rational,  intelligent,  moral  agent. 
He  inherits  all  tliat  moral  liberty  which  it  is  poilible 
for  a  creature  to  enjoy  •  and  all,  which  any  creature 
doth  or  can  improve. 

Liberty  and  agency^  as  it  appears  to  m,e  they  have 
often  been  made  ufe  of  in  difputes,  are  terms  of  fuch 
refinement  and  abf traction  as  to  be  incapable  of  any 
very  clear  explanation.  While  thefe  terms  lead  us  to 
an  inquiry  after  any  thing  different  from  what  we  all 
have  conlcioufnefs  of,  whenever  wc  exerciie  our  wills 
and  affeftions,  we  are  purfuing  a  fliadow  jnflcad  of  a 
fubftance  ;  there  being  no  liberty^  freedojn^  agency^  or 
power  ofwill^  befide  what  is  exercifed  in  voluntary, 
fpontaneous  exertion,  which  any  one  can  fenfibly  feel 
and  enjoy — M'hich  can  be  of  any  benefit  to  any  one,  or 
capable  of  improvement.  W'hen  we  look  for  that 
liberty  or  freedom  which  dignifieth  human  nature 
above  the  lower  creation,  we  are  to  fearch  for  it  only 
in  what  every  man  feels  when  he  exercifcth  will  and 
affecStion,"  or,  in  the  view  of  m^otives,  puts  forth  or  ex- 
erteth an  aft  of  choice.  This  is  v/hat  makes  a  free 
agent  :  thefe  are  the  exercifes  and  powers  which  con- 
ilitute  human  liberty — m.oral  freedom. 

Moral  liberty  effentially  confifleth  in  voluntary  ex- 
erciie. And  yet  when  I  fay  that  liberty  confifleth  in 
voluntary  exercife,  I  v/ould  not  be  underflood,  that 
liberty  and  volition  are  convertible  terms,  importing 
precifely  one  and  the  fame  thing.  But  my  meaning  is, 
that  in  every  volition  we  find  liberty,  true  moral  liber- 
ty, and  the  higheil  kind  of  it  that  ever  can  be  found  in 
a  moral  agent.  IMotion,  and  a  body  moving,  are  not 
precifely  one  and  the  fame  thing  :  yet  we  can  have  no 

idea 


Scil.l.  MORAL    AGENCY.  2| 

idea  of  the  former,  v/itliout  the  latter.  So  although 
liberty  and  volition  may  not  be  precilely  the  fame,  yet 
all  the  idea  we  have  of  liberty  is  to  be  found  in  volun- 
tary exertion.  Volition  may  more  properly  be  termed.^- 
c\.  J're.?  aclioji^  tlvin.  freedom  :  yet  to  obtain  an  idea  of 
liberty,  our  bed  way,  as  in  many  other  cafes,  is  not  to 
confider  tilings  abftraifl-ly,  but  to  turn  our  thoughts  to 
the  concrete  (volition)  ;  wherein  we  lliall  certainly 
(iifcover  the  thing  fought  for.  though  it  is  fo  difficult, 
if  not  impoffible,  to  feparate  the  abilra<£l  from  the  con- 
crete. 'To  he  free,  therefore,  2.ud  to  he  voluntary  in 
any  adlion  whatfoever,  either  internal  or  external,  I 
fuppofe  are  one  and  the  fame  thing. 

It  therefore  appears  that  the  queftion  fo  often  agita- 
ted, viz.  Whether  the  ff^ill  is  free  ?  is  utterly  unmean- 
ning  and  impertinent.  Whatever  is  inconfiftent  with 
the  freedom  of  the  human  v/ill,  is  equally  inconfiftent 
with  the  very  being  of  it  :  for  taking  away  its  freedom, 
is  defcroying  its  very  effence.  There  is  no  more  pro- 
priety in  afiiing  whether  the  /^ill  is  freef  than  whe- 
ther the  effential  properties  of  a  fubjeft  belong  to  it  ?  or 
whether  any  thing  is  made  up  of  its  conftituent  parts  ? 
It  may  as  well  be  allied,  \vh.e^\\eY  fire  is  hot,  or  water 
fluid  f  as  whether  the  Pi^'ill  i3>freef  and  yet  every  one 
knows  that  heat  and  fluidity  are  effential  properties  of 
fire  and  water  ;  the  ideas  of  thefe  qualities  being  ne- 
ceflarily  contained  in  the  explanation  of  the  terms.  In 
like  manner  is  freedom  eflential  to  the  humaji  M'ill  ; 
and  liberty  as  effential  a  property  of  our  voluntary  ex- 
ertions, as  heat  is  of  fire,  or  fluidity  of  water. 

Here  is  the  only  liberty,  agency  or  freedom,  of 
which  it  is  poffible  that  mankind  fhould  be  confcious 
and  percipient.  We  may  with  as  much  reafon  fup- 
pofe that  mankind  are  corifcious  and  percipient  of  that; 
which  is  the  ground  of  their  fir  ft  perception  and  confci- 
oufnefs  ;  as  to  fuppofe  that  they  are  confcious  of  any 
moral  liberty,  or  power  of  will,  antecedent  to,  and  the 
ground  of,  voluntary  exertion.  The  mind  is  confci- 
pus  of  nothing  otherwife  than  in  and  by  its  own  ex- 

tions. 


22  An    E  S  S  A  Y    on  Parti. 

ertions.  As  It  is  confcious  of  a  povv-er  of  thought  ard 
idea,  only  in  thinking  and  perceiving  ;  fo  it  is  confci- 
^  ous  of  a  power  ofwill^  only  in  the  exercijss  of  volition. 
That  the  mind  (hould  be  confcious  of  a  povjer  of  clioice 
which  is  diftingui (liable  from  'adual  choojing^  is  no  more 
conceivable,  than  that  v/e  fnould  be  confcious  of  a 
power  of  thinking  and  perceiving,  without,  at  the  fame 
time,  feelinp;  or  exercifuig  any  perception  or  thought. 

Minds  are  converfant  only  with  their   own  ideas  : 
they  perceive  and  are  immediately'^  confcious  of  nothing 
befide  their  o\vn  exercifes  and  ideas.      However   the 
mind  may  reajbn   and  infer  concerning   other  things, 
and  form  premifes,  and  make  concluiions,  with  a  great 
degree  of  juftice  and  precifion  ;    flill  thofe  things  of 
which  we  attain  the  knowledge  in  fuch  a  way   as  this, 
are  not   the  objediis   of  dire tt,   immediate  perception. 
If  liberty  is  what  vv-e  perceive  actually  to   exift  in  the 
mind,  it  can  certainly  be  perceived  no  otherwife  than 
in  its  exercife  :    jufl  as  a  power  of  choice  can  be  per- 
ceived only  in  actual  choofing.     But   liberty  exercifid 
mud  certainly  be  a  voluntary  exercife — an  exercife    of 
will.     And  what  liberty  or  freedom  any  one   can  per- 
ceive to  be  in  volimtary  exercife^   befide  what   is   itielf 
an  exertion  of  will,  and  is   ncceffarily  included  in  all 
our  voluntary  exertions-^    is  to  me  quite  inconceivable. 
It  therefore  foiloweth,    that  there   is  in  mankind  no 
confcioufnefs  of  liberty  or  freedom,  befide  the  confci- 
oufnefs  neceiTarily  contained   in  our  voluntary  exer- 
tions.    Confequently  it  is  prepofterous  and  unintelli- 
gible, to  talk  of  being  conjcious  of  any  power  of  will, 
diftinft  from  the  exercife  q1\n\\\.\    or,  of  a  power  of 
choofing,  diftind:  from  actual  choice.    Exercifes  of  vo- 
lition, and  making  aClual  choice^  are  fomething  of  which 
we  all  have  a  confcioufnefs  in  innumerable  inftances  ; 
and  herein  is  all  the  power  ofipill^  the  power  of  choice^ 
of  which  we  have  any  direcfl  and  immediate  percep- 
tion. 

If  mankind  have  any   confcioufnefs    or  immediate 
perception  of  any  power  of  will,  diflindt  from  what 

they 


Sea.  I.  MORAL    AGENCY.  23 

they  feel  in  the  a6lual  exercifes  of  volition — if  they 
are  confclous  of  any  power  of  a6lion,  diflinft  from  the 
confcioufnels  they  have  in  aftual  voluntary  exertion, 
and  previous  to  it  3  they  muft  nevertheleis  be  conlci- 
ous  of  this  power  as  being  in  exercije.  If  they  are  con- 
fclous of  this  power  of  will  and  aftion  as  i?!  adual  exer- 
cije y  this  is  in  no  meafure  different  from  bein,g  confcl- 
ous of  adual  choice — volimtary  exertion.  To  be  con- 
fcious  of  a  jwvoer  of  will  in  adual  exercije^  is  juft  the 
fame  as  to  be  conicious  of  an  exercife  of  will — adiual 
volition.     This  I  think  is  obvious. 

If  they  are  confcious  of  a  power  of  will  w^hich  is 
antecedent  to  exercife,  and  the  ground  of  it,  it  mufl  be  a 
power  wherein  men  are  involuntary  and  paffive  ;  it  be- 
ing a  power  refulting  from  the  immediate  efficiency  of 
God  as  its  caufe  ;  and  therefore  can,  with  no  propriety, 
on  any  principles,  be  X.QYx^^Afree.  It  is  objefted  againfl 
the  doftrine  of  an  infallible  connexion  in  things,  that 
it  is  inconfiflent  with  the  freedom  and  liberty  of  the 
will,  to  admit,  that  the  exercifes  of  it  arife  from  any 
extrinfic  influence  and  caufe.  But  no  one,  I  apprehend, 
will  think  of  afTertIng,  that  this  poicer  of  will  in  men, 
which  is  infilted  on  by  fome  as  the  next  and  immediate 
caule  of  voluntary  exercife,  doth  not  nrife  wholly  and 
entirely  from  fome  ^.v/ri;^//6" influence  and  caufe.  A- 
greeable  to  the  opinions  of  thofe,  therefore,  who  m.ake 
this.objet^fion,  it  is  impoflible  that  liberty  or  freedom 
fhould  confiH  in  f.icii  a  power.  For  in  this  povver, 
by  the  fuppofition,  mankind  are  /;/  every  fen] e  paftive. 
It  wa?  made — created  by  the  Deity,  without  any  agcn- 
c)'-,  inliucnce  or  choice  of  thcir's  :  and  now  it  is  made, 
it  is  perfecftly  involuntary  and  paffive.  It  is  therefore 
impoilible,  that  liberty  or  freedom  fnould  confifl  in  any 
fuch  power  as  is  previous  to  voluntary  exercife — menial 
exertion. 

I  the  rather  mention  thefe  things  to  take  off  the  force 
of  the  arguments  in  favor  of  fome  power  ofa«f}:iori  in 
men,  diftincT:  from  voluntary  exertion,  which  can  with 
any  fliew  of  reafon  be  confulcred  as  our  dignity  or  pri- 
vilege. 


44  An    essay    on  Parti. 

Vilege,  pretended  to  be  drawn  from  the  feelings  of  hu- 
man nature,  and  the  univerfal  fenfe  and  experience  of 
mankind.  And  if  the  obfervations  which  have  been 
mentioned  are  juft,  thiere  are,  in  faft,  no  fiich  feelinjrS 
as  are  urged,  in  human  p.ature  j  nor  is  it  the  univerfal 
fenfe  of  mankind,  that  human  nature  is  dignified  with 
any  fuch  powers  ;  or  that  it  doth  inherit  or  polfefs 
them . 

Spontaneous,  voluntary  exertion  is  fomething  of 
which  all  mankind  have  immediate  confcioufnefs  and 
perception*  Here  is  an  agency,  the  exiflence  and  re- 
ality of  which  may  be  fupported  and  proved  by  all  the 
feelings  of  human  nature,  and  the  univerfally  concur- 
ring teftimony  of  all  mankind.  Here  is  all  the  power 
which  is  neceffary  to  render  any  one  a  moral  agent, 
an  accountable  creature,  and  the  proper  fubjeft  of  re- 
ward or  punifhment,  praife  or  blame. 

But  it  will  probably  be  expe£ted,  that  fome  reafons 
£[iouldbe  offered  in  juftification  of  the  definition  which 
hath  been  given  o^ moral  agency  ;  and,  to  fhew  that  no 
power  in  ;;ze;z,  previous  to  voluntary  exertion,  and  the 
ground  thereof,  is  any  ways  eiTential  to  the  morality  of 
actions  ;  or  to  that  agency  which  is  necelTary  to  re- 
ward or  punifhment,  virtue  or  vice.  The  following 
reafons  appear  to  me  fufficient  to  juflify  the  definition. 

I.  That  men  are  the  proper  fubjefts  of  reward  and 
punifhment,  for  all  their  voluntary,  fpontaneous  exer- 
tions. Whatever  of  defert  there  may  be  in  other 
tilings,  it  is  yet  conceded  on  all  hands,  that  our  voliai- 
tary  exertions  have  moral  defert  in  them..  This  is  a  fort 
of  agency  which  is  the  objed:  of  command  and  prohibi- 
tion in  the  word  of  God.  Accordingly  we  find  that  the 
exercifes  of  affedlion,  voluntary  exertions,  are  fubjefted 
to  law,  and  are  the  direft  object  of  divine  precept. 
"  Thou  fhalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God,"  &c.  is  the  firfl 
and  great  commandmxCnt.  Nor  can  any  thing  juftjy 
be  confidered  as  having  the  nature  of  obedience  or  dif- 
obedience,  any  farther  than  it  partaketh  of  voluntary 
excrcije  and  affeCIion,     Merc  voluntary  exercifes,  of  a 

certain 


Sect.  I.  MOP.  AL    AGENCY.  is 

certain  kind,  are  accepted  as  obedience.  Thefe,  and 
tliefe  only,  are  our  conformity  to  the  divine  law.  And 
fo  much  do  all  obedience  and  difobedience  confifl  in 
the  exerciles  of  the  will,  fo  much  do  our  voluntary 
exertions  conftithte  the  very  effence  and  formal  nature 
of  virtue  and  vice,  that  no  man  will  ever  be,  either 
rewarded  or  punifhed,  for  any  thing  befide  his  exerciics 
of  affection — fpontaneous,  voluntary  exertions.  What- 
ever adlion  or  event  taketh  plate  without  any  concur- 
rence of  our  wills,  or  othcrwife  than  as  the  fruit  of 
our  voluntary  exertion,  and  v/hich  hath  nothing  of 
our  will  or  choice  in  it,  will  never  be  fet  to  our  ac- 
count for  adjufting  our  reward  or  punifhment. 

It  is  agreeable  to  the  cbmmon  ienfe  and  opinions  of 
men,  that  all  fpontaneous^  voluntary  exertions  carry  in 
them  defert  of  either  punifhment  or  reward.  It  is  a 
maxim  elfablifhed  by  the  univerfal  fenfe  of  mankind, 
that  the  excrcifes  of  our  affeftions  are,  in  their  very  na- 
ture, either  virtuous  or  vicious.*  And  fo  univerfally 
doth  a  fenfe  of  defert  on  this  account  prevail  among 
mankind,  that  in  order  to  determine  any  man's  char- 
after  and  defert,  we  always  accuilom  ourfelves  to  in- 
quire into  his  motives^  and  pae  temper^  dij'poritio'ri  or 
(iate  of  mind  from  whence  his  outward  aftions  and 
conducSfc  proceed.  Here,  all  acknowledge,  are  to  be 
found  moral  quality  and  defert.  In  t\\Q  exsrcifes  of  af- 
fe^iun  do  men  place  virtue,    or  vice. 

Tliefe  obfervations  are  abundantly  cqnfirmed  by 
the  Author  of  the  Examination  of  the  late  Prefidsnt 
Edrvards's  Inquiry  on  Freedom  of  fi^Hl.  He  confider- 
eth  all  'moral  good  and  evil  as  confi fling  in  the  dijpofition 
or  eflate  of  the  inind  or  will.  (p.  31.)  He  fays  (p^ 
96)  that  vje  apprdve  good  i?iteniions\  and  condemn  evil 
ones.,  in  oiirjelvss  'and  in  others.^  fo  far  asfiich  affeCiions 
can  he  knoivn.)   And  in  the  fame  place  he  reprefents  it, 

D  that 

*  Dr.  Taylor,  in  his  Scripture  noclrine  of  Original  Sin,  j;reatly  iiififictii  that 
all  fin  iieth  in  the  ch-iice  of  the  mind.  Thus  he  tells  lis  (p.  127.  edit,  i.}  that 
the  original  caufe  '»  of  lin  is  a  maa's  chor^Jing  to  follow  the  appetites  of  The  flelh  ;" 
that  "  fin  proceedeth  from  our  own  cko'ce,  as  it  neajfurlly  mult  ;"  (p.  13c)  that 
"  vice  is  alzvays  ttje  fali'ty  chr.ice  of  a  fe--fo>t's  otxin  luill,  other-u<'-ff  it  is  net  chi/te." 
(p.  190.)  And  he  tepit[Qinelh  ^»Ji,  or  ill e^u/ur  Jfjirf,  ?Lshcing  i'/rtjimhi\.  fp.  ;ij  ) 


■   V? 


26  An    E  S  S  A  V    ON  Partis 

that  whatever  the  outward  anions  of  men  in  fad  are,- 
they  are  judged  according  to  what  they  would  have 
done.  He  faith,  further,  that  though  natural  necejfity 
exercifeth  the  outward  aCl^  it  hinders  not  but  the  ejiaie 
of  the  will  J72ay  be  ri^ht  or  wrong.  The  juftfiefs  of 
thefe  obfervations  depends  entirely  upon  the  fuppofi- 
tion  that  virtue  and  vice  are  properly  and  direftly  pre- 
dicablje  of  the  exercifes  of  affeftion — free,  fpontane- 
ous,  voluntary  exertions.  If,  in  the  exercifes  of  fuch 
afteftions  limply,  there  is  nothing  virtuous  or  vicious, 
commendable  or  criminal  ;  then  furely  weare  to  look 
farther  back  than  to  the  intentions  of  men,  or  the  fate 
of  their  wills ^  for  virtue  and  vice. 

II.  There  is  nothing  morally  beautiful  or  deformed 
in  any  thing  befide  the  exercifes  of  afFeftion — fponta- 
neous,  voluntary  exertion.  Where  there  is  no  affec- 
tion of  any  kind,-  there  is  nothing  which  hearcth  any 
refemblance  of  the  moral  character  of  the  Deity  ;  nor^ 
any  thing  oppofite  to  it.  Where  there  are  no  excer- 
cifes  of  affeftion,  it  is  impoffible  that  there  fhould  he 
any  degree  of  obedience  to  that  great  command  of 
Love,  wherein  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  law:  and,  I 
may  add,  where  there  is  no  affection,  as  little  is  there: 
of  oppofition  to  it.  If  the  great  and  only  moral  beauty 
in  the  univerfe  confifteth  in  love^  in  its  feveral  and  dif- 
ferent exercifes  and  modifications  (all  which  confift 
in  certain  poiitive  exercifes  of  affection)  it  is  in  vain 
to  look  for  moral  beauty^  where  there  is  an  entire  want 
and  negation  of  all  mental,  voluntary  affeftion  :  and 
our  expecHiations  of  finding  any  moral  turpitude  or  de- 
formity, will  be  as  utterly  fruitlefs,  if  we  fearch  for  it 
in  fomething  which  is  wholly  deftitute  of  all  mental 
exercife  and  affection.  We  may  as  well  look  for  mo- 
ral beauty  in  the  order,  proportion  and  harmony  of 
the  natural  fyilem,'  or  in  the  colours  of  the  rainbow, 
as  in  any  thing  v^hatfoever,  which  is  wholly  void  of 
mental  exercife  and  affeftion.  And  we  may  as  ration- 
ally predicate  moral  turpitude  and  deformity  of  bar- 
ren deferts   and  ragged  mountains,    as  of  any  thing 

which 


Sea.  I  MORAL   AGENCY,  27 

\vhich  is  utterly  deftitute  of  all  voluntary  rxIFe^lion  and 
exertion.  There  is  nothin^e,  either  in  any  beauty,  or 
deformity,  v/hich  can  be  found  in  ajiy  thing  that  is 
wholly  without  mental  exercife  and  afledion,  that  is 
any  way  dillinguilhable  from  the  beauty  and  deformity 
of  natural  things  ;  which  none  pretend  to  be  either 
virtuous  or  vicious.  And  if  it  is  indeed  fo  that  there 
is  no  moral  beauty  or  deformity  in  any  thing  befide  the 
exercifes  of  aifefl:ion-r-free,  voluntary  exertion  ;  in 
fuch  exertion,  doubtlefs,  is  to  be  found  that  agency 
which  diftinguifheth  moral  beings,  and  is  tlie  proper 
ground  of  our  accountablenefs  to  God. 

III.  The  remorfe  of  confcience  which  wicked  men 
feel,  is  upon  no  other  ground  than  that  of  tlie  fuppofed 
evil  and  turpitude  of  exercifes  of  affection — voluntary, 
ipontaneous  exertion  :  This,  therefore,  is  an  argument 
that  moral  agency  confifletli  in  lucli  aiFeclions  and  exer- 
tions. Wiien  wc  do  any  outward  a^lion  for  which  we 
condemn  ourfelves,  our  remorfe  always  terminates  up- 
on the  aife<^ion  from  whence  it  proceeded,  and  which 
was  the  caufe  of  it  : — All  the  ground  of  forrow  is, 
that  we  exercifed  and  indulged  fuch  affedions  and  incli- 
nations. We  feel  ourfelves  jnftly  condemned  for  any 
v/icked  aftion,  upon  the  confideration  that  our  hearts 
ivcre  in  the  things  and  Ave  did  it  voluntaril)/  and  freely. 
No  one  pretends  to  look  any  farther  back  than  to  the 
voluntary  defign  and.  intention^  for  a  ground  of  praife  or 
blame.  An  awakened  confcience  never  referreth  us 
farther  back  than  to  the  ajfe6ion — the  intention  of  the 
mind.  And  \^  had  defign  and  intention  can  be  faftened 
upon  us,  all  our  pleas  fail,  and  our  excufcs  vanilh,  and 
our  own  confciences  condemn  us. 

In  thefe  obfervations  I  have  the  Ex-^— r's  concur- 
rence, in  the  following  words.  He  faith,  (p.  97)  IV e 
are  condemned  or  approved  of  ourj elves  for  a  'willing  or 
unwilling  mind  ;  and  have  a  natural  apprehenfion  that 
the  judgment  of  God  will  feco72d  our  own — A  natural  ap- 
prehenfion, however,  wliich,  I  muft  obferve,  is  very 
ill  founded,  unlefs  there  is  fomelhing  worthy  of  being 

D  z  approved 


28  An    E  S  S  A  Y    on  Parti, 

approved  cr  condemned  in  the  exercifes  of  the  will^  or 
in  voluntary  exertions.  Our  Author,  I  am  fenfible, 
prefently  adds,  that  '*•  the  inward  perturbation  vicious 
'^  men  feel,  proceeds  from  a  conviction  that  they  might 
''  have  cultivated  another  frame  of  heart  J^  But  if  by 
^  -  cultivating  another  fraiyie  of  heart ^^^  he  intends  any 
thing  diftincl  from  voluntary  exertion — any  thing. 
ii:ithoui  volition  and  v^ithout  defign  ;  the  afTertion  is  as 
irreconcilable  v,'ith  his  own  previous  obfervation,  as 
with  the  argument  nov/  under  confidcration.  If  by 
cultivating  another  frame  of  heart  our  Author  intends 
to  denote  any  exercije  of  mind  or  hearty  it  muft  unquef- 
t\on2.h\Y  ht  voluntary :  for  no  other  exercife,  particu- 
larly on  his  principles.,  can  be  a  reafonabie  ground  of 
any  inward  perturbation  at  all.  And  if  this  exprefiion 
is  defigned  to.  convey  the  idea,  of  any  exercije  of 
will.,  or  voluntary  exertion.,  inilead  of  weakening,  it 
ftrengtheneth  and  confirmeth  the  argument  under  con- 
ilderation.  But  if  the  Ex — r,  by  this  expreffion,  in- 
tends any  thing  which  is  wholly  involuntary  and  un- 
clefigning  ;  it  is  quite  unjuft  to  fpeak  of  intentions  as 
being  either  good,  or  evil  ;  or,  to  lead  his  readers  to 
apprehend  that  there  is  any  thing  which  ought  to  be, 
cither  approved  or  condemned^  in  willingnejs  or  unwil- 
lingne/s  of  m'lud. 

IV.  Another  argument  in  favor  of  the  definition 
which  hath  already  been  given  of  moral  agency,  is, 
that  mankind  are  agents  in  nothing  but  Jpontaneous^ 
voluntary  exertions.  Wliatever  event  comes  into  ex- 
iflence,  in  which  we  have  no  voluntary  intention  and 
dehgn  ;  whatever  effeS:  is  brought  to  pafs,  without 
any  concurrence  of  our  wills  ;  is  never  deemed  our 
cMion  :  vv^e  are  not  anfwerable  for  it.  If  we  can  plead 
that  we  were  not  agents  in  any  affair  ;  that  any  event, 
however  difagreeable,  hath  taken  place  and  exifted 
otherwife  than  as  the  fruit  of  our  voluntary  exertion., 
and  without  the  concurrence  of  our  wills  ;  this  will 
ever  be  confidered  as  fufficient  to  excufe  and  acquit  us 
from,  any  blame  in  the  cafe  ;  and  for  this  very  obvi- 
ous 


6*ea.l.  MORAL    AGENCY.  2^. 

ous  reafon,  viz.  that  nothing  but  our  own  adions — 
Ibmething  wherein  we  exerted  ourjelves^  and  were 
agents— C2in^  with  any  appearance  of  equity  and  jullice, 
be  charo;ed  to  our  account. 

Let  the  queftion  be  as  it  will  refpefting  the  powers 
of  human  nature  ;  whether  the  volitions  of  agents  are 
J  elf-originated  ;  or,  whether  they  derive  from  fome 
foreign,  extrinfic  caufe  ;  flill  nothing  but  the  excrcij'e 
of  thefe  powers  in  voluntary  exertions  can,  with  any 
propriety,  be  thought  to  incur  ccnfure,  or  merit  com- 
mendation. Whatever  are  the  powers  of  mankind, 
there  is  nothing  more  to  be  found  in  the  exercife  of 
thcfe  powers,  than  voluntary^  Jpontaneoiis  exertion. — 
Where  we  behold  voluntary  exertion,  we  behold 
every  thing  that  can  be  found  in  the  exercife  of  all 
thofe  faculties  and  powers,  for  which  the  moft  ftrenu- 
ous  advocate  for  the  powers  and  dignity  of  human  na- 
ture ever  pleadeth.  All  the  real  benefit  and  privilege 
of  any  liberty  that  is  ever  infifted  on  as  being  effential 
to  moral  agency,  is  to  be  found  in  voluntary  exertion. 
No  notion  o.f  freedom,  that  has  ever  been  efpoufed 
and  advanced,  dignifieth  mankind  above  this. 

If  it  is  true,  as  our  Author  urgeth,  (p.  109)  and  as 
is  univerfaily  infifted  on  by  the  advocates  for  a  power 
of  felf-determination  in  men,  that  a  freedojii  to  either 
fide  is  eifential  to  moral  liberty,  and  confiftent  with 
all  principles  of  moral  aftion,  and  all  doftrine  of  any 
influence  of  motives  upon  the  minds  of  men,  which  is 
capable  of  being  vindicated  and  explained;  yet  this 
freedom  to  either  fide  is  exercifed  only  in  the  mind's 
freely  determining  itfelf  to  one  fide^  rather  than  the 
other.  But  fuch  a  free  determination  of  mind  to  one 
fide,  rather  than  the  other,  is  nothing  m^ore  than  the 
mind's  preferring  the  one  to  the  other,  by  a  free, 
'Voluntary  determination.  So  that,  upon  the  whole, 
nothing  is  found  in  the  mind  more  than  voluntary ^Jpon- 
taneous  exertion.  The  higheft  powers  of  human  na- 
ture, threrefore,  that  are  ever  boafted  of,  when  they 
come  to  be  applied  to  ufe,  and  put  forth  into  exercife, 

amount 


3©  AnESSAYon  '      .    Part  I, 

amount  to  nothing  more  than  an  ad  of  choice  or  pre-r 
feretice — -free^  voluntary^  Jpontaneoiu  exertion.  Even 
the  doftrine  of  internal  liberty^  which  the  Ex — r  fo 
llrenuoufly  urgeth  in  oppofition  (as  he  imagines)  to 
Mr.  Edwards^  extendeth  to  nothing  farther  than  a 
choice,  preference,  or  prepcnderation  of  mind  to- 
wards fome  certain  objefts  rather  than  others  ;  the 
whole  of  its  benefit  and  exercife  being  comprehended 
in  voluntary,  fpontaneous  exertion. 

V.  In  judging  of  human  actions,  and  determining 
the  nature  and  quality  of  them,  mankind  never  carry 
their  inquiries  farther  back  than  to  the  flate,  temper 
or  difpofition  of  the  mind  from  whence  the  aiStions  of 
men  arife.  When  we  have  obtained  a  view  of  the 
diipofition,  and  are  fatisfied  what  was  the  internal 
ilate  of  the  mind — the  voluntary  exercife,  in  any  out- 
ward a<f^ion  ;  we  then  immediately  form  our  judg- 
ment and  opinion,  without  once  looking  for  the  caufe 
of  that  particular  ftate  of  mind,  or  voluntary  exertion. 
A  view  or  conviftion  of  what  the  heart  or  the  affeCtion 
really  is,  or  of  what  is  indeed  the  very  choice  of  the  niind^ 
always  terminates  the  inquiry,  and  fixeth  the  judgment 
in  regard  to  the  beauty  or  deformity  of  the  aftion. 
Upon  this  ground  alone  it  is  that  we  form  our  judg- 
ment of  the  charafters  of  men,  or  any  moral  beings  ; 
determining  and  judging  them  to  be  either  good,  or 
bad,  only  by  their  volitions.,  and  according  to  tlie  na- 
ture of  them.  And  if  thefe  obfervations  are  juft  (as 
every  one  I  believe  will  find,  upon  a  little  reflexion 
upon  the  exercifes  of  his  own  mind  in  judging  of  aftions 
and  characters  of  men)  it  certainly  followeth  from 
them,  that  the  reafon  and  common  fenfe  of  mankind 
place  the  exercife  of  that  liberty  which  is  effential  to 
the  morality  of  actions  and  charafters,  in  the  exercifes 
of  the  will — in  voluntary  exertion.  And  certainly  no 
liberty  can  be  of  any  benefit,  otherwife  than  in  ufe  and 
exercife  j  which  confideration  rendereth.the  inquiry 
after  thefiibflratum  of  liberty,  in  fome  myflerious,  in- 
comprehenfible  ppwer  of  felf-determination,  quite  nu- 
gatory and  fruitlefs.  Should 


Sea. I.  MOPvAL    AGENCY.  51 

Should  it  be  objefted,  here,  that  we  cannot  rcafon- 
ably  conclude  the  character  of  any  one  to  be  morally 
bad,  from  the  exercijes  of  his  ivill^  otherwife  than  on 
the  fuppoHtion  of  the  exljlence  of  fome  powers  in  hu- 
man nature  previous  to  aftual  choice  and  volition  ;  or, 
fome  fufficiency  or  ability  in  men  to  originate  choice, 
and  produce  volition  ;  and,  therefore,  that  the  crim- 
inality of  volitions  muft  be  ultimately  refolved  into 
the  ftate  of  the  mind,  or  man,  which  was  its  proper  and 
immediate  caufe  ;  I  fay,  fhould  fuch  an  objeftion  as 
this  be  urged  againfl  the  argument  under  confidera- 
tion,  I  would  reply, 

I.  That  this  objeftion  entirely  divefteth  volitions 
of  all  moral  quality  whatfoever,  and  placeth  virtue 
and  vice  wholly  in  the  caufe  olx^sxt  voluntary  exercifes 
of  our  minds.  It  iirips  the  exercifes  of  men's  wills  of 
moral  quality  ;  as  much  as  tlie  confideration  of  their  be- 
ing the  mere  pailive  effects  o^ voluntary  exertions^  doth 
outward  aClions .  According  to  this  objection,  it  is  as 
impertinent  to  talk  of  the  moral  deformity  and  turpi- 
tude of  i;6»//V/3?7-r,  any  otherwife  than  in  a  relative,  indi- 
re6t  view,  as  it  is  to  fpeak  of  the  moral  evil  o^  outward 
adions^  otherwife  than  in  reference  to  internal^  volun-' 
tary  exercifes  as  their  caufe  :  a  manner  and  figure  of 
ipecch,  on  this  fuppofition,  as  far-fetched  and  impro- 
per, as  that  would  be  which  fhould  attribute  fomething 
inorally  wrong  to  the  motion  of  a  ball,  ftruck  by  a  bat 
in  the  hand  of  a  voluntary  agent.  If  there  is  any  weight 
is  this  objed:ion,  whenever  we  fpeak  of  the  moral  evil 
(6^  volitions ^  we  muft  be  underftood,  if  we  wc^ild  be 
thought  to  talk  witli  propriety  and  good  fenfe,  to  pre- 
dicate fomething  morally  bad  of  volitions,  only  indi- 
reClly  and  figuratively^  and  in  a  view  of  their  ftanding 
in  fome  particular  relation  to  fomething  which  is 
wholly  involuntary  and  undeiigning.  And  if  moral 
evil  is  to  be  fought  in  any  tiling  wholly  involuntary" 
and  undefigning,  it  will  probably  be  difiicult  to  give  a 
i*eafon  why  it  fhould  be  fought,  rather  in  the  caufe 
than  in  the  ejfeCi  of  volition — -in  fomething  vv'hich  go- 

eth 


3-2  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Fart  L 

eth  before  it,   rather  than  in  what  is  confequent  upon 
it. 

And  befides,  if  the  moral  evil  of  volitions  (if  in-' 
deed,  on  this  fuppofition,  there  is  any  propriety  in 
Ipeaking  oi  voUtlons  as  being  morally  evil)  coniilleth 
in  their  caufe,  viz.  the  fiat  t^  of  the  rtiind^  or  dijpofitioii 
of  the  man  (if  the  r.^z/z/t?  of  voluntary  exertion  may  be 
fb  ftyled)  by  aparity  of  reafon  this  ftate  of  the  Tnind^ 
this  difpofition  of  the  7nan — being  not  itielf  uncreated, 
being  not  felf-originated — can,  alfo,  be  coniidered  as 
morally  evil  and  bad,  only  indire£lly  and  figuratively, 
and  as  related  to  its  caufe.  If  volitions  may  be  ex- 
culed  from  blame  on  account  of  their  relation  to  fome 
canje^  the  next  and  immediate  caufe  of  volitions  (fup- 
pofed  to  be  the  particular  ftate  of  the  mind^  or  7nnn) 
may  likewife  Hand  excufed  upon  a  like  plea  of  relation 
to  fome  ftill  more  diftant  caufe  ;  and  fo  on,  until  we 
get  back  to  a  caufe  which  is  firil  and  original,  Handing 
itfelf  in  no  relation  to  any  other  antecedent  or  prior 
caufe. 

But  if  things  which  we  have  accuflomed  ourfelves 
to  term  morally  evil  and  bad,  are  fo  only  on  account 
of  their  relation  to  fomething  elfe  which  is  their  caufe  ; 
t\\h  firfi^  this  original  caufe,  (landing  in  no  fuch  rela- 
tion to  any  thing  elfe  whatfoever,  cannot,  with  the 
lead  reafon  or  propriety,  have  7?ioral  evil  predicated  of 
it.  How  fubtil  and  ingenious  are  the  devices  of  men, 
to  (hift  off  all  blame  from  themfelves,  and  eafe  their 
minds  of  thofe  dark  forebodings,  and  gloomy  appre- 
henfior:s,  which  could  not  but  poffefs  and  fill  their 
minds,  if  they  gave  full  fcope  to  reafon^  and  fuffered 
confcience  to  do  its  office  !  I  am  humbly  of  opinion, 
that  fuch  a  way  of  reprefenting  the  matter — fucli 
groundiefs  and  fubtil  refinements — have  a  natural  tend- 
ency to  erafe  from  the  minds  of  men,  all  fenfe  of  moral 
defert,  and  at  once  fet  mankind  loofe  from  all  the  ties 
of  confcience,  and  the  reflraints  ariling  from  the  natu- 
ral apprehendons  which  poffefs  us  of  our  being  ac- 
countable creatures,  rewardable  or  punifhable  for 
our  actions.     And  yet,  2.  To 


^crA.  moral  AG  Jen  gy.  33 

2 .  To  fuppofe  the  evil  of  voluntary  exertions  arifeth 
from  the  badjiefs  of  the  dijpo/itioiz^  or  ft  ate  of  the  man\, 
is  to  fuppofe  that  there  is  moral  evil  in  the  dijpofition 
itfelfy  or  ftate  of  the  mind^  out  of  which  voluntary  exer- 
tions arife  ;  and  from  this  fuppofition  taketh  all  its 
Itrength.  But  this  is  a  fuppofition,  we  may  at  once 
fee,  importing  that  the  moral  evil  of  any  thing  confilt- 
eth  in  the  nature  of  it,  not  in  its  cauje : — a  fentlment 
very  obnoxious  to  Gentlemen  who  plead  (however 
inconftilrent  with  themfclves  even  in  this  very  article) 
that  afts  of  the  will  are  Jelf-ori^inated — not  arifmg 
from  a77y  foreign,  extrinfic  caufe.  After  what  the 
Ex — r  hath  faid  concerning  this  fentiment,*  we  may 
julfly  conclude  that  he  will  not  urge  an  objc<^ion 
which  is  incumbered  with  it.  But  this  is  not  the  only 
difficulty  attending  the  objetition  under  confideration, 
in  this  particular  form  of  it  :     For^ 

3.  To  fuppofe  that  the  moral  evil  and  fmfulnefs  of 
volitions  confilleth  in  the  particular  ftate  or  difpohtioii 
of  the  mind  or  man  out  of  which  they  arofe,  is  an  ar- 
gument founded  wholly  upon  the  fuppofition  of  a  con- 
nexion of  a6ls  of  the  will,  with  fome  antecedent  caufe  ; 
and  deriveth  all  it:,  ftrength  from  it.  To  refolve  the 
moral  evil  of  volition  into  thtfiate  of  the  mind  from 
which  it  arifeth.  Or  the  dijpofi'ion  of  the  man  whofe 
volitions  they  are  (confidcring  dfpofition  as  being 
fomething  perfedly  diftinft  from  voluntary  exertion, 
and  the  pronnd  of  it)  entirely  ciLablilhetti  the  doctrine 
of  connexion  between  the  volitions  of  agents  and  fome 
antecedent  caufe  ;  yea,  and  t'lat  fuch  an  one  as  is  w^hol- 
iy  extrinfic  of  volitions  : — -an  opinion  perfc<rLly  incon- 
fiftent  with  all  ideas  of  a  power  of  felf-detcrmination 
in  the  will,  or  felf-origination  of  volition* 

If  there  is  7io  connexion  betv/een  the  volitions  of 
agents,  and  any  antecedent  flate  of  the  raind,  or  man, 
it  is  utterly  unreafonable  to  charge  their  iniquity  an.l 
depravity  to  the  account  of  fitch  a  caufe*  Nor,  in- 
deed, is  it  reafonable  to  charge  the  fmfulnefs  of  voli- 
tions to  any  caufe  v.'hatfoevcr.      'i  he  fiiifuliicfs  of  a. 

E  ca:nr 


54  .       An    E  S  S  A  Y.   on  Part  f. 

cniife  is  one  linfulnefs  ;  the  finfulnefs  of  its  effed^ 
another.  If  the  volitions  of  agents  are  linful,  their  lin- 
fuhiefs  lies  in  themfelves,  and  not  in  fomething  elfe. 
It  is  perfeftly  unintelligible,  to  talk  of  the  finfulnefs  of 
any  thing,  as  being  in  fo77iethhig  elfe  befide  the  thing- 
deemed  fmful.  So  that  if  the  caufe  of  finful  volitions 
is  alfo  fnifal  ;  the  volitions  themfelves,  likewife,  are 
fo  :  and,  confequently,  there  is  moral  agency  in  voli- 
tions, or  voluntary  exertions.  If  moral  agency  or  lib- 
erty is  effential  to. the  accountablenefs  of  creatures, 
and  their  being  the  proper  fubjcds  of  reward  or  pun- 
ifiiment,  praife  or  blame  ;  if  there  is  no  connexion  be- 
tween the  volitions  of  agents  and  a^iy  antecedent  caiije^ 
in  determining  the  deformity  and  moral  turpitude  of 
adions  ;  we  of  confequence  have  nothing  to  inquire 
into,  befidc  the  nature  of  voluntary  exertions.  There 
is  nothing  which  can,  with  any  propriety,  be  termed 
either  a  good  or  a  bad  ftate  of  mind,  in  a  moral  fenfc, 
befide  volition,  or  voluntary  exertion. 

If  there  is  a  connexion  between  antecedent  ftate  of 
mind,  and  voluntary  exertions  ;  this  implieth  all  the 
necellity  which  that  great  Author,  upon  whom  the 
Ex — r  is  animadverting,  ever  urgeth.  This  implieth 
a  neceffity  as  inconfiftent  with  the  Ex — r's  idea  of  lib- 
erty, as  the  moft  obnoxious  fentiment  of  Hobbs, 
Spinoza,  or  the  late  Mr.  Jonathan  Edwards. 
And  to  concede  any  fuch  connexion,  is  utterly  incon- 
fiftent with  all  ideas  of  that  felf-origination  of  motion 
and  volition,  which  our  Author  confidereth  as  being 
eflential  to  accountablenefs  and  liberty. 

Thefe  obfervatioris,  if  they  are  juft,  do  certainly 
make  it  appear,  that  all  the  ideas  we  can  have  of  moral 
deformity  and  turpitude,  are  to  be  found  in  fpontanc- 
ons,  voluntary  exertion  ;  whatever  we  may  talk,  of 
depravity  and  corruption,  as  confifting  in  the  caufe  of 
human  volitions — in  fomething  which  is  involuntary 
and  without  defign.  This,  therefore,  is  a  ftrong  ar- 
gument to  the  prefent  point,  viz.  that  moral  agency 
confifteth  in  voluntary  exertions. 

VI.     If 


Sea,  L  M  O  R  A  L    A  G  E  N  C  Y.  ^y 

VI.  If  moral  agency  doth  not  confift  in  fpontaneoiis, 
voluntary  exertion  ;  it  muft,  of  coiirle,  coniift  in 
foinething  which  is  wholly  without  volition  and  with- 
out deiign.  No  medium  can  be  chofen  betwixt  volun- 
tary and  involuntary^  which  can  polFibly  aiufi:  us  in  ex-^ 
ploring  tiie  nature  of  that  agency  v.'hich  is  eiTential  to 
virtue  and  vice,  praife  and  blame.  There  is  nothing 
we  can  behold,  or  any  ways  apprehend,  which  is  nei- 
ther voluntary  nor  involuntary,  but  holding  a  medium 
between  them.  Nothing,  indeed,  can  be  an  objed:  of 
human  apprehenfion  or  conception,  which  doth  not  fail 
under  either  the  one  or  the  other  of  thefe  predica- 
ments. Every  effeft,  every  object  which  we  behold, 
or  of  which  we  can  form  any  manner  of  idea  or  con- 
ception, is  either  voluntary  or  the  contrary. 

For  any  one  to  urge,  that  moral  agenc)?-  coniifleth  in 
any  thing  which  is  involuntaiy-^-whoWy  with6ut  voli- 
tion and  delign— is  inconfiflent  with  all  the  ideas  of 
Jiberty  which  Gentlemen  who  are  advocates  for  a 
power  of  felf-determination  in  men  entertain,  as  well 
as  with  reafbn  and  common  fenfe.  This  opinion, 
would  place  liberty^  or  moral  aiyency^  in  tliat  which  is 
no  a6Hon  at  all  ;  it  would  predicate  moral  quality^  of 
mere,  neceiTary,  involuntary  effefts. 

If  it  fliould  be  urged,  that  moral  agency  confifleth 
partly  in  voluntary  exertion,  and  partly  in  fomething 
which  is  involuntary  ;  this  would  as  truly,  in  a  degree, 
contradict  the  natural,  plain  didiatcs  of  reafonand  com- 
mon fenfe,  as  the  fuppofition  that  it  confiileth  in  forne-' 
thing  which  is  ivholl]/  involLmtar)^  and  without  dcfiga  : 
for  if  virtue  and  vice  maybe  predicated  in  any  dep-ree 
of  that  which  is  involuntary^  the  utter,  entire  involun- 
tarinefs  and  undefigning  nature  of  any  thing  will  be 
no  proof  that  it  is  Vv'ilhout  moral  quality,  virtue  or 
vice. 

It  therefore  unquefi"idn ably  appearetli,  that  all  that 
moral  agency  which  renders  us  ft  fubjeCts  of  reward  or- 
punifiiment,  praife  or  blame,  confideth  lufpontansoiis^ 
voluntary  exertion.     "VVc   can    give  no    defcription  of 

E   2  any 


36  An    essay    on  Parti, 

any  thing  bcfide  this,  which  will  comport  with  the 
common  ideas  and  apprehenfions  of  men,  concerning 
the  nature  of  virtue  and  vice  ;  and  I  may  add,  can. 
forjn  no  idea  o^jnoral  adion  different  from  this.  In 
voluntary  exertions  are  contained  all  the  ideas  of  any 
liberty  which  is  effential  to  our  being  accountable  crea- 
tures— the  proper  fubjefts  of  reward  or  punifhment, 
praife  or  blame.  So  unnecefiary  is  it  to  look  beyond 
voluntary  exertion  for  that  liberty  which  is  effential 
to  the  morality  of  actions,  that  it  is  quite  inconfiftent 
with  it.  Nothing  which  is  involuntary,  hath  any 
degree  of  liberty  or  moral  agency  in  it. 

But  in  fuch  liberty,  fuch  an  agency,  as  'this,  the 
minds,  the  hearts,  of  men  cheerfully  and  univerfally 
acquiefce.  It  is  a  diftate  of  the  reafon  and  the  com- 
mon fenfe  of  men,  that  fuch  an  agency  as  this  renders 
men  the  fit  fubjedls  of  puniflimcnt  or  rev/ard.  Upon 
this  ground  it  is  thought  "we  are  condemned  or  ap- 
*'- proved  of  ourfelves,  for  a  ivilling  or  an  ufiivilling 
*'  77iind  ;  and  have  a  natural  apprchenfion,  that  the 
"judgment  of  God  will  fecond  our  own."  And  when 
our  Author  Ipeaks  of  the  cultivation  of  the  frame  of  the 
heart  as  being  fomething  morally  good  or  evil,  he  can- 
not, I  think,  defign  to  convey  an  idea,  by  the  expreffion, 
of  any  thing  diilinguifhable  from  voluntary  oertior. — 
any  thing  which  is  involuntary,  and  in  that  fcnle  re- 
cellary. 

If  any  one,  therefore, -inquireth,  Wherein  confifis 
that  liberty  which  is  effential  to  moral  agency,  virtue 
and  vice  ?— it  muft  be  replied,  Infpontaneous^  volun- 
tary exertion,  Unlefs  the  term  liberty  is  ufed  in  a 
fenfe  fo  abfl:ra(2:ed  and  refined  as  to  be  incapable  of 
explanation,  this  anfwer  muft  certainly  be  fatisfaftory. 
In  what  is  neceffarily  involved  in  the  idea  of  our  vo- 
luntary exertions,  we  find  every  thing  that  is  effential 
to  virtue  and  vice.  And  whenever  we  behold  fuch 
agency  as  this,  we  do  neceffarily,  and  without  reafon- 
ing  and  refieftion,  in  a  moral  view,  approve  or  difap- 
prove  of  it  :  nor  doth  any  thing  elfe  ever  gain  our  ef- 
teem,  or  incur  our  difapprobation.  I 


5e(a.  I.  MORAL    AGENCY.  57 

I  am  fenfible,  that  power  of  ivill^  power  of  choice^ 
pivjer  of  adion^  Sec.  are  expreffions  in  common  nfe 
among  mankind  ;  and  muft  therefore  be  luppofcd  to 
have  a  meanings  and  contain  fome  idea  in  them.  We 
often  hear  men  talk  of  a  power  of  aCUon  as  being  ne- 
cefTary  to  moral  agency  ;  as  it  certainly  is  :  but  the 
word  Power  is  of  doubtful,  uncertain  fignification,  in 
this  application  of  it.  It  will  therefore  be  neceffary 
particularly  to  inquire  into  the  nature  of  Power,  and 
(if  we  can)  afcertain  the  bounds,  and  defcribe  the 
meaning,  of  it.  This  fliaU  be  the  bufniefs  of  the  ne:>:t 
fedlion. 

X 

Sect.    IL 

Of  P  0  IV  E  R. 

NQUIRIES  into  the  nature  of  liberty  and  agency, 
__  it  appears  to  me,  have  been  greatly  embarrafTed 
and  perplexed  by  the  vague  and  indeterminate  fenfe  in 
which  the  word  Power  hath  been  ufed  in  fuch  like 
difputes.  It  feems  to  be  often  ufed  to  denote  fome 
privilege — fome  fufficiency  there  is  in  men  for  fome  e- 
vent,  over  and  above  any  thing  of  v/hich  we  are  con- 
fcious  in  mere  voluntary  exertion.  Thus  a  power  of 
thinking — of  underftauding — of  will — feemeth,  many 
times,  to  be  confidered  as  fome  power ^  opportunity^  or 
fu^ciency^  there  is  in  men,  to  begin  or  produce  tiiought, 
underftauding  or  volition  ,• — a  power^  confcquently, 
which  is  without  thought,  without  underftanding,  and 
without  will — a  power  ftripped  naked,  and  diverted  of 
every  thing  whereby  it  can  ever  pofTibly  be  known, 
diftinguifhed,  or  enjoyed.  Even  the  accurate  Pvlr. 
Locke  fpeaketh  of  a  power  to  begin  aaions  of  the  inindy 
by  a  preference  of  the  mind.  (^See  Hum.  Und.  Vol.  I. 
Chap.  21.  Sec.  5.]  As  if  the  atlion  and  preference  of 
the  mind  were  fo  different  from  each  other,  as  that 
they  might  properly  be  treated  of,  as  cau(e  and  effeCi  ! 

Or. 


38  An-    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  L 

Or,  as  if  the  mind  was  not  always  in  adion^  when  it 
prefers  any  thing  ! 

The  meaning  of  the  word  Power,  as  a}5plied  both  to 
natural  and  moral  things,  reqiiireth  careful  explana- 
tion. I  fliall  examine  the  term,  in  the  preient  fedtion, 
with  care  and  flriftnefs  ;  endeavoring,  as  far  as  I  am 
able,  to  clear  the  fubjeft  of  the  difficulties  with  which 
it  hath  ufually  been  perplexed.  I  beg  the  Reader's 
careful  and  candid  attention  to  the  following  obferva' 
tions  on  the  fubjeft. 

I.  The  word  Power,  as  applied  to  natural,  inani- 
mate things,  I  believe,  in  common  ufe,  intcndeth  and 
implieth  nothing  more  than  a  fitnefs  or  capacity  for  be- 
ing the  fuhjed  offome  certain  effeds^  from  external  in- 
jiuence.  Thus  there  is  a  power  of  fertility^  or  of  beijig 
rendered  fruitful^  in  the  earth  ;  of  vegetation^  in  plants 
and  herbs  ;  and,  of  refifiance^  elajlicity  and  motion^  in 
bodies.  And  all  that  we  can  confiftently  mean,  by 
fuch  like  expreffions,  is,  that  the  earth,  and  different 
bodies  upon  it,  are  fubjed:  to  certain  particular  altera- 
tions and  changes,  from  fome  certain  kinds  of  influence 
and  operation  upon  them.  Where  we  behold,  in  na- 
tural bodies,  certain  vifible,  difcernible  effefts  arife 
from  the  application  or  influence  of  fome  external 
caufe  ;  there  we  accuftom  ourfelves  to  fpeak  of  bodies 
as  having,  or  being  endued  with,  certain  poTuers. 
This  fufceptiblenefs  in  bodies,  of  certain,  particular 
kinds  of  influence  ;  or,  a  fitnefs  and  adaptednefs  in 
them,  to  be  the  fabjefts  of  certain  efFe(Si:s  ;  wc  ufually 
exprefs  by  the  term  Power.  Thus  we  find,  by  expe- 
rience, that  the  air,  under  certain  given  circumflances, 
is  expanded  ;  under  others,  cojnprejj'ed  :  hence  we  fay, 
that  the  air  hath  a  power  of  expanfion  and  compreffion. 
But  if  wc  ufe  tlie  expreffion  with  propriety,  we  can 
mean  nothing  more  by  it,  than  the  foundation  there  is, 
in  the  nature  of  things,  for  certain  difcernible  altera- 
tions and  effed;s,  in  fcnfible  things,  from  feme  parti- 
cular kind  of  external  influence  and  caufe.  But  not 
having  ever  obferved  any  fuch  effeft  in  ivater.^  from 

any 


Se£t.h  MO  Rx\L    AGENCY.  ^ 

any  caufe  we  have  known  to  operate  upon  it  ;  we  fay, 
water  hath  neither  a  power  of  being  expanded^  nor 
compre(Jcd  :  and  yet,  all  that  we  can  confiftently  mean 
by  fuch  an  expreffion,  is,  to  deny  any  foundation,  m 
the  nature  of  things,  for  any  fuch  cfFed  in  water^  from 
the  operation  of  any  caufe,  or  external  influence,  , 
which  liath  ever  fallen  under  our  obfervation. 

In  a  lenfe  fmiilar  to  this  do  we  ufe  the  phrafes, 
Power  of  Motion — of  Elalticity — of  Gravitation.  We 
mean,  by  fuch  like  terms  and  phrafes,  to  defcribe 
fomething  which  we  call  capacity  in  bodies  of  becom- 
ing the  fubjefts  of  certain  difcernible  alterations,  and 
perceptible  efrefts,  from  the  operation  and  influence  of 
fome  external  caufe  :  or  (to  fpeak  more  philofophi- 
cally)  we  mean  to  exprefs  the  foundation  there  isy  in 
the  nature  of  things^  under  certain  given  circumftances^ 
for  fuch  perceptible^  fenfible  effeds. 

Thcfc  obfcrvations  are  fufficient  to  determine  the 
meaning  of  the  v/ord  Power,  Vv-hen  applied  to  mere 
fenfelefs,  inanimate  things  ;  and  Ihew,  that  we  intend 
nothing  more  by  it,  than  the  capacity  there  is  in  mate- 
rial things,  of  being  the  fubjecSts  of  certain  difcernible 
alterations  and  changes,  upon  the  application  of  fome 
external  influence  and  operation  :  and  this  is,  really, 
nothing  more  than  the  foundation  there  is  in  nature, 
for  the  taking  place  of  eflecHis,  in  a  certain  particular 
feries,  connexion  and  order. 

Thefe  remarks,  it  is  hoped,  may  furnifh  us  with 
fome  materials  for  a  proper  explanation  of  the  powers 
of  human  nature  ;  and  for  afcei  taining  the  meaning  of 
the  exprefiion. 

The  expreffion,  the  powers  of  human  nature^  when  it 
is  ufe d  171  its  real  analogy  to  the  word  Power,  as  ap- 
plied to  inanimate^  material  things^  can  import  nothing 
more  than  a  capacity  there  is,  in  human  nature,  of  be- 
coming the  fiibjeft  of  certain  particular  fenfations, 
apprehenfions,  and  voluntary  exei^tions.  We  have 
obferved  it  to  be  a  general  law  of  nature,  or  rather  of 
divine   operation,  that,   under  certain  circumllances, 

me!i 


^'0  An£SSAYon  Part  ti 

men  fliould  be  the  fubjecls  of  certain  feelhjof,  exercife-s 
Viiid.  fe^ijntions .  Accordingly  we  fay,  that  man  hath  a 
power  of  thought — of  miderftanding — and  of  will — to 
exprefs  the  different  kinds  of  eifed;  of  wliich  he  may  be 
the  fubjeft,  under  certain  circumftances,  and  from 
iome  particular  influence  and  application*  But  when 
wc  fpeak  of  men  as  having  a  power  of  thinking  and 
'willing^  it  is  as  diftant  from  all  reafon  and  common 
fenfe  to  conceive  an  idea,  from  this  expreflion,  that 
men  are  the  juhjeCls  of  their  own  influence^  in  thinking 
and  willing,  as  it  is,  from  the  fimilar  expreffion,  in  re- 
ference to  natural  things,  to  conceive  the  earth  itfelf, 
and  natural  bodies  upon  it,  to  be  the  fubjeds  of  their 
own  influence^  in  attradlion,  vegetation,  and  the  other 
fenfible  effects  which  v/e  obferve  are  conftantly  taking 
place  in  the  material  world.  If  the  human  mind  is  the 
Jubjedi  of  its  own  influence,  in  thinking  and  willing  ; 
it  mufl  be  an  influence  that  is  exerted  luithout  thought^ 
and  without  defign:  a  confideration,  which  at  once 
takes  away  its  fufhciency  for  being  the  canje  of 
thought,  and  of  will.  But  it  is  no  more  agreeable  to 
common  fenfe,  to  imagine  that  men  are  the  JuhjeCis  of 
their  oiun  influence^  in  thinking  and  willing,  than,  that 
matter  is  theJubjeCi  of  its  own  influence  on  itfelf  in  that 
tendency  we  obferve  in  the  various  parts  of  material 
things  to  each  other,  and  to  one  common  centre, 
which  we  mean  to  exprefs  by  the  terms  Gravitation 
and  x\ttra<5lion.  It  is  quite  as  agreeable  to  common 
fenfe,  to  fuppofe,  that  the  tendency  which  we  obfervC 
in  natural  bodies,  upon  the  furface  of  our  earth,  to  its 
centre,  is  the  effed:  of  fome  fecret  and  very  myfterious 
influence  exerted  by  the  bodies  themfelves  upon  theju- 
felves^  caufing  them  to  gravitate  toward  the  centre  ;  I 
fay,  this  is  a  fuppolition  quite  as  agreeable  to  common 
fenfe,  as  the  opinion  which  fijppofeth  that  mankind 
exert  an  influence  on  themfelves,  caufing  them  to  put 
forth  thought^  and  exert  aCIs  of  will.  And  one  would 
render  himfelf  ridiculous  to  ufe  the  v/ord  Power,  in 
reference  to  inanimate  things,  in  fuch  a  fenfe  as  this  ; 

and 


Sea.  t.  MORALAGSNCY.  4t 

and  to  exprefs  fuch  a  mixed  and  inconceivable  kind  of 
influence  ;  and  would  plainly  (hew  himrelf  to  be  an 
utter  ftranger  to  nature,  pnd  to  its  laws.  And  yet  tb 
conceive  that  the  expreffions,  The  powers  of  human 
nature^  The.  powers  of  maiikind^  import  that  thofe  men- 
tal and  moral  exercifes,  which  take  place  in  rational, 
intelligent  agents,  are  fruits  and  eifefts  of  fome  certain 
influence  exerted  by  thefe  fame  agents  upon  thera- 
felves  in  order  to  be^et  and  produce  mental  a<ftion  and 
exertion,  I  muft  take  liberty  to  be  of  opinion,  is  not 
at  all  lels  ridiculous  and  abfurd. 

If  any  fhould  objeft,  that,  by  the  word  Power, 
when  applied  to  inanimate,  material  things,  we  mean 
fomething  wholly  natural  ;  but,  by  the  fame  term^ 
when  applied  to  ihen,  and  expreffmg  fomething  pecu- 
liar to  rational,  intelligent  agents,  we  mean  fomething 
wholly  moral  ;  and  that,  therefore^  there  can  be  no 
juft  reafoning  from  the  one  to  the  other — this  would 
relieve  no  difRculty,  nor  at  all  affifl:  and  help  our  ap- 
prehenfions  of  the  matter  :  for  to  fay  that  the  powers 
of  matter  are  merely  natural  ;  whereas,  by  the  ac- 
knowledgment of  all,  thefe  powers  of  mankind,  which 
are  the  fubje6t  of  controverfy,  are  altogether  of  the 
moral  kind  ;  only  expreffeth  the  different  kinds  of 
effects,  of  which  rational  beings  and  inanimate  things 
are  the  fubjeAs,  from  the  influence  of  fome  external 
Inliuence  or  caufe  :  the  one  of  thcfc  effefts  we  term 
morale  and  the  other  ytatural  ;  only  'oecaufe  the  one  is 
volulitary^  the  other  involuntary  :  tlie  diftinftion  of 
terms  refers  only  to  the  difference  of  the  eflecls  ;  and 
was  made  with  no  view  to  difl:inguil]i  the  riaturc  and 
operation  of  the  fevcral  caujes  of  them.  A  moral  caufe 
lignificth  a  voluntary^  defigninn  one  ;  a  natural^  one  that 
is  without  will  and  without  defipn  :  fo  alfo  of  eifecls 
which  may  be  termed  moral^  an<l  natural  ;  we  are  to 
undcrfland  by  the  former,  fuch  as  arc  dcfipjiing  and 
voluntary  ;  by  the  latter,  fuch  as  are  without  deCivn 
and  without  will.  The  terms  moral  and  natural^  ss 
ufcd  in  this  ev.ilion,  are  of  the  fame  import  with  z^o- 

F  luKtary 


42  AnE  S  S  A  Y    ON  Parti, 

luntnry  and  involuntary  (by  involuntary  meaning  only 
toithout  all  exercifes  of  willy  and  carry  no  other  idea  in 
them. 

Hitherto,  the  Reader  will  keep  in  mind,  I  have 
treated  of  Power  only  as  indicating  a  fitnels  in  any 
thing  to  be  the  lubjed:  of  particular  influence  ;  and  to 
have  certain  effedls  appear  in  it,  upon  the  application 
of  fuch  influence  to  it.  One  thing  which  comes  into 
confideration,  and  is  of  importance,  ii>  determining 
the  feveral  natures  of  things,  and  their  Ipecific  differ- 
ences from  each  other,  is,  their  fitnefs  and  adaptednefs 
to  be  the  fubjefts  of  fome  certain  kinds  of  influence  ; 
and  to  have  certain  effe£ls  appear  in  them,  upon  the 
application  of  fuch  influence  to  them,  and  its  exertion 
upon  them.  Thus  we  find  the  air  to  be  expanded  by 
heat ;  and  that  bodies  are  moved  by  the  influence  of 
certain  degrees  of  external  force  upon  them.  Upon 
this  ground  it  is  that  we  fay  the  air  has  a  power  of 
expanfion  ;  and  bodies,  the  power  of  motion.  So, 
from  the  influence  of  fome  caufe  or  other,  we  find 
men  to  be  the  fubje£ls  of  underftanding  and  volition. 
Hence  we  fay,  they  have  a  power  of  intelleft,  and  a 
power  of  will. 

This,  it  appears  to  me,  is  all  that  we  can  eonfiflently 
mean  by  the  expreflions,  u4  Power  of  Underfiandingy 
and  Power  of  IV ill ^  if  we  ufe  them  to  denote  any  thing 
previous  to  all  perception  and  voluntary  exertion. 
When  we  behold  thefe  effeds-^  as  in  other  cafes,  fo  in 
this,  our  minds  frequently  recur  to  a  caufe :  and  from 
an  uniformity  of  etfeft,  we  infer  uniformity  of  caufe, 
and  of  its 'influence  and  operation.  From  a  general 
uniformity,  alfo,  of  divine  operation  (things  continu- 
ing as  they  are)  we  conclude  and  infer  a  fimilarity  of 
eifecfts,  and  look  forward  to  it  :  wc  expeft  events  to 
take  place  in  the  fame  feries  and  order,  in  which  we 
have  obferved  them  already  to  come  uniformly  into 
exiitence.  That  confl:itution  and  eftablifliment  of 
things,  which  is  the  ground  of  fuch  like  reafonings, 
and  the  uniformity  of  their  operation  and  iflue,  is  what 

we 


Sea.I.  MORAL    AGENCY.  45 

WC  mean  to  exprefs  by  the  word  Power,  as  applied  to 
natural  things  ;  and,  frequently,  as  applied  to  intelli- 
gent beings,  or  moral  agents. 

Not  that  I  apprehend  this  to  be  the  only  fenfe  in 
which  the  word  Power  may  be  ufed  with  propriety,  as 
applied  to  moral  agents — to  men.  Far  otherwife  :  for 
it  may  doubtlefs  be  ufed  with  proprieiy  to  indicate 
and  point  out  fonie  abilities  properly  in  men — fome- 
thing  wherein  man  is  a  moral  agent,  and  on  account 
of  which  he  is  a  fit  fubje^ft  of  praife  or  blame,  com- 
mendation or  ceniiire.  The  definition  of  Power,  in 
this  ufe  and  application  of  the  term,  as  far  as  I  am 
able,  I  (hall  prelcntly  give.  But  it  may  be  worth  our 
while  firfl  to  fpend  a  little  time  in  comparing  the  ideas 
of  Power,  entertained  by  thofe  Gentlemen  who.ef- 
poufe  the  doftrine  of  a  contingency  of  events,  with 
the  definition  which  hath  been  already  given  ;  and  fee 
if  thefe  ideas  are  any  where  to  be  found  in  it. 

If,  by  a  power  of  felf-determination ^  as  the  phrafe  is 
frequently  ufed  by  Gentlemen  on  that  fide  of  the  qaef- 
tion,  and  by  the  Author  of  the  Examination  of  Mr. 
E  D  w  A  R  D  s^s  Inquiry — a  power  ofivill^  a  power  of  choice^ 
^•c. — be  meant  nothing  more  than  fome  foundation 
there  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  for  our  beiLg  the 
fubjedls  of  certain  exercifes  of  choice  ;  Calviniftic 
divines  have  no  contention  with.them.  If  by  capacity 
of  choofing^  faculty  ofwill^  &:c.  be  underftood  the  foun- 
dation there  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  or  the  particu- 
lar conftitution  of  any  being,  for  becoming  the  fubjeft 
of  fuch  kind  of  cffedls  ;  tlie  exprelfion  will  not  lead  to 
that  confufion  which  hath  very  generally  attended  the 
ufe  of  it.  Ufed  in  this  fenfe,  it  will  not  carry  away 
the  mind  into  a  dark  apprehenfion  of  fome  fecret  and 
myfterious  power,  which  exerteth  influence  upon  itfelf, 
to  roufe  up  and  firft  awaken  itfelf  into  a6lion  : — a  no- 
tion, than  which  nothing  can  poHfibly  be  more  repug- 
nant to  itfelf,  and  to  common  fenfe  ;  or  more  diredily 
and  infallibly  deflroy  and  take  away  all  ground  and 
poflibility  of  its  own  exiftence.     If  there  is  any  Inch 

F  3  power 


44  An  ,E  S  S  A  Y    on  Parti, 

power  as  this  in  human  nature,  it  is  by  no  means  con* 
tained  within  the  definition  of  power  which  hath  been 
but  now  given.  This  definition  is  far  from  compre-= 
hending  it  :  yea,  I  may  fay  there  mufl  be  a  definition 
coined  for  it,  and  terms  of  greater  energy,  and  more 
cxpreflive,  than  our  dry^  barren  langurtge  will  afford, 
be  invelied  to  defcribe,  and  in  its  full  fhength  expreis, 
the  idea,  to  the  weak  minds  and  feeble  apprehenfions 
of  men. 

If  men  may  be  the  fabje£ls  of  volition  and  choice,  it 
in  no  meafure  from  thence  followeth  that  they,  by 
fome  mental  exertion  of  their  own,  originate  their 
own  volitions.  A  fitnefs,  or  adaptednefs,  in  any  thing, 
to  be  the  fubjeci^  of  ^  certain  kind  of  influence^  and,  in 
confequence  of  that  influence,  to  have  certain  effects 
appear  in  it,  doth,  in  no  degree,  of  itjelf  determine 
whence  this  influence  arifcth — whether  it  is  from 
within,  or  from  without*.  For  a  perfon  to  be  a  fubje<Si; 
capable  of  having  exercifes  of  uoill^  and  for  him  to  or/- 
ginate  thefe  exercifes,  are  two  very  different  things  ; 
the  proportions  affirming  them  being  no  ways  cour 
nedled  together,  The  power  which  Arminian  divines 
plead  for,  and  the  power  which  hath  now  been  defined, 
are  fo  far  from  being  one  and  the  fame,  that  they  are 
entire  oppofites  ;  at  leafl,  fland  in  oppofite  relations 
to  each  other.  The  one  is  a  power  to  operate  ;  the 
other,  a  power  to  be  wrons^ht  upon  :  the  one  puts  forth 
power,  and  exercifeth  influence,  in  order  to  produce 
effefts  j  the  other  is  a  fitnefs,  or  adaptednefs,  to  have 
effefts  of  a  certain  kind  appear  in  it  :  the  one  is  what 
Mr.  Locke  calls  aftive  power  ;  the  other,  paffive  : 
the  one  exerts  influence  ;  the  other  is  th^fubjed  of  it. 
The  Reader,  I  think,  will  very  eafily  obferve,  that  the 
idea  of  a  power  of  felf-determination  in  the  will,  or 
of  a  felf-origination  of  motion  within  ourfelves,  is  no 
where  to  be  found  among  the  ideas  contained  in  the 
definition  of  Power  which  hath  been  already  given. 
The  power  which  hath  been  already  defcribed  is  very 
different  from  that  power  of  felf-detennination  in  the 

will, 


Sea.  I.  MORAL    AGENCY.  45 

will,  which  is  by  many  infifted  on,  as  being  efTential 
to  moral  aftion — praile  and  blame,  virtue  and  vice.  I 
fhall  now, 

II.  Attempt  to  illuftrate  that  idea  of  Power,  which 
denoteth  and  indicateth  fome  ability  properly  in  men — 
fomething  wherein  man  is  a  moral  agent ^  and  in  which 
there  is  defert  of  praife  or  blame,  efteem  or  difappro- 
bation.  Any  power,  which  hath  moral  quality  and 
defert  in  it,  necelTarily  implieth  exercije  ofivill^  or  vo~ 
luntary  exertion.  Nothing  fhort  of  voluntary  exercife 
incurs  cenfure,  or  meriteth  commendation  ;  or  is  any 
way  properly  and  diredlly  the  objeft  o{  affedio?7. 

Such  a  power  as  this,  as  the  word  is  generally  ufed, 
implieth  fufftciency  for  fome  certain  event.  That  is  a 
power  to  perform  any  thing,  which,  when  exerted,  is 
productive  of  the  defired  event.  When  any  event 
taketh  place  upon  our  choofing  it^  and  in  confiexien  with 
our  choice  ;  according  to  the  ufe  and  import  of  the 
word  in  common  language,  we  have  the  poiver  of  that 
event,  or  power  to  produce  it.  When  the  event, 
which  is  the  object  of  choice,  doth  not  follow  the 
election  of  the  mind,  or  voluntary  exertion  towards  it  ; 
then,  according  to  common  language,  it  is  not  in  our 
power.  Any  event  which  comes  into  exiftence  imme- 
diately upon  our  choofmg  it,  and  whofe  exiftence  de- 
pends on  the  choice  of  our  m.inds — as  effeds  on  their 
caufes,  and  confequents  on  their  antecedents — may 
properly  be  faid  to  be  in  our  power. 

Only  I  defire  to  have  it  remembered  here,  that  Pow- 
er, in  this  conftru6lion  of  it,  is  not  effential  to  moral 
agency,  virtue  and  vice.  The  mind  may  be  free,  and 
exert  itfelf  with  great  ftrength,  without  any  of  this 
power.  There  may  be  ftrong  exertions  of  mind  to- 
ward fome  certain  object,  and  5'-et  its  exiftence  be  in 
no  meafure  connected  with  thefe  mental  exertions  to- 
wards it.  But  this  want  of  connexion  of  event,  with 
the  choice  of  the  mind,  doth  not  at  all  deftroy  or  take 
away  that  agency  which  hath  virtue,  or  vice,  diredtly 
predicable  of  it^      The  end^-avors  of  a  man  may  be 

good, 


46  An    essay    on  Pait'l, 

or  bad,  in  a  moral  fenfe,  and  yet  fail  of  fuccefs.  The 
moral  beauty  and  deformity  o^  affeCiions  do  not  at  all 
depend  upon  their  connexion  with  any  outward  event, 
Tliis,  I  think,  is  agreeable  to  tlie  common  fenfe  of 
mankind. 

Upon  tliis  ground  it  is,  that  ''  we  are  condemned 
''  or  approved  of  ourielves,  for  a  willing  or  unwilling 
"  mind."  Upon  this  ground  it  is,  that  we  rate  the 
character  of  a  benefadlor,  or  an  enemy,  by  his  defigns 
and  purpofes  towards  us,  as  far  as  we  are  capable  of 
difcerning  and  difcovcring  them  ;  and  not  by  his 
ability  aftually  to  affift  or  injure  us. 

To  illuflratc  tiie  idea  of  Power,  in  this  latter  con- 
ftruftion  of  the  term,  I  would  obferve  the  following 
things. 

I .  That  the  objeft  of  power,  when  the  word  is  ufed 
to  denote  fome  ability  and  fufficiency  properly  in  men^ 
is  fomething  future — fomething  diftinft  from  prefent 
volition,  or  our  prefent  voluntary  exertions.  Prelent 
volition  having  already  gained  exiflence,  and  therefore 
being  neceffarily  what  it  is  ;  it  is  now  too  late  for  any 
power  to  be  exerted  to  determine  the  nature  of  it.  It 
is  altogether  impoffible  that  there  fhould  be  any  caufe, 
from  the  operation  of  which  it  can  become  true,  that 
prefent  volition  fhould  be  what  it  really  is  not,  or  not 
what  it  really  is.  New  volitions,  or  a  different  flate 
of  mind  from  what  at  prefent  is,  may  be  tlie  fruit  of 
the  operation  of  fome  external  caufe  ;  or,  even  of 
prefent  voluntary  exertion  :  but  it  is  quite  too  late 
for  any  caufe  to  exert  its  influence,  or  any  power  to 
be  put  forth,  in  order  to  determine  or  fix  the  nature 
of  volitions  which  are  already  in  exiflence  ;  or  to  pre- 
fcribe  bounds  and  limits  to  them.  Whatever  is  in 
exiflence,  is  beyond  the  reach  of  any  power  which 
denoteth  fufficiency  for  the  produftion  of  future  event. 
Tlierc  cannot  be  a  more  palpable  impropriety,  than  to 
talk  of  having  power  over  prefent  volitions  ;  either  to 
produce  or  determine  them  ;  or  in  any  meafure  alter 
or  vary  their  real  exiflence,  fo  as  to  take  away  their 

praife-worthinefs 


Sea.  h  MOHALAGENCY.  47 

praife-worthinefs    or   vicioufnefs,   or   in   any  degree 
leiren  or  magnify  it. 

2 .  Power  implieth  a  connexion  between  the  volitions 
of  agents,  and  the  event  which  is  the  obje£b  of  volition- 
Whatever  external  aftion,  or  event,  we  find  immedi-^ 
ately  taketh  place,  upon  our  willing  or  choofing  it, 
we  accuflom  ourfelves  to  fay,  is  in  our  power.  It  is 
ditncult  to  conceive  what  idea  men  would  convey  by 
the  expreffion  of  events  being  in  our  power  ^  be  fide  that 
of  a  conftituted  connexion  between  our  voluntary  ex- 
ertions, and  thole  events  which  are  their  objed:s,  and 
upon  which  they  terminate.  Thus  we  fay,  men  have 
a  power  to  run^  xualk^  or  write^  whenever  thefe  actions 
are  conneded  with  the  election  and  preference  of  the 
mind,  and  immediately  take  place  upon  becoming  the 
direft  objefts  of  our  choice.  But  if  any  one  is  under 
fuch  circumftances  as  that-  thefe  adlions  do  not  come 
into  exiflence  and  take  place,  immediately  upon  the 
choice  and  preference  of  his  mind  ;  they  may,  in  that 
cafe,  properly  be  faid  to  be  out  of  his  power.  Wh^n 
we  fay  that  any  thing  is  out  of  our  power ^  we  mean  to 
deny  a  connexion  between  the  event,  and  that  aft  or 
exertion  of  our  minds,  whereby  M^e  choofe  and  prefer 
it.     Yet, 

3.  Many  things  may,  with  propriety,  be  faid  to  be 
•within  our  power.,  which,  neverthelefs,  do  not  in  fad 
become  the  objcfts  of  our  preference  and  choice.  The 
aftaal  exertion  of  the  mind  or  will  toward  an  objecl, 
is  not  effcntial  to  the  idea  of  power,  as  the  term  is 
many  times  ufed.  For  if  this  were  the  cafe,  men 
could  not  be  faid  to  have  power  for  any  thing,  other- 
wife  than  in  the  adu id  performance  of  it.  They  could 
not  be  faid  to  have  power  to  run.,  walk.,  or  write^ 
otherwife  than  in  actual  running,  walldng  and  writing. 
But  where  we  obferve  a  conftant  connexion  between 
certain  mental  exertions,  and  thofe  outward  events 
"Which  are  their  objefts  ;  where  w^e  obferve  events 
come  into  exiftence  in  a  particular  relation  to  certain 
exertions  of  mind,  ciiooling  and  preferring  them,  and 

folio  v/ii!'r 


48  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  L 

following  this  choice  and  preference  of  mind,  as  effefts 
do  their  caufes  ;  this  fufficiently  authorizes  us  to  fay, 
that  the  events,  thus  connected  with  human  choice  and 
preference,  are  i7i  the  power  of  men,  even  though  they 
are  not  now  adlually  chofen  and  preferred. 

4.  Power,  therefore,  ftriftly  fpeaking  (wherein  the 
idea  conveyed  by  the  term  is  diftinft  from  volition 
itfelf,  and  from  any  thing  which  has  moral  deiert 
immediately  and  direCily  predicable  of  it)  is  no  more 
than  a  law  of  conflant  divine  operation.  It  is  nothing 
more  than  a  divine  conflitution,  or  an  eftabliftied  con- 
nexion between  human  volitions  and  certain  external 
events.  It  is  a  law  of  nature  (to  ufe  the  common 
mode  of  exprellion)  that  walking  or  writing,  for  in- 
ftance,  fliall  ufually  take  place  upon  a  man's  choice  or 
preference.  And  where  we  find  this  eftablifhment,  it 
is  fufficient  to  juftify  the  affertion,  that  thcfe  events 
are  in  men's  power.  But  to  fpeak  more  philofophi* 
cally,  and  according  to  ftrift  truth,  //  is  agreeable  to 
the  manner  of  conflant  divine  operation^  for  God  to 
bring  thefe  events  into  exifle?ice  in  a  connexion  with  the 
choice  and  preference  of  our  7ninds  ;  and  only  in  that 
way.  No  one  fuppofeth,  that  without  divine  aids  and 
efficiency,  men  have  power  to  write,  walk,  or  any 
thing  elfe.  But  when  God  has  fo  conllituted  the 
world,  and  our  make  and  frame  ;  or,  when  it  is  the 
law  and  manner  of  conftant  divine  operation,  that 
theie  events  fhall  immediately  take  place  upon  our 
choofing  them  ;  they  are  then  in  our  power ^  as  much 
as  any  thing  can  be  in  our  power  ;  and  as  much  as  is 
iieceffary  to  our  being  either  praifed  or  blamed,  for 
performing  or  neglecting  them. 

In  thefe  two  definitions,  I  am  humbly  of  opinion, 
are  contained  the  whole  of  the  idea  of  Power,  as  far 
as  we  have  any  neceffary  concern  with  the  term,  ick 
our  inquiries  into  moral  agency  and  liberty. 

Power  muft  mean  either  the  fitnefs  or  adapt e dnefr  t7t 
things^  to  be  thejubjeds  of  certain  influences  andeffeds  ; 
or  the  foundation  there  is^  in  the  nature  of  things^  for 

that 


Sec^.  II.  MORAL    AGENCY.  4^ 

that  order  and  connexion  of  events  %uhich  we  behold  t 
or,  a  connexion  betiueen  the  volitions  of  agents^  and 
ihoje  outward  events  which  are  their  dired  and  imiiiedi- 
ate  objeds.  *  In  the  former  fenfe  of  the  term,  men 
may  be  faid  to  have  powers  ofwill^  under  [landings  Szc. 
as  they  are  fubjed:s  fitted  for  havmg  fuch  efFefts  take 
place  in  them  ;  or,  as  they  are  adapted  to  receive,  or 
be  the  fubjefts  of,  that  kind  of  influence  which  is  the 
caufe  of  human  underflanding  and  will.  Thus  the  air 
is  fitted  for  receiving  that  kind  of  influence,  and  being 
the  fubjedi;  of  it,  which  is  the  caufe  of  its  being  expanded 
or  comprefTed  ;  and  on  this  ground  we  fay  the  air  hath 
a  power  of  expanfion  and  compreflion.  In  the  latter 
lenfe  of  the  term  Power,  men  may  be  faid  to  be  endow- 
ed with  it,  in  all  thofe  inftances  wherein  there  is  an 
cflabliihed  connexion  between  prefent  voluntary  ex- 
ertion, and  thofe  external  aftions  and  events  which 
are  its  next  and  immediate  objefts.  By  external  aCiio7i 
or  event^  I  mean  any  thing  whatfoever,  which  is 
extrinfic  of  that  mental  and  voluntary  exertion^  which 
choofeth  and  terminateth  upon  it.  There  is,  doubtlefs, 
fo  near  a  relation  of  human  volitions  themfelves,  in 
many  inflances,  to  one  anotiier  ;  and  they  take  place 
in  fuch  a  feries,  order  and  connexion  with  each  other  ; 
that,  in  many  cafes,  our  own  adts  of  will  may  in  fome 
fenfe  be  faid  to  be  in  our  power.  This  matter  I  will 
endeavour  more  particularly  to  explain  prefently. 

To  obferve  order,  here  fcems  to  be  the  proper  place 
to  inquire,  whether  the  idea  of  a  leif-origination  of 
motion,  or  felf-determining  power,  in  men,  is  any 
where  to  be  found  within  the  latter  definition  of  power. 

A  little  attention  will  convince  any  one,  that  the 
power  which  is  pleaded  for,  by  Gentlemen  on  that  fide 

G  of 

*  If  any  one  imagines  that  the  power  which  wc  attribute  to  the  fun,  of  exhaling 
vapour;  and  to  fire,  of  burning,  &c.  are  not  comprehended  under  either  of  the 
definitions  of  power  which  have  been  given  ;  1  am  content  that  they  fliould  be 
made  a  diftincl  ciafs,  rather  tfian  dilpute  wiih  any  one  about  it.  It  mult  doubt- 
lefs be  acknowledged,  however,  that  there  is  no  proper  efficiency  cither  in  the 
fun  or  the  fire  ;  nor  are  the  powers  of  the  fun  and  fire,  flridly  fueaking,  any 
thinj;  more  than  the  foundation  there  is,  in  Uie  nature  or  tilings,  for  that  order 
andconnexion  of  events,  which  we  bchoUl,  as  expreffed  above. 


50  AnESSAYon  PaftL 

of  the  queflion  refpefting  power,  can  have  no  place 
under  the  laft  definition.  The  power  which  they 
contend  for  as  being  elTential  to  mora]  agency  and  lib- 
erty, is  fomething  antecedent  to  all  voluntary  exertion, 
and  is  the  proper  ground  and  cniij'e  of  it.  The  power 
v\^hich  was  laft  defined,  is,  fufficiency  in  prefent  volit?i- 
tary  exertion^  for  fome  future  external  event.  Of  that 
power,  voluntary  exertion  is  the  effedl  and  fruit  :  of 
this^  it  is  the  caiije  of  fome  other  event  ;  and  is  con- 
fidered  only  in  relation  to  its  efFeft,  without  any 
reference,  one  w^ay  or  another,  to  its  caufe.  The 
power  for  which  Arminian  divines  are  advocates,  is, 
a  power  to  begin  motion^  even  internal  motion  or 
volition  :  this  power  relates  only  to  the  producT:ion  of 
fome  effedi^  by  a  motion  already  begun.  That  is  a 
power  which  lieth  in  fomething  antecedent  to  voluntary 
exertion  :  this  confidereth  voluntary  exertion  itfelf 
wholly  as  caufe.,  and  the  ground  of  fome  external  tvent 
or  effeft.  In  that,  the  difpute  feems  to  be  refpefting 
the  caitfe  of  voluntary  exertion  :  in  this,  refpefting  the 
efficiency  of  voluntary  exertion  itfelf,  a$  cauje  of  fome 
future,  confequent  event. 

But  it  is  quite  unneceiTary  to  carry  the  comparifori 
any  further,  in  order  to  illuflrate  the  difference  of 
thefe  feveral  kinds  of  power  ;  as  it  is  probable  that 
none  of  the  advocates  for  a  power  of  felf-determination 
in  men,  will  ever  urge  that  the  idea  of  that  power 
which  they  contend  for,  is  contained  under  this  defini- 
tion ;  or,  indeed,  under  either  of  the  definitions  of  the 
term  povv^er,  which  have  as  yet  been  given.  If  they 
fliould,  Calviniflic  divines,  and  fuch  as  are  of  opinion 
that  all  voluntary  exertion  in  creatures  arifeth  from 
fome  caufe  extrinfic  of  themfelves,  will  no  longer 
pretend  to  maintain  a  controverfy  with  them  relative 
to  power  ;  unlefs  it  be  refpe^ting  the  propriety  of  the 
terms  they  make  ufe  of  to  convey  their  ideas  of  the 
Powers  of  Mankind  :  and  here  they  may,  doubtlels^ 
manage  one  to  great  advantage. 

If  the  fitnefs,   or  adaptednefs,  of  any  creature  or 

thing 


Sea.  II.  MORAL    AGENCY,  51 

thing,  to  become  the  fubjeft  of  fome  certain  influence 
from  without  ;  and,  in  confeqiience  of  that  influence, 
to  have  jQ)72e  certain  rffffcis  appear  in  it  ;  together, 
alfo,  v/ith  the  fufficiency  which  now  aftually  appeareth 
in  it  for  fonie  external  co72jeque?it  effeft  :  if,  I  fay,  thefe 
two  defniitions  do  not  contain  the  wliole  of  tlie  idea  of 
any  power  which  can,  with  the  lead  propriety,  be  pre- 
dicated of  any  mere  creature  ;  the  advocates  for  a 
power  o?  felf-determination  in  men  will  open  a  new 
fource  of  knowledge,  by  explaining  thofe  boafled 
powers  of  mankind,  v/herein,  they  urge,  the  principal 
iiignity  of  human  nature  confifleth. 

Should  it  be  here  faid,  that  no  one  ever  pretended 
to  plead  for  any  powers  in  human  nature,  over  and 
above  a  Jiifficisncy  in  what  now  aCiually  exifls  iti  afnbje^^ 
for  fome  future  event  ;  that  the  power  they  plead  for  is 
a  fiifficiency  in  ME^  for  the  produdion  of  volition — this 
fiifficiency  lying  in  the  power  which  is  the  caufe^  ar:d 
volition  itfelf  being  the  e^ffed  :  ihould  fuch  a  plea  as 
this  be  made,  it  would  be  quite  deficient  in  anfwcring 
the  purpofes  for  which  it  is  urged  ;  and  that,  two 
ways  : 

I.  It  cannot  rationally  be  fuppofed,  that  the  Power 
in  men,  which  is  confidered  as  the  cau/e  of  volition, 
doth  any  thing,  or  is  effedual  to  any  thing,  any  other- 
wife  than  in  adual  exercije.  To  treat  of  any  thing  in 
the  light  and  under  the  character  of  cau/e ^  and  yet 
confider  it  as  doing  nothing — exerting  no  influence — is 
at  once  to  diveft  it  of  all  the  qualities  and  ideas  of  a 
caufe,  and  ftrip  it  naked  of  every  thing  on  the  account 
of  which  there  is  the  leaft  reafon  to  apprehend  any 
fufficiency  in  it,  for  any  future,  external  event.  For 
volition  to  be  the  effeft  of  fuch  a  caufe  as  this  (could 
any  fuch  caufe  be  conceived  of)  would  be  as  utterly 
inconfiflent  v/ith  thofe  ideas  of  Liberty  which  arc 
pleaded  for  by  the  advocates  for  a  pov/er  of  feli'-de- 
termination  in  men,  as  any  Neceffity  which  can  be 
conceived  of  or  named.  To  urge  that  volition  arifcth 
from  fuch  a  caufe  as  this,   is  to  allign  it  an  involuntary 

G  2  caufe — ' 


52  An    E  S  S  A  Y    on  Parti. 

caufe — one  that  is  not  adive^  but  perfeAly  paffive  ; 
which  niuft  neqeifarily,  according  to  their  ideas  and 
definitions  of  it,  utterly  deprive  it  oi  -^freedojn, 

2 .  If  it  fliould  be  fuppofed  that  tliis  power  producetU 
volition  hy  its  exercije^  in  order,  flill,  to  anfwer  the 
purpofes  of  the  advocates  for  it  ;  it  muft  be  prefumed 
that  the  exercife  is  voluntary  and  free  ;  otherwife,  the 
volition  which  is  its  fruit  and  effeft,  upon  their  prin- 
ciples, cannot  be  free.  But  if  the  exercife  of  this 
power  is  voluntary^  then  that  which  is  coniidcred  as 
the  cau/e  of  volition,  is  vohmtajy  exertio7i  ;  which  at 
once  taketh  away  all  its  diftindtion  from  volition  itfelf, 
^nd  utterly  confounds  the  caufe  with  its  effeCi, 

It  may  in  this  place  be  proper  to  obferve  fomething 
refpefting  the  connexion  of  human  volitions  one  ^vith 
another  ;  as  it  may  ferve  to  give  fome  fuller  view  and 
clearer  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  powers  under  confid- 
cration.  I  beg  the  Reader's  candid  attention  to  the 
following  obfervations. 

I .  It  feems  that  God  hath  eflabllflied  a  connexion  in 
fbme  cafes  between  human  volitions  of  a  certain  kind, 
in  a  continued  feries  and  fucceffion  ;  fo  that  the  whole 
chain,  or  feries,  fhall  arife  out  of  that  which  is  original 
in  it ;  each  fucceflive  volition  growing,  as  it  were,  out 
of  its  next  preceding  one  as  its  caufe.  This,  indeed, 
is  manifeftly  the  cafe  of  all  human  volitions,  as  to  their 
genus — that  which  denominates  them  either  morally 
good^  or  morally  evil.  This  eftablifhment,  in  tliofe  two 
grand  points^  took  place  in  the  firft  of  mankind.  It 
was  the  appointment  and  conftitution  of  God,  that,  if 
Adam  retained  his  integrity,  and  perfifted  in  innocency, 
through  the  propofed  time  of  his  trial,  all  human 
nature,  which  fnould  afterward  come  into  being, 
jQiould  be  of  the  fame  general,  excellent  kind,  viz.  holy. 
It  was  God's  law  or  confutation,  on  the  other  hand, 
if  Adam  fell,  that  human  nature  fliould  all  come  into 
being  /iV2//J  /  and  that  it  fiiould  always  continue  fo, 
unlefs  fonie  new  andjpecial  difpenjation  and  conflitution 
rcjpi'ciing  the  human  race  fliould  be  introduced.    Adam, 

in 


Sea.  ir.  MORAL    AGENCY.  53 

in  facl,  did  fall  ;  this  determined  the  point  in  rcCpeO: 
to  his  pollerity,  that  they  fhould  all  come  into  the 
world  infill.  To  this  divine  eftablilhment  or  conjfli- 
tution  do  the  fcriptures  direft  us  to  look,  for  the 
reafon  why  mankind  are  now  univerfally  brought  into 
exiflence  in  fuch  a  corrupt  and  fallen  Hate. 

2.  Wherein  there  is  fuch  an  eftablifhed  connexion 
taking  place  betwixt  human  volitions  of  a  certain  kind, 
ads  of  will  may,  in  Jotne  jenje  ^  be  faid  to  be  in  our  poiu- 
er.  If  there  is  a  divine  eftablifhment,  whereby  it  be- 
cometh  certain,  or  is  agreeable  to  the  common,  fixt 
law  and  method  of  divine  operation,  that  the  nature 
of  our  future  volitions  fliall  be  determined  by  the  pre- 
fent ;  or,  whereby  it  becometh  certain  that  our  future 
exercifes  of  will  fhall  be  agreeable,  in  kind,  to  our 
prefent  ;  this  brings  our  future  exercifes  m  this  refped 
within  our  power.  An  ad  ofwill^  which  is  connected 
with  our  prefent  voluntary  exercife,  may  as  properly 
be  faid  to  be  in  our  power,  as  ?inj  outward  event  {idLwd." 
ing  in  the  fame  connexion.  If  outward  events  are 
faid  to  be  in  our  power,  only  becaufe  of  their  con- 
nexion with  oar  exercifes  of  will  ;  then  any  future 
volitions  themfelves,  alfo,  may  be  faid  to  be  in  our 
power,  as  far  as  they  ftand  in  a  limilar  connexion  with 
prefent  choice  and  exercifes  of  will. 

3.  It  therefore  appeareth,  that  all  thofe  voluntary 
exercifes  and  affeftions,  which  are  required  of  us  in 
the  divine  law,  may  be  faid  to  be  in  our  power.  There 
is  no  oppofition  to  any  obedience  which  is  claimed  by 
the  divine  law,  except  it  be  in  our  wills.  This  kind 
of  oppofition,  in  other  matters,  is  never  confidered  as 
taking  away  our  power.  Men  are  fubjecls  capable  of 
receiving  thofe  influences  from  without,  w^iich  are  the 
proper  and  direct  caiife  of  holy  aii'eftions  ;  and  are 
fubje6ls  properly  fitted  for  having  fuch  effefts  appear 
in  them.  A  continued  feries  of  holy  exercifes  are,  by 
divine  conftitution,  certainly  connected  with  the  firll: 
and  loweft  degree  of  that  kind  of  dehre  which  VvC  are 
called  to  in  the  gofpel.     This  feries  of  holy  exercifes 

may 


54  AnESSAYon  Part  I, 

may  therefore  be  faid  to  be  in  our  power  ;  and  men 
may  be  faid  to  have  power  to  "•make  them  new 
hearts,",  and  "  turn  from  their  evil  ways  unto  the 
Lord." 

Nor  doth  fuch  a  reprefentation  of  the  matter  in  any 
meafure  remove  the  true  ground  of  the  neceility  there 
is  of  divine  and  fupernatural  influences  on  the  hearts 
of  men,  in  order  to  their  being  brought,  in  any  de- 
gree, to  the  true  knowledge  and  love  of  God.  Man 
is  not  poffeiTed  of  an  independent  power  for  any  ihing. 
The  concurrence  and  influence  of  an  omnipotent 
power  are,  really,  as  eflential  to  our  moving  a  finger, 
or  drawing  a  breath,  as  to  our  becoming  true  gofpel 
penitents  and  believers  :  and  yet  we  fcruple  not  to 
fay,  that  men  have  power  to  move  and  to  breathe. 
So,  .becaufe  Jpecial  divine  influences  and  omnipotent 
power  are  abfolutely  necefl^ary  to  any  holy,  right  and 
fpiritual  exercifes  in  the  heart  of  a  fmner  ;  there  is  no 
more  reafon,  07i  that  account^  to  deny  it  to  be  in  the 
power  of  men  to  be  holy,  than  there  is  to  deny  it  to 
be  in  their  power  to  move  and  breathe,  becaufe  of  a 
neceflity  of  the  concurrence  of  divine  aids,  to  the 
actual  taking  place  of  the  event.  I  therefore  pro-? 

ceed  to  obferve, 

.  4.  That  this  divine  eflablifliment,  or  conftitution  of 
things,  whereby  it  becometh  certain  that  the  volitions 
of  moral  agents  fhall  take  place  in  a  certain  feries  and 
order,  and  be,  in  the  manner  before  defcribed,  con- 
jiefted  together,  is  all,  I  humbly  conceive,  that  we  can 
coniiflently  mean  by  the  terms  Habit,  and  Temper, 
w^hen  they  are  intended  to  exprels  any  thing  previous 
to  voluntary  exertion  or  inclination,  and  diftindl  from 
it.  When  we  fay,  for  inftance,  that  it  is  the  jiature 
or  temper  of  a  man  to  be  covetous,  or  profufe  ;  we 
mean  only  to  exprefs  the  connexion  we  apprehend 
there  is  between  his  prefei^t  covetings^  and  fiture  ava- 
ricioiifnefs  of  inclination  ;  Or,  the  connexion  there  is 
between  prefent  profufion^  and  future  prodigality  and 
difipation. 

On 


Sea.  II.  MORALAGENCY.  s^ 

On  this  ground  it  is,  or  on  account  of  the  connexion 
we  have  uiually  obferved  between  prefent  exercifes  of 
volition,  and  future  voluntary  exertions  of  the  fame 
general  nature  and  tenor,  that  we  form  a  judgment  of 
the  fninre  conduct  of  men,  by  their  prefent  characters  ; 
juft  as  we  form  a  judgment  of  future  events,  in  the 
natural  world,  by  what  are  commonly  called  the  Laws- 
of  Nature,  by  which  our  material  fyllem  is  governed. 
But  yet  Philofophers  allow,  that  what  are  commonly 
termed  the  Laws  of  Nature,  refpedling  the  material 
world,  are,  ftridly  fpeaking,  no  more  than  a  fixt, 
eftabiiflied  method  of  conftant  divine  operation.  It  is, 
likewife,  equally  unqueiHonably  true,  refpefting  the 
tempers  and  difpofitions^  or  moral  habits^  of  mankind 
(which  fcem  to  be  the  general  law  according  to  which 
moral  events  take  place)  that  they  are  no  more  than 
certain  laws,  or^nethods  of  conftant  divine  operation. 
And  this  notwitnftanding,  it  may  as  properly  be  faid, 
that  it  is  the  nature  of  a  wicked  man  to  do  wickedly, 
as  it  is  the  nature  of  a  tree  to  bear  its  fruit,  or  of  an 
acorn  to  produce  an  oak. 

Thefe  obfervations,  if  juft,  may  pollibly  afford  fome 
light  into  an  event  which  hath  generally  been  efteemcd 
myfterious,  and  to  be  of  difficult  folution  :  I  mean  the 
Fall  of  our  Firft  Parents  from  their  original  ftate  of 
perfeiTcion  and  purity,  into  a  ftate  of  infinite  ruin  and 
guilt. 

The  few  following  obfervations  upon  this  point  are 
humbly  fubmitted  to  the  careful  inquiry  and  candid 
examination  of  the  intelligent  Reader. 

I.  It  appeareth,  /rom  the  foregoing  obfervation:', 
that  Adam  in  imiocency  had  not  a  lioly  temper^  or  the 
habit  of  liolinefs.  Such  a  temper,  or  habit,  was  to  be 
gained  by  his  own  diligent  endeavours,  and  a  faithfid 
improvement  of  the  talents  committed  to  him.  Thisi 
was  to  be  the  fruit  of  the  exercife  of  his  own  free  -will- 
I  would  by  no  means  be  undcrftood  to  intimate,  that 
the  original  innocency  of  our  firft  parents  confifted  in 
a  mere  negation  of  all  nioral  evil  ;    for,  their  tirit  and 

original 


$6  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  t» 

origitial  cxercifes  were,  doubtlefs,  holy — pofitively 
virtuous  and  good.  But  habit ^  or  temper^  is  formed 
by  the  eftablifliment  of  a  connexion  between  omv  prefent 
and  our  future  exercifes,  and  a  kind  of  dependence  of 
the  latter  on  the  former^  And  on  account  of  fuch  a 
connexion  as  this,  which  we  generally  obferve  to  take 
place,  it  is,  that  the  truth  of  that  common  obfervation 
is  wholly  founded,  that  "  old  habits  are  rarely  over- 
come." But  fuch  a  fixt  eftablifnment  and  conftitution, 
relpefting  the  voluntary  exercifes  of  Adam's  mind, 
had  not  yet  taken  place  :  fuch  an  efhablifhment  being 
all  the  confirmation  which  he  ever  would  have  had  in 
his  holy  and  happy  ftate,  if  he  had  retained  his  integrity, 
and  perfifted  in  innocency,  through  the  propofed  time 
of  his  trial. 

Habit  and  Temper  mean  nothing  more  than  a  certain 
fixt  connexion  between  our  prejcnt  (^ercifes  of  will, 
and  future  voluntary  exertions  of  J-ie  fame  general 
nature  and  denominations .  Refpedling  Adam,  it  was 
the  decree  of  God,  that  one  finful  exercife  (liould  form 
a  temper^  or  hahit  ;  fuch  an  exercife  being  certainly 
and  infallibly  connedled  with  confequentfmful  exercifes 
and  volitions.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  a  holy  te^nper^ 
or  the  habit  of  holinefs,  was  to  be  contracted  and 
formed  only  by  a  number  and  feries  of  holy  exercifes 
of  foul.  This  confideration  may,  by  the  way,  lead  us 
to  obferve  a  difference  in  Adam's  flate  of  trial,  from 
that  of  any  of  his  pofterity — a  difference  in  favour  of 
the  latter.  Adam  was  to  perfift  in  obedience  for  a 
certain  tiiiie^  and  have  a  number  and/(fr/>j-  of  holy 
exercifes-,  before  that  fixt  and  certain  connexion  between 
prefent  and  future  exercifes  of  the  fame  general  nature 
and  denoinination^  which  we  mean  to  exprefs  by  the 
terms  Habit  and  Temper,  might  take  place.  But  it  is 
now  become  a  gracious  conftitution  of  God,  and  the 
fubjedt  of  a  promife  to  men,  that  Habit  fliall  be  formed 
by  one  fuch  exercife  as  we  are  called  to  in  the  gofpel : 
perfeverance  in  holinefs,  and  eternal  life,  being 
certainly  and  infallibly  conneded  with  the  firft  and 

lowefl 


Sear.  II.  MORAL    AGENCY.  57 

lowed  degree  of  hearty  compliance  with  the  propofals 
of  the  goipel. 

2.  It  hence  appeareth,  that  the  firft  fin  and  fall  of 
Adam  were  not  in  oppoiition  to  the  habit  and  temper 
of  his  mind  ;  tliough  this  ad:  was  in  direft  oppofition 
to  all  Xh^  former  moral  exercijes  of  it.  All  that  makes 
it  fo  inconceivable  to  us,  that  any  one  fliould  aft  and 
conduct  in  oppofition  to  the  temper  and  habit  of  his 
mind,  is,  the  connexion  we  have  obferved  invariably 
to  take  place  (unlefs  there  is  fome  manifeft  and  fpecial 
divine  interpohtion  to  the  contrary)  between  prefent 
exercifes  of  will,  and  future  voluntary  exertions  of 
the  fame  general  nature  and  denomination.  If  we  had 
not  been  wont  to  find  fuch  a  connexion  in  things,  and 
fo  accuftomed  to  look  for  and  expect  it  ;  it  would  ap- 
pear nothing  ftrange  or  furprifing  to  us,  to  find  in  men 
a  direct  oppofition  between  X\\qXv prefent  and  paft  incli- 
nation and  will  ;  or,  to  expert  a  like  oppofition  in  ex- 
ercifes to  come.  Were  it  not  that  our  ideas  and  con- 
ceptions of  things  were  turned  into  a  particular  chan- 
nel, and  formed,  as  it  were,  in  a  certain  mould,  by 
our  obferving  fuch  a  connexion  in  human  volitions^ 
and  fach  an  invariable  law  of  operation  refpefting 
their  coming  into  exiftence  ;  there  would  appear  no- 
thing flrange,  nothing  embarraffing,  in  the  opinion, 
that  men  might  tnrn  alternately  from  fm  to  holinefs, 
and  from  holinefs  to  fm  ;  as  we  fee  the  matter  in  fadt 
exemplified,  in  the  cale  of  our  firft  parents,  and  thofe 
of  their  pofterity  v/ho  become  true  converts  to  the 
religion  of  Chrift. 

The  fall  of  our  firft  parents  was  an  event  inconfift- 
ent  with  fuch  a  connexion  in  thin2:s  as  hath  been  A^'i- 
crjbed  ;  and  utterly  irreconcilable  with  habit  and  iem- 
,pcr^  in' this  conftruftion  of  the  terms.  But  this  dilii- 
cult'y  will  at  once  fabiide,  if  v/e  rccolleft,  that,  in  rei- 
pccTt  to  Adam  in  innocency,  there  was  no  fuch  connex- 
ion took  place:  lie  had  no  holy  y^'?/'/Y  of  mind,  ard 
temper  of  foul,  to  (111  againlt  and  refill.  And  as  to  any 
difficiiltv  arifini^f  fro??z  temper^  it  is  no  more  inconcciva- 
■        ^     ^      •  '    II  blc 


^  Ai^    E  S  S  A  Y    o  >T  Part  t 

ble  how  Adam  fliouldyFw,  than  how  he  ilionld  contimis 
to  be  holy.  There  is,  I  would  beg  leave  to  obferve, 
no  difficulty  at  all,  refpefting  the  fall  of  Adam  from 
his  original  ftate  of  perfeftion  and  purity,  into  a  ftate 
of  fin  and  guilt,  which  is  any  W2.ys  peculiar^  and  doth 
not  equally  prefs  the  argument  in  general  refpefting 
the  taking  place  o?  any  fm,  and  the  admijfion  of  it  into 
God's  world. 

If,  indeed,  we  would  maintain  a  proper  idea  and 
fuitable  fenfe  of  the  conftant,  immediate  dependence 
of  all  creatures  and  things  on  God  ;  and  would  duly 
confider  how  utterly  unconnefted  human  volitions  in 
themfelves  are,  and  in  their  own  nature,  abflraftly 
confidered,  and  afide  from  any  particular  divine  ejlab- 
liflmient  and  law  of  operatioii  refpeiVing  their  taking 
place  ;  if  thefe  things,  I  fay,  were  duly  confidered  and 
kept  in  view,  I  muft  take  liberty  humbly  to  exprefs  it 
as  my  opinion,  tljat  we  ihould  not  find  ourfelves  fo 
embarrafled  and  perplexed  in  the  argument  refpecSting 
Adam's  original  fin  and  fall. 

But  it  is  time  to  conclude  the  feftion  on  Power,  and 
proceed  to  confider  the  doftrine  of  Motives  ;  which  is 
a  fubjeft  of  importance  in  the  prefent  inquiry.  This 
ftiall  be  the  bufinefs  of  the  next  fedlion. 


S    E   C   T.      Ill, 

IVherein  the  Nature  and  Influence  o/"  M  o  t  i  v  e  s  are 
carefully  examined  and  explained. 

''T'^HE  ufe  and  application  of  the  term  Motive,  in 
JL  moral  efiays  and  metaphyfical  difquifitions,  is 
frequently  fuch  as  tendeth  to  beget  an  apprehenfion  in 
the  Reader,  that  the  mind  is  the  pajjlve  Jubjed  of  the 
influence  of  miOtives  ;  that  there  is  fomething  very 
nearly  refembling  an  active  power  and  agency  in  them, 
to  produce  ciTects  on  the  mind  ;  or,  at  leafi:,  that  they 
are  the  ?neajiSj  or  infiiruments,  whereby  God  avjakeneth 

the 


Sea .  in.  MO  R  A  L    A  G  E  N  C  Y.  59 

the  mind  Into  fenfation,  perception  and  choice.  The 
human  mind  leems,  many  times,  to  be  confidered  as 
being  7720ved  and  determined  by  motives  ;  in  the  fame 
manner  as  clocks  and  watches  are  moved  and  deter- 
mined by  weights  and  fprings.  It  is  apparent,  that  in 
theie  machines  every  degree  of  motion  in  the  wheels 
is  the  e^'eci  of  antecedent  influence  upon  them,  from 
the  weights  and  fprings.  The  fpring  of  a  watch  puts 
forth  and  exerteth  its  influence,  previous  to  the  motion 
of  any  of  its  wheels  ;  and  the  motion  of  the  wheels  is 
wholly  the  fruit  and  <f^c?  of  external  iKfiuence.  So, 
of  a  clock,  and  its  weights.  But  in  a  fenfe  fmiilar  to 
this  it  cannot,  I  believe,  properly  be  faid,  the  mind  of 
n;ian  is  governed  by  r/iotlves^  and  fubjeft  to  their  in- 
fluence. Motives  have  no  influence,  otherwife  than  in 
their  being  actually  perceived.  They  obtain  the  ap- 
pellation of  motives^  only  in  the  miners  feeling  th.ir 
influence,  or  being  in  aChial^notion  in  the  view  of  them'. 
And  when  the  mind  feels,  or  perceives,  the  infiuence 
of  a  motive  ;  it  is  then  too  late  for  the  motive  to  pro- 
duce effe£ls  on  the  mind — exciting  it  to  motion,  clioice, 
or  aftion  ;  the  mind  being  already  moved^  the  will 
exerted^  toward  fome  certain  objeft  ;  and  choice  having 
gainecl  exiflence.  Motives,  as  being  wholly  unper- 
celved,  have  no  tendency  to  move  the  mind,  or  eflgage 
eleccion  •  and,  as  to  the  perfon  unconfcious  of  them, 
do  not  obtain  that  appellation.  Beauty,  for  inflance, 
fo  long  as  it  is  wholly  unperceived,  hath  no  tendency 
to  produce  love,  and  engage  affedlion  :  it  doth  not, 
antecedent  to  its  being  perceived,  exert  any  influence 
upon  the  mind,  which  exciteth  it  to  motion  and  affec- 
tion :  when  it  is  perceived,  it  is  too  late  for  it  to  exr. 
ert  influence  upon  the  mind,  in  ordci'  to  excite  its 
clioice  ;  it  hz'ing  already  relijhed^  and,  ofcourfe,  chc-' 
fen.  In  the  inind^s  perceivijig  any  thing,  which  is  fitted, 
by  the  nature  and  confticution  of  it,  to  be  an  objecl  of 
its  aileclion,  is  really  all  the  choice  Vvhich  is  ever  made 
of  it.  Nothing  that  is,  in  its  nature,  the  objed:  of  ai- 
fe^iion,    is  ever  either  chofen,   or  refuled,  v/ith  any 

II  2  feeling. 


6o  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Partly 

feeling,  exercife,  or  perception  of  mind,  different  from 
what  is  necelTariJy  and  certainly  implied  iji  the  rjiina's 
perceivi?tg  it. 

If  it  fhould  be  faid,  that  the  mind  may  perceive  a 
heautiful  objeft^  and  ^v'Ct,  by  reafon  of  the  particular 
ftate  or  frame  of  the  mind,  have  no  relifli  of  it  ;  and 
it  fhould  from  hence  be  urged,  that  the  perception  of 
object  or  motive  is  antecedent  to  choice,  and  confe- 
quently  is  a  perception  which  doth  not  necefiarily  im- 
ply choice  and  preference  in  it  ;  in  anfv/er  to  fuch  an 
objection,  I  reply,  that,  as  the  cafe  is  here  ftated,  and 
under  fuch  circumflances,  beauty  is  not,  according  to 
the  common  acceptation  of  the  term,  conf  dcred  as  be- 
N^ng  any  motive,  or  having  the  influence  of  a  motive, 
upon  fuch  a  mind.  "Without  all  queftion,  the  mind 
may  have  fome  kind  of  perception  of  an  obje6l  which 
is  abfolutely,  in  itfelf,  beautiful  ;  and,  at  the  lame 
time,  inft:ead  of  relifhing  and  choofmg,  have  a  great 
degree  of  difaffedlion  and  averfion  to  it.  Yet  it  cannot 
properly  be  faid,  that  the  mJnd  perceivcth  the  beauty 
of  the  objedl.  For  the  mind  to  be  aifecled  by  the 
motive  of  beauty,  and  perceive  the  influence  of  fuch  a 
motive  to  love  an  objeft,  is,  in  faft,  to  perceive  the 
beauty  of  the  objeft,  or  the  very  thing  or  quality  in 
it,  which  the  mind  doth  relifli  in  its  choofmg  it.  And 
for  the  mind  to  have  fuch  a  perception  of  the  beauty 
of  an  objecl,  is  all  the  choice  of  the  objeft  which  ever 
taketh  place.  The  mind  hath  no  perception  relative 
to  it,  different  from  the  perception  of  its  beauty^ 
which,  with  any  propriety,  can  be  called  c hoofing  it. 
There  is  no  a^ion  of  the  mind  towards  it,  befide  what 
is  neceffarily  included  in  the  idea  of  the  perception  of 
iis  beauty.  The  perception  of  the  beauty  of  an  object 
may  be  the  proper  caufe,  or  ground,  of  fome  outivard 
adion  relative  to  it  ;  but  it  is  not  the  caufe  and  ground 
of  choice^  nor  any  thing  diflinft  from  it. 

The  cafe  is  exaftly  parallel,  in  regard  to  the  mind's 
refufing  and  rejefting  any  thing.  That  which  dif- 
pleafeth  and  difgufteth  the  mind,  is  not  firll  perceived, 

and, 


Sea.  III.  MORAL    AGENCY.  6; 

and,  in  confequence  of  that  perception,  rejedled  :  for 
a  perception  of  the  clifguftfal,  difpleafing  quality,  is  all 
the  action,  motion,  or  perception,  the  mind  ever  feels, 
and  of  which  it  is  ever  conicioiis,  in  refufmg  and  re- 
jefting  it. 

It  hence  appeareth,  that  there  is  an  utter  impropri- 
ety in  faying  that  the  mind  is  governsd2.nA  determined 
by  ?iiotive  ;  if  the  expreffion  is  defigned  to  reprefent 
motive  as  tiie  caufe^  and  choice  or  volition  its  effl-d. 
In  the  fenfe  wherein  it  may  truly  be  affirmed,  of  moral, 
intelligent  beings,  that  they  aft  intlie  view  of  motives, 
and  are  under  the  influence  of  motives  ;  that  choice  of 
mind  and  voluntary  exercife  which  is,  properly  and  in 
the  moft  ftridl  fenfe,  their  adion^  and  the  influence  of 
motives  on  their  minds^  are  by  no  means  to  be  con- 
fidered  as  fuftaining  that  relative  diitinftion  which  is 
conveyed  by  the  terms  caiife  and  effe^.  To  view  the 
matter  in  fuch  a  light  as  this,  would  lead  to  evident 
inconfiftency  and  confufion. 

There  are  but  tv/o  fenfes  in  which  the  term  Motive 
is  commonly  made  ufe  of  among  men.  In  the  firft  of 
thefe,  it  importeth  the  very  choice  of  the  mind  it/elf: 
in  the  fecond,  the  external  objeiH  or  qualify  which 
doth,  or  ought  to,  terminate  it,  and  which  is  exhibited 
as  a  reafon,  in  the  view  of  which  the  mind  ought  to 
aft,  either  in  choofing,  or  refufmg. 

I.  The  word  Motive,  as  it  is  very  frequently  n^ed. 
in  common  converfation,  importeth  no  more  than 
fome  certain  perception  of  the  mind,  and  nothing 
different  from  the  real  choice  and  exercife  of  it.  The 
word  Motive  is  very  often  ufed  to  exprefs  the  views 
and  choice  of  the  mind,  in  diilinftion  from  outward 
aft,  or  objeft.  It  is  more  commonly  ufed,  I  believe, 
in  this  ^cn^G^  than  in  any  other  ;  it  being  very  rarely 
ufed  in  fuch  a  fenfe  as  to  carry  our  thoughts  back  to 
the  caufe  of  choice  or  voluntary  exertion.  Ufually 
where  it  is  fo  applied  as  to  lead  the  mind  to  confider 
a7iy  thing  in  relation  to  its  caiife^  it  is  outward  action. 
\Vhen  motive  is  confidered  as  caiije  or  antecedent^  its 
correlative  is  outward  aClion  llius 


^2  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  L 

Thus  by  the  motive  of  a6iion  we  mod:  commonly 
mean  that  particular  view,  ftate  or  cxercife  of  mind^ 
which  is  the  next  and  immediate  caufe  or  ground  of 
outward  aftion.  In  tlus  fenfe  -we  always  ufe  the  word 
when  we  fpeak  of  inquiring  into  the  vwtrces  of  men, 
in  order  to  judge  of  the  nature  of  their  actions  ;  or, 
rather,  of  their  charad:ers  by  their  adions.  It  feems 
to  be  an  eftablifhed  fentiment — a  maxim  among  man- 
kind— that  nothing  giveth  moral  denomination  to  out- 
ward anions,  but  the  internal,  mental  views  and  dif- 
pofition  from  whence  they  arife.  On  this  ground  it 
becometh  a  diftate  of  common  fenfe,  to  inquire  into 
the  77iotives  of  the  actions  of  men,  and  be  well  fatisfied 
what  they  were,  in  order  to  form  any  certain  judgment 
or  determination  concerning  them  :  meaning,  by  mo- 
tives^ nothing  prior  to  the  afts  and  exercifes  of  the 
mind,  or  dillindl  from  them.  Accordingly,  the  word 
Motive,  as  it  is  very  frequently  uied  among  men, 
intendeth  Client al  exercije  itjclj- — voluntary  exertion. 
When  it  bringeth  the  idea  of  caufe  at  all  into  view,  it 
is  in  relation  to  external  aCiion  as  its  effeft. 

II.  The  word  Motive,  when  it  is  not  ufed  in  the 
forementioned  fenfe,  denoteth  the  external  obieft  which 
doth,  or  ought  to,  engage  the  aifeclion,  and  terminate 
the  choice.  Here  it  is  ufed,  neither  for  volition  itfelf, 
nor  for  the  caufe  of  volition  ;  but  merely  for  external 
objedl. 

I.  The  word  Motive,  M^hen  it  implieth  fomething 
diftinft  from  mental  exercife — the  internal  difpofition 
— is  many  tim.es  ufed  to  (ignify  an  objeft  which  ought 
to  excite  and  engage  the  affedtions.  Thus  we  fpeak 
of  motives  of  interefr,  of  hope,  of  fear,  of  fricndfuip, 
&c.  Here  we  mean  reajons  drawn  from  the'  confider- 
ation  of  interefl,  or  friendfiiip,  which  do,  or  ought  to, 
engage  our  attention,  and  excite  fome  afi'edlion  :  or, 
reafons  and  confiderations  adapted  to  influence  hope, 
or^fear.  W^hich  is  as  much  as  to  fay,  that,  in  the  view 
and  conQderation  of  certain  reafons  or  truths  exhibited 
to  us,    we  commonly  do,     or  ought  to,  feel  a  concern 

for 


Sea.  III.  MORAL    AGENCY.  6f 

for  our  own  intereft  ;  or,  exercife  hope,  fear,  friend- 
Ihip,  ^c.  Or,  which  is  the  fame  thing,  in  the  view 
and  contemplation  of  fome  certain  reafons  and  truths, 
we  ought,  and  it  woukl  be  faitable,  to  exercife  hope  ; 
in  others,  fear  ;  in  others,  friendQiip.  In  this  fenfe 
we  ufe  the  phrafe.  The  motives  of  the  go/pel  ;  mean- 
ing only  the  7-eaf'ons  exhibited  in  the  gojpel^  why  men 
ought  to  forfake  their  fins,  and  turn  unto  God  ;  or, 
tlie  confiderations  which  do,  or  ought  to,  have  the 
weight  of  realbns  with  us  for  turning  unto  God.  The 
7notiues  of  the  gofpel  mean  the  reafons  there  exhibited, 
why  it  is  fuitablL;  and  proper  that  we  fliould  forfake 
our  fins,  and  become  true  penitents  and  believers.  In 
the  inftances  v.diich  have  been  mentioned,  it  is  evident 
that  the  term  motive  expreffeth  and  denoteth  merely 
external  objeft,  without, bringing  the  idea  of  cmife  at 
all  into  view.  It  is  very  manifeft,  that  by  the  term 
motive^  as  applied  in  the  forementioned  cafes,  is  not 
commonly  underftood  cau/e.  The  motives  held  up  to 
view  in  the  gofpel,  to  induce  and  perfuade  men  to  turn 
from  fin  to  God,  and  the  caufe  of  the  aiTtual  turning  of 
men — or  that  efficiency  which  produceth  this  effeft — 
are  two  quite  different  things.  Multitudes  have  many 
of  thefe  reafons  (motives)  full  in  view  ;  and  yet 
utterly  refufe  and  ncgledt  to  return.  So  multitudes 
behold  thofe  reafons  and  objefts,  in  the  view  of  which 
it  would  become  them  to  exercife  hope,  fear,  friendlhip^ 
&c.  and  yet  this  view  is  accompanied  with  none  of 
thefe  elfecls.  The  caufe  why  men  are  influenced  as 
they  ought  to  be  by  rea/ons  and  motives^  and  the  rea- 
fons and  motives  themfelves  in  the  view  of  which  they 
are  influeiiced^  are  quite  two  things,  altogether  dItTer- 
ent  from  each  other.  The  cauf  of  the  mind's  clofmg 
with  reafon  and  truth,  is  one  thing  ;  the  reajort  and 
truth  with  which  it  clofeth,  is  another.  The  ccnfe  of 
voluntary  exertion,  is  one  thing  ;  and  the  ohjeds  in 
the  view  of  which  inteiligencies  do  exert  t]:ieir  wills, 
is  another.  The  word  motive  is  never  ulcd  to  denote 
•the  former  ;    but  often,  the  latter.     It  often  meaneth 

tlie 


^4  ANESSAYdpf  Part  I. , 

'  the  renfon  by  which,  or  in  the  view  of  which,  men 
ought  to  feel  themfelves  biafTed  and  influenced  ;  but 
never  the  caufe  why  they  do,  in  faft,  feel  themfelves 
influenced  and  bialfed  by  reafon.     Accordingly, 

2.  When  we  inquire  upon  what  motive  it  is  that 
aiy  one  choofeth  or  relifheth  any  particular  object  ; 
we  mean,  by  the  inquiry,  only  to  know  what  certain 
quality  it  is,  in  a  more  complex  and  general  objeft, 
which  engageth  the  attention,  and  terminates  the 
choice  and  affection.  If  it  be  inquired,  for  inflance, 
upon  what  7notive  a  man  entertains  an  affection  for  a 
certain  woman  ;  all  that  is  fought  for  in  the  cafe,  is 
the  particular  quality  in,  or  belonging  to,  the  objeft, 
which  engageth  the  choice,  and  terminates  the  affec- 
tion 5  whether  it  is  wit,  beauty,  virtue,  or  a  good  for- 
tune. So,  likewife,  if  we  afk  upon  what  motives  a 
man  preferreth  a  private  life  to  a  public  ;  we  only 
mean  to  inquire,  what  are  the  particular  objects,  or 
circumftances,  attending  fuch  a  fituation,  which  engage 
his  choice  and  attention,  and  on  account  of  which  fuch 
a  fituation  appeareth  preferable  to  him.  Accordingly, 
if  the  objeft  relifhed  or  chofen.is  a  fimple  idea,  it 
would  be  efteemed  quite  impertinent  to  fay  any  thing 
about  motive  one  Avay  or  the  other.  Thus  if  any  one 
fhould  inquire  of  another  why,  or  upon  what  motive^ 
he  relifhed  the  tafle  of  an  orange,  or  the  fmell  of  a 
rofe,  he  would  not  be  thought  to  deferve  an  anfwer  : 
he  might,  with  as  much  reafon  and  propriety,  inquire 
why  the  fky  looks  blue,  or  the  fun  bright. 

Thefe  things  I  obferv^e,  to  fhew  that  the  word  Motive, 
as  in  common  ufe  among  men,  never  importeth  the 
cauje  of  voluntary  exertion — the  efficient  reafon  of  its 
being  brought  into  exiflence  ;  but  always,  either  the 
volition — the  voluntary  exertion  itfelf — or  the  objedt 
which  terminates  the  will,  and  engageth  the  affection. 
When  we  inquire  for  the  motive  of  outward  aCiion^ 
the  term  always  denotethx'(?//V/(?;7.  When  we  inquire 
upon  what  motives  a  perfon  choofeth  this  thing,  or 
the  other  ;  the  fenfe  of  the  word  Motive  is  always 
confined  to  outward  objed.  When 


Se(^.  III.  MORAL   AGENCY.  6y 

When  we  fay,  that  the  Mind  never  a<^eth  without 
motive,  or  that  there  is  never  an  aCi  of  choice  without 
a  motive  ;  the  fenfe  of  the  word  motive  muft  be  con- 
fined to  external  objecfl.  If  we  ufe  the  term,  in  this 
cafe,  in  the  fame  fenfe  in  which  we  do  wlien  we  are 
inquiring  the  reafons,  or  motives^  of  tlie  outward  con- 
dud:  of  men  ;  it  will  lead  to  mofl  manifeft  confufion. 
The  motive  of  outward  adion  is  volition — internal, 
mental  exertion.  To  fay,  therefore,  that  the  mind 
never  aCleth  or  choofeth  without  a  motive  (the  term 
ftill  retaining  the  fame  fenfe  which  it  doth  when  given 
as  a  reafon,  ground  or  fpring  of  outward  aftion)  is 
the  fame  as  to  fay,  that  the  mind  never  adeth  or  choof- 
eth^ unlefs  when  it  is  influenced  thereto  by  its  own 
adiion  and  choice  ;  that  is,  that  there  is  no  adion  or 
choice  of  the  mind,  but  fuch  as  hath  its  fource,  ground 
or  fpring  in  its  own  antecedent  a,(ftion  and  choice  : 
which  a  little  attention  will  fhew  to  be  ridiculous  and 
abfurd. 

But  if  by  the  term  Motive  we  mean  external  objed:, 
and  fay  that  there  can  be  no  aft  of  choice  without  a 
motive,  the  alTertion  will  undoubtedly  be  juft.  Choice 
and  affeftion  always  imply  objeit  ;  they  always  termi- 
nate upon  fomething.  It  is  ridiculous  to  talk  of  choice 
without  jnotivcy  in  this  fenfe  of  the  term  :  this  would 
be  to  fuppofe  that  the  mind  exerteth  an  aft  of  choice, 
and  yet  choofeth  nothing  ;  that  the  mind  choofeth,  and 
yet  nothing  is  chofen  :  that  is,  that  the  mind  choofeth 
nothing,  and  confequently  maketh  no  choice. 

But  having  explained  the  term  Motive,  and  men- 
tioned the  feveral  fenfes  in  which  the  word  is  ufcd  in 
common  language  among  men,  it  may  be  proper  to 
inquire,  more  particularly,  what  influence  motives  can 
have,  in  determining  the  volitions  of  men.  The  voli- 
tions of  men  are  often  reprefented  as  being  under  the 
influence  of  motives,  and  determined  by  tliem  ;  and 
motives  are  treated  of  as  caufes  of  afts  of  the  will.  It 
will  be  impoflible  to  judge  what  influence  motives  have 
in  the  taking  place  of  human  volition,  and  in  dcterjuin- 

I  iii2 


66  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  L 

mg  and  caufing  afts  of  the  will,  without  ftilly  under- 
ftanding,  and  fixing  precifely,  the  meaning  of  the  terms 
Caufe,  Influence,  Determination,  &c.  as  they  are  com- 
monly made  ufe  of,  relative  to  the  prefent  argument. 
For  the  better  underjftanding  of  this  matter,  I  would 
obferve  the  following  things. 

I.  That  the  infiue7ice  of  motives  upon  the  minds  of 
men,  and  the  efficient  caiife  of  volition,  are  far  from 
being  one  and  the  fame  thing.  When  we  Ipeak  of 
voluntary  exertion  as  being  under  the  influence  of  rtio- 
tive,  and  afts  of  will  as  being  deternnnedhy  motive  ; 
it  is  not  tq,  be  underflood,  that  we  are  treating  of  the 
efficient  caufe  of  volition,  or  that  power  and  efliciency 
which  origi?2ates  the  exigence  of  fuch  an  event,  and 
exerteth  a£live,  caufal  influence  for  the  produftion  of 
it.  When  we  are  treating  of  the  cdiifes  of  things,  we 
generally  ufe  the  term  Caufe  in  a  more  large  and  gene- 
ral fenfe  ;  rarely  defigning  to  treat  of  the  effiicient  rea- 
fo72  of  their  exifl:ence,  or  make  that  a  fubjeft  of  debate. 
Philofophers  do  not  ufe  the  term  in  this  fenfe,  in  their 
phylical  difquifitions  and  inquiries  ;  but  make  ufe  of 
it  to  denote  rather  an  antecedent  or  occafion  of  fomc 
.  certain  event,  than  the  efficient  reafon  of  its  exifl:ence. 
When  they  ufe  the  term  Caufe  in  its  moft  fl;rid:  fenfe, 
as  implying  efficiency  in  it,  and  carrying  the  idea  of 
aftive  influence  in  the  prodiiCiion  of  any  event,  in  the 
natural  world  ;  they  ever  refer  to  the  Deity,  the  great 
iirft  caufe,  whofe  confl:ant  efficiency  and  operation 
fupport  all  nature,  and,  agreeable  to  certain  eftabliflied 
rules  and  laws,  by  a  confl:ant  efficiency  and  power  pro- 
duce that  feries  of  events  which  we  conftantly  behold 
in  the  material  world. 

So,  when  we  are  inquiring  into  the  caufe  of  moral 
events  ;  if  we  ufe  the  term  in  fo  limited  a  fenfe  as  to 
include  only  the  idea  oi  produdive  injluence  and  effitcien- 
cy^  it  will  be  quite  prepoflerous  and  infignificant  to 
bring  motives  at  all  into  view,  or  make  any  mention 
of  them  ;  it  being  moft  obvious  and  plain,  that  they 
arc  not  the  canjes  of  volition.     When  we  are  inquiring 

into 


Sea.  III.  MORAL    AGENCY.  67 

into  the  Juiirces  of  things,  and  the  caufe  of  their  exig- 
ence ;  as  in  the  natural,  fo  in  the  moral  world,  we  are 
compelled  to  refolvc  all  into  tlie  divine  difpoial,  and  a 
certain  law,  or  mctliod,  of  conllant  divine  agency  and 
operation."*  ^Vhat  are  ufually  termed  Jecondary  cau- 
fes^  have  no  produclive  eillciency  and  euergy  in  them. 
And  when  we  fpeak  of  things,  in  the  natural-world,  as 
/Zc?i";fZo- on  each  other,  we  ufe  the  term  in  an  indirecc 
and  figurative  fenfe  ;  not  fuppofing  that  there  is  any 
aClion^  in  the  moil  Itrift  fenic,  any  where  but  in  one 
who  is  properly  en  agent^  and  who  exerts  infiiiejice^ 
-aniS.  putt eth  forth  efjiciency,  for  the  production  of  fom.e 
event.  To  reprefent  motives  as  tlie  cnujes  of  volition, 
in  the  flrift  and  proper  fenfe  of  the  term,  would  be  at 
once  to  inveft  them  with  agency,  and  make  them  moral 
beings.  VVlien,  therefore,  we  confider  motives  as  the 
caufes  of  adts  of  the  will,  the  idea  of  aftive  energy  and 
efficiency  mufl  be  carefully  excluded  from  the  expref- 
fion  ;  otherwife  it  will  betray  us  into  manifefb  error 
and  confulion. 

"Whenever  the  will  is  faid  to  be  governed  by  mo- 
tives, and  motives  are  repreiented  as  the  caiife  of  voli- 
tion ;  the  word  caufe,  it  mufl  be  carefully  renxember- 
ed,  implieth  nothing  more  than  an  occafion  of  the 
event  ;  or,  fomething  eflential  to  the  event,  and  witli- 
out  which  it  could  not  be  what  it  is.  In  this  fenfe 
motives  may  be  faid  to  be  the  caufes  of  volition,  and 
the  will  to  be  under  the  government  of  motives. 
Tlius,  fomething  in  fnow,  which  occafions  that  parti- 
cular appearance,  is  the  caufi^  of  its  whitcnefs  ;  and 
tlie  roundnefs  and  fmoothnels  of  its  particles,  the  caufe 
of  the  fluidity  of  water.  It  is  very  manifefl  that  the 
word  Caufe,  in  thefe  inllanccs,  denoteth  nothing  of 
I   2  efficiency  ; 

*  Dr.  Taylor  feemeth  to  be  of  tliis  opinion,  when  he  f:iitli,  '« I  do  not  know 
<'  tint  we  derive  any  thing  at  all  from  Adam,  t>ut  by  the  icill  and  operation  of 
<'  God — rfio  more  than  the  acorn  deriveth  from  the  oak.  It  is,  I  judge,  a  great 
«♦  ihoui^h  common  fallacy,  to  fuppoi'e  that  fomething  is  infufed  into  the  huinan 
"nature,  ablolutely  independent  of  ouvfelves,  and  not  from  the  luill  of  God." 
(See  Scrip.  Doc.  i:c.  p.  187.)  And  aj=;aiii,  "No  chan>;es  can  happen  in  our 
"  conftitution,  withaut  cither  the  a t>l> ointment,  cr  hnin.di.ite  operation,  of  God-'' 
p.  191. 


68  AnESSAYon  Parti. 

efficiency  ;  but  only  fomething  effentialto  the  whitenefs 
of  fnow,  and  the  fluidity  of  water. 

In  a  fenfe  analogous  to  this,  the  agreeable  appeara72ce 
of  any  thing  may  be  faid  to  be  the  cauje  of  our  choof- 
ing  it  ;  and  the  perception  of  fometliing  difarrreeable, 
the  caufe  of  our  diflike  and  averfion.  And  thus  the 
•will  may  be  faid  to  be  as  the  grente/i  apparent  good  is  ; 
jufl  as  the  fluidity  of  water  may  be  faid  to  be  as  the 
Jmoothnefs  and  roundnejs  of  its  particles  are  ;  or,  the 
folidity  and  hardnefs  of  any  thing,  as  the  clofenejs^  co- 
he  fion  or  fixednefs  of  its  parts.  But  to  fay,  that  agree- 
able and  difagreeablc  appearances  are  the  efficient  rea- 
fon  and  caufe  of  volition,  would  be  as  far  from  being 
true,  as  that  the  fmoothnefs  and  rotundity  of  the  par- 
ticles of  water  have  efficiency  in  them  to  produce  flui- 
dity and  fluctuation  ;  or,  that  nearnefs  and  fixednefs 
of  parts  have  efficiency  to  produce  folidity  and  hard- 
nefs as  their  effeCl.  An  agreeable  appearance  to  the 
mind,  is  no  more  diftin<fi:  from  choice,  than  a  fixednefs 
and  cohefion  of  parts  is  diftin<ft  from  folidity.  Agree- 
able and  difagreeable  appearances  and  perceptions  are 
efTcntial  ingredients  in  choice  and  averfion.  Nothing 
is  ever  chofen,  otherwife  than  as  being  agreeable  ;  or 
refufed,  otherwife  than  as  being  difagreeable.  This 
being  the  cafe,  we  have  accuftomed  ourfelves  to  fpeak 
of  an  agreeable  appearance,  as  the  caufe  of  choice  ; 
and  a  difagreeable  appearance,  as  the  caufe  of  ■a.\t\{\on. 

2 .  When  we  fpeak  of  the  determination  of  the  will^ 
there  is  equal  need  of  care  and  caution  that  we  do  not 
bring  into  view  the  idea  of  productive,  caufal  efficiency 
and  influence.  That  may  be  faid  to  determine  the 
will,  which  is  the  occafion,  or  reafon,  of  its  being  as 
it  is  and  not  otherwife.  Tlie  will  is  determined  by 
motive,  as  fight  is  determined  by  objed:,  and  hearing 
by  found.  Thus,  the  paper  before  me  determines  my 
fight  ;  and  the  found  which  now  laluteth  my  ears,  my 
hearing.  Yet  that  particular  perception,  or  -light, 
which  I  have  when  I  look  upon  the  paper  before  mq, 
is  not,  properly  Ipeaking,  caiifed  by  the  perception  of 

this 
? 


Sea.  III.  MORAL    AGENCY.  69 

this  objeft,  or  its  fenfibly  flriking  my  eye  ;  nor  is  my 
hearing  caiijeid  by  the  found  \rhich  faluteth  me  :  and 
yet  my  prefent  fight  may  properly  be  faid  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  paper  before  me  ;  and  my  hearing,  by 
tlie  found  which  ftrikes  and  falutes  me.  In  a  fenle 
fimilar  to  this,  volition  may  be  faid  to  be  excited  by 
motive,  and  the  will  determined  by  it. 

It  may,  alfo,  agreeable  to  the  fenfe  in  which  t"he 
term  is  frequently  ufed,  be  properly  faid,  that  motives 
have  influence  in  determining  the  will.  In  complex 
objects,  every  fmiple  idea  hath  i/z/Zz/^/zfc"  in  determining 
their  nature.  In  mixt  colours  every  ingredient  hath 
influence  in  determining  the  Hiade.  Yet  every  fmiple, 
of  which  the  compound  is  made,  hath  its  influence  only 
in  being  blended  with  the  others,  and,  as  it  were,  by 
incorporating  with  them.  So  motives  have  influence 
in  determining  the  will  ;  and  yet  they  have  no  influence 
any  otherwife  than  in  being  perceived  :  for  it  is  in  their 
being  perceived  that  they  determine  volition  to  be  as  it 
is,  and  not  otherwife.  This,  I  think,  muft  be  the 
fenfe  in  which  motives  may  be  faid  to  have  influence  in 
determining  the  will. 

3.  Motives  may  be  faid,  in  fome  fenfe,  to  have  a 
tendency  to  excite  volition,  and  engage  afieftion.  But 
whenever  this  is  affirmed  of  motives^  the  term  muft  be 
ufed  only  for  external  objeft  :  for  nothing  is  more 
manifeft,  than  that  motives  (external  objefts)  have  no 
degree  oi  aOive  efficiency  and  influence  upon  the  mind 
to  produce  volition  ;  nor  any  influence,  otherwife  than 
in  being  perceived.  The  will  feels  the  tendency  of  a 
m.otive  to  engage  its  choice,  in  -adual  choofmg  ;  as 
bodies  feel  (if  I  may  fo  fay)  their  mutual  tendency  to 
each  other,  only  in  being  attracted  and  drawn.  There 
is  a  foundation,  in  the  nature  of  things,  or  in  the  law 
of  divine  operation,  for  all  material  things  to  unite 
with  one  another.  This  foundation  for  this  natural 
union,  we  call  tendency.  This  tendency  is  in  every 
atom  in  the  whole  fyftem.  Yet  we  may  conceive  two 
different  atoms  placed  at  fuch-an  almoft  infinite  diftance, 

the 


70  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Parti. 

the  one  from  the  other,  as  to  have  no  degree  of  per- 
ceptible, difcernible  influence,  upon  each  other.  And 
though  in  their  prefent  fituation,  and  remote  diflance 
from  each  other,  no  fenfible  efi'eft  of  this  tendency  to 
each  other  appeareth ;  there  is,  neverthelefs,  the  fame 
foundation  in  thefe  atoms,  or  minute  particles  of 
matter,  for  producing  difcernible  effects  upon  one 
another,  upon  their  being  brought  within  the  fphere 
of  each  other's  attraftion,  as  there  is  in  any  two 
particles  of  matter  in  the  fyftem,  .however  nearly  pla- 
ced the  one  to  the  other.  This  adaptednefs  in  material 
things  to  produce  eftefts  upon  each  otlier,  is  common- 
ly termed  tendency  ;  though  it  is  nothing  more,  ftriclly 
fpeaking,  than  the  foundation  there  is,  in  a  certain  law 
of  conitant,  divine  operation,  for  the  taking  place  and 
coming  into  exiflence  of  fuch  particular  events  and 
effects. 

So,  alfo,  it  may  with  equal  propriety  be  obierved 
of  any  particular  kind  oifood  ov  fruit  which  we  never 
tafted,  or  faw — that  it  is  impoffible  it  Ihould  have  any 
influence  in  pleafing  the  palate,  or  gratifying  the  appe- 
tite, otherwife  than  in  brino  adiually  tafled  andrelijhed. 
The  favour  of  food,  or  fruit,  can  have  no  influence  in 
determining  our  love  to  it,  otherwife  than  in  being 
perceived  :  for,  in  perceiving  the  tafte  or  favour  of 
food  or  fruit,  is  all  the  love  or  hatred  to  either,  which 
ever  taketh  place.  But,  this  notwithflanding,  there  is 
fomething  in  the  nature  of  certain  kinds  of  food  and 
fruit — fomething  in  the  (liape,  fize,  fmoothnefs  or 
roughnefs  and  arrangement  of  the  parts,  or  in  the  tone 
of  the  itomach,  or  texture  of  the  palate — which  lays  a 
foundation  for  our  reliJJiing  the  food,  or  fruit,  as  foon 
as  they  are  tafted,  and  the  favour  of  them  is  known. 
The  foundation  there  is  in  the  nature  of  things,  under 
certain  circumftances,  for  this  effect,  is  what  I  mean 
to  exprefs  by  the  word  Tendency,  as  I  here  ufe  the 
term. 

This  tendency  may  be  predicated  with  equal  prot- 
priety,  both  of  the  palate,  and  of  the  food,  or  fruit. 

There 


Sea.  III.  MORAL    AGENCY.  71 

There  is  no  rrtore  tendency  in  the  food,  or  fruit,  to 
pleafc  the  palate,  than  there  is  in  the  palate  to  be  pleaj- 
ed\mt\\  the  food,  or  fruit  :  as  there  is  no  more  ten- 
dency in  the  earth  to  attract  the  bodies  which  iurrouud 
it,  than  there  is  in  furrounding  bodies  to  be  atU'aCicd 
by  it. 

Thefe  obfervations  may  ferve  to  illuftrate  the 
meaning  of  the  term  Tendency,  wdien  applied  to  mo- 
tives in  their  relation  to  volition,  and  previous  to  any 
perception  the  mind  hath  of  them.  No  tendency  of 
motives  to  volition  is  j^erceived  and  felt,  otherwife 
than  in  the  'aftnal  taking  place  and  exertion  of  choice. 
Yet  there  is  a  foundation  in  the  nature  of  things,  arif- 
ing  from  fome  certain  quality  in  objecis,  and  from  the 
particular  date,  temper  and  complexion  of  the  mind, 
for  their  being  chojen  whenever  thpy  (liall  be  known 
and  perceived,  and  as  foon  as  they  fhall  come  into  the 
view  of  tlie  mind.  Or,  fo  fpcak  more  agreeably  to 
ftrift,  philolophic  truth  ;  it  is  agreeable  to  tlie  confti- 
tution  of  God,  and  the  law  of  conftant  divine  opera- 
tion, that  fach  particular  ellecTiS  Oiould  invariably  take 
place  under  fnch  certain  circumftances,  and  coine  into 
exiftence  in  fuch  a  particular  fcries,  connexion  and 
order.  This  foundation  which  there  is  in  motives  for 
engaging  the  choice  and  ele6lion  of  the  mind,  or  in 
the  mind  itfelf  for  having  its  choice  and  election  r;?- 
^(iged  by  llich  objefts,  is  what  we  often  mean  to  ex- 
prefs  by  the  term  Tendency,  as  applied  botli  to  the 
mind  itfelf,  and  to  motives — external  objefts. 

In  this  fenfe  only  mufl  the  word  be  uled,  wlien  we 
fay  tliere  is  a  tejidency  in  motives  to  excite  volition  ; 
or,  a  tendency  in  the  mind  to  have  volition  excited  by 
motives.  There  is  no  other  tendency  than  this  in 
motives,  7vhi!e  mipcrceived^  to  excite  the  will  to  mo- 
tion and  a^ion  :  and  to  aiFirm  any  other,  will  not 
comport  with  the  ftrift  truth  of  things.  But  fuch  a 
tendency  as  this^  in  motives,  to  volition,  and  in  the 
v/ill  tp  be  influenced  hy  motives,  may  doubtlcfs  be  with 
trutlrafFirmcd.     And    fo    jli;.ong.r.nd    infupcrabk  are 

thefe 


72 


'  An    essay    on  Parti. 


thefe  mutual  tendencies  of  motives,  and  the  will  of 
moral  beings,  to  each  other  ;  and  fo  infeparable  the 
connexion  between  the  influence  of  the  former,  and 
the  exertions  of* the  latter  ;  that  no  objecH:,  with  qual- 
ities fuited  to  the  ftate,  temper  and  diipofition  of  the 
mind,  ever  cometh  into  its  view  without  being  actu- 
ally chofen.  Such  an  object  is  no  fooner  apprehended 
and  perceived  by  the  mind,  than  it  is  relifhed  and 
chofen.  And  fuch  was  the  antecedent  jflate  and  dif- 
pofition  of  the  mind,  and  fuch  the  adaptednefs  of  the 
obje^  with  its  qualities  to  that  particular  ftate  and 
temper  of  mind,  as  to  lay  a  foundation  for  choice, 
and  be  a  ground  of  the  certainty  of  it,  Vv'henever  the 
objedl  fhall  come  within  the  view  of  the  mind. 

Thefe  obfervations  may  ferve  to  fliew,  in  what  fenfe 
the  human  will  may  be  faid  to  be  governed  and  deter- 
minedhy  motives^  and  how  the  exertions  of  it  are  under 
their  influence.  And  it  from  hence  appeareth,  that 
motives  are  never  to  have  caufal  influence  and  efli- 
ciency  attributed  to  them  ;  nor  to  be  confidered  as 
caiifes  in  any  other  view  than  as  being  efjential  to  the 
exercifes  of  human  will  and  affedlion.  If  thefe  things 
were  properly  conildered,  and  kept  in  view,  I  am 
humbly  of  opinion,  that  we  fliould  not  find  the  appear- 
ance of  fuch  inconfiftency  and  abfurdity  in  what  Mr. 
Edwards  hath  faid  upon  the  nature  and  influence  of 
motives  in  determining  the  volitions  of  moral  agents, 
as  the  Author  of  the  Examination  of  his  Inquiry  on 
Freedom  of  Will,  would  perfuade  the  public  to  believe 
may  be  faflened  upon  him. 

It  is  often  faid,  that  the  brute  creation  are  governed 
by  injiin^  ;  mankind — rational,  moral  agents — by  mo- 
tives. By  thefe  expreflions,  as  in  common  ufe  among 
men,  we  mean  no  more  than  to  diftinguifli  the  differ- 
ent caufes  of  the  oiitxuard  adions  of  men,  from  thofe  of 
the  beafts.  "VS'^e  are  greatly  in  the  dark  as  to  the  par- 
ticular law  of  operation,  under  the  influence  of  which 
tlie  adlions  of  the  brutal  part  of  onr  world  take  place. 
But  finding  it  very  diflinguifliable  from  that  under  the 

operation 


Seft.  III.  MORAL   AGENCY.  f^ 

operation  and  influence  of  which  trees  and  plants  thrive 
and  flourifti,  and  apparently  of  a  nature  far  fuperior  to 
it ;  and  yet  much  inferior  to  the  moral  habits  of  man- 
kind ;  we  have  given  it  the  name  of  m/iindi,  without 
affixing  any  very  diftin^H:,  determinate  ideas  to  the 
term.  However,  wc  can  certainly  mean  nothing  more 
by  it,  than,  in  general,  that  law  of  operation,  under 
the  influence  of  which  the  motions  we  behold  in  then! 
take  place. 

When  we  fpeak  of  the  laws  of  our  nature,  we  are 
under  better  advantages  for  affixing  diftin£t,  determi- 
nate ideas  to  the  expreffion.  Here  v/e  have  our  own 
feelings  and  perceptions  to  guide  our  inquiries.  When 
we  fay,  that  moral,  intelligent  beings  are  governed  by 
motives  ;  meaning  by  the  expreffion  to  intimate  the 
law  of  tkeir  nature,  under  the  influence  of  which  their 
aCiions — what  is  vifible  to  others — take  place  ;  wc 
have  the  concurring  {tii^^  and  univerfal  feelings  of 
mankind,  to  illuftrate  and  give  fignificancy  to  the  ex- 
preffion. When  we  fay,  that  rational  beings  are  gov- 
erned by  motives,  and  their  adions  are  the  fruit  of 
their  influence  ;  the  moft  natural  and  obvious  meaning 
of  the  expreffion  is,  that  their  condu(5l,  their  anions, 
are  the  fruit  of  voluntary  choice  and  defign.  The 
conduft  and  a6lions  of  beafts  are  the  fruit  of  a  certain 
law  of  their  natures,  which  we  term  infl:in£t  :  the  con- 
duft  of  men,  the  fruit  of  free,  voluntary  election. 
But,  that  this  voluntary  defign  and  choice,  which  are 
the  caufe  and  ground  of  outward  a£lion,  are  them- 
felves  alfo  the  effe«5t  of  vohmtary  defign  and  choice  5 
that  the  free,  voluntary  election  of  the  mind,  from 
whence  outward  aftions  proceed,  are  themfelves  alio 
the  effisd:  oi  the  free,  voluntary  eleftion  of  the  fame 
7nind  ;  is  what  never  entereth  the  thoughts  of  the  vul- 
gar ;  being  a  refinement  upon  metaphyfics  and  com-* 
mon  fenfe,  for  which  we  are  indebted  to  that  uncom- 
mon freedom  of  thought  and  inquiry,  which  hath 
greatly  prevailed  in  theie  latter  ages  of  the  world. 

When  we  fay,  that  mankind  are  governed  by  motives  ; 

K  the 


74  An    E  S  S  A  Y    o^J  Part  L 

the  original,  natural  meaning  of  the  expreffion  is,  thafe 
their  (outward)  conduft  is  under  the  influence  of 
free,  voluntary  defign,  and  the  fruit  of  it.  But  it  no 
more  leads  us  to  apprehend,  that  this  intelligent,  vol- 
untary defign  is  itfelf  the  fruit  and.eft'ed:  of  voluntary 
defign  in  the  fa77ie  beings  than  the  expreffion,  that  the 
v/heels  of  a  watch  are  under  the  government  of 
fpringG,  leadeth  us  to  imagine  that  the  elaftic  power  of 
the  fpring,  -which  a£teth  immediately  upon  the  wheels, 
is  alfo  the  eiFe<Sl:  of  fome  other  elaftic  power  and  force. 

In  judging  of  the  moral  quality  of  aftions,  mankind 
never  carry  their  inquiries  farther  back  than  to  the  in- 
ternal, voluntary  defign  of  the  agent.  When  this  is 
formed,  we  have  all  the  ground  to  form  a  judgment 
upon,  that  is  ever  defired.  Mankind  evidently  Hand 
ill  need  of  fome  mark,  or  period,  within  which  to 
bound  and  limit  their  inquiries  into  the  morality  of 
aftions.  The  univerfal  fenfe  of  men  hath  marked  in- 
telligent defign — free,  voluntary  election — as  this  pe- 
riod ;  being  the  utmoft  limit  of  all  reafonable  inquiry 
after  caufe^  ill  order  to  determine  the  charaders  of 
men,  and  the  morality  of  aftions. 

When,  therefore,  we  fay,  that  intelligent,  moral  be- 
ings are  governed  by  motives  ;  we  ufually  mean  to 
diftinguifh  the  next  immediate  caufe  oi  human  adJiofiSy 
from  the  caufe  of  other  vifible  effefts  which  take  place 
in  the  inferior  works  of  creation — the  natural  world. 
The  expreffion  importcth,  that  the  former  are  the  fruit 
of  shoice- — of  free,  voluntary  defign  ;  but  that  the  lat- 
ter arife  out  of  fome  certain  law  of  divine  operation, 
v/ithout  any  de/ign  whatever^  or  any  intention  any 
where,  except  in  him  who  eftabliflied  fuch  a  law  of 
operation,  and  gave  energy  and  efficiency  to  it. 

Thefe  obfervations,  I  am  humbly  of  opinion,  make 
it  manifefl,  that  the  inquiry  concerning  motives,  ac- 
cording to  the  ufe  of  the  term  in  common  language, 
never  carrieth  the  mind  farther  back  than  to  the  jja- 
/«/Y^  of  volitions — the  real  voluntary  defign  and  pur- 
pofe  of  the  heart.     What  is  the   ground   and  efficient 

caufe 


Sea.  IV.  MORAL    AGENCY.  75 

caufe  of'oolition^  is  a  fubjeft  which  fallcth  under  an  en- 
tirely different  head  of  inquiry.  "What  tlie  caufe  o^ 
volition  is,  may,  perhaps,  be  a  fubjeft  worthy  of  at- 
tention, and  fit  to  employ  the  talents  of  inquifitive, 
contemplative  minds  ;  but  this  is  a  fubjedt  which  by 
no  means  belongeth  to  the  inquiry  concerning  moral 
liberty  and  agency,  which  has  fo  long  engaged  the  ge- 
niufes  and  pens  both  of  the  advocates  for,  and  oppo- 
fers  of,  the  free,  fovereign  and  glorious  grace  of  God. 


S  E  c  T.     IV. 

fVherein  Virtue  and  Vice  are  fliouon  to  confift  in  the 
Nature  of  the  internal  difpojitions  and  inclinations  of 
7nen^  in  dijiindion  from  their  Caufe. 

IT  is  a  fentiment  very  obnoxious  to  man)?-,  that  the 
elTence  of  virtue  and  vice  confifteth  in  the  nature 
of  difpofitions  and  inclinations,  and  not  in  their  caufe. 
The  Author  of  the  Examination  of  the  late  Prefident 
Edwards's  Inquiry,  &c.  appears  to  be  particularly  dif- 
fatisfied  with  it  ;  and  treats  Mr.  Edwards's  argument 
upon  this  fubjeft  with  contempt.  He  fpeaks  of  it  as 
matter  of  furprife  to  him,  to  find  a  Gentleman  of  Mr. 
Edwards's  abilities  ''  ufing  fo  weak  an  argument,  del- 
*'  cending  to  fo  thin  a  fubtilty  as  this,  that  the  efTencc 
"  of  virtue  and  vice  is  not  in  their  caiife^  but  in  their 
'■^nature.''  (p.  50.)  And  faith,  that  "  nothing  can  be 
^'  more  futile  than  the  evalion,  that  the  cffence  of  vir- 
"  tue  and  vice  lies  in  the  nature  of  volition. '^  (p.  66.) 
It  might  have  been  expefted  of  a  Gentleman  of  pene- 
tration and  difcernment,  that  he  would  have  expofed 
t\\t  fubtil fophi/iry  of  Mr.  Edwards's  argument  on  this 
fubjeft.  and  removed  the  thin  veil  which  covereth  it, 
that  it  might  appear  in  its  own  native  iveaknefs  and/}^- 

tility.      But  the  Ex r,  as  it  appears  to  me,  hath 

made  ufe  of  no  argument  to  confute  this  pofition  of 
Mr.  Edwards,  but  what  that  Author  had  fuificiently 

K  2  obviated 


76  AnESSAYon  Parti. 

and  refuted  in  that  fedion  wherein  he  particularly 
handleth  the  fubjedl. 

But  whether  it  be  an  opinion  agreeable  to  reafon 
and  common  fenfe,  that  the  virtue  and  vice  of  man's 
internal  difpoiitions  and  inclinations  confift  in  the  ?2a- 
iure  of  thofe  difpoiitions  and  inclinations  themfelves, 
in  diftind:ion  from  their  caufe^  I  propofe  to  make  the 
fubje£t  of  particular  and  careful  examination,  in  the 
prefent  feftion. 

And  ''as  no  authority  can  be  of  equal  weight  to" 
cftablifh  "  this  pofition  as  the  Authors  own,  we  beg 
*'the  Reader  would  confider  the  following  paiTages  ; 
*'  which  are  To  full  to  our  purpofe,  that  we  are  faved 
*'  the  trouble"  of  fo  long  and  laboured  a  proof  of  the 
point,  as  might  otherwife  be  thought  ncceffary.  He 
tells  us  (p.  31.)  that  "  all  moral  good,  or  evil,  con- 
"  fifls  in  the  disposition  or  state  of  the  mind,  or 
*'  will."  He  faith,  and  foundeth  an  argument  upon  it, 
(p.  46.)  *'  that  wickednefs  lies  in  the  state  of  the 
*'  will."     And  in  p.  49,  he  fpeaks  of  afts    of  the  will 

as   ODIOUS    "  IN   THEIR   OWN   NATURE."      In    p.  96, 

our  Author  placeth  wickednefs  in  the  perfon's  design 
and  INTENTION.  And  in  the  following  page  fpeaks 
of  a  willing  or  unwilling  mind^  as  the  objed  of  approha-' 
tion^  or  the  contrary.  And,  more  than  all  this,  our 
Author  fays,  (p.  65.)  "  For  he  (Mr.  Edwards)  very 
*-^  juftly  obferves,  that  the  essence  o^  all  moral  good 
*'  or  evil  lies  in  the  internal  inclinations^  diJpoCitionSy 
*'  volitions,^*  And  lower  down,  on  the  fame  page, 
*'  That  vice  and  virtue  lie  in  the  /late  or  frame  of  the 
"  foul,  aftd  in  this  otily,"  What  could  he  have  faid 
more  direct  and  full  to  the  prefent  cafe  ?  If  all  moral 
evil  confifleth  in  the  dijpofition  or  flate  of  the  mind  or 
will  ;  then  none  of  it  confifteth  in  the  caiife  of  the  dif- 
pofition,  or  flate  of  the  mind.  And,  if  a61s  of  the 
v/ill  are  odious  in  their  owv  nature  ;  the  odioufnefs  of 
a6ls  of  the  will  doth  not  lie  in  their  cauje.  If  wicked- 
nefs lies  in  the  Jiate  of  "  the  will,"  it  doth  not  lie  in 
\}a&  caufe  of  this  ftate.     And  if  it   is  with  ju/iice  that 

Mr« 


Sea.  IV.  MORAL    AGENCY.  77 

Mr.  Edwards  obferves,  that  the  ejfence  of  all  moral 
good  and  evil  lies  in  the  internal  inclinations,  Sec.  then 
the  efTence  of  ?ione  of  it  lieth  in  their  caufe.  Upon 
thefe  principles  there  is  nothing  more  manifeft,  than 
that  virtue  and  vice  confift  in  the  nature  of  the  difpo- 
(itions  and  inclinations  of  men,  in  diftindbion  from 
their  caufe.  But,  if  it  were  only  allowed,  that  fame 
degree  of  virtue,  or  vice,  is  to  be  found  in  the  voli- 
tions  of  men,  confidered  as  abftra£ted  from  their  caufe;- 
this  would  fufficiently  prove,  that  virtue  and  vice  are 
not  incoftfiftent  with  a  certain,  infallible  connexion  in 
things  ;  and,  that  it  is  by  no  means  effential  to  the 
ideas  of  virtue  and  vice,  that  they  ihould  be  utterly 
unconned:ed  with  all  antecedent  ground,  reafon  or 
caufe  of  their  exiftence.  But  it  is  not  only  allowed, 
by  our  Author,  that  there  may  be  forne  degree  of  vir- 
tue and  vice  in  voluntary  exercifes  themfelves  ;  but 
it  is  infifled,  that  this  is  the  very  feat  of  virtue  and 
vice  ;  aCis  of  the  will  being  odious  i?i  their  own  nature  ; 
and  that  "  all  moral  good  and  evil  confift  in  the  difpo- 
"  fition  or  ftate  of  the  mind,  or  will."  In  this  full  and 
exprefs  manner  doth  our  Author  give  his  opinion  in 
favour  of  the  argument  under  confideration  ;  though 
in  Mr.  Edwards  he  ftyleth  it  "  a  thin  fubtilty,  a  futile 
cvafion." 

There  are  other  things  in  our  Author,  which,  by 
fair  deduction,  inconteftibly  prove  the  point  under 
confideration  ;  and  do  moft  certainly  fhcw,  that  the 
elfence  of  virtue  and  vice  is  not  in  their  caufe^  but  in 
their  nature.  Yea,  the  leading  fentiments  of  his 
whole  book — the  principal  point  in  which  all  his  ar- 
guments centre — taketh  for  granted  this  very  fenti- 
ment,  and  muft  immediately  lofe  all  fupport,  if  this 
opinion  and  principle  fail.  Our  Author  very  ftrenu- 
oufly  contendeth,  that  a  power  oi  felf-determination  in 
men,  and  of  originating  motion  in  themfelves,  is  ef^ 
fential  to  moral  agency  and  liberty  : — that  aiSts  of  the 
will  muft  be  felf -originated^  in  order  to  have  moral 
quality  predicable  of  them.     And  he  fpeaks  of  it  as 

being 


78  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  L 

being  tnofl  unreafonable  to  fuppofe,  that  ''  mere  ef- 
"  fe6ls  fliould  be  thought  virtuous,  or  vicious,  and 
*'  not  the  caufe  that  produced  them  ;"  or,  that  the 
paffhe  efFedl  could  have  another  ''  and  diftincl  wick- 
'^  ednefs  from  that  of  its  caufe/'  (p.  66.)  According 
to  our  Author,  nothing  can  be  more  abfurd  and  irra- 
tional than  to  fuppofe  the  exercifes  of  the  will,  or 
voluntary  exertions,  in  men,  to  be  the  fruit  of  any- 
external  influence  and  caufe,  for  this  very  reafon^  that 
fuch  a  fuppofition  would  be  quite  inconfiftent  with  the 
opinion  that  voluntary  exertions  are  either  virtuous, 
or  vicious.  To  fuppofe  that  they  arofe  from  the  in- 
fluence of  any  external  caufe,  would,  in  his  view,  im- 
mediately flrip  them  of  all  moral  quality,  and  render 
exercifes  of  will  unfit  ojed:s  of  either  praife  or  blame. 
So  elfential  is  it,  in  his  view,  to  the  virtuoufnefs  and 
vicioufnefs  of  the  exercifes  of  the  will,  that  they 
fhould  be  utterly  uneonnedted  with  antecedent,  extrin- 
fie  caufe. 

But  if  thefe  things  are  fo,  can  any  thing  be  more  ab- 
furd than  to  feek  for  the  effence  of  virtue  and  vice  m 
their  cauje  f  Our  Author  infifleth,  that  all  virtue  and 
vice  confift  in  the  (late  and-  dijpofition  of  the  mind  ; 
and  that  ads  ofwilliii2Ly  be  odious  in  their  own  nature  : 
and  not  only  fo,  but  that  it  is  effential  to  their  being 
either  virtuous  or  vicious,  that  they  fliould  be  of  fuch 
a  peculiar  nature  as  to  need  the  alfiftance  of  no  extrin- 
lic  caufe  in  order  to  their  gaining  exiflence.  Can  any 
thing  more  infallibly  and  beyond  all  contradidlioii 
prove  that  the  effence  of  virtue  and  vice  cloth  certain- 
ly confift,  not  in  their  caufe,  but  in  their  nature  ? 
That  the  virtue  and  vice  of  volitiojis  fhould  lie  in  their 
caufe^  is  fo  far  from  being  true,  upon  our  Author's 
principles.,  that  it  is  utterly  inconfiftent  with  all  ideas 
of  their  being  either  virtuous  or  vicious.,  to  fuppofe  that 
they  have  any  connexion  whatfoever  with  a7iy  antece- 
dent caufe. 

If  it  fliould  be  urged,  that  moral  evil  and  deformity 
are  not  properly  and  directly  predicable  of  volitions 

themjclves^ 


9ea.  IV.  MORAL    AGENCY.  7$ 

themjblvcs^  but  of  man  exercifmg  and  putting  forth  a<Sts 
of  will  ;  this  would  flill  fuppofe  the  efTence  of  virtue 
and  vice  to  confifl,  not  in  their  caufe,  but  in  their  na- 
ture. For  our  Author  urgeth,  that  man,  in  his  volun- 
tary exertions,  is  not  the  fubjeft  of  any  external  in- 
fluence ;  and  as  to  that  exertion  which  is  deemed  either 
virtuous  or  vicious,  is  to  be  confidered  as  unconnefted 
with  all  caufe.  The  vice  or  virtue,  therefore,  which 
is  predicated  of  the  man,  in  the  exercifes  of  his  luill^  is 
to  be  fought  in  the  man  exercifmg  and  putting  forth  ad:s 
of  will  ;  and  not  in  any  thing  which  is  a  caufe ^  where- 
of maji  cxercifing  and  puttiiig  forth  aCls  of  "Voill  is  the 
effect:. 

But  that  there  can  be  no  reafon  or  confiftency  in 
placing  the  virtue  and  vice  of  the  internal  difpofitions 
and  inclinations  of  men  in  any  thing  diflinft  from  the 
difpofitions  or  inclinations  themfelves,  may  be  far- 
ther and  flill  more  clearly  argued  from  the  following 
confiderations. 

I.  If  the  virtue  and  vice  of  the  voluntary  exercifes 
and  internal  inclinations  of  men,  d,o  not  confifl  in  thefe 
exercifes  and  inclinations  themfelves,  they  do  not  con- 
fifl in  any  thing.  Whatever  virtue  or  vice  there  may 
be  in  other  things^  it  is  not  the  virtue  or  vice  of  the 
exercifes  of  the  ivill.  \^  exercifes  of  the  will  are  virtuous 
or  vicious,  that  virtue  or  vice  mufl  not  be  found  i7i 
thefe  exercifes^  and  be  predicated  of  them.  If  there 
can  be  found  nothing,  either  virtuous  or  vicious,  hi 
the  nature  of  voluntary  exercife  ;  it  is  certain  that 
voluntary  exercife  is  improperly  made  the  fubjeCf^  of 
wliich  moral  quality,  either  virtue  or  vice,  is  the  pre- 
dicate. If  virtue  and  vice  are  not  to  be  fought  in  tlie 
things  deemed  virtuous  and  vicious,  they  are,  of 
courfe,  not  to  be  fought  in  any  thing.  If  we  mufl  flill 
be  referred  to  the  caife  of  that  which  appearcth  to  us 
to  be  either  beautiful  or  deformed,  it  is  a  plain  caie 
that  we  never  fliall  come  to  the  thiiig  2 tfelf  \v\\ic\\  is, 
in  its  own  nature^  morally  beautiful  or  deformed — and 
for  this  very  obvious  reafon,  viz.  That  nothing  is  fo, 

in 


8o  AnESSAYoji  Parti. 

in  /■''/  own  nature  ;  but  only  in  its  caufe.  What  can 
be  more  obvious  than  that,  upon  thefe  principles,  the 
difcovery  of  the  true  nature  of  virtue  and  vice  doth, 
and  ever  muft,  flee  before  the  inquirer,  as  faft  as  he  can 
purfue.  W^hen  he  hath  carried  his  inquiries  to  ever 
fo  great  a  length,  he  is  no  nearer  a  difcovery  than 
when  he  firft  entered  upon  the  fubjeft.  Like  our  own 
fhadow,  it  efcapeth  us  as  fail  as  we  can.  purfue.  The 
grand  obje£l  of  purfuit,  however  feemingly  near  and 
within  our  reach,  ftill  eludes  our  grafp,  and  ever  will ; 
and  nothing,  on  this  fuppofition,  can  be  more  idle  and 
fruitlefs  than  to  make  an  inquiry  like  this  the  objed:  of 
purfuit^ 

There  is,  indeed,  a  mofl:  palpable  abfurdity  and  in- 
confiflency  in  reprefenting  the  quality  of  any  thing  to 
confift,  not  in  the  nature  of  the  thing  itfelf,  but  in  its 
caufe.  To  fpeak  of  the  virtue  and  vice  of  voluntary 
inclinations  and  exertions^  not  as  confifting  in  the  incli- 
nations and  exertions  themfelves,  but  in  fomcthing  elfe 
quite  diftin(ft  from  them,  is  to  talk  unintelligibly,  and 
without  meaning.  How  is  it  poffible  for  any  one, 
from  fuch  reprefentations  as  thefe,  to  determine  where 
virtue  or  vice  is  5  or  to  form  any  manner  of  idea  or 
conception  of  any  fuch  quality,  or  know  that  there 
ever  was,  or  is,  or  can  be,  any  fuch  thing  ?  We  may 
with  as  much  propriety  fay,  that  the  colour  of  a  piece 
of  cloth  confifls  in  the  dyer  ;  or,  that  the  perfume  of 
ointment  is  in  the  apotliecary.  We  may  as  well  fay, 
that  the  fournefs  of  grapes  confifteth  in  the  vine  that 
bore  them  ;  or,  the  putrefa<ftion  of  a  carcafe,  in  the 
air  which  occafioned  it.  I  may  appeal  to  any  one, 
whether  it  is  poffible  for  us  ever  to  apprehend  his 
ideas  of  colour  and  perfume^  who  fpeaks  of  them  as  con- 
fifting in  the  dyer  and  the  apothecary  ;  or,  of  fournefs 
and  putrefaction,  ivho  reprefents  them  as  being  in  the 
vine,  or  in  the  air  which  furroundeth  us.  As  impoffi- 
ble  will  it  be,  I  may  venture  to  aflert,  ever  to  get  his 
ideas  of  moral  beauty  and  deformity,  and  comprehend 
his  meaning  of  the  terms,  who  reprefcnteth  the  vir- 

tuoufnefs 


86^:. IV.  MORAL   AGENCY.  81 

tuoufnefs  and  vicioufnefs  of  voluntary  exertions  and 
internal  difpofitions^  as  confifting,  not  in  the  dilpofitions 
themfelvcs,  but  in  their  cauje, 

II.  To  place  the  effence  of  virtue  and  vice,  not  in 
their  nature^  but  in  tlieir  caiife^  cxcludetli  all  pollibility 
of  fin  ;  and  denies  it  to  be  conceivable  that  any  fucli 
event  fhould  ever  take  place.  According  to  this  argu- 
ment, whatever  hath  a  caufe,  cannot  be  iinful  ;  for  the 
fmfulnefs  of  any  thing  lieth,  not  in  the  nature  of  it, 
but  in  its  caufe.  That  which  hath  not  a  caufe,  but  is 
felf-exiflcnt,  cannot  be  Iinful,  for  this  as  well  as  other 
reafons,  that  fmfulnefs  doth  not  lie  in  the  nature  of 
things,  but  in  their  caufe.  But  this^  by  the  fuppofition, 
having  nothing  but  its  nature^  or  what  is  to  be  found 
271  the  nature  of  it,  predicable  of  it  5  it  being  itfelf 
without  caufe  ;  can  for  this  reaj'on  have  no  vice 
charged  to  its  account.  That  which  is  an  effect  can- 
not be  vicious,  becaufe  the  vicioufnefs  of  any  thing  is 
to  be  charged  to  ir.s  caufe.  That  which  is  only  a  caufe^ 
being  in  no  refpefts  the  eifed:  of  any  thing  elfe,  cannot 
be  finful  :  "  For  nothing  can  be  more  futile  than  the 
"  evafion,  that  the  eifence  of  virtue  and  vice  confifts 
*'  in  their  nature^  not  in  their  cauje.'^  What  can  be 
more  manifefl  than  that,  according  to  fuch  a  method 
of  reafoning,  it  is  abfolutely  impoflible  there  ever 
fhould  be  any  fuch  thing  as  fin. 

Befides  :  If  the  evil  of  fin  lieth  in  its  caufe,  this  fup- 
pofeth  that  it  hath  a  caufe  ;  and  that^  fuch  an  one  as  is 
extrinfic.  of  itfelf.  To  reprefent  the  caufe  of  volition 
as  fomething  which  is  contained  in  volition  itfeli',  and 
not  extrinfic  of  it,  is  utterly  to  confound  caufe  and 
ejfeCi^  and  to  deftroy  that  relative  diftindion  wiiich 
really  fubfifteth  between  them.  Therefore,  I  fay,  to 
fpeak  of  the  evil  of  v^olition  as  lying  in  its  caule,  lup- 
pofeth  that  it  hath  a  caufe  out  of  itfelf ;  and  that  it 
came  into  exiftencc  by  the  influence  and  operation  of 
that  caufe.  On  this  hypothecs,  therefore,  I  would  in- 
quire, where  we  are  to  find  the  evil  of  l\\Q  firft  fin  that 
ever  took  place  ?  by  the  fuppoiition  the  firfl  fin  had  a 

L  caufe, 


82  An    E  S  S  A  Y   ON  '         Parti. 

caufe,  and  that  fiich  an  one  as  "was  out  of  itfelf.  Yet 
this  cauje  oi\he:firfi  fin  could  not  be  fmful  :  this  would 
be  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Nor  could  its  efftCi  be 
fmful,  becaufe  it  did  not  proceed  from  a  fi^iful  caufe  : 
— a  confideration  effential  to  the  evil  of  any  thing,  in 
the  view  of  thofe  Gentlemen  who  are  advocates  for 
that  notion  of  Freedom  which  I  mean  to  oppofe.  Ac- 
cording to  their  definitions,  neither  caufe  nor  effed 
could  poflibly  be  fmful.  Yet,  it  being  an  inconteftible 
faft,  that  there  was  ^firfi  fin  /  and,  according  to  thefe 
Gentlemen,  it  being  effential  to  the  very  being  of  it, 
that  it  fhould  arife  out  o?fo?ne  caife  ;  how  can  it  be 
but  that  it  arofe  out  of  the  great  First  Cause,  and 
from  his  energy  and  efficiency  ? 

Thus  do  their  notions,  that  the  eyil  of  fm  arifeth 
altogether  from  its  caufe  and  confifleth  in  the  caife^  as 
neccffarily  and  palpably  make  God  the  author  and  effi- 
cient caufe  of  fin,  as  any  of  thofe  obnoxious  doftrines 
that  were  ever  advanced  by  the  mofl  rigid  fatalift  that 
ever  wrote. 

When  our  Author  termet^  Mr.  Edwards's  obferva- 
tion,  that  "  the  effence  of  virtue  and  vice  is  in  their 
nature^  not  in  their  caufe,"  a  weak  argument^  thinfiih- 
tilty^  &c.  I  am  at  a  lofs  to  know  whether  he  meaneth, 
in  reference  to  the  truth  of  the  proportion,  or  the  per- 
tinency of  it  to  his  general  argument.  If  the  Ex — r 
fpeaks  in  reference  to  the  truth  of  the  obfervation, 
when  he  calleth  it  "  a  weak  argument,  thin  fubtilty,'^ 
&c.  he  ought,  at  leafl,  to  have  taken  fome  notice  of 
the  reafons  upon  which  Mr.  Edwards  groundeth  his 
affertion.  But  fmcc  he  hath  not,  the  critical  reader 
will  perhaps  think  that  he^  not  Mr.  Edwards,  ufeth 
nveak  argunie?2ts^  defcendeth  to  thin  fubtilties .  So  far  is 
he  from  juflifying  his  oppofition  to  Mr.  Edwards  in 
this  point,  that  he  hath,  repeatedly,  fully  and  exprefsly, 
afferted  the  fame  thing  ;   as  I  have  already  fhown. 

If  our  Author  treats  this  argument  of  Mr.  Edwards's 
with  contempt,  becaufe  he  imagines  it  impertine^it  to 
that  Author's  general  argument,  I  cannot  think  that  he 
dothit  juftice.  \Mien 


Sea.  IV.  MORAL    AGENCY.  83 

When  it  is  urged  by  Objeftors,  that  it  is  inconfiftent 
with  the  virtuoufnefs,  or  vicioufnefs,  of  internal  clif- 
pofitions  and  inclinations,  to  fuppofe  that  they  (lioiild 
proceed  from  fome  antecedent  caufe  with  which  their 
exiftcncc  was  connected  ;  and,  that  the  connexion  of 
volition  with  any  antecedent  caufe,  ground,  or  reafon, 
of  its  exiflence,  is  inconfiflent  with  all  ideas  of  its  hav- 
ing moral  quality,  either  virtue  or  vice,  predicablc  of 
it  :  when,  I  fay,  fuch  an  objedion  as  this  is  urged 
againft  that  infallible  certainty  and  connexion  in  things, 
which  Mr.  Edwards  was  endeavoring  to  illuflrate  and 
prove  ;  could  any  thing  be  more  natural,  more  perti- 
nent to  his  argument,  than  to  fliew  that  the  virtue  and 
vice  of  volitions  confift,  not  in  the  caufe  or  antecedent 
ground  of  thefe  volitions,  but  in  the  nature  of  them  ? 
Every  impartial  reader  mull  fee  that  fuch  a  reply ^  to 
fuch  an  ohjedion^  could  not  be  impertinent.  I  cannot 
but  think  that  the  Ex — r  himfclf,  upon  a  revievv^  of  the 
matter,  will  be  convinced  that  he  hath  not  herein  done 
juftice  to  Mr.  Edwards. 

But  let  us  attend  to  our  x\uthor's  reafoiiing  and  ob- 
jeftions  on  this  head,  and  fee  if  there  is  any  weight  in 
them. 

He  urgetli  (p.  66.)  that  there  is  as  much  reafon  to 
fuppofe  that  volitions  partake  of  moral  good  imd  evil, 
with  reference  only  to  their  caufe  ;  as  that  mere  bodily, 
outward  anions  fliould  be  efteemed,  either  morally 
good  or  evil,  only  in  relation  to  their  caufe.  Thefe 
are  not  juft  his  own  words  ;  but,  as  far  as  I  can  judge, 
contain  the  true  fenfe  of  his  argument.  In  reply  to  it, 
I  would  obferve, 

I .  That  outward  aftions  and  bodily  motions  are  ne- 
ver, themfelves,  eileemed  to  be,  either  virtuous,  or 
vicious.  TheE — rs  argmnent  is  founded  on  a  fuppo- 
fition,  that  outward  aCiions^  as  well  as  the  internal  dif- 
pofitions  from  whence  they  proceed,  arc  morally  vir- 
tuous or  vicious  :  that,  over  and  above  the  moral 
virtue  and  vice  there  are  in  the  internal  exercifes  and 
dilpolitions,   there  is   fomething  properly  worthy  of 

1    1  cfleem 


84  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  I'art  I, 

efteem  or  difapprobation,  in  thofe  outward  adions 
which  are  their  fruits  and  effefts.  On  any  other  fup- 
pofition  it  miift  appear  impertiuent  to  afk,  as  he  doth, 
on  the  laft  cited  page,  "  Why  outward  afts  are  de- 
clared virtuous  or  vicious  only  with  reference  to  their 
caufe,  while  this  is  denied  of  volition  :'*  Whereas 
the  truth  is,  that  outward  anions  are  not  declared 
virtuous  or  vicious  at  all^  in  a  dire  ft  fenfe  ;  but  are 
confidered  merely  as  fruits  and  indications  of  fomething 
which  is,  in  the  proper  fenfe,  virtue  or  vice.  We 
have  no  proper  indices  of  the  moral  characters  of  men, 
befide  their  outzuard  anions.  And  as  it  is  by  thefe 
alone  that  we  form  our  judgment  of  men,  we  have 
accuftomed  ourfelves  to  fpeak  of  outward  anions  as 
being  morally  good,  or  bad  ;  when,  at  the  fame  time, 
we  mean  to  confider  them  only  as  marks  of  moral 
qualities,  which  in  a  dired:  fenfe  are  either  virtuous  or 
vicious.  But  this  fubjeft  hath  been  very  accurately 
and  particularly  handled  by  Mr.  Edwards  himfelf,  in 
that  feftion  of  his  book  which  he  wrote  exprelsly  upon 
the  fentiment  under  confideration.  And  1  do  not  fee 
how  ^our  Author  could  expeft  any  weight  to  be  laid 
upon  his  01U72  arguments^  until  he  had  fairly  anfwered 
what  Mr.  Edwards  had  faid  in  defence  o^  his. 

2.  This  being  the  cafe  o?  outward  aCiions — whatever 
is  vifible  to  men,  we  are  neceffitated,  when  we  are  ex- 
amining for  moral  beauty  or  deformity,  to  look  back 
to  their  cauj'e- — fomething  not  obvious  to  our  fenfes. 
But  if  it  was  a  diftate  of  natural  reafon,  that  there  is 
any  degree  of  moral  good  or  evil,  beauty  or  deformity, 
in  the  outzuard  adions  themfelves  ;  we  fhould  have  no 
occafion  to  inquire  into  the  caufe  of  even  outward  ac- 
tions^ or  bring  it  at  all  into  view,  in  forming  our 
opinion  of  the  virtuoufnefs  or  vicioufnefs  of  theiji.  If 
outward  actions  were  as  truly  of  a  moral  nature,  as 
internal  exercifes  ;  there  would  be  no  more  reafon  in 
examining  the  caufe  of  the  former,  than  of  the  latter, 
in  order  to  determine  the  cpiality  of  them. 

In  order  to  determine  the  moral  evil  of  volitions^  we 

never 


Se(a.  IV.  MORALAGENCY.  85 

never  need  make  any  inquiry  concerning  their  canfe. 
If  the  evil  of  the  caiije  is  fought,  it  will  be  then  necef- 
fary  to  examine  the  caiife.  But  in  order  to  judge  of 
the  evil  of  the  cjfsi^^  nothing  befide  the  eftecTt  need 
come  under  our  obfervation.  To  fay  that  we  cannot 
judge  of  the  moral  evil  of  volition,  without  knowing 
and  being  acquainted  with  its  caufe,  is  as  perfectly 
abiurd  as  to  fay  that  we  cannot  judge  of  tiie  fliape  and 
fitting  of  a  garment  without  knowing  the  taylor  who 
made  it  ;  or,  of  the  beauty  of  a  piece  of  embroidery, 
witliout  knowing  the  lady  who  wrought  it. 

Our  Author  (in  p.  50.)  attempts  to  confute  Mr. 
Edwards  out  of  liis  own  mouth.  In  order  to  it,  he 
quotes  what  that  Author  fays  to  prove  that  all  events 
which  come  into  exiflence  have  an  anfwerable  cauJe, 
and  that  their  exiftencc  is  certainly  conneded  with 
their  caufe.  In  treating  this  argument,  Mr.  Edwards 
had  faid  (p.  62.  edit.  3.)  that  ''  there  cannot  be  more 
in  the  effect,  than  in  the  caufe."  His  meaning  evidently 
is,  that  every  caufe  is  adequate  to  the  prodiidion  of 
whatever  appeareth  in  its  effecl  ;  and  that,  in  this 
fenie,  there  cannot  be  more  in  the  effect,  than  there  is 
in  its  caufe  : — That,  as  it  is  a  ditfcate  of  common  fenle, 
that  no  event  can  come  into  exiftence  without  a  caufe  ; 
fo  it  is  equally  a  dictate  of  the  fame  common  fenfe  of 
men,,  that  every  event,  or  effeft,  muft  arife  from  a 
caufe  which  hath  a  futliciency  in  it  for  the  production 
of  that  eflbd:  of  which  it  is  the  caufe.  But  from  this 
pofition  it  is  by  no  means  a  confequence,  that  volition 
cannot  be  virtuous  of  vicious,  farther  than  the  caufe 
of  it  is  virtuous  or  vicious. 

Mr.  Edwards  like  wife  hath  allowed,  that  "  it  may 
be  wickednefs  in  the  caufe,  that  it  produces  wicked- 
nefs."  Our  Author  inferreth  as  a  confequence  from 
this  conceflion,  '  ■  that  in  every  finfal  volition  there 
are  two  wickednefTes."  But  he  is  certainly  here  too 
liady  in  his  conclufion  :  becaufe  there  may  be  a  wicked 
cniife  of  wickednefs,  it  doth  not  from  thence  neceflarily 
follow,  that  the  caufe  of  every  wickednefs  is  itfelf  alio 

wicked. 


86  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  '  Part  L 

wicked.  All  good  and  evil,  virtuous  and  vicious, 
actions  of  men,  have  an  occaiion  of  tiieir  coming  into 
cxiflence.  Yet  we  do  not  commonly  argue  the  good- 
nefs  or  badnefs  of  the  occafion,  from  the  virtue  or 
■vvickednefs  of  the  fadt ;  but  fuppofe  that,  many  times, 
fomething  truly  good  and  virtuous  may  be  occafioned 
by  that  which  is  evil  ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  fome- 
thing bad — morally  evil— by  that  Vv^hich  is  good  :  or, 
that  moral  good,  or  evil,  may  be  occafioned  by  that 
which  is  neither  evil,  nor  good. 

Our  Author  takes  it  for  granted,  that  efFe<3:s  and 
caufes  have  fuch  a  relation  to  one  another,  and  that 
there  is  fo  near  and  intimate  an  union  fubfifling  be- 
tween them,  as  that  they  muft  neceffarily  participate 
of  the  moral  qualities  of  each  other.  On  the  ftrength 
of  this  fuppofition  he  very  peremptorily  cenfurethMr. 
Edwards  for  maintaining  this  pofition,  "  That  all 
virtue  and  vice  confifl  in  the  nature^  not  the  caufe  of 
things  ;"  and  treats  his  argument  as  being  contemptible 
and  weak.  Whereas,  in  truth,  a  wicked  effed;  is  no 
more  a  proof  of  a  wicked  or  finful  caufe,  than  a  necef- 
fary  eife6b  is  a  proof  that  its  caufe  is  neceffary.  It  is 
no  more  certain,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  the  effect 
which  is  the  production  of  a  virtuous  caufe ^  will  alfo 
be  itielf  virtuous  ;  than  that  the  ciFeft  which  is  the 
production  of  a  voluntary  caufe ^  will  be  alfo  itfelf  lyo/- 
iintary.  This  is  the  reafoning  of  one  whom  our  Au- 
thor (p.  48.  marg.)  quotes  with  approbation.  If  he 
had  kept  it  in  view  until  he  had  got  two  pages  forward, 
it  might  have  faved  him  the  trouble  of  feveral  things 
which  he  hath  there  been  at  the  pains  of  writing. 

Upon  the  whole,  I  think  it  muft  very  manifeftly  ap- 
pear to  every  careful,  attentive  inquirer,  that  all  the 
virtue  and  vice  of  the  internal  difpofitions  and  incli- 
nations of  men,  is,  and  muft  of  neceflity  be,  fought  for 
and  found,  in  the  difpofitions  and  inclinations  them- 
selves ;  and  that  nothing  can  be  more  abfurd  and  un- 
intelligible than  to  reprefent  the  quality  of  any  thing, 
not  as  being  in  the  thing  itfelf,  of  which  it  is  a  quality, 

but 


Sect.  IV.  MORAL    AGENCY.  87 

but  in  fomething  elfe  entirely  diftind:  from  it.  Ac- 
cording to  thofe  rules  of  reafoning,  whereby  the  fln- 
fulnefs  of  volitions  is  made  to  confifl  in  their  caufe, 
any  man  may  be  fafcly  challenged  to  give  an  intelligi- 
ble derinition  of  fmfulnefs,  or  convey  any  idea  of  the 
thing,  or  fhew  the  leafl  poflibility  of  its  exiftence. 

If  there  is  any  fuch  thing  as  fmfulnefs,  it  muft  be  in 
the  thing  v^^hich  is  iinful  :  the  eflence  of  it  muft  be  in 
the  thing  itfelf,  not  in  its  caufe  ;  as  much  as  warmth 
and  brightnefs  are  in  the  beams  of  the  fun,  in  diftinc- 
tion  from  that  which  is  the  cauje  of  ther  being  emitted 
and  fent  down  hither  upon  our  world.  And  if  this  is 
true,  no  appearance  of  argument  can  be  drawn  from 
the  conlideration  that  there  is  77ioral  quality — virtue  or 
vice— *-in  the  voluntary  exertions  of  the  minds  of  men, 
againft  a  certain,  infallible  connexion  in  things,  and 
the  dodbrine  which  maketh  human  volitions  the  effeCi 
of  fome  external  influence,  or  extrinfic  caufe. 

Becaufe  the  fun  is  luminous  and  warm,  it  would  be 
very  ridiculous  to  reafon,  that  therefore  the  caufe  of 
the  exiftence  of  that  warm  and  luminous  body  is  alfo 
itfelf  Mrarm  and  luminous.  Equally  abfurd  and  ridi- 
culous would  it  be  to  urge,  that  becaufe  there  is  fucli 
a  thing  in  faft  as  fmful  exiftence,  therefore  the  caufe 
of  that  exiftence  muft  likewife  be  itfelf  Iinful :  and  ftill 
more  ridiculous,  if  poflible,  fo  ftrenuoufly  to  hold  to 
the  opinion,  that  there  is  fuch  a  kind  of  connexion  be- 
tween caufes  (what  may  in  the  moft  ftrift  and  proper 
fenfe  be  fo  termed)  and  their  eifefts,  as  that  they  necef- 
farily  partake  of  the  qualities  of  each  other,  as  to  be 
driven  to  the  hard  neceflity  of  fuppodng  every  thing 
which  is  fmful  to  be  fclf-originated,  felf-exiftent. 

However  fit  a  fubje£b  the  inquiry  into  the  caufe  of 
human  volitions  may  be  to  employ  the  talents  of  con- 
templative, inquifttive  men,  it  is,  however ,^  a  fubjeft 
quite  foreign  from  the  prefent  controverfy  ;  having  no 
particular  relation  to  it,  or  connexion  with  it.  The 
way  therefore  is  open,  notwithftanding  any  objeftions 
of  this  kind,  for  a  dire£t  proof  of  an  eftabliftied,  infal- 
lible 


88  An    E  S  S  A  Y    CN  Part  L 

lible  certainty  in  things  ;  and  for  fhewing  a  fixed  con- 
nexion between  antecedents  and  confequents,  caufes 
and  efFe6ts.  However  intricate  and  perplexing  the  ar- 
gument may  be  in  other  refpefts,  it  is  quite  unembar-. 
raffed  in  this  :  it  can  no  longer  juflly  be  harraffed  with 
the  objection  of  its  being  inconfiftent  with  all  our  ideas 
of  virtue  and  vice. 

Why  it  fhould  be  thought  to  be  fo  inconfiftent  with 
truth  and  reafon,  that  men  fhould  be  praifed  or  blamed 
for  their  own  free,  voluntary  exertions,  even  though 
the  operation  and  influence  of  fome  caule,  extrinfic  of 
thcmfelves,  were  neceffary  to  the  taking  place  of  thefe 
volitions,  and  their  coming  into  exiftence,  is  <iifhcult 
for  me  to  conceive  ;  unlefs  it  be,  that  the  necefTity  and 
concurrence  of  fuch  a  caufe,  to  the  takmg  place  of  the 
volitions  of  men,  are  inconfiflent  with  thofe  ideas  of 
the  fufficiency,  and  boafled  independency,  of  men, 
which  diflinguilli  and  degrade  the  human  race.  No- 
thing is  more  humbling  to  the  pride  of  human  nature 
than  the  thought  of  being  held  in  a  flate  of  abfolute 
dependence  on  the  fovereign  will  of  Him  in  whofe 
hand  our  lives  are,  and  whofe  are  all  our  ways.  To 
be  fafl  bound  under  his  power,  and  chained  down  in  a 
ftate  of  the  mofl  perfetH:,  entire  dependence  on  the  fov- 
ereign pleafure  of  fome  iuperior,  invifible  Agent,  is  a 
thought  fpurned  at  by  the  proud  and  haughty  fpirit  ; 
and  is  moft  abhorrent  from  thofe  ideas  of  felf-fufficien- 
cy  and  importance,  which,  to  the  eternal  difgrace  of 
the  fpecies,  are  cherifhed  in  the  hearts  of  men* 


S    E   C   T.      V. 

In  which  is  inquired^  ff'^hether  there  is  not  an  antecedent 
certainty  of  the  exijlence  of  every  event  inhich  ever 
comes  into  being  f 

CERTAIN,  eftablifhed  connexion  between  caufes 
and  their  effedls,   and  the   infallible  antecedent 

certainty 


SeA.  V.  MORALAGENCY.  8$ 

certainty  of  all  events  which  ever  come  into  cxiflcncc, 
is  an  argument  v/hich  hath  been  handled  bj'-  Mr.  Ed- 
wards with  fuch  peculiar  flrength  and  perfpicuity,  in 
that  every  inquiry  which  our  Author  hath  undertaken 
to  examine  ;  that,  until  his  reafonings  in  fupport  of 
the  opinion  of  fuch  a  connexion  in  things  are  obviated 
and  refuted  by  the  advocates  for  fuch  a  liberty  and 
freedom  in  human  nature  as  is  inconfiftent  with  an  ab- 
folute  previous  certainty  of  all  events,  it  feemeth 
almoffc  impertinent  to  oifer  any  thing  farther  upon  the 
fubjedt.  Propriety,  however,  will  hardly  admit  of  its 
being  paffed  over  in  filejice.  I  would  therefore,  in  this 
feftion,  briefly  fuggefl:  a  few  arguments  in  fupport  of 
this  opinion. 

I.  That  it  fliould  be  fo,  and  that  there  is  a  certain, 
infallible  connexion  of  all  events  which  ever  take 
place,  with  fome  antecedent  caufe  or  ground  of  their 
cxiftence,  is  a  diftate  of  natural  reafon,  and  perfectly 
agreeable  to  the  common  fenfe  and  undcrftandings  of 
men.  Wherever  we  behold  an  event,  there  we  infer 
a  caufe  :  this  fcems  to  be  one  of  the  firft  di<^ates  of 
the  reafon  of  men.  There  is  nothing  in  vv^hich  man- 
kind give  earlier  teflimonies  of  reafo.ning,  than  in  in- 
ferences which  they  very  apparently  make  frorn  effcd: 
to  caufe.  And  this,  indeed,  is  a  firfl  principle,  and  the 
ground  of  all  our  reafonings — that  every  effeiJ-  mull 
have  a  caufe  ;  and  that^  fuch  an.  one  as  is  adequate  to 
it  :  and  that  effefts  are  always  indiifolubly  connefted 
with  their  caufes.  If  this  principle  is  given  up,  all  the 
foundation  of  our  reafoning  is  deftroyed,  and  we  are 
left  in  a  flate  of  the  ntmod  uncertainty  and  doubtful- 
nefs.  If  this  principle  is  removed,  PauPs  reafonings 
(flom.  I.  20.)  in  proof  of  the  exiftence  and  perfection 
of  one  fupreme  GOD,  are  utterly  inconclufive  and 
falfe.  He  fays,  ''  The  invifible  things  of  him,  from 
"  the  creation  of  the  world,  are  clearly  Je en. ^  beiitfr  im- 
**  derflood  by  the  things  that  are  made.,  even  his  eternal 
*'  power  and  Godhead.*'  And  yet  this  concluiion  of 
the  Apoflle's  is  entirely  grounded  on  the  fuppofition, 

M  that 


9b  Am    E  S  S  a  Y    on  Part  L 

that  every  efFeft  hath  a  caufe  ,  and,  that  elFe^Sls  and 
their  caufes  are  clofely  and  infeparably  conneded  to- 
gether. If  this  is  not  an  undoubted  truth,  the  Apoftle's 
reafonings  are  unjuft  ;  his  conclufions  precipitant. 
For  the  exiftence  and  perfeftion  of  the  Godhead  are 
feen  and  underftood  by  the  things  that  are  made,  only 
as  the  cau/e  is  feen  and  underftood  in  and  by  its  effeCi. 
But  if  there  may  be  an  effeft  without  a  caufe,  and  un- 
connefted  with  caufe  ;  then  no  caufe  can  be  certainly 
feen  and  underftood  by,  or  in,  its  effeft.  If  one  event 
may  exift  without  any  antecedent  ground  and  caufe, 
another  may  alfo  :  and  therefore  it  will  be  impoffible 
to  determine,  from  elfedts,  which  have,  and  which 
have  not,  a  caufe  ;  which,  or  whether  any  at  all,  are 
conned-ed  w^th  any  antecedent  caule  or  reafon  of  their 
exiftence.  For  if  the  leaft  conceivable  event  may  exift 
without  a  caufe,  all  ground  of  faith  is  at  once  remov- 
ed, and  all  the  labour  of  mankind  after  knowledge  and 
truth,  as  to  matters  of  faith,  is  utterly  in  vain. 

And  if  this  reafoning  (from  effcdt  to  caufe)  is  juft, 
when  applied  to  material,  inanimate  things  ;  much 
more  fo  is  it,  when  applied  to  animate,  immaterial 
things.  Here  the  argument  ftrongly  concludeth  frcm 
the  lefs,  to  the  greater.  If  events  in  the  natural  world 
require  a  caufe,  certainly  a  caufe  is  not  lefs  neceflary 
to  the  exiftence  of  thofe  more  important  and  intereft- 
ing  events  which  take  place  in  the  moral  world.  If  a 
cauje  may  be  feen  in  the  fmalleft  event  ;  much  more 
may  it  be  feen  in  greater  and  more  important  ones. 
And  furely  none  can  deny,  that  moral  events  do  as 
vifibly  need  to  be  under  the  reftraints  and  guidance  of 
wifdom,  as  natural  ones  :  and  it  is  as  much  a  diftate 
of  reafon,  that  it  is  wife  and  fit  that  the  time,  manner, 
and  all  the  circumftances,  of  their  exiftence,  fliould  be 
exactly  bounded,  limited  and  prefcribed. 

The  principle,  therefore,  of  a  poffibility  that  events 
fhould  come    into   exiftence  without  the  influence  of 
any  extrinfic,  antecedent  caufe,  ftrikes  at  the  very  root 
of  revelation  j  taketli  away  all  ground  of  the  credibil- 
ity 


Sea.  V.  MORAL    AGENCY.  91 

ity  of  it  ;  and  at  once  divefls  it  of  all  its  authority  to 
command  our  belief.  If  one  event  may  take  place 
without  a  caule,  another  may  :  and  it  may  be  that  thir. 
grand  and  beautiful  fyftem,  which  our  eyes  behold, 
was  felf-originated  and  felf-made  ;  and  that  the  fur- 
prifing  fcene,  and  regular  fucceffion  of  events  which 
have  taken  place  in  our  world,  have  fomehow  unac- 
countably jumbled  into  exiflence  in  fuch  admirable 
harmony  and  order,  neither  under  the  guidance  of 
wifdom,  nor  the  influence  of  caufe.  And  thus  the  de- 
nial of  this  grand  principle  of  knowledge  leads  imme- 
diately to  the  Epicurean  doftrine  of  Chance. 

It  is  as  much  a  dilate  of  the  common  underftand- 
ings  of  men,  that  there  is  a  connexion  of  -moral  events 
with  their  caufes,  as  o^  natural :  and  upon  this  ground 
only  is  it,  that  we  ufe  wifdom  and  art  in  adapting 
motives  to  the  difpofitions  of  men.  Our  notions  of 
habit  and  charader^  if  ftriftly  examined,  will  appear  to 
be  nothing  more  tlian  an  apprehended  connexion  of  a 
number  and  feries  of  mental  exercifes,  of  the  fame 
general  nature  and  denomination.  It  is  upon  an  appre- 
henfion  of  fuch  a  connexion,  that  we  form  any  concln- 
fions,  or  even  conjefture,  refpeaing  the  future  condudl 
of  particular  perfons  ;  and  pretend  to  judge,  from 
what  hath  already  appeared  in  them,  how  they  will 
conduct  under  any  given  circnuirtanccs,  and  in  anv 
particular  fituation.  It  is  only  On  fuppofition  of  a 
connexion  between  caufes  and  efFe£ls,  as  well  in  the 
moral  as  in  the  natural  world,  that  v/e  fuppofe  our- 
felves  to  have  the  leafl  authority  to  form  even  a  con- 
jefture,  concerning  the  future  exigence  of  any  one 
event  that  can  poflibly  be  named.  On  this  foundation 
it  is,  that  all  our  faith  in  divine  revelation  is  built  ;  no 
man,  any  otherwife  than  on  the  fuppofition  of  fuch  a 
connexion,  having  the  leafl  reafonable  ground  to  hope 
for  the  accomplifhment  of  any  one  of  the  promiles 
of  it. 

Nothing  can  be  more  certain,  than  that  the  accom- 
pliflimcnt  of  the  prophecies  of  the  word  of  God  doth 

M  2  fq 


92  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  L 

fo  much  depend  on  the  voluntary  exercifes  of  free 
agents,  and  is  fo  intimately  conned:ed  with  them,  as 
that  without  them  it  is  not  pollible  that  they  fhould 
ever  be  accompliflied  and  fulfilled.  And  it  is  abfurd 
to  fay,  that  any  event  can  be  more  certain  than  the 
meajis  throngh.  which  it  is  to  take  place  ;  that  the 
accomplifliment  of  any  prophecy  can  be  more  certain, 
than  thofe  voluntary  exercifes  of  intelligent  creatures, 
in  which  their  accomplifhment  confifleth.  But  if  there 
is  no  connexion  in  things,  between  caufes  and  efFefts, 
antecedents  and  confequents,  belide  what  is  condftent 
with  that  power  ofjelf-detenmnatioii  in  men,  and  free- 
dom to  either  fide^  which  the  Ex — r  pleads  for,  as 
being  neceffary  to  moral  aftion  ;  it  will  be  utterly 
impoffible  for  any  event  whatever  to  become  certain 
by  means  of  the  voluntary  exercifes  ofmen^  in  any  degree 
of  confiftency  with  the  creature's  being  a  fit  fubjed:  of 
reward  or  puniftment,  praife  or  blame. 

The  Ex— r  himfelf  admits  (p.  67,  81,  82.)  that 
every  moral  event  mufl  have  an  anfwerable  caufe  ;  but 
infiileth,  that  it  mufl:  be  a  moral  cauje  ;  and  appeals  to 
the  common  underftanding  of  men,  -whethtv  intelligent 
mind  mufl  not  be  that  caufe.  And  as,  upon  his  princi- 
ples, it  cannot  be  that  the  Deity  fliould  be  the  caufe  of 
human  volitions  ;  he  would  hence  infer,  that  mankind 
- — voluntary  agents — are  the  caiijes  of  their  own  vol- 
untary exertions  and  actions  ;  and,  confequently,  de-^ 
ter7nine  themfelves  (i.  e.  felf-determined)  to  moral 
good  and  evil.  Our  Author's  reafonings  here  appear 
to  me  to  be,  as  well  fubverfive  of  his  own  princi- 
ples, as  inconclufive  in  themfelves.     For, 

I.  They  admit  an  infallible  connexion  between  hu- 
man volitions  2iW^fo'ine  antecedent  caufe.  If  every  moral 
event  hath  an  anfwerable  caufe  on  w^iich  it  is  depend- 
ent for  its  exiflence  ;  then  all  moral  events  come  into 
exiftence  under  the  infhience  of  their  feveral  caufes — 
an  influence  v>/hich  is  previous  to  the  event  and  extrifific 
of  it,  and  with  which  the  event  is  certainly  conne<^ed. 
Now  if  moral  events  fcand  in  fuch  a  relation  to  their 

caufes, 


Sed.  V.  MORAL    AGENCY.  93 

caufes,  and  are  fo  connefted  with  them,  it  cannot  be 
that  the  voluntary  exercifes  of  mankind  are yd'//-or/o-m- 
ated :  this  connexion  being  as  inconiiilent  with  a  power 
of  felf-determination  in  men,  as  any  dodlrine  of  necef- 
lity  that  was  ever  elpoufed  by  Hobbs,  Spinoza  or  Mr. 
Edwards.  Let  the  cauj'e  of  moral  events  be  intelligent 
mind^  or  what  elfe  it  will,  that  doth  not  hinder  or 
break  that  certain  connexion  in  things — between  hu- 
man volitions  and/c;;;2^  antecedent  cauie,  which  entire- 
ly fubvcrteth  that  liberty — that  freedom  to  either  Jide^ 
which,  in  our  x^uthor's  view,  is  eflential  to  virtue  and 
vice.  If  our  Author  meaneth  to  account  for  that  moral 
event  called  volition^  by  intelligent  mind^  as  its  caufe, 
in  order  to  evade  the  evidence  of  a  fixt  connexion  and 
antecedent  certainty  of  things  ;  his  confequence  is 
certainly  exceedingly  lame  :  it  hath  no  connexio7i  with 
his  premifes.  To  argue  againft  an  eftabliflied  connex- 
ion in  things,  and  between  caufes  and  effects,  only  by 
refolving/o^^^d'  events  into  fomc  certai?!^  particular  cauje^ 
is  not  to  bring  a  reafon  to  which  any  one  can  Jniily" 
expeft  a  reply.* 

2.  .Our  Author  urgeth,  that  the  intelligent  mind, 
which  is  the  caufe  of  moral  events — volitions — niulh 
be  the  human  mind,  not  the  divine.     But  yet  i?itelligent 

mindy 

*  The  connexion  of  the  ai£ts  of  tlie  will,  with  fome  antecedent,  extrinfic  caufci 
is  very  fully  and  exprefsly  aflertcd  by  Dr.  Whitby,  i/i  hh  dlfconrfe  o;z  the  f.vc  foitits, 
rotwithftanding  his  fhowing  himlelf  fo  flrenuous  an  advocate  for  a  power  of  I'elf-, 
determination  in  men.  In  treating  on  the  influences  of  the  divir.e  ipirit,  in  his 
difcourfe  oi f"fficie7it  and  efftEluaU  cjinmori  avdffccial grace-,  he  faith  (p.  221,  222. 
edit.  2.)  «'  That  it  muft  be  granted  that  in  raifin;;  an  idea  in  my  brain  by  the 
"  Holy  Spirit,  and  the  imprelfion  made  upon  it  there,  the  action  is  truly  phyjical  .- 
♦'  That  in  thofc  adiions  I  am  nvholly  fajfi-ve — That  thefe  operations  are  iireJifiibU 
«'  in  their  produftion"  And  (p..  303.)  that  "  when  evidence  is  propounded  and 
«'  difcernedi  the  mind  doth  -necejfarily  afl'cnt  unto  it."  Here  the  reader  will  ob- 
ferve,  that,  according  to  the  Dodtor,  we  are  •wholly  fajjlve  and  TiecrJJaryiw  our  aflent 
to  propofitions— fpeculative  truth  ;  and  that  luch  alVent  arifeth  aiiogether  from 
extrinjic,  phy  s  1  c  a  l  influence  and  operation.  And  this  fame  Author  aflertcth 
(p.  21 2.)  that  «'  what  makes  the  ixiiLl  chocft,  is  fomething  approved  by  the  undtr-- 
*>■  Jl^nding,  and  cottfequently  appearing  to  the  foul  as  good."  And  faith,  that 
*'  to  fay  that  evidence  propofed,  apprehended  and  coni'.dered,  is  not  fufficient  to 
*•  make  the  underjiavding  to  appro-ve  ;  or  that  the  greateft  good  propofed,  or  the 
•»  greateft  evil  threatened,  when  equally  believed  and  rettcded  on,  is  not  fiffficicnt 
*♦  to  engage  the  ivill  to  choofe  the  good  and  refufc  the  evil,  is,  in  elted,  to  fay» 
««  that  lubicb  alone  doth  mei'e  the  iviii  to  choofe  or  to  rtfufe,  is  not  fufficient  to  en- 
•'  gage  it  fo  to  do."  And  all  the  arguments  on  that  and  one  or  two  of  the  next 
fuccceding  pages,  afe  calculated  and  urged  to  prove  a  connexion  of  ads  of  the 
will,  with  fome  antecedent  views  of  the  mind. 


94  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  I, 

77tind^  in  liis  fenfe  of  the  expreffion,  is  itfelf  as  much  an 
effhd  as  any  thing  elie  ;  and  ftandeth  in  as  much  need 
of  a  caufe  for  its  fupport,  as  that  moral  event  itfelf,  of 
Avhich  intelligent  mind  is  the  caufe.  His  device, 
therefore,  is  quite  infufficient  to  account  for  human 
volitions,  in  confiflency  with  their  being  unconnedled, 
in  their  exiflence,  with  any  antecedent  caufe.  To 
pretend  to  account  for  one  moral  event  by  another^  and 
that  an  event  the  exiftence  of  which  is  as  unaccounta- 
ble as  the  other,  for  the  exiflence  of  which  this  is 
brought  into  view  as  a  reafon  oi^  caufe  ;  and  this^  too, 
in  order  to  evince  the  poflibility  of  the  exiftence  of 
fome  events^  without  connexion  with  a?:y  antecedent 
caufe  ;  every  critical  reader  will  at  once  fee  is  perfect- 
ly inconfiflent  and  abfurd. 

It  is  conceded  that  every  moral  event  muft  have  a 
caufe.  The  exercifes  of  the  human  will  are  the  events 
in  queftion.  Our  Author  appeals  to  "  thofe  who  have 
common  underftanding  to  judge,''  whether  intelligent 
mind  (not  the  Deity,  but  the  mind  itfelf,  for  the  exer- 
cife  of  which  a  caufe  is  fought)  is  not  the  caufe.  I  be- 
lieve we  may  fafely  venture  to  put  the  decifion  of  the 
queftion  upon  the  propofed  iflue. 

II.  A  fixed,  unalterable,  eftablifhed  connexion  in 
things  ;  or  a  previous  infallible  certainty  of  all  events 
which  ever  did,  or  will,  take  place  within  the  whole 
compafs  of  creation  3  may  be  moft  clearly  and  certain- 
ly inferred'  from  the  conftant,  abfolute  dependence 
which  all  things  have  upon  God.  Every  cauje  which 
exerteth  any  influence  in  the  whole  univerfe,  deriveth 
all  its  operative  power'  and  ftrength  ultimately  from 
God  ;  and,  therefore,  in  all  its  exertions,  muft  be,  in 
fome  way  or  other,  connected  either  mediately  or  im- 
mediately with  the  divine  will,  and  the  conftant  exer- 
tions of  the  divine  mind.  Even  admitting  that  there 
are  fach  powers  of  human  nature  as  our  Author  urgeth 
(were  it,  indeed,  poflible  to  form  any  manner  of  idea 
or  conception  of  them)  ftill  for  their  being — their  ex- 
iflence— they  muft,  of  neceflity,  be  conflantly  depend- 

f  ent 


Setl,V.  MORAL   AGENCY.  95^ 

ent  on  God.  It  cannot  be  fuppofed,  with  the  lead 
appearance  of  reafon,  that  men,  or  any  other  creatures^ 
are  fo  formed,  dignified  and  endowed,  as  to  be  capable 
of  exifting,  and  remaining  any  thing,  even  the  ipace  of 
a  fmgle  moment,  without  divine  aids,  and  fupports 
from  witliout,  fo  as  to  render  a  pofitive  a6i  of  power 
neceffary  to  annihilate  and  reduce  them  to  their  ori- 
ginal nothing.  And  whatever  is  altogether  and  entire- 
ly dependent  on  God  for  its  exiftence^  in  the  whole  and 
every  part  of  it  ;  muft,  of  confequence,  be  dependent 
on  God  for  its  exertion^  in  the  whole  and  every  degree 
of  it  : — ^the  exertion  being  one  thing  which  necefiarily 
comes  into  confideration  in  determining  the  ;2fi2'z^rd' and 
quality  of  the  exiftence  which  is  fupported  and  upheld.* 
And  if  the  power  infifted  on,  in  every  degree  of  its 
exertion,  is  dependent  on  God,  the  confequence  unde- 
niably is,  that  its  exertions  are,  in  fome  way  or  another, 
clofely  and  infeparably  connecfted  with  fome  anteced- 
ent cauie.  And  if  they  are  conucded  with  fome  ante- 
cedent caufe,  nothing  is  more  manifeft  than  that  there 
is  an  antecedent  certainty  of  their  exiflence.  Thefe 
confequences,  to  me,  it  appearetli,  cannot  be  evaded, 
without  denying,  not  only  an  immediate^  but  even  au 
ultnnate,  dependence  on  God.  \  mediate  and  ultimciie 
dependence  as  truly  giveth  a  previous,  abfolute  and 
infallible  certainty  to  any  thing,  as  an  immediate  de- 
pendence. The  whole  and  only  diiTerence  is,  that,  in 
the  one  cafe^  the  caufe  vrhich  determines  and  giveth 
certainty  to  the  event,  operates  through  one  or  a  num- 
ber of  means ^  before  its  genuine  tendency  and  ultimate 
influence  becometh  vifible  in  event  :  in  the  other ^  its 
tendency  and  influence  are  immediately  feen  ;  and  it 
doth  not  operate  and  extend  through  any  ?2:edium^  to 
its  effeft.  It  is  quite  unphilofophical  (not  to  fay  athe- 
iflical)  to  fuffer  any  number  of  inters  cning  media  to 

obfcure 

*  This  obfervation  is  nndoiibiedly  jiift,  if  men  liave  not  a  po^ver  of  Iclt'-Uetcr- 
mination  or  of  originating  voluntary  motion  in  themfelves.  For  if  men  liavc  not 
this  power,  ihey  are  equally  dependent  on  God  for  their  exerc.'/cs  as  lor  tiicir  ^^- 
irrg — their  exiftence.  And  for  a  proof  thnt  there  are  no  fuch  powers  in  nicn,  I 
bfg  leave  to  refer  the  reader  to  the  next  lection,  where  tliii  fu'ojcd  is  particularly 
coniidered. 


96  An    E  S  S  A  Y    on  Part  L 

obfcure  the  agency  of  that  divine  hand  which  God  is 
lifting  up  and  making  vifible  in  all  his  works.  And  it 
is  very  ungrateful  and  difrefpeftful  to  the  Deity,  for  us 
to  fuffer  an  eftahliJJied  courfe  of  things,  or  an  operation 
by  weans ^  to  lelTen  our  fenfe  of  dependence  on  liim. 

But  that  a  power  of  felf-determination  in  men,  and 
of  beginning  motion  in  themfelves,  fliould  be  fpoken  of 
as  inconfiftent  with  that  dependence  which  creatures 
neceffarily  have  on  God,  Dr.  Clarke,  in  his  demonflra- 
tion  of  the  being  and  attributes  of  God,  and  our  Author 
after  him  (as  he  quotes  him  v/ith  approbation,  p-  93, 
94.  marg.)  thinketh  to  be  only  "  a  childifli  trifling 
with  words.''  Let  us  hear  the  DocT:or's  more  manly 
reafoning  upon  the  fubjeft.  In  the  firft  place  he  tells 
us  that  "  a  power  oti  beginning  motion  is  not  in  iff  elf 
an  impoflible  thing,"  (a  power  in  a  being  to  begin  his 
mun  internal  motion  he  doubtlefs  meaneth,  or  his  ob- 
fervation  is  perfectly  impertinent,)  ''  becaufe  it  muft 
of  necefTity  be  in  the  fupreme  caufe."  (edit.  8.  p.  83.) 
Hence  he  concludes,  that  it  may  be  cojnmunicated  to 
creatures.  The  Doftor  goes  on  to  obferve  farther, 
that  fuch  a  power  no  more  implieth  independency, 
than  our  powers  of  perception  and  confcioufiiefs  imply 
independence  on  God.  He  fays,  *'  In  reality  it  is  al- 
''  together  as  hard  to  conceive  how  confcioufnefs  or 
"  the  power  of  perception  fhould  be  communicated  to 
"  a  created  being,  as  how  a  power  of  fclf-motion  fliould 
"  be  fo."  (p.  84.)  A  fmall  degree  of  refledlion,  I 
think,  will  convince  any  one  that  the  Doftor's  obferva- 
tions  are  neither  juft  nor  pertinent.     For, 

I .  By  what  authority  doth  he  fo  peremptorily  con- 
clude that  this  power  of  beginning  motion  muft  necef- 
/drily  be  in  the  fupreme  caufe  ?  There  is,  in  truth,  no 
more  reafon  to  fuppofe  that  fuch  a  power  exifteth  in 
the  fapreme,  than  in  fubordinate,  beings.  It  is,  if 
poffible,  a  greater  inconfiftency  to  fuppofe  it  to  be  in 
God,  than  in  men.  However,  that  v/hieh  is  perfecftly 
inconfiftent  and  abfurd  in  itfelf,  and  is  a  notion  v/hich 
is,  in  various  ways,  fubverfive  of  itfelf,    can,  with  no 

propriety, 


-«ea:.  V.  MORAL    AGENCY.  ^f 

propriety,  be  applied  either  to  the  Creator,  or  to  his 
creature.  That  which  is  abfurd  and  inconfiftent  with 
itfelf,  is  fo,  be  it  where  it  will  ;  cither  in  the  Su- 
preme, or  in  Tome  fubordinate  caufe. 

But  if  this  povver  is  indeed  of  God,  there  inufl:  haver 
been  a  time,  according  to  the  Dotitor^s  own  ftating  of 
the  matter,  when  motion  did  begm  in  God.  To  talk 
of  there  being  a  power  of  begiftning  (internal)  motioyi 
In  God,  without  fuppofing  that  the  motion  and  exercife 
of  tlie  divine  mind  ever  did,  or  in  the  nature  of  things 
might  be  conceived  to,  begin^  I  think  we  may  be  al- 
lowed to  fay,  is  "  a  childifh  trifling  with  words.''  And 
to  fpeak  of  the  motion  and  exercife  of  the  divine  mind 
z^  in  fad  tvtr  beginning  to  exift,  is  rnore  than  "  a 
childifh  trifling  with  words  ;''  even  an  ciFe<flual  denial 
of  the  exiftence  and  perfeftion  of  God.  But  doth  the 
Doctor,"  and  the  Ex — r  after  him,  who  thinks  that 
the  Do(fJ:or  hath  argued  the  poflibility  and  reality 
of  fuch  a  power  '*  in  a  clear  and  conclufive  manner,'^ 
imagine  the  motion — -the  exercife  of  the  divine  mind — 
ever  began  ?  Do  thefe  Gentlemen  fuppofe  that  the 
Deity  exifted  for  a  time,  without  the  leaft  motion  or 
thought  of  heartj  or  any  degree  o^  exercife  of  will  ?— 
and  that  then,  by  his  £oycre\^n  pie afitre  (which,  by  the 
way,  did  not  yet  exift)  he  brought  his  own  infinitd 
mind  fo  into  motion^  as  that,  in  conjeqtience  of  this  mo- 
tion, it  might  be  his  pleqfiire  that  motioti  fhould  be^inf 
Certainly  fuch  reafbnings  as  thefe  are  very  unfitly 
ftyled  "  demonftfation  of  the  being  and  attributes  of 
God  ;''  fmce,  if  there  was  any  truth  in  them,  they 
v^ould  much  more  fully  danonfirate  that  there  is  no 
fuch  being  as  God,  of  any  attributes  or  perfe6lionSi 
Surely  the  fuppofition  of  the  pofjibiliiy  of  the  commu- 
nication of  fuch  a  power  to  the  creature,  ncedeth  fome 
better  fupport  than  this,  in  order  to  gain  credit  in  the 
world. 

In  oppofition  to  this  meaning  of  the  Doctor's,  the 
reader  may  find  that  he  himfclf  aflferteth  (p.  15.)  that 
'^'^  whatever  eKills,  muft  cither  have  come  into  being 

N  *'  out 


9»  AnESSAYon  PartL 

'*^  out  of  nothing,  abfolutely  without  a  caufe  ;  or  it 
■*'  mwll  have  been  produced  by  fome  external  caufe  j 
''  or  it  muft  be  l^lf-exiftent.'*  And  farther  on  the 
fame  page  he  faith,  that  for  any  thing  to  h^  produced  by 
itjHf  \%  an  exprcls  contradiftion.  And  on  p.  60.  he 
makes  ufe  of  the  fame  kind  of  reafoning  refpecling  ex- 
ternal motion,  in  order  to  prove  the  eternal  exillencc 
of  a  wife,  intelligent  Caufe.  Yet  he  conftantly  urgcth 
n  power  of  be  pinning  motion  as  elfcntial  to  liberty,  both 
in  the  Creator  and  the  creature.  (See  p-  73.  77-^ 
How  far  thefe  things  are  confiftent,  every  reader  may 
judge.  It  is  very  manifeft,  that  voluntary  exertion 
,  (the  motion  in  queflion)  whenever  it  taketh  place,  is 
Jciiiething  which  doth  exi/l.  According  to  the  Do6lor'& 
reafoning,  therefore,  it  either  comes  into  being  with- 
out a  caufe  ;  or  is  produced  by  fonie  external  canje  ;  or 
muft  be  felf-exiftent.  But  that  any  thing  fhould  come 
into  being  without  a  caiife^  the  Doftor  himfelf  urgeth, 
is  a  plain  contradiftion.  That  our  voluntary  exertions 
are  felf-exiftent,  ^6  clear  a  reafoner  as  the  Doclor  will 
by  no  means  infift  ;  efpecially  llnce  he  is  fo'  careful  to 
vindicate  his  doftrine  of  a  power  of  felf-motion  in 
men,  from  the  objc£tion,  that  it  implieth  independency 
on  God.  How  then  can  he  confiftently  fupport  his 
own  principles  of  a  power  of  felf-dctermination,  or  of 
beginning  motion  in  ourfelves,  as  elFential  to  moral 
liberty  and  freedom  ?  And  why  is  it  not  a  plain  and 
manifefl:  confequence  of  his  own  reafonings,  that  vol- 
untary exertion  doth  indeed  arife  from  fome  external 
caiijef  And  befides,  the  Doftor  exprefsly  alloweth  an 
antecedent,  ablolute  certainty  of  all  events,  aiid  that 
the  divine  prefcience  fuppofeth  it  :  (See  p.  103,  104.) 
which  is  as  utterly  inconliflent  with  that  kind  of  liberty 
for  w^hieh  he  pleadcth,  as  any  neceffity  rcfpefting  hu- 
man volitions  which  is  ever  urged  by  Calviniftic  di- 
vines. Nothing,  certainly^  but  a  ftrong  attachment 
to  fome  pre-conceived  opinion,  could  have  driven  Co 
clear  and  excellent  a  reafoner  as  Dr.  Clarke,  to  fa)?- 
things  fo  evidently  abfurd  and  inccmfillent  with  each 
other  !  2.  The 


Sca.V.  MORAL    AGENCY.  99 

2.  The  Docflor  greatly  miflakes  us,  if  he  ruppofclh 
that  we  mean  to  account  for  the  manner  of  divine 
operation  in  communicating  coufrioujnefs^  perception). ^ 
or  any  tiling  clfe,  to  men  ;  and  fro>n  thejice  argue  the 
inconfidency  of  his  communicating  to  115  the  powers 
in  queftion.  The  7?wdiis  of  divine  operation,  in  pro- 
ducing moral  being,  perception  and  confcioufners,  is 
what  no  one,  that  1  know  of,  pretends  to  comprehend. 
But  if  confcioufnefs  and  perception  are  the  fruit  of  di- 
vine efficiency  and  operation,  then  for  theje  powers 
creatures  ^re  dependent  on  God.  The  Dodor  fpeaks 
of  a  power  of  exifting^  of  being  confcious.,  &c.  in  a  man- 
ner wliich  as  truly  implieth  ifidcprndency^  as  that  power 
o? felf-motion^  for  which  he  is  fo  llrenuous  an  advocate. 
If  by  thefe  expreflions  he  means  a  power  in  men,  tlie 
fruit  of  the  exertion  and  influence  of  which  is  their 
exigence  or  confcioufnefs,  he  is  very  fafe  in  concluding 
that  fiich  powers  as  truly  imply  independence  on  God, 
as  it  can  be  fuppofed  to  be  implied  in  a  power  of  felf- 
motion,  felf-determination.  And  whenever  v/e  con- 
cede, that  human  nature  is  endowed  with  fuch  powers, 
we  will  then  readily  admit  that  the  Doftor's  "  clear 
and  conclulive  reafonings"  are  quite  fufficient  to  filence 
all  our  objeftions  againft  that  opinion  of  a  power  of 
fclf-motion  in  men,  which  arije  fro?n  an  apprehenfion  of 
its  inconfiflency  with  that  dependence  which  all  creatures 
have  upon  God^ 

3.  Inilead  of  fairly  anfwering  the  objection,  there- 
fore, the  Doftor  only  lets  us  know,  that  the  very  fame 
objeAion  lieth  with  equal  weight  againft  fome  things 
which  he  fuppofeth  we  receive  for  truth  ;  and,  there- 
fore, that  it  is  unreafbnable/or  us  to  mention  it.  ""l  he 
obje«llion  againft  his  opinion,  as  he  himfelf  itatcs  it,  let 
it  be  remembered,  is,  that  it  implieth  ability  in  men  to 
a6{  independently  fro7n  any  fuperior  caufe.  And  is  not 
the  very  thing  which  he  is  pleading  for,  a  power  in 
men  to  originate  their  own  internal  cxercifes  and  mo- 
tions ? — even  fo  that  the  nature  of  thefe  exercifes,  and 
^he  direction  of  thefe  motions,  fhall  be  determined,  not 

N  2  bv 


joo  An    essay    on  t'art  h 

^y  any  extrin/ic,  but  wholly  by  an  iritrinfic  caufe  ? 
And  doth  not  this  imply,  that  thefe  motions  and  exer- 
cises are  independent  of  every  thing  extrinfic  of  the 
man  whofe  exercifes  they  are  \  Doth  not  the  Doctor's 
opinion,  even  by  the  very  terms,  imply  that  there  are 
grounds  for  the  objedlion  which  the  maintainers  of 
fate  (as  he  is  pleafed  to  term  them)  make  againit  it, 
viz.  that  it  implieth  an  ability  in  the  creature  to  ad 
independently  from  any  fuperior  caufe  ?  Is  it  not  a 
j)ower  of  s&;.F-MOTioN  that  the  Do<^or  foflrenuoufly 
iirgeth  ?  And  what  can  this  povjer  mean,  unlefs  it  be, 
tliat  for  certain  exercijes  ayid  motions  we  are  dependent 
only  on  ourfeives— not  on  2iUy  foreign ^  extrinfic  caufe  ? 
For  us  to  be  independent  on  any  fuperior  caufe  /o a*  our 
adions^  is  to  have  our  aClions  arife  from  no  external, 
fuperior  efficiency,  or  caufe.  And  when  our  aCiions^ 
arife  from  no  fuch  efficiency,  then  we  aCi  indepaidtntlyt 
pf  any  fuch  efficiency.  When  our  aCfions  do  arife 
from  any  external  efficiency  and  influence,  then  they 
are  not  Jelf-origiiiated — we  are  not  Jelf-moved,  For 
Jelf-origitiated  motion  to  be  dependent  on  extrinfic  caiije 
nnd  inftuence^  for  its  exiflencc,  is  a  contradiftion  in 
terms.  When  the  adion  of  the  mind  doth  not  arife 
from  the  influence  of  any  external,  fuperior  caufe  ; 
then  it  certainly  nCteth  independently  of  fuch  caufe. 
Thcfdfalifis^  therefore,  will  doubtlefs  think  that  there 
is  weight  in  their  objeftion,  until  a  better  and  more; 
pertinent  anfwer  is  provided,  than  th^  Do£tor  hath 
given  it. 

As  to  the  Doc^tor^s  argument  from  the  feelings^  the 
experience  of  mankind,  there  certainly  cannot  be  much 
weight  in  it.  He  fays,  "  We  have  all  the  fame  expe* 
^'  rience,  the  fame  marks  and  evidence,  exactly,  of  our 
'^  having  really  a  power  of  felf-motion,  as  the  moft 
"  rigid  fatalifl  could  poffible  contrive  to  require,  if  he 
"  was  to  make  the  Jiippofition  of  a  nian*s  being  endued 
"  with  that  power."  (p.  85.)  This  is  a  bare  aflertion 
as  to  matter  of  faft.  And  the  advocates  for  certain 
^omiexion^  to  be  liire  Mr.  Edwards  and  his  followers, 

as 


Sea.  V.  MORAL    AGENCY.  loi 

as  confidently  afTert,  that  *'  all  their  feelings ^  their 
experience^  their  perception  and  confcioulnels,  are  but 
precifely  fuch  as  are  perfectly  confiflent  witlr  that 
eftabliflied  connexion  and  previous  certainty  of  things, 
for  the  belief  of  which  they  have  had  the  opprobrious 
name  of  fatalifls  fo  liberally  beftowed  upon  them.'' 
Jail  as  much  weiglit  as  is  laid  upon  the  one  of  thcfe 
arguments  or  alTertions,  muft  alfo  be  allowed  the 
other  5  by  which  means  tliey  will  exaftly  counterbal- 
ance and  deftroy  each  other. 

III.  That  there  is  a  previous  certainty  of  all  events 
»— a  certain,  infallible  connexion  in  things — is  abun- 
dantly manifell  from  the  doftrine  of  the  fore-know- 
ledge of  God.  That  there  is  fuch  a  fore-knowledge 
of  God,  even  of  the  volitions  of  men,  the  nioft  hidden, 
fecret  volitions  and  exercifes  of  their  thoughts  and 
hearts,  is  very  clearly  evident  from  the  word  of  God, 
as  well  as  from  the  conftant  conformity  of  Divine 
Providence,  in  all  ages,  to  the  view  and  reprefentation 
of  things  given  in  his  holy  w^ord.  And  fmce  God's 
certain  fore-knowledge  of  all  things  is  a  doftrine  con- 
ceded by  the  advocates  for  a  power  of  felf-determina- 
tion  in  men,  I  (hall  not  think  it  neceflary  to  enter  upon 
the  proof  of  it  ;  but  fliew  the  certainty  with  which  this 
doctrine  inferreth  an  eftablidied  connexion  in  things, 
and  a  previous  infallible  certainty  of  all  events  which 
ever  take  place  in  the  ?7wral^  as  well  as  in  the  natural 
world. 

It  is  impoflible  any  event  fliould  be  fore-known,,  the 
futur^  exillence  of  which  is  uncertain.  An)'-  event, 
the  future  exiftence  of  which  is  in  the  nature  of  things 
uncertain,  way  fail  of  taking  place.  And  to  fuppofe 
that  any  fuch  event  fhould  he  fore-knowji,,  very  ill  ton- 
fifteth  with  the  pofTibility  of  its  failing  of  ever  gaining 
exiftence.  This  is  juft  the  fame  as  to  fuppofe  that  the 
exiftence  of  an  event  may  be  fore-knomn^  which  yet 
'}}iay  never  take  place.  Fore^knoinled^e  of  an  event  is  a 
knowledge  of  the  certainty  of  the  future  exiftence  of 
that  event.     But  if  there  is  not,  in  the  nature  of  things, 

an 


102  Aw    E  S  S  A  Y    on  Part  I, 

an  abfolute  certainty  of  the  futare  exigence  .of  an 
event  ;  nothing  can  be  more  inanifeflly  abfurd,  than 
to  fuppofe  that  its  future  exiftence  fbould  be  fore-, 
known.  Knowledge  of  any  thing,  as  it  relateth  to  the 
prefent  argument,  is  no  other  than  tshe  mind'syc'^Ko-,  or- 
percezving^  its  certainty.  But  to  fuppofe  that  certainty 
ifhould  h^feen  and  perceived  where  it  is  not^  and  where 
it  doth  not  exift^  is  irrational  and  abfurd.  Where 
there  is  fufficient  ftrength  of  faculties,  it  is  polfible 
that  whatever  doth  exifl^  may  be  perceived  and  feen. 
But  to  lee  things  •which  are  not — which  do  not  exi/I — t 
requires  very  peculiar  i^cuKics,  and  a  ftretch  of  powers, 
quite  beyond  all  degree  of  human  conception  and  com- 
prehenfion,  and  even  dire^Uy  co-ntradiftory  thereto. 
An  event  which  is  contingent,  and  the  exiflence  of 
which  is  not  now  certainly  fuiurey  c2innot  be  feen  to  be 
future,  by  inunediate  intuition  ;  for,  by  the  fuppofition^^ 
there  is  no  fuch  event  cxi/ling.  Strength  of  faculties, 
and  quicknefs  and  accuteuefs  of  difcernment,  better 
enable  beings  to  fee  and  difcover  whatever  is — what-^ 
ever  doth  exijl.  But  no  conceivable  frrength  of  facul- 
ties, and  enlargement  of  powers,,  make  any  advances 
toward  a  difcovery  and  fight  of  what  is  not.  Such  an. 
event,  could  it  be  conceived  of,  could  not  be  feen  by 
means  of  any  thing  elfe  ;  for,  by  fuppofition,  it  is 
wholly  unconneded  with  any  thing  elfe.  Until,  there- 
fore, they  who  oppofe  the  dodrine  of  an  abfolute  con-r. 
nexion  in  things,  and  an  infallible  antecedent  certainty 
of  all  events,  fhew  us  fome  way  in  which  events,  fo 
contingent  as  they  imagine  humjin  volitions  are,  may 
be  certainly  fore-known,  we  fliali.think  the  doctrine  of 
the  divine  prefcience  an  infupejj'able  difficulty  in  the 
way  of  their  fcheme.  As  all  events,  the  exillence  of" 
•which  is  certain^  are  capable  of  being  fore-known  /  fo, 
on  the  other  hand,  all  events  which  are  capable  of 
being /or<f-/^;;c7i;«,  have  antecedent  certainty  of  exillence. 
Fore-knowledge,  and  antecedent  certainty  of  exifteiji.ce, 
mutually  imply  each  other. 

The  -Kx — r   feemeth  fenfible  of  a  difficulty  in  his 

fcheme, 


3c£t.V.  MORAL    AGENCY.  io$ 

fcheme,  arifing  From  the  doftrine  of  the  prefcience  of 
God  ;  and  doth  not  ffven  pretend  to  atifwer  and  removt 
it.  He  fays  (p.  104.)  ''  The  difEciilty  arifing  from. 
*'  the  divine  prefcience  we  pretend  not  to  be  able  to 
"  clear  :"  but  adds,  **  it  is  fufficient  that  it  equally 
*'  lies  againft  Mr.  Edwards's  doiHirine.*^  By  what 
methods  of  reafoning  our  x\uthor  perfuaded  himfelf 
that  there  was  any  diinculty,  from  the  do6i:rine  of  the 
divine  prefcience,  attending  his  doctrine  of  a  previous 
infallible  certainty  of  all  events  (which  is  the  argument 
w^herein  the  forti-know^ledge  of  God  is  introduced  by 
Mr.  Edwards)  it  is  difficult  for  me  to  apprehend.  Eat 
that  lie  fhoLild  think  this  anfwer /«/^aV;^/,  may  appear 
a  little  furprifing  to  the  reader,  if  he  will  be  pleafed 
to  turn  no  farther  back  than  to  the  note  on  the  next 
J)receding  page  of  his  book.  There,  the  reader^will 
find,  our  Author  is  objediing  againft  Mr.  Edwards's 
doftrine,  that  it  makes  God  "  the  proper  author,  the 
*'  efficient  caufe,  of  all  the  fins  of  men  and  devils.'! 
In  reference  to  this,  his  words  are,  *'  To  which  ob- 
*' jeftion  it  is  really  furprifing  to  find  Mr.  Edwards 
*'  returning  thi^  anfwer — that  the  doftrine  of  his  op- 
*'  pofers  is  involved  in  the  fame  difficulty.  For  admit 
*'  it  to  be  fo,  is  this  a  proper  anfs,Ver  ?  If  either  his 
*'  doftrine,  or  theirs,  is  juftly  chargeable  with  fuch  a 
*'  confequence^  by  all  the  regard  we  owe  to  a  Deity, 
"  and  Moral  Governor,  we  are  bound  to  reject  a 
"  fcheme  which  contains  fuch  an  imputation  on  him.'^ 
To  deny  the  prefcience  of  God,  or  adopt  a  fcheme  of 
do6trine  which  cannot  be  reconciled  with  his  certain 
fore-knoMdedge  of  all  events,  carries  an  imputation  on 
God  as  really  difnonourable  to  him,  as  any  of  the  ob- 
noxious fentimdnts  fuppofed  by  our  Author  to  be  con- 
tained in  that  traft  of  Mr.  Edwards,  upon  which  he  is 
animadverting^  And  yet  this  is  a  difhculty  with  which- 
our  Author\  fcheme  is  confeff'edly  embarraffcd,  an:d 
from  which  he  doth  not  even  pretend  to  be  able  to 
clear  it.  To  lahich  objedion^  I  may  now  fay  in  my  turn, 
it  is  really  furprifing  to  find  our  Author  retiirning  this 

anfiver — ■ 


104  AnESSAYon  Part  1/ 

anjwef — that  the  doClrine  ef  his  oppofer  is  involved  in  the 
janie  difficulty.  For  admit  it  to  he  fo^  is  this  a  proper 
anjiver  f  If  either  his  dodrine^  or  theirs^  is  ju/ily' 
chargeable  with  jiicJi  a  ccnjequence^  by  all  tJie  regard  we 
owe  to  a  Deity ^  and  Moral  Governor^  we  are  bound  to 
rejed  a  fcherrie  which  contains  Juch  an  imputation  on  hinii 
iSurely  the  impropriet}''  of  returning  fuch  ail  anfw«r 
conlfl  not  have  made  a  very  deep  impreffion  upon  thef 
mhid  of  our  Author  ;  of  he  muft  have  remembered  it, 
at  lealt  for  one  page  forward. 


E  e 


Vt. 


Wherein  the  notion  of  a  power  of  Jelf-detefmination  in 
the  will^  or  of  originating  motion  in  ourj elves ^  is  care- 
fully co/ijidercd^  and  the  inconji/iency  of  it  fJiown. 

THE  idea  of  a  power  of  fclf-determination  in  men, 
and  of  originating  motion  in  themfelves,  hath 
been  (liewii  by  Mr.  Edwards  to  be  fo  perfectly  incon* 
iident  and  abfurd,  fo  repugnant  to  itfelf  and  to  com-' 
mon  fenle  ;  that,  until  Jiis  yealbnings  are  fhe\vn  to  be 
inconchifive,  and  the  fophiftry  of  his  arguments  ex-^ 
pofed,  it  feems  unhec«plfary  that  any  thing  Tarther 
fhould  be  faid  upon  the  fubjecl:.  Propriety,  however, 
will  hardly  fuifer  it  to  be  wholly  pafTed  over  in  filence, 
in  an  elTay  on  that  agency,  to  wliicli  fuch  a  power  is 
erceemed  e[iential  by  tliofe  who  appear  as  advocated 
for  it.  It  might  be  rcafonably  expciHred  of  any  one 
who  attempteth  publicly  to  eztpole  "  the  falfliood  of 
Mr.  Edwards's  fcheme,"  that  he  fhould  provide  a  per- 
tinent anfwer  to  the  reafons.by  which  that  Author 
fupports  it,  and  fhew  the  weaknefs  and  inconcluftve- 
ncfs  of  the  arguments  which  he  maketh  ufe  of  in  its- 
defence.  But  this,  I  think,  the  Ex — r  hath  not  even 
attempted.  Nothing  is  faid,  thro*  his  whole  perform- 
ance, to  fhew  the  unjuftnefs  or  falfhood  of  that  Au- 
thor's realbnings  on  this  fubjeft  ;    6r,  in  any  meafurey 

tc> 


Sea.  VI.  MORAL    AGfiNCY,  lo^ 

to  take  off  the  edge  or  abate  the  force  of  them.  The 
principal  argument  which  our  Author  ofFereth  in  con- 
futation of  Mr.  Edwards's  reafonings,  particularly  on 
this  fubjed^  is,  that  the  doctrine  of  fuch  an  infallible 
connexion  in  things,  as  is  inconfiftent  with  the  power 
in  queftion,  makes  God  the  Author  of  fin,  and  implieth 
the  concurrence  of  poiitive  divine  efficiency  to  the 
taking  place  of  fuch  an  event.  Whether  this  is  aii 
objeftion  of  any  weight,  and  by  any  means  fuflicient  to 
overthrow  the  doctrine  againft  which  it  is  brought,  I 
fliall,  by  and  by,  confider  as  carefully  as  I  can. 

Our  Autiior,  indeed,  informs  the  public,  in  his  pre- 
face, that  *'  the  inquifitivc  may  find  a  full  anfwer  to 
"  the  principal  arguments  of  Mr.  Edwards's  book,  fpe- 
"  culatively  confidered,  in  Dr.  Clarke's  demonftration 
*'  of  the  being  and  attributes  of  God."  If  the  Doctor's 
anfwer  is  fo  full  and  complete,  our  Author  might 
tioubtlefs  have  given  a  fummary  of  it,  in  fo  clear  and 
ftriking  a  manner,  and  fet  it  in  fo  flrong  and  convin- 
cing a  light,  as  would  have  put  a  final  period  to  the 
debate  on  this  intricate  fubjeft.  He  hath  not,  howe- 
ver, feen  fit  to  talce  this  method  to  elucidate  his  fub- 
jeft.  The  public,  therefore,  may  perhaps  diffent  from 
the  Ex — r  in  opinion,  concerning  the  fulnefs  and  per- 
fpicnity  of  the  Doctor's  anfwer  to  the  principal  argu- 
ments of  Mr.  Edwards's  book. 

I  would,  therefore,  in  this  fee^ion,  propofe  the  doc- 
trine of  a  power  of  felf-determination  in  the  will,  or 
of  originating  motioii  in  ourfelves,  to  free  and  careful 
examination. 

I  confefs  myfelf  difficulted,  however,  to  form  any 
clear,  determinate  idea  of  the  power  in  queftion.  A 
power  of  felf-determination  appears  to  me  incapable 
of  definition  or  conception.  If  I  mifieprefent  tlie 
opinion  of  our  Author,  and  of  Gentlemen  on  that  fide 
of  the  queftion  with  him  refpecfting  liberty  ;  it  is  not 
with  defign,  but  wholly  for  want  of  undcrftanding 
what  the  opinion  and  fentimcnt  really  is. 

In  Ipeaking  of  the  power  which,  in  Lis  view,  is  no- 

O  cefiai  y 


lo^  AnESSAYon  ^    Partf. 

.cefTarjr  to  moral  liberty  and  agency,  our  Author  term- 
eth  it  ''  a  power  of  felf-determination,"  (p.  34.  88.) 
and,  after  Dr.  Clarke,*  *'  a  power  of  beginning  mo- 
tion— a  power  of  felf-motion,'*  &c.  (p.  93,  94,  95. 
marg.)  It  is  fpoken  of  as  a  felf-jnoving  j acuity — a 
principle  or  power  o^  beginning  motion,  (p.  91.  marg.) 
The  Ex — r  confiders  it  as  a  power  whereby  77ien  are 
the  voliinta^ry.^  defigning  caufes  of  their  own  volitions. 
(p.  81,  82.)  It  hence  appears  that  the  power  which 
our  Author  infifts  on  as  eflential  to  moral  liberty,  is  a 
capacity,  or  faculty,  with  which  moral  agents  are 
endowed,  of  beginning  and  originating  their  own  internal 
motions  and  voluntary  exertions  :  even  fo  that  nothing 
but  what  is  in  the  ■)nan^  and  what  properly  belon^eth  to 
him^  canjuftly  be  confidered  as  the  Ci^/^/i?  of  his  mental  ex- 
ercifes  and  volitions.  Accordingly  he  urgeth  that  we 
muft  be  the  caufes  of  our  own  volitions .  (p .  8  2 . )  And  rep- 
refents  the  application  of  commands,  invitations,  moni- 
tions. Sec.  as  being  coniiftent  with  2.  freedom  to  either 
fide.  (p.  109.)  This  is  the  power — thefe  are  the  fa- 
culties, which,  in  our  Author's  view,  are  eflential  to 
moral  aftion,  virtue  or  vice,  praife  or  blame. 

Moral  action,  therefore,  upon  thefe  principles, 
is  fomething  of  which  there  is  no  caufe,  reafon,  or 
ground  whatfoever  of  its  exiftence.  *'  For  whatever 
''  exifts,  muft  either  have  come  into  being  out  of  no- 

"  thing 

*  The  Do£>or's  pretended  demonftration  of  the  realSty  of  the  exiftence  of  that 
kind  of  liberty  and  freedom  of  will  which  heconfidereth  aseflential  to  the  molality 
of  aftions,  drawn  from  the  power  there  is  efientially  in  Cod  to  begin  motion  ; 
•which  power  it  is  fuppofed  he  hath  communicated  to  his  creatures  ;  I  muft  beg 
Jeave  to  confider  as  a  mere  quibble  upon  the  term  motion.  When  he  firft  ad- 
vanceth  his  argument  for  freedom  of  luilh  from  a  power  in  the  Deity  to  begin 
mation  ;  his  readers  would  naturally  be  led,  from  his  manner  of  ufing  the  term, 
to  underftand  him  to  fpeak  of  external,  material  moticn,  though,  afterwards,  the 
term  is  fo  ufed  as  Xo  coniey  xhc  xAsa.  oi -voluntary  exerelfi — internal  motion.  If 
the  Dodor's  argument  for  liberty  is  that  there  is  a  power  in  God.  which,  in  kind 
and  in  a  degree,  he  hath  communicated  to  men,  to  begin  external,  material  motion  ; 
with  whom  doth  he  imagine  that  he  is  contending  ?  But  becaufe  there  is  a  power 
in  the  Deity  to  begin  external,  material  motion,  doth  it  from  thence  follow  that 
he  hath  a  power  to  begin  his  own  internal,  -voluntary  exercifes  and  motions  ?  Or 
from  a  power  in  men  to  begin  fuch  kind  of  motion,  doth  it  at  all  follow,  that 
they  are  poii'efled  of  that  powtr  of  ivill  and felf-determination  which  the  Doctor 
urgeth  ?  His  premifes  and  cdnfeqtience  are  certainly  utter  flrangers  to  each  other. 
So  w/ak  an  argument,  from  fo  ftrong  and  mallerly  areafoner,  rendercth  the  caufe 
itleif,  in  whicli  it  is  urged,  juftly  fufpicious. 


Sea.  VI.  MORAL    AGENCY.  '407 

*'  thing,  abfolutely  without  a  caufe  ;  or  it  muft  have 
*'  bfeen  produced  by  fome  external  caufe  ;  or  it  muft 
*'  be  felf-exiftent  ;"  the  two  laft  of  which  will  not  ei- 
ther of  them  be  pretended  of  creatures.  (See  Dr. 
Clarke's  Demonftrat.  &c.  p.  15.  edit.  8.)  This  alfo  is 
very  manifeftly  implied  by  the  terms  self-motion, 

SELF-MOTIVE,     POWER,    SELF-MOVING    FACULTY, 

&c.  It  is,  by  the  very  terms,  a  motion  or  exercife,. 
for  which  there  is  no  ground,  reafon  or  caufe,  out  of 
it/elf  and  of  what  properly  helongeth  to  its  very  nature. 
Nothing,  therefore,  can  be  more  prepoflierous,  than 
to  attempt  to  give  a  reafon  for  the  exiftence,  or  taking 
place,  of  that  kind  of  adion^  of  which  our  Author 
would  predicate  either  virtue  or  vice,  according  to 
his  own  definition  of  it.  The  very  attempt  denieth 
the  thing  defigned  to  be  illuftrated  and  proved.  And 
yet  our  Author  blames  Mr.  Edwards  for  not  having 
fhown  the  caufe  of  volition.  On  the  other  hand,  our 
Author  blames  Dr.  Clarke  for  fpeaking  of  a  groundy 
foundation^  caufe^  or  reafon^  of  God's  being  ;  becaufe, 
as  he  fuppofeth,  there  is  an  utter  impropriety  in  fup- 
pofmg  any  thing,  in  any  fenfe,  the  prior  ground  of  the 
jirft  exiftence.  (See  p.  37,  38.  marg.)  And  yet  there 
is  as  manifeft  an  impropriety  in  attempting  to  give  a 
resfon  or  caufe  for  the  exiftence  of  that  which  is  felf- 
originated  ;  as,  to  affign  a  prior  ground  of  the  firft 
exiftence. 

According  to  our  Author's  definition  of  the  power 
in  queftion,  the  following  things,  it  may  be  obferved, 
are  effential  to  moral  adlion. 

I .  That,  immediately  antecedent  to  choice,  or  vo- 
luntary exertion,  man  muft  be  perfeftly  indifferent  in 
the  ftate  of  his  mind  ;  without  the  leaft  degree  of  in- 
clination, bias,  or  preponderation,  one  way  or  the 
other  ;  or,  to  one  thing  more  than  to  another.  Ac- 
cordingly we  find  that  the  advocates  for  the  power 
under  conftderation,  exprefsly  and  avowedly  plead  for 
a  liberty  of  indifference^  as  being  ellential  to  virtue  or 
vice,  praiie  or  blame. 

O  2  2.  Anotlier 


1o8  An    essay    oi^  Parti. 

2.  Another  thing  efTential  to  the  power  under  codC- 
deration,  is,  that  there  fhould  be  no  prevailing  ten-« 
dency  or  preponderatioa,  in  the  Hate  of  things,  from 
outward  objeds^  to  any  one  particular  choice  or  volun* 
tary  exercife,  rather  than  another  ;  from  which  ten- 
dency, or  preponderation,  there  fhould  arife  a  greater 
probability  that  one  particular  volition  fliould  take 
f  lace,  than  another.  All  fuch  prevailing  tendency  in 
outward  objects  muJH:  infallibly  be  of  the  nature  of 
that  necellity,  which,  in  our  Author's  view,  is  incon* 
fiftcnt  with  all  ideas  of  moral  defert  in  actions.  For 
as  far  as  there  is  a  preponderancy  and  prevailing  ten«» 
dency  in  things  to  one  certain^  particular  volition, 
rather  than  another  ;  fo  far  a  connexion  taketh  place 
between  volition,  and  fome  antecedent,  external  caufe. 
But  fuch  a  connexion  as  this,  in  every  degree  of  it,  the 
Kx — r  infifts,  h  inconfiftent  with  that  fovereignty  over 
our  own  anions,  which,  in  his  view,  is  efTential  to  all 
ideas  of  moral  defert. 

5.  In  that  indifference  which  is  infifled  on  as  effen-^ 
tlai  to  free  and  moral  aftion,  it  is  evident,  man  muft 
be  either  perceptive  and  confcions,  or  utterly  uncon- 
Icious  and  impercipient.  If,  in  that  indifference, 
which,  in  cur  Author's  view,  is  efTential  to  the  moral- 
ity of  action,  the  mind  is  perfedlly  u7iconJcious  and  ;:72- 
percipient  ;  it  mufl  be  fuppofed,  that,  by  an  exertion 
of  its  own,  for  which  (it  is  to  be  remembered)  there 
was  no  antecedent  caufe,  reafon  or  ground^  and  in 
v/hich  it  is,  itfelf,  utterly  without  any  degree  of  con* 
fcioufnefs  or  perception,  it  awakened  and  rouled  up 
itfelf  into  confcioufnels,  a«5tivity  and  life.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  in  that  indifference  which  is  immediately 
to  precede  the  eleftion  of  the  mind,  in  order  that  its 
choice  may  be  free,  it  is  percipient  and  con/cious  ;  it 
mufl  be  fuppofed  that  the  mind  takes  into  its  view  the 
ideas  of  things  propofed  to  \X.s>  free  choice,  and  fur- 
ve^reth  them  in  their  leveral  properties,  relations  and 
connexions,  with  a  perfe(^  mdifference  of  mind,  with- 
out the  leafl  bias  or  inclination  one  way  or  thc.othcr  ; 

until 


Sea.  VI.  MORAL    AGENCY.  1G9 

until  the  noble,  unfettered  foul,  by  its  non-fovcreign 
and  arbitrary  aft,  (which,  by  the  way,  is  antecedent 
to  any  degree  of  mentnl  adioii  and  exertion)  command* 
eth  itfelf  into  a  bias  and  preponderation  of  difpofition 
towards  jome  one  of  that  variety  of  objefts  which  are 
ii;i  view,  rather  than  all  others. 

All  thefe  things  appear  to  me  necefTary  to  that  pow- 
er oi fclf-motion^  JeLf-cieter?mnation^  which,  in  our  Au- 
thor's view,  is  eifential  to  moral  agency,  virtue  and 
vice.  For  if  there  is  any  internal  bias  upon  the  mind, 
inclining  and  prevailingly  difpofmg  it  to  any  particular 
aftion  or  choice,  rather  than  its  oppofite  ;  or,  if  there 
is  any  thing  m  the  Itate,  circumftances,  lituation  or 
connexion  of  o«z'Zi;d!/Y/  objetls^  ^vom.  whence  arifeth  a 
prevailing  tendency  or  preponderation,  in  any  way,  or 
on  any  account,  to  one  certain,  particular  choice  of 
the  mind,  rather  than  another  ;  in  that  cafe  it  is  ma- 
nifeft  that  either  this  internal  bias^  or  the  external  cir^ 
cumflances  of  things,  concur  as  cauje  to  the  taking 
place  of  an  a<fl  of  will,  and  to  determine  it  to  be  as  it 
is  and  not  otherwije.  But  that  fuch  a  connexion  of 
volition  with  any  antecedent  canfey  or  ground  of  its 
exillence,  is  confident  with  that  liberty  and  freedom 
which  are  eifential  to  virtue  and  vice,  appears  to  me 
utterly  inconiillent  with  the  whole  drift  of  our  Au- 
thoi-'s  reafonings,  and  every  attempt  to  prove  the  irre- 
concilablenefs  of  moral  neceffity,  w^ith  internal,  hu- 
man iibeity.  Particularly  doth  he  exprefs  himfelf  to 
this  purpoie  in  p.  97.  His  words  are  thefe  :  *'  If  ex~ 
■*'  ternal  conilraint  or  natural  ncceflity  renders  a  per- 
*'  fon  incapable  of  fuch  commands  as  refpeft  material 
"'^  aftion  ;  moral  neceffity,  or  internal  conftraint,  muA: 
"  render  him  equally  incapable  of  fuch  commands  as 
*'  refped:  the  exercifes  of  the  mind^  or  a<SI:s  of  volition." 

But  whether  in  this  ftate  of  pcrfeft  indifference, 
"which  immediately  j.^recedeth  the  free  choice  and  elec- 
tion of  the  mind,  a  perfon  is  perceptive  and  confcious, 
or  utterly  unconfcious  and  impercipient,  doth  not  ap- 
pear by  any  thing  Qur  Author  ^lath  particularly  and 

exprefsly 


tto  An    essay    on  Part  I. 

cxprefsly  faid  upon  the  fubjetfV.  It  may,  therefore, 
be  proper  to  confider  the  matter  more  attentively,  in 
each  of  thefe  views  ;  as  the  power  urged  byArminian 
divines  will  certainly  fall  under  the  one  or  the  other 
of  thefe  predicaments. 

I.  It  will  be  worth  our  while  to  examine  into  the 
caufe,  or  reafon,  of  voluntary  exertion,  upon  the  fup'* 
pofition  that  man  is  perfe(ftly  unconjcious  and  imperci" 
fient  immediately  preceding  the  choice  and  election 
of  his  mind. 

To  common  uivderftan dings  it  muft  appear  difficult 
to  conceive  how  any  thing,  in  a  ftate  of  perfeftimper- 
ceptivity  and  unconfciouinefs,  {hould  become  adtive, 
confcious  and  percipient,  without  the  influence  and 
concurrence  of  any  external  caufe.  That  fuch  an 
event  as  this  fliould  take  place,  is  as  utterly  inconceiv- 
able, as  that  non-entity  Ihould  bring  forth,  and  that 
an  intelligent,  perceptive  being — yea,  that  tlioufand«; 
and  millions  of  fuch — Ihould  fpring  immediately  out 
of  nothing  into  exiflence,  without  the  creative  power 
of  another,  and  the  influence  of -any  external  caufe. 
That  perception  and  idea  fhould  arife  out  of  fomething 
which  is  as  far  from  them  as  matter  is  from  thought  ; 
and  this,  too,  without  the  concurrence  and  influence 
of  any  external  operation  and  caufe  ;  is  a  fuppofition 
which  affronteth  common  fenfe,  teareth  up  the  foun- 
dation of  all  our  reafonings,  and  is  as  full  of  abfurdity 
as  the  atheiftical  notion  of  a  fortuitous  concourfe  of 
atoms  concurring  to  the  formation  of  this  ftupendous 
and  beautiful  fyftem. 

To  fuppofe  man  himfelf  to  be  the  caufe  of  the  begin- 
ning of  his  own  perception,  is  quite  as  extravagant  as 
to  fuppofe  him  to  be  the  caufe  of  the  beginning  of  his 
own  exiflence.  That  exertion  of  his  while  imperci- 
pient^  which  muft  be  the  productive  caufe  of  percep- 
tion, would  be  quite  as  extraordinary,  as  the  exertion 
of  one  who  doth  not  exift  (however  abfurd  and  felf- 
repugnant  the  fuppofition)  in  order  to  bring  himfelf 
into  being  and  exiltence.     And  to  confider  man  as  the 

caufe 


Scft.VI.  MORAL    AGENCY.  xii 

eaufe  of  his  own  coufcioufnefs  and  exertion — there 
being  neither  confcioufnefs  nor  exertion  in  him,  other- 
wife  than  as  2.  fruit  of  the  operation  of  this  myflerious 
caufe-— is  to  give  fucli  a  view  of  cauje^  as  at  once  ftrips 
it  of  every  thing  which  contains  in  it  a  reafon  for  the 
exigence,  or  taking  place,  of  any  efFe<Sl — or  whereby 
it  is  adequate  to  the  produdion  of  tlie  eiFeft,  of  which 
it  ailigned  as  the  ground,  reafon  or  caufe  :  and  there- 
fore Icaveth  the  fubjeft  refpedliing  man's  firft  becoming 
perceptive,  animate  and  confcious,  as  to  any  ground 
or  reafon  of  fuch  an  event,  as  perfedly  in  the  dark  as 
if  no  reafon  had  been  pretended  to  be  affigned  for  it. 

To  fuppofe  that  man  fhould  be  the  cauje  of  his  own 
perception^  by  Jome  exertions  of  his  oivn^  is  to  make  the 
effe^ft  anticipate  its  caufe,  and  gain  exiftence  without 
any  of  i//  afliftance  and  influence.  For,  man,  in  this 
exertion  of  his  for  the  produdtion  of  perception,  mufb 
be  fuppofed  to  be  perceptive  and  confcious  ;  other- 
wife,  the  exertion,  whatever  it  may  produce  in  him, 
cannot  properly  be  called  his  exertion.  So,  likewife, 
a  man  muil  be  voluntary^  in  that  exertion  of  his, 
whereby  he  produceth  his  own  volitions.  And,  if  fo, 
the  caufe-  or  reafon,  itfelf,  which  is  adduced  for  the 
fblution  of  one  difficulty,  bringeth  another  as  great 
along  with  it  ;  and  will  do  fo  in  infinitum  :  and,  there- 
fore, is  a  caufe,  or  reafon,  which  doth  not  at  all  aflifl 
us  in  our  inquiries  after  truth,  or  anfwer  any  purpofe 
in  reafoning  and  argumentation. 

2 .  It  is  queflionablc,  whether  the  difficulty  refpec- 
ting  man's  being  the  caufe  of  his  own  voluntary  exer- 
tions, would  be  in  any  meafure  removed  by  fuppofmg 
him  to  have  idea  or  obje£l  in  view,  immediately  pre- 
ceding fuch  exertion.  The  Ex — r  conftantly  fuppof- 
eth  that  men  are  the  defigning  caufes  of  thofe  in-war d 
aCis  wherein  the  nature  of  virtue  and  vice  confijietk. 
(Seep.  67.  82.)  If,  immediately  antecedent  to  any 
voluntary  exertion,  we  are  to  confider  man  as  having 
idea  and  obje£i:  in  view  ;  we  are  to  conceive  him  as 
contemplating,  with  ap^rfed  indifferency,  that  variety 

of 


tll2  An    £  S  S  A  Y    on  Parti. 

of  objeds  which  fiii'round  him,  and  prcrent  thcmfelves 
to  his  view;  having  not  the  leafl  degree  of  aifed:ion 
for  one,  more  than  another,  until,  by  a  certain  noble 
fovereignty  of  his  own,  he  detcrnanes  kimfelf  mto  a 
preponderating  bias,  or  inclination  of  mind,  to  one 
certain  object,  rather  than  another.  Here  the  fiippo- 
(ition  mider  confideration  preienteth  to  our  view  a 
more  philojophic  kind  of  anunal  than  is  probably  to  be 
.  found  in  our  world  ;  or,  even  in  any  part  of  the  ciea* 
tion  of  God  !  And  yet  this  is  the  flate,  thefe  the  cir- 
cum fiances,  it  is  neceffary  for  man  to  be  in,  im-apedi'- 
iately  antecedent  to  any  mental  inclination,  or'^ohm- 
tary  exertion  ;  in  drder  that  fuch  inclination  and  ex- 
ertion may  have  moral  quality— virtue  or  vice— ^ 
predicated  of  it. 

Upon  tlie  fuppofition  that  fuch  an  indifference  as 
this  is  eifential  to  the  morality  of  aftion,  and  neceflaiy 
immediately  to  precede  the  choice  of  the  mind,  in  order 
that  fuch  choice  may  be  free  ;  I  defire  that  the  follow- 
ing things  ma^  be  obferved. 

I.  Such  an  indifferency,  or  liberty  to  either  fide^  as 
implieth  a  freedom  from  all  prcpeiifity — all  prepon- 
derating influence  or  bias,  whereby  it  becomes  more 
certain,  or  probable,  from  any  confideration  whatever, 
that  clioice,  or  volition,  will  terminate  upon  one  ob~ 
je(ft,  than  another  ;  is  utterly  incoiililtent  with  ali  ideas 
of  any  depravity  in  human  nature  in  its  prefent  fallen 
fcate,  or  any  difadvantnge  mankind  arc  laid  under  by 
our  original  fm  and  fall.  *  In  p.  105  of  his  book,  our 
Author  fpeaks  of  an  m-potency  derived  to  mankind 
from  Adam,  in  fuch  terms  as  would  naturally  lead  his 

readeis 

*  Dr.  Whitby,  (♦ii  the  five  points,  (p.  joz,  303.  edit.  II.)  alloweth  tiiat  it  may 
be  confirtent  with  a  llate  of  trial  and  Iieccloir,  loi  it  to  become  exceeding  dijjicult 
for  men  to  do  good,  and  tor  men  to  iiave  a  JirsKg  bintj  and  foii-eifui  irrciinaiicn, 
to  what  is  evil.  And  Dr.  Taylor,  \n  \\\sj'cii^iuye  diSti'tne,  &c.  (edit.  II  )  tells 
iis,  (p.  228.)  "  That  we  aie  \ery  apt,  id  a  world  full  of  temptation,  to  be  de- 
"  ceivcd  and  drawn  into  fin  by  hoi'.ily  api'etires  ;  that  when  once  we  are  under 
'"  llie  government  of  thele  api)elitcs,  it  ib  at  leafl  c-xcfediTfg  d-fficult,  if  not  im- 
"  pRA'CTicABLE.to  rccover  ourl'elves  by  tl:e  mere  force  of  reaicn  ;  and,  confe- 
»'  quenily,  ih.it  we  Hand  in  need  of  th'i'Iift-givhig  Spirit."  How  far  thefe  fen» 
timents  are  Confluent  with  that  power  oi  J'elf-dtiera.inutiifi  inlirted  on  by  our 
J^uthor,  and  fo  repeatedly  ur^ed  by  thele  Gentleaien  theuu'elves,  I  leave  to  the 
reader  to  judgt* 


Sed.Vt  MORAL    AGENCY.  ii^ 

readers  to  iniagiiie  that  he  conceived  we  were  fubjeft- 
cd  to  certain  dil advantages^  by  the  defection  of  our  fird 
parents  from  God.  And  in  p.  6i.  62.  he  admittcth 
that  fuch  a  (bate  of  will  rnay  be  required  of  us,  as  is 
forever  impoflible  ;  but  fuppofeth  tliat  tliis  can  be  only 
on  fuppoHtion  of  a  power  once  given,  but  loft.  From 
fuch  like  pafTages  and  expreffions,  his  readers  would 
be  naturally  led  to  conclude  that  the  Ex — r  himielf  is 
of  opinion  that  mankind  are  laid  under  fomG  difadvan- 
tages,  and  are  under  fome  obftrudtionSi  in  the  way  of 
attaining  that  perfedlion  and  holineis  which  is  required 
and  demanded  of  them  ;  and  are  under  fome  prevail- 
ing bias  or  tendency^^  either  internal  or  external,  to 
that  fin  and  wickedneis  which  is  their  utter  ruin.  But, 
this  notwithilanding,  he  infifteth  that  fuch  a  power  of 
ielf-determination  a?  implieth  a  freedom  to  either  fide^ 
is  elTential  to  that  liberty  v/hich  is  necefiary  to  the 
morality  of  action.  To  me  this  appeareth  inconfift- 
ent  ;  and  to  include  a  conceflion  that  we  may  be  under 
moral  obligation  to  pei'form  fomething  to  which  we: 
have  not  the  freedom  in  queftion,  and  to  which  we 
have  not  a  power  of  felf-determination.  If  it  is  eften- 
tial  to  the  ideas  of  moral  aftion,  that  man  be  pofTefTed 
of  I'ucii  a  power  of  felf-determination  as  implieth  a 
freedom  from  all  bias  or  preponderation,  either  inter- 
nal or  external  ;  the  confequence  is  unavoidable, 
(Either  that  mankind,  in  theii*  prefent  flate,  are  not 
moral  agents  ;  or,  that,  whatever  may  have  been  con- 
ceived, by  gloomy  minds,  of  the  prefent  lapjed^  degen- 
erate ftate  of  human  nature,  mankind  do  in  faft  pofTefs 
all  that  perfection  and  dignity  of  nature  with  which 
Adam  was  endowed  in  his  original  ftate  ;  and  are  no 
farther  the  lubjeCts  of  either  praife  or  blame,  than  they 
aft  from  the  fame  generous  lovereignfy  and  noble  ind'f- 
ferency  with  whicli  it  is  fuppofcd  he  was  orighially 
created  and  endowed. 

2.  Such  a  power  of  felf-determination  in  mep,  as 
implieth  an  entire  indiTerency  of  v/ill  and  alie.licn, 
and  a  freedom  from  all  internal  bias  and  inclination. 

P  .  and 


ti^  An    E  S- S  A  Y    o>f  Part  Iv 

and  allprcponderation  or  tendency  arifmg  from  out- 
ward circumflances,  lituatioii  or  objects,  to  any  par- 
ticular, definite  choice  ;  is  altogether  inconiiftcnt  witlv 
the  idea  of  a  finner's  being  ever  nbandojied  of  God,  and 
jjivefJ  over  to  the  cnnmiijjlun  of  fin.  It  hath  been  the 
general  opimon  of  ProteRant  Divines,  that  fmners  arc^ 
fometimes,  in  fuc-h  a  ienfe  abandoned  of  God,  and 
given  over  to  finning,  as  implieth  a  flrong,  prevailing 
tendency  in  the  ftate  and  circumflances  of  things, 
either  internal  or  external,  or  both,  to  that  moral  evil- 
and  wickednefs  •which  is  exceedingly  provoking  to 
him,  and  which  draweth  down  his  difpleafure  upon 
them.  And  this  opinion  is  fufiiciently  authorized  by 
the  Apoitle  Paul,  in  his-Epiflle  to  the  Romans.  When 
he  had  been  giving  the  character  of  the  heathen  world^ 
and  mentioning  their  proncneis  to  idolatry,  whereby 
they  ""'changed  tlic  glory  of  the  uncorruptible  God,, 
into  an  image  made  like  to  corruptible  mail,  he  fays, 
(ver.  24;)  fVherefore^  aljo^  God  gave  them  up  to  un- 
cle annejs  throupji  the  lujis  of  their  own  hearts.  And 
(ver.  26.)  FoF  this  cauje  God  gave  them  up  to  vile  cf-' 
fcCiioris .  And  even  the  Ex— ^r  himfelf,  though,  as  it 
:>ppears  to  me,  in  dire  ft  oppofition  to  the  leading  len- 
timents  of  his  whole  book,  yet  apjrears,  by  Ibme  thingi; 
laid  in  it,  to  be  of  the  fame  opinion.  In  p.  107,  he 
fi:)eak3  oi  finners  being  abandoned  and  given  vp  of  God  y 
and  formcth  an  argument' upon  it,  and  draws  a  conclu- 
lion  from  it,  as  he  imagincth.-  in  favour  of  a  power  of 
felf-determ-ination  in  m.en.  It  is  difficult  to  conceive 
v/hat  our  Author  can  intend  by  the  exprellion  oifinners 
being  abandoned  and  givenup  of  God^  fhort  of  a  prevail- 
ing tendency  in  the  ftate  of  things^  either  internal  or 
external,  to  that  fin  which  is  their  ruin-^fome  fuch 
tendency  as  is  utterly  inconfiflent  with  a  freedom  to 
either  Jide,  And  it  is-  very  raanifefl  that  this  is  the 
lenfe  in  which  he  ufeth  tlie  phrafe,  by  the  argument 
which  he  foundeth  upon  it,-  in  order  to  eflablifli  his 
own  fentiment — ^a  fentiment  direftly  repugnant  to  itj. 
and  mofl  perfcftly  inconliflent  with  it.^     For  as  far  as 

any 


■f^ea.ri.  MORAL    AGENCY.  viy 

nny  of  the  determinations  of  the  mind  take  place  under 
fach  an  InHucnce  as  miiib  certainly  be  implied  in  the 
oxpreHions  of  hc^iftg  abandoned  and  given  up  ofGod^  (if 
•they  have  any  meaning)  they  cannot  he  fclf-oriiyinated 
and  fcdf-movcd  ;  and,  therefore,  in  our  Author's  fenfe 
of  freedoii;!,  cannot  be  free.  If  perfons  being  aban- 
cioned  and  given  up  of  God  doth  not  import  any  pre- 
vailing tendency  and  preponderation,  in  the  (late  and 
circumftances  of  things,  to  vice  and  wickednefs,  rather 
-than  to  virtne  and  holinefs  ;  certainly  no  weight  can 
be  laid  upon  the  fnppofition  that  fmners  are  fom,etimcs 
abandoned  and  given  np  of  God,  as  an  argmiient  to 
prove  that  a  ^owcy  o? /rl.f-determi?2aiion^  and  a  freedon: 
to  either  ftde^  is  a  privilege  of  v^'hich  they  had  been 
hi^retofore  poiiefTed  :  if  it  dnth  import  fnch  a  prevail- 
ing tcndesicy  an-d  preponderation,  t&c.  then  fiirely  that 
liberty,  which  is  efTential  to  the  fnoralitv  of  a(?}:ions,  is 
coniillcnt  v/ith  a  prevailing  tendency  'in  the  ftate  and 
circumftances  of  things,  either  external  or  internal,  or 
botli,  to  thofe  aftions  and  determinations  which  arc 
denominated  morally  evil. 

To  fpeak  of  fmners  being  abandoned  and  given  np 
of  God,'^  withont  importing  a  prevailing  tendency  to 
ilich  choice  and  aiftions  as  are  morally  evil,  in  diftinc- 
\ion  from  thofe  which  are  nioraily  virtuous  and  good  ; 
is  to  talk  unintelligibly  and  witliout  meaning.  To 
I'pcak  of  a  power  of  felf-motion,  felf-determ'ination,  as 
ibmething  v/liich  is  confiftent  with  a  prevailing  ten- 
dency in  things  to  one  prrticular  event  ip  diltinclion 
from  all  others,  and  in  oppofition  to  them,  is  to  uie 
terms  in  a  manner  equally  unmeaning  and  unintelligi- 
ble. Either,  therefore,  there  can  no  fuch  thing  in 
nature  take  place,  refpei^ling  any  man,  as  may,  with 
the  lead  appearance  of  propriety,  be  termed  his  being; 
abandoned  and  criven  up  of  Cod  ;  or,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  liberty  which  confifteth  in  a  freedom  to  either 
fide — a  freedom  from  all  preponderating  tendency  and 
bias,  in  the  ftate  and  circumftances  of  things,"  to  one 
particular  choice    and  a<flion,    rather  than  another— 

P  2  jcannC't,. 


Ii6  An    essay    on  Parti. 

cannot,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  cfienfial  to  mor^l 
agency,  virtue  and  vice. 

Our  Author  faith,  that  fmners  being  abandoned  and 
given  up  of  God,  implieth  that  they  once  had  a  moral 
power  to  turn  and  live.  In  order  tliat  the  perfpicuity 
and  pertinency  of  this  argument  might  appear,  it  was 
incumbent,  I  think,  on  our  Author,  to  determine  whe- 
ther fmners  are  criminalor  blameworthy  for  not  re- 
turning unto  God,  after  they  are  abandoned^  Sec.  If 
they  are  not^  their  being  aba?idoned  lays  no  foundation 
for  any  increafe  of  guilt  and  wickednefs,  nor  at  all  in- 
ferreth  any  probability  of  it  ;  but  the  contrary  ;  and 
"we  mufi:  wait  for  farther  explanation,  in  order  to  de- 
termine the  nieaning  of  the  expreflion.  If  they  are 
crirriinal  and  blameworthy  for  not  turning  unto  God 
after  they  are  ahaiidoned  and  given  up  of  hirn  /  then,  by 
our  Author's  own  conceffion,  moral  inability  is  not  in- 
confiftent  with  our  ideas  of  virtue  and  vice,  and  defert 
pf.praife  and  blame. 

It  is  very  manifeil:,,  that  the  phrafe  of  bei?2g  abandoned 
and  given  up  ofGod^  as  it  hath  been  commonly  ufed  by 
Divines,  carries  with  it  the  idea  of  fome  degree  of 
necejjity.,  of  fome  kind  or  other,  of  the  commiflion  of 
fin  ;  and,  therefore,  the  confideration,  that  any  aftion, 
or  exercife  of  the  human  will,  is  the  fruit  and  confe- 
quence  of  fuch  neceffity,  by  no  means  deftroyeth  the 
moral  quality  of  it  ;  nor  is  it  confident  with  its  being 
morally  evil  and  criminal  in  the  fight  of  God. 

But  it  may  be  now  proper  more  particularly  to  in- 
quire, whei'her  our  having  idea  or  obje<ft  in  view^  while 
yet  in  a  ftatc  of  perfe£l  indifference  of  will,  and  with- 
out all  degrees  of  bias  ^n^  inclination  of  mind,  is  a  fup- 
pofition  which  would  make  it  at  all  more  conceivable 
or  fuppofable  that  we  fhould  originate  our  ovv^n  incli- 
nations and  voluntary  exertions,  than  if  we  were,  im-. 
mediately  preceding  the  exercifes  of  our  will,  in  a 
ftate  of  perfect  iinperceptivity  ;  as  unconfcious  as  the 
air  we  breathe,  or  the  earth  we  walk  on.  It  is  to  be 
remembered,   that,   by  the  fuppofitipn,  thi§  view  of 

objed 


Sea.  VI.  MORAL    AGENCY.  I17 

objed:  hath  not  the  leaft  tendency  in  it  to  determine 
fhe  will,  or  excite  or  engage  the  affecftion.  Such  3, 
tendency  as  this,  in  that  intelled;ual  view  of  o'o)et.^t 
which  is  utterly  v/ithout  allection,  is  as  inconiiitent 
with  a  power  of  felf-niotion,  felf-determination,  in 
men,  as  that  very  doctrine  of  ncceffity  which  is  fo  ob- 
noxious to  our  Author.  Such  a  tendency  would  im- 
ply, that  volition  arifeth,  at  leaft  in  part,  from  fome 
external  influence  ;  and  would  infer  a  degree  of  ron- 
nexion  with  fome  antecedent,  extriniic  cauie  ;  and, 
therefore,  a  certain  degree  of  necejjity  of  its  exiftence  ; 
both  which  are  perfeftly  repugnant  to  all  ideas  of  that 
fovereignty  over  our  own  wills,  which  mull  certainly 
be  implied  in  a  power  oi Jelf-motion^  jdf-determinatio?i . 
For  any  one  to  urge  mere  idea,  or  view  of  objed:,  in 
xViiich  mankind  are  perfedliy  pafTive,  as  a  reafon  by 
which  to  account  for  a  power  of  felf^motion  and  felf* 
detcrrmnation  in  men,  is  at  once  to  confute  himfclf, 
and  give  up  his  own  argument  ;  as  it  placeththe  cauie 
of  the  determination  of  volition  in  fomethingextriniic 
of  tlie  w^ill  itlelf ;  connefting  it  with  fomething  where- 
i;i  man  is  acknowledg-ed  to  be  entirely  pafiive.  The 
very  attempt,  indeed,  of  any  perfon  of  thefe  princi- 
ples, to  give  a  reajan  for  human  volition,  at  once  con- 
futeth  his  own  fentiments  ;  as  it  implieth,  that  volition 
is  an  effect  which  ftandeth  in  need  of  a  caiije  to  be  the 
ground  and  fupport  of  its  exiftence,  equally  with  other 
dependent  and  created  things. 

It  is  acknowledged,  that  mere  intellectual  perception 
of  objei^  is  entirely  diltin(ll  from  the  exertion  of  the 
power  in  queftion  i  yea,  and  that  the  mind  often 
choofeth,  and  exerteth  this  Jelf-7notive  power  in  direct 
oppolition  to  that  propriety,  that  fitnefs  and  fuitable-!- 
nefs  in  objects,  which  are  apprehended  by  the  judg- 
r^ient  and   underftanding.   "^^   (See  p.   15,   16.  marg.) 

And 

*  As  an  argument  in  favour  o.'  the  liberty  in  queftion,  our  Author  quoteth  Dr. 
Clarke,  in  lii*  fourtli  reply  to  I.cibrtiiz,  where  he  liiith.  that  "  Intelligent  being-, 
"  are  a^entt  ,•  not  fajfi-ji:  in  beiji)^  mo-vedhy  moti'ves,  as  a  ialufice  is  by  lueights  ; 
"  but  they  have  aeii-ve  poivers-j  a',!^  do  move  themfel'ves,  fonietimes  U])on  tlie  view 
•'  oi'j'iiOftg  qioUYCs,  Ibr.iotime:  ypor.  "Ufak  ones,  and  fonieiimes  wliere  things  are 

"  abrglu^tlj" 


.ti3  An    essay    o>:  Parti. 

And  certainly  a  propriety  and  fitnefs  in  things,  which 
is  not  the  leaft  regardeJ  in  the  determination  of  the 
will,  can  no  more  be  a  ground  and  reafon  of  thofe  de- 
terminations, than  if  the  idea  of  propriety  did  not  cy.\il 
in  the  mind,  and  the  mind  was  wholly  unconfcious 
both  of  obje<5b  and  iitnefs.  it  is,  therefore,  as  fuppoi- 
abie  (and,  upon  our  Author's  principles,  mafl  he  ac- 
knowledged to  be  fo)  that  voluntary  motion  and  ex^- 
ertion  fliould  arife  inftantaneoufly  and  immediately 
out  of  non-entity,  without  the  operation  and  influence 
of  any  extrinfic  caufe,  as  that  it  Ihouid  take  place  in  a 
mind  which  hath  idea  and  xjbjetft  in  vie-w,  without  the 
concurrence  and  influence  of  any  inch  caufe.- 

If  it  fliould  be  faid,  that  it  is  not  pretended  that  hu- 
man volitions  take  j)lace  in  the  fame  manner  as  any 
event  muit  be  conceived  to  do  (were  any  fuch  thing 
pofiible)  which  fliould  ftart  into  life  and  being  imme- 
diately out  of  non-exiftence,  without  the  concurrei;c€ 
of  any  extrinfic  caule  ;  but  that  Man,  who  is  created 
and  upheld  every  moment  by  the  mighty  power  of 
God,  is  the  proper  author  and  caufe  of  his  own  \  oli- 
libus  ;  I'uch  a  fnppofition  would  not  at  all  relieve  the 
opinion  of  a  povycr  of  felf-motion,  fclf-detcrmination, 
from  the  difliculties  which  embarrafs  it  i;  nor  would  it 

in 

"  ahfohitcly  i"diff:rcnt.  In  which  l.i't'V  r.->fc  there  may  !jc  iin-y  ^icd  yaf-jo  tQ 
"  <i.7.  though  two  or  ninre  ivu\s  ot"  acting  may  be  abl'-iiiiic'v  irdljlci eui .''  To 
which  ohi'ervafion  of  the  Doctor  M'-.  Leibnitz  in  his  tit'th  piper  replieth  :  «•  It 
•♦  nu!ft  alfo  be  conliderccl.  tliat,  properly  fpeakingi  motives  do  no't  aci  upon  th;; 
•'  mind,  as  weights  do  upon  a  balance;  but  it  is  rather  the  mind  that  acts  by 
(«  virtue  of  the  motives,  vvl\ich  are  its  difffitioyts  to  act.  And  therefore  to  p  c- 
<<  tend,  as  the  Author  does  here,  that  the  mind  prefers  fometimes  weak  moiivcy 
'■  to  Itrong  one.;,  and  even  that  it  p''>fcrs  ihat  which  is  indiffirent  before  moiives  ; 
•'  this,  I  fay,  is  to  ciiwde  the  mird  fiom  tiio  m'^tlvei,  as  if  tliey  were  ivithoui  the 
««  mind,  as  the  weight  is  diflinct  from  the  balance  ;  and  as  if  the  mbid  liad,  bc- 
"  iides  moiives,  other  difp-Jitioiis  to  act,  by  virtue  of  wliich  it  eould  rye:/  or  accept 
*<■  tiie  ifi(,ii-i'es.  Whereas,  in  truth,  the  motives  comprel'.cnd  all  the  d[fi>'Jlti:,ns 
<'  which  the  mind  can  have  to  act  voluntarily  ;  for  they  include  not  only  tiie  rear 
<<■  fana-,  but  alfo  the  inclina>iovti  arifing  fro'u  paiTions,  or  otlier  precedinji;  iinpref- 
"  fions.  Wherefore  if  the  mirjd  (hould  prefer  a  weak  itfliittUinn  to  a  Ihonc  one> 
«■  it  would  ad  againft  itl'clf,  and  othcrvvife  than  it  h  difpc/ed  to  ad.  Wliicli 
•  '  n-'ows  that  the  Auilior's  notions,  contrary  to  mine,  are  luperlicial,  and  appear 
•'  to  have  no  folidity  in  them,  when  they  are  well  contidered.  To  alibrt,  alfn> 
f*  that  the  mind  may  hai-e  good  reaf'jns  to  nSt,  when  it  has  no  motives,  and  iL-hen 
«'  thi»pr^  r.fc  a/>/olutei-y  indifferent,  as  the  Author  explains  himfelf  licre  ;  this,'.  I 
•«  lay,  is  a  manitelt  contradiction  :  for  if  the  mind  ha.s  good  reafon s  for  takinq;  the 
" /"^r/ it  takes,  then  the  thlntcs  are  not  <//<//]yfjv>/^  to  tjie  inind."  (Fjperb  be- 
tween Mr.  Leibnitz  and  Dr.  Claike.     p.- 121.  and  16:-.  i6y.) 


fica.VI.  MORAL    AGENCY.  119 

in  the  leaft  ^iTiH  us  in  forming  any  ideas  and  concep- 
tions of  the  power  in  queftion,  its  properties,  or  the 
law  and  manner  of  its  operation. 

If  man  is  the  aiitJior  and  caula  of  his  own  volitions, 
it  is  unc]ueilionable  that  ht  mud,  in  fome  way,  exert 
XuniiiiM  i?i  order  to  produce  them.  C^/z^/c- always  takes 
place  and  is  exerted  previous  to  the  exillence  of  its 
eiieiTt.  if  man  is  the  caujc  of  his  own  acfts  of  will,  he 
mull  excFcile  forae  pov/er  in  order  to  produce  thejc 
;-v(:ls.  'I'hat  which  doth  noth'uiir — cxcrtcth  nothing  in 
order  to  an  ejJ\'Ci^  and  fo,  of  courfc,  antecedent  \q^  1\\q, 
cffetT; — hath  nothing  in  it  of  that  relation  which  M'p 
mean  to  expreis  by  tlie'  word  cauje  ;  and  is  llript  of 
every  thing  whereby  it  is  fitted  for  being  the  reajon  of 
an  event.  If  man,  therefore,  is  the  ccade  of  his  own 
volitions,  ho  muft  be  fo  by  Jome  exertion.  To  repre- 
fent  him  to  be  tlie  cauJe  of  his  own  afts  of  v/ill,  other- 
wife  tlian  by  any  exertion,  is  to  bring  into  view  a  caiife 
of  fuch  a  fmgular  and  peculiar  nature,  as  containeth  in 
it  no  manner  of  realirn  for  the  exiilence  of  its  cffeiTi:. 
If  man  is  the  canje  of  iiis  own  volitions,  by  Jome  exer- 
tion of  his  own  ;  it  niiul  be  an  exertion  which  is  either 
voluntary^  or  involuntary .  If  the  exertion,  by  which 
man  is  the  caufe  of  his  own  afts  of  will,  is  voluntary  ; 
then  this  exertion  itfclf  is  an  aCl  of  the  will  ; — there 
being  no  juft  ground  of  any  diilinction  between  an  nit 
cf  the  luill^  and  voluntary  exertion.  And,  confequently, 
this  exertion  of  man,  whereby  he  is  the  caufe  of  his 
own  acTis  of  will,  is  itfelf  the  very  elfeci,  of  which  wc 
are  endeavouring  to  explore  the  caufe,  in  man.  To 
fay  that  man,  by  his  own  free,  voluntary  exertions, 
produceth  and  is  the  caufe  of  his  own  acls  of  will — 
free,  voluntary  exertions — makes  not  the  lead  advances 
toward  a  folution  of  the  queftion,  "  What  is  the  r^'r^t'- 
of  an  a<5b  or  exertion  of  the  will  V  nor  at  all  alliftetk 
us  in  exploring  it.  To  fuppofe  this  exertion  of  men, 
whereby  they  beget  and  produce  their  own  v^olitions, 
to  be  involuntary^  and  to  have  no  exerciie  of  will  in  it, 
v/ould  be  attended  with  feveral  difficulties.     For, 

I.  Such 


T2d  Air    E  S  $  A  Y    o>?  t^art  L 

1.  Such  nn  exertion  as  this  muft  imply  fbme  faculty 
or  power  in  human  nature,  which  hath  never  yet  been 
difcoverecl  ;  but  hath  hitherto  efcaped  the  notice  and 
obiervation  of  the  mofh  fubtile  and  critical  inquirer. 
It  is  not  the  faculty  of  uncle rfl an dinsi  •  foi"i  with  the 
diftates  of  this  facult)',  it  is  acknowledged,  the  choice 
of  the  mind  is,  in  no  degree,  connefted  ;  being  often 
in  oppofitionto  them<  And  that^  furely,  cannot  be  the 
cmije  of  an  event,  the  whole  influence  of  which  (all  the 
influence  which  it  is,  by  the  nature  of  it,  fitted  to  have) 
is  utterly  refifted  by  the  event.  And  what  powers 
there  are,  in  human  nature,  for  any  to  exert,  befide 
thofe  of  underflanding  and  will,  we  muft  wait  to  be 
informed  by  fuch  as  urge,  that  all  the  a^ls  of  ouf  wills 
are  the  effects  of  our  own  exertions. 

2.  To  fuppofe  that  fome  human  exertion,  which  is 
withoilt  volition  and  properly  diftinft  from  it,  is  yeS 
the  cmife  of  acls  of  will  in  us  ;  is  to  fuppofe  volition 
to  be  not  only  connedled  with  foiiie  antecedent  caufe, 
but  that  fuch  an  one  as  is  entirely  involuntary^  and 
therefore  neceff'ary^  with  all  that  necellity  which  carl 
be  predicated  of  any  mere  natural  efi'edt.  This  is  at 
once  inconliftent  with  all  the  ideas  of  liberty  given  by" 
our  Author,  and  utterly  fubverfive  of  a  power  of  lelf- 
motioji,  felf-determination. 

3.  If  volition  is  an  eifed:  of  fuch  hiiman  exertion  a^ 
is  withoilt  volition^  it  muft,  of  confequence,  be  an  ex- 
ertion in  which  77ian  is  not  an  agent.  How  any  man 
fliould  exert  himfelf  and  be  an  agent  in  any  thing 
wherein  he  hath  no  exercife  of  will  and  voluntary 
choice,  is  quite  inconceivable.  Nor  is  it  lefs  difficult 
to  give  a  reafon  wliy  fiich  an  exertion  fliould  be  attri- 
buted unto  him  as  his  own  ad.  If  the  exertion,  which 
is  the  caiije  of  an  aft  of  will  in  man,  is  without  any  adl 
or  agency  of  man's  will  in  it  ;  it  muft,  of  confequence, 
be  an  exertion  in  which  man  is  entirely  and  perfectly 
pafllve  ;  and,  therefore,  an  exertion  which  can,  M'-ith 
no  propriety,  be  termed  our  adioii.  And  if  it  is  a 
caufsy  in  the  exercilc  and  operation  of  which  man  is 

paflive 


Scft.Vi.  MORAL   AGENCV.  li! 

jDaiUve  and  involuntary  ;  it  may  as  well  be  external  as 
internal^  as  to  any  advantage  mankind  can  ever  reap 
from  it,  or  any  improvement  it  makes  in  liberty,  by 
removing  it  farther  from  neceffity. 

If  the  power,  which  mankind  are  fnppofed  to  hav6 
over  their  own  wills,  and  to  produce  adcs  arid  exertions 
of  will  in  themfelves,  hath  no  degree  of  choice,  pre- 
ference; or  volition  in  it  ;  it  77jay  be  that  it  never  will 
beget,  or  produce,  choice.  And  a  man  may  exercife 
his  fovereignty  over  his  own  will,  to  as  little  purpofe 
as  a  poor  bCggar,  covered  with  rags,  exerts  his  fove- 
reign  authority  over  kingdoms  and  realms,  v/hich  his 
fick,  difordered  brain  hath  made  him  imagine  are  fub- 
jed:  to  his  fole  cdmmand  and  arbitrary  will.  That 
muft  furely  be  a  very  miferable  and  impotent  fort  of  a 
power  over  the  will,  which,  in  its  ntmoft  ftrength  of 
exertion,  will  never  produce  the  leaft  degree  of  voli- 
tion, or  choice — v^olition  and  choice  being,  neverthe- 
lefs,  under  fome  other  and  more  efFeclual  law  of 
operation.  And  yet  it  is  not  at  all  furpriling,  that  this 
fovereign  power  over  the  will  fliOuld  never  bring  the 
leafl:  degree  of  volition  or  choice  into  exiflence  ;  be- 
caufe,  by  the  fuppolition,  it  is  never  exerted  luith  any 
Juch  defign  and  choice^  or  put  fortli/^;r  any  fiich  purpofe. 
It  is  altogether  inconceivable  how  that  power  of  will 
ihould,  in  any  wife,  account  for  the  taking  place  of 
choice^  and  volition,  which  hath  no  greater  tendency 
to  fuch  an  event  than  to  its  contrary,  even  in  the  ut- 
moft  ftrength  of  its  exertion  ;  and  wliich,  indeed,  doth 
not  prefer  choice,  or  tend  to  it  more  tha:n  to  its  oppo- 
fitc. 

"VVhoever  fpeaketh  of  a  felf-originating  motion  in 
the  mind  of  man,  or  of  an  exercife  of  will  begun  by 
itfclf,  conveys  no  manner  of  idea  beyond  that  of  the 
bare  exercife  of  volition  and  motion.  There  i^  fome- 
thing,  in  the  very  nature  of  things,  repelling  every 
idea  of  any  thing  f;irther  in  men,  and  refifting  every 
conception  of  it  :  the  very  idea  (if  I  may  lb  call  it) 
of  a  power  of  felf-motion,  felf-determination,  in  vari- 

Q.  ous 


I2'2 


An    ess  ay    on  Part  ^, 


ous  ways  deftroying  itfclf,  every  way  militating  againft 
it le If  and  its  own  exiftence,  and  entirely  fliutting  itfelf 
out  of  the  world. 

Nothing  farther,  it  appears  to  me,  can  be  faid,  to' 
define  this  felf-detcrminating  power  of  the  will,  than, 
that  the  nature  and  quality  of  volition  is  to  be  dtter- 
rnimd  by  fomething  which  is  to  be  found  in  volition 
itfelf,  and  belonging  to  it  :  jull  as  we  fay,  that  a  cer- 
tain difpofition  of  equal  lines  detertnines  or  conJUtiites 
a  fquare  ;■  and' equal  diflance  from  a  centre,  a  circle. 
In  fuch  a  fenfe  as  thig^,  both  a  fquare  and  a  circle  are 
determined  by  tliemfelves  ;  \,t.  J  elf- determined.  If 
this  is  what  Gentlemen' mean  by  a  felf-determining 
power,  they  will,  probably,  have  no  one  to  contend 
with  them.  If  they  intend  any  thing  farther,  it  mufl' 
be  fomething,  of  whicli  no  difl:in<5l,  determinate  idea 
can  be  formed-;  and  which,  indeed,  the  very  iuppofi- 
tion  of  its  being  would  fhut  out  of  exiflence. 

That  aft's  of  will  fhould  be  connedled,  in  their  exifl- 
ence, with  Ibme  antecedent  and  extrinfic  caule,  and 
the  agent  be  efleemdd  virtuous,  or  vicious,  for  exer- 
cifes  of  will  which  take  place  in  fucli  a  connexion  ;  is 
a  fentiment,  which,  in  our  Author's  opinion,  is  embar- 
raffed  with  infuperable  difficulties.  The  Ex — r  fup- 
pofeth,  that  if  it  might  be  admitted  that  men  are  tlie 
voluntary:^  defigning  cauj'e  of  thofe  imvard  ads  wherein 
the  nature  of  virtue  and  vice  confifs^  this  would  unravel 
the  myflery,  and  folve  the  whole  difficulty,  if^tt^^.  67.) 
This,  however,  would  be^  at  befl,  but  running  into 
One  difficulty,  in  order  to  avoid  another.  It  is  here 
conceded,  that  th<?  nature  of  virtue  and  vice  confifteth 
in  the  inward  ads  of  men  :  that  is,  as  our  Author 
doubtlefs  miean€th,  their  volitions.  But  there  can  be 
no  moral  quality,  either  virtue  or  vice,  in  the  voli-" 
tions  of  men,  unlefsthey  themfelves  ar€  the  voluntary, 
defigning  caufes  of  them.  This  is  our  Author's  argu- 
ment ;  than  which,  a  more  extraordinary,  I  prefume, 
is  no  Avhere  to  be  found. 

Will  our  Author  inlill,  that  none  of  our  inward  afts 


Seft.  VT.  IMORAL    AGENCY.  125; 

are  either  virtuous,  or  vicious,  unlefs  they  are  the 
efdcfs  of  our  own  voluntary  dcfign  f  If  it  is  indeed  fo, 
:^he  confequenee  is  unavoidable,  that  the  firfl  in  the 
feries — that  inward  a6l  which  alone,  on  his  principles, 
is  felf-originated,  rclf-determiued-r-can  have  no  moral 
quality  predicated  of  it  :  for  this,  it  is  to  be  remem- 
bered, is  not  the  effed  of  our  own  voluntary  delign. 

In  order  that  any  thing  may  be  either  virtuous  or 
vicious,  upon  our  Author's  principles,  it  is  neceflary 
that  it  ihould  be  the  eifeft  of  our  own  voluntary  de- 
fign.  Whatever,  therefore,  is  felf-originated,  and 
doth  not  arife  out  of  fuch  a  caufe,  cannot  have  virtue 
or  vice  predicated  of  it.  Confequently,  that  exercife 
which  is  original,  and  firft  in  the  feries,  felf-determin- 
ed  and  felf-moved,  being  not  the  (?^^ -of  voluntary 
defign,  nor  connefted  with  it,  is  utterly  y/ithout  vir- 
tue ;  and  as  perfectly  free  froiij  all  taint,  or  flain,  of 
vice. 

And  yet,  upon  our  xAuthor's  principles,  it  is  effential 
to  the  very  nature  of  virtue  and  vice,  that  the  volitions 
of  agents  fhould  be  utterly  unconne6le4  with  all  ante- 
cedent caufe.  Therefore  thofe  volitions,  which  are 
the  effl^ds  of  our  own  free,  voluntary  defign,  being,  in 
their  nature,  conncfted  with  fome  antecedent  caufe> 
are  confequently  deilitute  of  all  degrees  of  virtue  and 
vice'. 

Nor  are  th.efe  the  only  ways  in  which  our  Author's 
fentiments  are  incQnfillent  with  the  very  being  either 
of  virtue  or  vice.  For  it  is  a  favourite  i£ntiment  of 
his,  that  there  is  no  more  in  the  cffeft,  than  in  its 
caufe.  He  fays  (p.  58^)  "  There  is  no  evading  the 
"  confequence,  indeed,  that  the  whole  guilt  of  men's 
'*  evil  difpofitions  is  chargeable  on  God,  not  them- 
*'  felves,  or  on  blind  neceflity  and  fiitality,  if  the 
"  things  Mr.  Ed\vards  advanceth  be  true." — Meaning, 
doubtlefs,  what  he  advanceth  in  proof  of  an  ellabiiih- 
ed,  unfailing  connexion  between  all  events  or  effefts, 
and  fome  antecedent  caufe.  Thofe  volitions,  tlierc- 
fore,  which  arc  the  cffeCls  of  our  ov/n  voluntar)'  de- 

%  2  ii^n, 


324  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  L 

fign,  cannot,  for  this  very  reajon^  have  either  virtue  o;- 
predicated  of  them.     Further, 

''  There  being  no  more  in  the  effect,  than  in  its 
*'  caufe,-'  it  is,  upon  the  principle  I  am  confidering, 
ridiculous  to  fpeak  of  thofe  volitious  which  are  the 
effects  of  fuch  an  aft  of  the  will  as  doth  not  arife  out 
of  a  former  voluntary  defign  (it  being  itfelf //Vy?  and 
original  in  the  ferics)  as  having  moral  quality  in  it,  or 
being  capable  of  virtue  or  vice.  The  Jelf-moved^  J^lf- 
determincd  aft  pf  will,  is  neither  virtuous  nor  yiciouSj 
becaule  it  is  not  the  fruit  or  eJfeCt  of  our  own  volun- 
tary defign.  That  which  is  the  effeil  of  our  originaL 
^r/?  voluntary  defign,  cannot  be  virtuous,  or  vicious, 
for  this  reafon,  viz.  That  there  was  no  virtue  nor 
vice  in  its  caufe.  So  that,  upon  the  whole,  nothing 
can  be  more  irrational,  inconfillent  and  abfurd,  than 
to  fuppofe  that  there  can  be  any  fuch  thing,  in  the 
Vniverfe,  as  we  mean  to  expreis  by  the  terms  virtue 
and  vice.  That  original  voluntary  defign,  which  is 
the  caiife  of  our  own  inward  afts,  cannot  be,  itfclf, 
vicious,  for  this  obvious  reafon,  viz.  That  it  doth 
not  arif^  out  of  a  vicious  cauje,  Thofe  inward  afts, 
which  are  the  effcds  of  pur  o"vvn  voluntary  defign, 
cannot  be  vicious,  for  two  reafons  ;  The  firll  is,  that; 
they  are  ejfeds-^not  fqlf-originated,  felf-moved  ;  the 
fecond  is,  that  (there  being  no  more  in  the  effeft  thau 
in  its  caufe)    they  did -not  arife  out  of  a  vicious  cauJe, 

Thus  doth  it  appear,  that  the  idea  of  felf-motion, 
felf-determjnatioa,  that  is,  a  motion  originated  by 
itfelf,  and  by  its  own  caufai  influence  brought  into 
exiflence,  is  "  in  itfelf  as  evidently  and  clearly  a 
*'  contradiftion,  as  that  two  and  two  fliould  make  five,"! 
or  any  other  the  moil  abfurd  and  contradiftory  fuppo- 
fition  that  can  be  named.  And  therefore,  though 
challenged  in  fo  high  a  tone,  by  fo  great  a  man  as  Dr. 
Clarke,  we  fiiall  not  be  "  afliamed"  utterly  to  deny 
that  tlierc  is,  or  ever  was,  or  can  be,  any  fuch  thing  ; 
or,  that  any  man  ever  had  an  idea  of  it.  And  here, 
if  I  might  be  allowed j  1  would  tranfcribe  a  fentence 

froR^ 


vSea.  VI.  MORAL    AGENCY.  i-j" 

from  the  Doftor,  and  apply  it  to  the  prefent  cafe. 
His  words  are  thefe,  ""  A  man  of  any  confiderahle 
*'  modefly  Vv^ould  be  ahnoft  tempted  rather  to  doubt 
*'  the  truth  of  his  faculties,  than  to  take  upon  him  to 
*'  aiTert  one  fuch  intolerable  abfurdity,  merely  for 
."  avoiding  another.''    (ed.  8.  p.  85.) 

From  fach  a  delcription  and  repreientation  of  thofe 
internal  exercifes  and  motions  which  are,  alone,  in  the 
fenfe  of  thefe  Gentlemen,  the  fubjefts  of  moral  defert  : 
-s—That  they  mufl  be  the  fruit  and  effed  of  onr  own 
voluntary  defign  ;  yet  J  elf-originated^  felf-moved  : — 
That,  in  order  to  their  being  denominated  morally 
evil,  they  mufl  arife  out  of  an  evil  cauje^  and  be  the 
eff'eds  of  it  ;  and  yet,  in  order  to  their  being  denom-i- 
nated  morally  evil,  it  is  abfolutely  neccflary  that  they 
fliould  be  utterly  unco?ineded  with  any  extrinfic^  (f.nte' 
cedent  caufe  /—rThat  their  moral  evil  doth  not  confift 
in  the  nature  of  them,  but  their  caufe  ;  and  yet  that 
they  have  nothing  belide  their  nature  predicable  of 
them  ;  out  of  themfelves,  and  diftinguifliable  from 
their  peculiar  nature^  they  having  no  caufe  : — And, 
finally,  that  if  they  are  not  caujed  by  our  own  volun- 
tary defign,  they  cannot  be  juftly  chargeable  with  mo- 
ral evil  ;  and  yet  if  they  are  caujed  by  any  thing  out  of 
themfelves,  they  can,  for  that  very  reajon^  have  no 
moral  evil  predicated  of  them  :— rl  lay,  from  fuch  di^^- 
criptions  and  definitions,  as  thefe,  of  thofe  kinds  of 
exercifes  and  motions  which  alone  are  capable  of  mo- 
ral defert,  what  can  any  one  think — what  can  the 
world  of  mankind  conclude— but  that  all  our  ideas  of 
jnorality  are  imaginary  and  vain,  and  the  very  terms 
virtue  and  vice^  empty  and  infignif^cant  ? — That  the 
very  ideas  of  moral  evil  and  fm  are  the  offspring  of 
the  frighted  imaginations  and  difordered  brain  of  ig- 
norant, pedantic  reclufes,  educated  in  the  gloomy  vale 
of  fuperftitioii  and  ignorance — prejudices  from  which 
the  mind  can  be  unfettered  only  by  breathing  the  freer 
air  of  focial  pleafiire,  and  thus  opening  and  expanding,, 
to  receive  n^ore  noble  und  liberal  ideas  and  fcntiments 

of 


j;jS  An    E  S  S  A  Y    on  Part  T, 

of  things  ?  What  lefs,  than  to  eradicate  from  the  mind^ 
ofnjenthofe  uneafy  apprehenfions,  wliich,  notwithT 
ftanding  all  the  arts  oi philojophy^  will  many  times  get 
poiTellion  of  them,  can  people  in  general  apprehend  to 
be  the  delign  of  Gentlemen,  who,  in  their  definitions 
of  moral  evil,  make  ufe  of  fuchnice,  fubtilc  and  pecu- 
liar diflindtions — fliifting  and  changing,  and  affirming 
and  denying,  in  the  very  fame  breath,  one  and  the 
fame  thing  ?  According  to  fuch  like  reafonings  as- 
thcfe,  who  but  muft  apprehend  that  the  natural  notion? 
of  men,  conterning  moral  good  and  evil,  are  an  elfcrt 
of  that  extraordinary  machinery  which  is  fuppofed  by 
a  late  w*riter  *  to  have  been  introduced  by  the  wile 
Author  of  Nature,  that  we  might  receive  a  nice  and 
ariificial  £tt  of  feelings,  merely  for  the  fake  of  giving 
confcience  a  commanding  power  and  influence. 

But  it  feemeth  unnecelfary  any  farther  to  purfue  the 
argument  \  efpecially  fmce  the  objeftions  made  by  Mr. 
Edwards  againft  a  power  of  felf-determination  in  men, 
and  his  clear,  nervous  and  conclufive  reafoning  and 
argumentation  againft  the  poflibility  of  any  fuch  power, 
are  by  our  Author  pafled  over  in  filence,  and  left  in 
their  full  ftrength. 

But  before  I  finifli  the  feftion,  I  beg  to  be  indulged 
in  a  conje6ture  concerning  the  rife  and  origin  of  the 
notion  of  this  myfterious,  incomprehenfible  power  in 
men.  I  cannot  but  apprehend,  that  the  opinion  arofe 
from  a  degree  of  abflraftion,  in  the  ideas  of  men,  or 
exercifes  from  agents  ;  which  is  a  refinement  far  above 
vulgar  underftandings,  if  not  above  truth  itfelf.  From 
this  abll:ra<n:ed  idea  of  aOaon^  we  have  been  taught  to 
look  upon  the  agent  as  one  thing — his  aCiion^  as  an- 
other :— P'or  what  can  be  more  abfurd,  fay  they,  than 
to  talk  of  an  exercife.  without  fomethino  to  a«5l  ? — an 
aCiion  w^ithout  an  a^ent  f  Hence  men  have  been  led  to 
confider  an  adion  and  the  agent^  as  it  were,  different 
fubflances  :  the  one,  the  cauf'e  ;  the  other,  \\\^  effcd. 
But  it  is  far  from  being  true,  that  aCiion  (I  mean  men- 
tal, 

*  Lord  Kajms's  clTay  on  the  principles  of  morality>  &c.  See  p-  an* 


.Sea.  VL  MOllAL    AGENCY.  127 

tal,  voluntary  exercife)  and  agent  m'a.y  jujily  be  confid- 
ered  under  thefe  different  predicaments,  and  as  ful- 
taining  the  different  relations  to  each  other  which  \vt 
mean  to  exprefs  by  the  terms  caufe  and  effcd.  The 
action  of  a  man  noteth  only  a  certain  mode  of  his  ex- 
iftcnce  ;  it  being  merely  an  accidc'ut^  of  which  man  is 
t\\QJubjtCi,  There  is  as  little  reafon  in  confidering 
?nn.n  and  his  exercife  as  diflinft  things,  fuflaining  the 
different  relations  to  each  other  of  caufe  and  effeCl^  as 
there  is  for  making  a  like  diftin<Slion  between  body  and 
its  motion  :  treating  of  the  former,  as  caufe  /  the  lat- 
ter, as  effeCi. 

li'  agent  and  adio7i  do  not  adm.it  of  that  relative  dif- 
tincTiion  to  each  other,  which  we  mean  to  expfefs  by 
the  terms  caufe  and  effedl,  it  is  perfectly  unmeaning 
and  unintelligible  to  fpeak  of  an  agent  as  being  the 
defigning  caufe  of  his  own  voluntary  exercifes  and 
a(ftions.  "V\^e  may  with  equal  propriety  fpeak  of  the 
air,  as  the  cauje  of  tlie  wind  which  bloweth  ;  or  of  thfi 
fea,  as  the  caufe  of  the  fluftuation  of  its  waves.  Man 
may,  according  to  the  com-mon  ufe  of  terms-,  be  prop- 
erly flyled  the  voluntary^  defigning  caufe  of  fueh  out-* 
ward  events- or  cffe«^s^.  as^  are  immediately  connedled 
with  the  choice  and  preference  of  his  mind,  which  we 
com-monly  term  external  anions.  But  it  is  only  in  an 
indireft,  figurative  fenfe,  that  any  externaf  outward 
event  whatfoever  can  be  called  our  aClion  ;  and  only 
on  account  of  its  fpecial  relation  to  fomething  which 
is,  in  the  ftri£l  fenfe,  our  aCiion.  Nothing  befide  our 
o-wn  voluntary  exertions  are,  flrit^ly  fpeaking,  our 
(iClion.  Herein  alone  are  we  agents — are  we  aftive. 
And  for  us  to  confider  our  volitions  as  the  ejfeds  of 
our  own  voluntary  defign,  would  be  only  to  make 
volition  the  effeft  of  volition — the  effeift  of  itfelf  ;  or 
to  place  moral  evil,  not  in  volition  itfelf,  but  in  the 
agent  its  caufe.  According  to  which  principle,  moral 
evil  muft  be  fought  in  fomething  which  is  antecedent 
to  volition,  and  entirely  diftindl  from  it  ;  and,  there- 
fore, not  in  the  voluntary^  defigning  caufe  of  it. 

But 


128  An    E  S  S  A  Y    On  Parti. 

But  if  it  is  indeed  fo  that  there  is  no  ground  for  ab- 
ih'afting  aCHon  from  agejit  (meaning  by  at'Uon^  inter- 
nal^ voluntary  exercife  and  exertion)  any  more  than 
there  is  for  abftrafting  accident  from  \t^Juhje6f^  or  jno- 
tion  from  the  body  moved  ;  it  will  certainly  follow, 
that  fitch  a  relative  diftinclion,  as  we  mean  to  exprcfs 
by  the  words  cauje  and  effcii^  doth  not  fubfift  between 
agent  and  his  aClion.  And  there  muft  be  as  great  and 
evident  an  impropriety  of  fpeech,  in  faying  tliat  men 
are  the  caiijes  of  their  own  aftions^  as  in  faying  that  the 
loadftone  is  the  caufe  of  its  magnetifm,  or  fugar  of  its 
fweetnefs. 

If  men  had  not  confidered  moral,  voluntary  exertion 
in  a  degree  of  abllradlion  quite  unphilofophical  and 
inconceivable,  I  muft  beg  leave  to  fay,  that  rnoral 
agents  never  would  have  been  thought  of,  as  the  volun-^ 
tary^  defigmng  caiijes  of  their  own  VQlittons  ;  any  more 
than  a  fubjeft.,  of  its  accidents  ;  or  beings  of  its  exif^ 
tence.  And  when  it  is  once  confidered,  that  agent  and 
his  aCiion  do  not  bear  the  relation  to  each  other  of 
caufe  and  effed  ;  then,  probably,  the  cauje  of  volition 
will  no  longer  be  thought  to  belong  to  the  inquiry  into 
the  nature  of  that  moral  agency,  or  liberty,  which  is 
clfential  to  virtue  and  vice,  praife  and  blame.* 

Having  thus  proved,  as  I  apprehend,  the  perfect  in-" 
confiftency  of  the  notion  of  a  pov/er  of  felf-detcrmina- 
tion  in  men  ;  the  confequence  clearly  is,  that  all  cxer-^ 
cifes  of  human  volition  arife  wholly  from  fome  extrin- 
fic  caufe.  And  as  it  will  probably  be  granted,  on  this 
hypothefis,  that  all  caufes  derive  their  injfluence  ulti- 
mately from  God  ;  I  beg  leave  to  take  this  for  granted, 
and  fhall  build  feveral  of  my  arguments,  in  the  fecond 
part  of  this  Treatifc,  on  this  fup^ofition. 

SEct.VL 

*  «'  Obj.      Wlience  came  this  moral  impotcvry  ? V/hat  have  you  to  do> 

<«  to  aflc  this  here  ? You  have  no  need  to  alk  it  for  the  underftanding  of  what 

'«  I  have  fpoken.     It  can  ftand  on  its  own  legSi    wltiiout  flying  to  that  foreignt 
"f  or  remote  help.-— — Let  it  come  which  way  it  will,  you  fee  it  doth  not  excufe ; 

«'  and  fo  do  all  men,  whatfoever  they  may  lay  to  the  contrary." Trueman'S 

Difcourfe  of  Natural  and  Moral  rmpotcncy.  page  14a. 


5fca.  til.  MORAL    AGENCY.'  ti9 


S  E  C  t.   vir. 

U'^ here  in  ii  is  JJiown^  that  ihe  dodf-ine  cfnh  infallible 
previous  certainty  of  all  hiunan  volitiotis  doth  not  im- 
ply that  mankind  are  biit  mere  rnachines, 

THE  advdcatfes  for  a  po-^er  of  felf-deteffhinatiori 
in  men  loudly  exclaim  againlT;  the  doiHirine  of  an 
sntecedent  infallible!  certainty  of  the  vohmtary  exer- 
difes  of  m€^n,  as  being  utterly  inconfiftentwith  all  ideas 
<5f  moral  liberty  ;  fubjeding  all  the  actions  of  mankind 
<o  the  fevere-^  Vigid  laws  of  ahjolute  fate  ;  Itiaklng  the 
ihind  of  man  but  a  ciirioiiS  piece  of  mere  machinery, 
and  all  the  exercifes  of  it  no  othfer  than  mechanical 
motions.  This  is  a  weapon  which  hath  been  nfed  with 
as  much  fuccefs,  perhaps,  in  defence  of  a  power  of 
felf-determination  in  men,  as  any  with  which  the  ad- 
vocates fof  fuch  a  power  have  combated  the  oppofite 
opinion.  This  is  an  objeftion  againft  the  do£lrine  of 
a  previous  certainty  of  all  events,  frequently  and  re- 
peatedly urged  by  our  Author.  (See  p.  6i,  82,  83, 
84,  85,  124.)  And  he  reprefents  this  doftrine  as  in- 
ferring a  necejjity  as  utterly  inconfiftent  with  all  ideas 
of  a  praife-worthy  or  cHminal  aftion,  as  even  natural 
neceffity  :  a  necelTity  inconfiftent  with  the  n>oral  per- 
feftions  of  God,  and  making  him  ''  the  almighty  mi- 
iJifter  of/rt/d'.'"  (S'eep.  81 — 2—3.)  Here  he  difTents 
from  Dr.  Clarke.  The  Doctor  diftrnguifheth  between 
natural  and  moral  neceffity  :  this  d^iftincftioa  our  Au- 
thor cxprefsiy  denieth  (p.  81.)  And  his  argument 
(p.  61 .)  is  founded  on  the  fame  fuppofition.  But  upon 
the  very  fuppofition  of  an  abfolute  moral  neteffity, 
fuch  an  one  as  inferreth  aS  infallible  a  certainty  as  ?iny 
natural  neceffity  which  can  he  conceived  of,  it  is,  that 
the  Dodor  founds  his  demonftrative  arguments  of  the 
moral  attributes  and  perfetflions  of  G6d.  He  faith 
Cp.  116.  edit.  &.)  that  ''  'tis  evident  He  (God)   rouft 

R  '^  c.f 


130       ■  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Parti. 

"  oi  neceffity  do  always  what  he  knows  to  be  fitteft  to 
"  be  do7ie.*'-  And  in  p.  118.  he  faith  exprefsly,  thaf 
the  "  moral  attributes^'  (of  the  Deity)  "  are  really 
"  "  and  truly  neceffary^-  by  fuch  a  neceftity,  as,  though  it 
"  be  not  at  alt  inconfifLeut' with  liberty,  yet  is  equally 
*'  certain^  infallible ^  and  to  be  depended  upon^  as  eveif 
"  the  exiflence  itfelf,  or  the  eternity  of  God/' 

So  the  Docftor  alloweth,  that  moral  necejjity  is  evi- 
dently conliflent  with  natural  liberty  ;  and,  that  it  i^^ 
morally  impoffible  for  a  perfoii,  free  from  alt  pain  and 
difordcr  of  body  and  mind,  to  endeavour  to  hurt  him- 
felf;  and  faith  exprefsly,  that  it  is  morally  impoffible 
for  him  to  choofe  to  do  it.  "  Which  alfo,"  continues- 
he,  ''  is  the  very  fame  reafon  why  the  moft  perfeft 
"  rational  creatures  fuperior  to  men  cannot  do  evil  :' 
''  not  becaufe  they  want  a  natural  poiver  to  perform 
"  the  material  a^ion  ;  but  becaufe  it  is  inorally  impof- 
^^  fible^  that,  with' a  ptrfecl  knowledge  of  what  is  befty 
^'  and  without  any  temptation  to  evil,  their  will  fl)ould 

determine  itfelf  to  choofe  or  a<ft  foolifl:ily  and  unrea-^ 

fonably.''  (See  p«  100  of  his  Demoriftration,  Scq, 
edit.  8.)  How  confident  this  is  with  a  power  of  felf- 
determinatio7i  in  men,  1  leave  to  every  one  to  judge. 
The  fame  neceffity  is'  allowed  by  the  Do<5J:or,  p.  68, 
315,  117,  &c.  And  he  faith  (p.  119.)  that  it  is  as 
abfolutely  impojfible  for  God  to  aft  contrary  to  his 
moral  attributes,  as  to  divefl  himfelf  of  his  natural' 
ones.  And  many  of  his  arguments,  and  clear,  juft 
reafonings,  arc  founded  upon  the  fuppofed  confiftency 
of  freedom  and  liberty  with  moral  neceffity. 

And  that  the  will  of  creatures  fliould  be  nereyarily 
cleterminedAyf  fomething  out  of  itfelf,  is  fo  far  frorii 
being  inconiiftent  with  praife-worthinefs  and  virtue, 
in  the  Dcftor's  view  of  things,  that  it  is  a  certain  proof 
of  wickednefs  and  vice,  for  the  will  not  to  be  in- 
fluenced and  governed  by  fomething  ah  extra.  He 
faith  (p.  186,  187,  I §8.)  "  And  by  this'  undcritand- 
'^'  ing  or  knowledge  of  the  natural  relations  and  fitneff- 
^'  cs  of  things,  the  w/7/j-  likewife  of  intelligent  beings 

* '  are 


Sca.Vil.  MORAL    AGENCY.  131 

-"  ape  coil  flan  tly  directed,  and  mujr  needs  he  detenrdned 
*'  to  aft  accordingly  ;  excepting  thoie  onl3%  who  will 
^''  things  to  be  what  they  are  not,  and  cannot  be  ;  that 
'•'  is,  whofe  wills  are  corrupted  by  particular  intereil 
^*'  or  afl^'ftion,  qt  fiuayed  by  Tome  nnreafonable  and 
^'  prevailmgrpaJpAm."  Again,  "  For,  originally  and  in 
''  reality,  'tis  as  natural  and  (morally  fpeaking)  JieceJ- 
*'  /aty,  that  the  will  flionld  be  determined  in  every  ac- 
**  tioii  by  the  reafun  of  things,  and  the  right  of  the  cafe  ; 
^'  as  it  is  natural  and,  abfolntely /'peaking^  72ece[J'ary  that 
*'  the  underftanding  fhould  fubniit  to  a  devfionjlrated 
*'  truth."  Here  the  Doftor  certainly  fliewcth  hinifelf 
a  friend  to  the  doftrine  oi  fate.,  as  far  as  this  doftrine 
is  implied  in  moral  neceffity^  and  a  fixed,  infallible, ccr-= 
tainty  of  all  events  5  however  he  may  exprefs  his  dif- 
inclination  to  it  elfev/hcre. 

If  mankind  would  only  diflinguifh  carefully  the  ideas 
Wiiich  they  annex  to  the  terms,  moral  exerci/e  and  ;72(f- 
chauical  motion.,  I  cannot  but  think  that  the  objeftion 
againft  a  previous  infallible  certainty  of  all  events,  as 
well  moral.,  as  natural — that  fuch  a  doftrine  fuppofeth 
men  to  be  but  mere  macliines,  and  ail  their  internal 
exerciles  no  other  than  mechanical  motions — would 
lofe  all  its  plaufibility  with  mankind,  an4  appear  ut- 
terly unworthy  to  fall  from  the  pen  of  a  philoibpher.  ••>^ 

By  moral  exercife  we  mean  that  nffeOJ.on  of  ?nind^  of  • 
which  we  are  con/aous  in  our  views  of  moral  things  : 
Or,  whenever  we  feel  either  love  or  hatred.  Sec.  m 
tlie  view  of  any  charafter,  or  moral  truth  ;  then  we 
put  fortli  a  moral  exercife.,  and  perform  a  moral  aCiion. 
'iliis  is  the  iilea,  which,  I  believe,  is  generally  enter- 
tained of  moral  exercife  and  a€iion  ;  and  which  needeth 
no  farther  explanation,  as  it  is  fomething  of  which 
every  one  hath  a  confciQufnefs  within  himfelf,  and 
daily  experienceth  in  his  own  bread. 

On  the  other  hand  :  Mechanical  motion  is  that  which, 
in  the  fubjeft,  is  without  either  will.,  conjcioujnefs.,  per- 
ception or  defign.  Whatever  motion  we  behold,  which 
appea,reth  to  be  utterly  involuntary  and    undefigning., 

li  2  we 


X32  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  L 

%ve  confider  as  altogether  mechnnknl- — a  motion  arifing 
wholly  from  Ibme  external  iuiluence  and  operation  ; 
being  witlwut  the  leaji  degree  of  voluntary  inclination 
and  defign.  Thus  we  ternrx  the  motions  of  the  earth, 
and  other  bodies  which  corapofe  the  material  fyftem, 
inechanical.  And  after  the  fame  manner  do  we  fpeak 
of  the  afcending  of  vapours,  the  blowing  of  the  winds, 
Jhe  motions  of  clocks,  watches,  &c.  The  efFefts 
which  we  behold  in  thefe  natural  bodies,  we  never 
jconfider  as  the  fruit  of  any  voluntary  intention,  medi- 
tation or  defign,  in  the  bodies  themfclves  which  are 
|the  fubjefts  of  thsfe  vifiblc  effects  :  but  the  changes 
jind  alteratJions  which  we  obfcrve  in  them,  we  confider 
as  the  mere  pfteds  of  fomc  external  influence  and  foYce. 
Thefe,  it  .appears  to  me,  are  the  ideas  which  men 
generall}''  have  of  ?rioral  exercijes^  and  of  mechanical 
motions  ;  ideas  as  diftinft  frqm  each  other,  as  voluntary 
and  involuntary^  deftgning  and  iindefigned. 

If  thefe  definitions  ar.e  juft,  can  any  thing  be  more 
imreafonable  than  to  coniider  voluntary,  d,efigning  a- 
gents,  as  but  mere  machines,  becaufe  there*is  an  ante- 
cedent ground  or  reafon  of  their  mental  exercifeS  and 
volitions  ?  VVhen  men  are  agents  in  any  thing,  is  not 
this  a  fufficient  reafon  why  they  fhould  be  praifed  or 
blamed,  according  as  the  action  is  either  morally  good 
or  evil  .''—And  that,  even  though  there  was  an  ante- 
cedent caufe  or  reafon  of  the  aftion,  in  the  operation 
and  influence  of  which  they  themfelvcs,  were  not 
agents  or  aciive  ?  Are  men  in  any  mcaiure  the  lefs  vo- 
lufitary,  aftivc  and  defigning,  in  their  mental  and  mo- 
ral exercifes,  bccaufe  of  any  antecedent  ground  or 
reafon  there  may  be  of  thefe  their  mental  excrciles,  in 
tlie  influence  and  operation  of  whicli  reafon,  caufe  or 
j^round,  they  themlelvcG  are  net  defigning  and  volun- 
tary ?  As  v.^cll  might  we  fay  that  the  moral  being  man^ 
bccaufe  for  his  exiflence  he  is  wholly  dependent  on 
O.od,  and  is  entirely  the  woikmanfhip  pf  God,  is  but  a 
ijir.re  machine.  And  if  men  are  not  the  lefs  voluntary 
by  rpj^ioji  of  an^^  previous  caufe  there  is  of  their  men- 


Sea.  Vlf.  MORAL    AGENCY.  133 

lal  inclinations  and  exertions  ;  why  is  the  opinion  that 
there  is,  in  fa<ft,  an  antecedent  cauie,  ground  and  rea- 
son of  ail  tlie  voluntary  exercifes  of  men,  in  the  oper- 
ation and  influence  of  which  for  the  production  of  vo-r 
iition,  naankind  arc  not  thpmielves  ajftive  and  volun;- 
tary  ;  exclaimed  ap;ainf]:  as  containing  the  heathenilh, 
atheilUcal  notion  of  fate,  and  making  mankind,  though 
curious,  yet,  but  mere  macliines  ?  *  If  the  proper  dif- 
tinftion  between  ?}ioral exercifes  and  mechanical  motions^ 
•js,  that  tiie  former  are  voluntary  and  defigning,  the 
latter,  without  will  and  without  defign  ;  then  furely 
there  is  no  foundation  for  the  objeiftion  under  confi- 
deration  ;  nor  can  any  ufe  be  made  of  it,  except  in 
jpxclamation  and  popular  harangues,  and  applications, 
.not  to  the  reafon,  but  to  the  imaoinations  of  men. 

It  hence  appeareth  that  man  may  be  called  an  agent ^ 
and  juftly  be  confidered  as  the  doer  or  ador  of  any 
thing,  even  though  he  is  not  the  pofitive,  efficient  catije 
of  his  own  voluntary  exertion  ; — or  though  he  is  not 
aClive  or  infiuetitial  in  the  operation  of  that  caufe^  which 
hath  for  its  effeCt^  voluntary  exertion  : — And  this  with 
as  much  propriety  as  a  man  may  be  faid  to  live  and 
<fA7/?,  tliough  he  is  in  no  degree  the  caufe  of  liis  own 
life  and  esiftence.  This  our  Author  alloweth  ;  (p. 
64.)  but  tliink^  his  adveriary  is  nccelTarily  entangled 
in  this  confequence,  that  God  is  the  pofitive  caufe  and 
foundation  of  linful  voli|;ion.  He  fays,  ""  if  he"  (man) 
*'  is  only  the  Jiib'jed^  the  doer^  the  aCior  of  fins — who 
*'  then  is  the  pojitive  caufe  and  fountain  of  it  r"  The 
great  obje^ion,  that  God  is  the  pofitive  caufe  and 
fountain  of  wickedneis,  fliall  be  confidered  in  its  pro-- 
per  place.  All  that  is  of  importance  to  the  inquiry 
immediately  under  conlideration,  is,  whether  men  are 
pot   criminal    and   blameworthy  for  doi?ig  and  ading 

wickednefs  ? 

*  Dr.  Wliitby  on  the  five  points  exclaims  loudly  a^ainft  the  dodlrine  of  an 
eftabiiihcd  conncxioa  in  things,  us  containiiii^  the  lieHtheniih.  atlieiftical  doctrine 
oif.itr.  Sec  Difcoiirfe  4.  Ch.jp.  4.  throufjliout.  And  yet  this  fame  Author  al- 
Io\yeth  men  to  be  pajjive  in  receiving  ideas,  and  in  having  impreffions  made  on 
their  uiulfv.landings.  Seep.  IZ(.  li?..  50J.  And  very  nunifeltly  concedeih* 
yea  wr^etii  a  connexion  of  will  with  the  views  and  dilates  of  the  underfianuing. 
ilow  i\,x  he  is  hereir)  confident  \\\x.\\  him|"ei:',  I  iesv^;  «o^>  reader  to  iudt?^-- 


134  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  {, 

wickednefs  I  And  whether,  after  it  is  conceded  that, 
even  upon  fuppofition  of  a  previous,  infaUiblc  certainty 
of  the  volitions  of  men,  they  are  the  doers  and  ac'rors 
of  wickednefs,  there  can  be  any  reafon  or  room  for 
the  objeftion,  that  the  do£lrine  of  fuch  an  infallible 
previous  certainty  of  all  events,  makes  men  but  mer9 
machines,  and  borders  too  much  upon  the  atheiilicaJ. 
notion  of  fate,  to  be  entertained  by  Chriftian  divines  I 
If  it  is  once  granted  that  it  is  criminal  to  be  the  doers^ 
the  adors  of  v/ickednefs  ;  the  grand  obje«^ion  againftthe 
Calviniftic  cjo^trin^  refpe<fting  the  divine  decrees,  pre- 
dcftination,  Sec,  Sec.  that  it  makes  men  but  mere  ma- 
chines, va^ifheth,  and  lofeth  all  its  force  :  and  the 
labouring  point  of  debate  will  be,  not  the  confiflency 
of  moral  liberty,  with  an  eftabliilied  connexion  in 
tilings  ;  but  where  the  fountain  and  fource  is,  of  this 
previous  certainty  and  eftabliOied  connexion  in  things  ; 
and  v/hether  the  cauje  pf  iinfal  action  is  alfo  itfelf 
iinful. 

But  was  it  ever  queftioncd  by  any  one,  whether  the 
docr^  the  atlor  of  v/ickednels,  is  defferving  of  contempt 
and  blame  ?  Is  it  neceffary  that  we  ftould  be  firft  inr 
fallibly  determined  refpesfiing  an  antecedent  certainty 
of  our  own  wicked  deeds  and  aCiions^  before  there  can 
be  any  room — -any  rational  ground  for  taking  (liame 
and  blame  to  ourielves  ?  Do  we  ever  wait  to  have  this; 
point  ir.ade  evident  and  plain,  before  we  venture  to 
cenfure  and  call  blame  upon  others  for  the  wickednefs 
they  tranjaii  and  cornmit  f  Mull  it  be  evident  beyond 
contradiction  that  man  is  the  fountain.^  the  pnfilive 
Jource  and  caufe  from  v/hence  his  evil  volitions  arife  as 
eff'cds^  before  we  may  venture  to  pronounce  any  one 
criminal  and  guilty  \  Nothing  is  more  evident  than 
that  this  is  not  agreeable  to  the  common  praecipe  and 
univerfal  cuftoiVi  of  men. 

But,  after  all,  if  it  were  in  faft  the  cafe,  and  could 
eafily  be  made  fo  to  appear,  that  mankind  are  Xht  Jour- 
ces^  the  pofttive  caiije  of  their  own  voluntary  exertions  ; 
this  vv'ould,  by  no  means,  anfwev  the  objedor's  pur-r 

pofe  ; 


$t^.v\i.         MORAL  Agency.         135 

poCe  ;  but  would  leave  him  ft  ill  involved  in  the  fame 
difficulty  which,  in  his  view,  embarraffeth  the  do<ftrine 
of  a  previous,  infaHible  certainty  of  all  events.  For 
if  mm  is  the  pafitive  cauie  6{  his:  o>vn  ad:s  of  willy 
then,  certainly,  upon  the  ohjtdor's  plan,  afts  of  will 
are  bat  mere  eiVeds  ; — and  fiich,  too,  as  are  abfolutely 
and  infcillibly  conne«5led  with  their  pofif.ive  (and  I 
Blight  juftly  add)  involiiiitary  cauft  .•—-which  certainly 
vcr^eth  upon  the  obnoxious  doctrine  of  fate. 

Befides,  if  man  is  the  dc/igning  caufe  of  his  own  vo- 
litions, it  muft  doubtleis  be  that  he  is  fo  by  zvohuitary 
defign  ;'  and  this^  affo,  the  effect  of  a /or ;?jfr  voluntary 
defign,  and  fo  on,  until  we  come  to  the  'volition  which 
is  origina'l  and  firft,  witho-ut  any  going  before  it.  And 
this  firft,  original  volition  mu(^  be  either  an  event 
Vithout  a7iy  caufe  ;  6r  arife  from  fome  foreign,  ex- 
trinfic  caufe  ;  which  again,  upon  the  objector's  prin- 
ciples, introduceth  the  gloomy^  iyrannical  doctrine  of 
fate.  For  volition  to  arife  out  of  no  caufe  whatfoever, 
and  be  an  event  for  which  there  is  abfolutely  no  rea- 
fon  and  gro^irnd,  is'  as  inconfiftent  v/ith  liberty  and 
freedom,  as-  the  opinion  of  an  antecedent  certainty  of 
all  events.  For  upon  the  objesftor's  principles,  it  is 
necefiary  that  volition  ftiouM  arife  out  of  a  free  caufe. 
For  volition  to  arife  out  of  no  cailfe,  and  thus  be  an 
eveat  abfokitcly  un-accountable  and  for  which  ho  pof- 
fible  reafon- can  be  given,  makes  it  as  undefigning  and 
ntceflary,  as  the  fuppofition  of  its  abfolute,  infaHible' 
connexion  v/ith  fome  extrinfic  caufe.  For  it  to  arife 
dut  of  any  cauje^  as  its  eifett,  fuppofeth  it,  upon  our 
Author's  principles,  to  be  a  motion  which,  is  merely 
iliechanical.  But  it  being  t.  maxim  w^th  the  Ex — r, 
that  there  is  no  more  in  the  effect  than  in  its  caufe,  to 
fuppofe*  that  volition  arifeth  out  of  man's  voluntary 
defign,  as  its  caufe,  will  make  man  himfelf  but  a  mere 
machine.  So  that,  even  upon- the  objector's  own  prin- 
ciples, as  truly  as  on  our?,,  man,  however  curious,  is 
yet  but  a  mere  machine. 

There  is  no  way,  upon  tlie  i:)rincipres  of  Gentlemen 

who 


1^6  An    E  S  S  A  Y    on  Parti. 

"Vvho  lir^e  fuch  objeftions  as  thefe,  for  any  one  to  be- 
come really  blame-worthy  and  criminal,  unlefs  he  is 
the  caulb — the  pofrtive  Iburce  and  efficient  author — of 
liis  own  whole  exillence  :  all  dependency  for  life,  be-" 
ing  or  exercife,  invelving  in  it  the  nbjurd.,  inconftfient 
dodrine  of  fate  And  it  is  indeed  quite  as  conceivable, 
that  a  creature  fhould  be  the  politive,  voluntary,  de^' 
figning  caufcof  his  whole  exillence,  as  of  any  part  of 
it  ;  or,  that  a  fubjedl  lliouid  be  the  r^7///c  of  its  omi? 
accidents.' 

I  think,  therefore,  while  it  is  allowed,  as  it  ccvtainly 
mud  be,  that,  even  upon  the  do<^rine  of  a  certain^ 
eflablilhed' connexion  in  things,  men  art  doers — adors 
of  wickedncfs  ;  and  that  they  exert  adls  of  will— ^a-- 
ercife  voluntary  defign  ;  there  can  be  no  weight  in  the 
objeclion,  that,  upon  this  hypothefis,  they  are  but  mere 
machines.  It  rnufl  be  manifeft  to  every  one,  who  will 
attentively  ccnfider  the  matter,  tha:t  we  ufe  the  word^ 
mechajiical^  not  to  exprefs  the  connexion  of  any  thing 
with  fome  antecedent  caufe,  ground  or  reafon  of  its 
exigence  ;  but  merely  to  note  the  quality  of  an  efl'cfty 
as  being  without  voluntary  intention  and  defign.  Ilie 
word  Vriechankal  is  not  ufed  to  denote  the  relation  of 
effe<^,  but  the  nature  and  quality  of  it,  as  being  without 
will  and  without  defign.  So  that  although  all  events' 
may  equallV  faftain  the  relation  of  effefts,  yet  they  are 
not  all  mechanical  ;  fome  being  voluntary  and  defign-> 
i'ng  ;  others,  without  intention,  or  defign. 

IfbyFATEis  meant  a  blind,  undefigning  neceility 
of  events  ;  every  impartial,  candid  mind,  will  eafily 
difcover  the  unreafonablenefs  of  charging  the  doftrine 
of  an  antecedent,  infallible  certainty  of  all  events,  as 
favouring  of  the  antient,  hcatheniih  opinion  of  fate. 
But  if  by  the  term,^  as  ufed  by  modern  divines,  be 
meant  nothing  more  than  an  infallible^  previous  cer- 
tainty of  every,  even  the  mofl  minute,  event  which 
ever  taketh  place  in  any  part  of  the  moral  or  natural 
fyftem,'  1  am  willing,  for  my  own  part,  to  allow  myfclf 

a 


Sfidl.  VIII.  MORAL    AGENCY.  137 

a  maintainer  of  the  dodrine  of  fate*  (though  I  greatly 
diflike  the  term.  ;)  and  fhall  thhik  mylelf  fufficiently 
kept  in  countenance  by  the  greuteft  philofophers  in  all 
ages,  as  well  heathen  as  chriftian — by  the  moll  eminent 
divines  in  the  early  ages  of  the  church — by  the  Aflcm- 
bly  of  Divines  at  Weflminfler — and,  finally,  by  the 
holy  fcriptures  themielves,  which  mod  fully  and 
ftrongly  afTert  the  unpopular  doctrines  of  prcdeftina- 
tion,  and  the  abfolutenefs  and  uuiverfality  of  the  di- 
vine decrees.  Thefe  are  the  doftrincs  which,  there  is 
abundant  reafon  to  think,  are,  at  bottom,  fo  difguftful 
and  unpleafing  to  men  ;  and  which  are  meant  to  be 
Secretly  wounded  by  the  hard  names  of  necejjity  and 
fate. 


Sect.     VIIL 

H'^herein  the  Ex — r's  rerifo72ings^  in  fever  al  parts  of  kit 
performance  -which  have  not  yet  been  taken  notice  of 
are  particularly  confidcrcd. 

THOUGH  I  am  humbly  of  opinion  that  what  Mr. 
Edwards  hath  faid  directly  upon  the  fubjeft  of 
the  government  and  detemiinntion  of  the  will  by  motives^ 
is  not  altogether  ccrrecl:,  but  liable  to  Jbme  of  the  ex- 
ceptions which  the  Mr. — r  hath  taken  againft  it  ;    flill, 

S  it 

*  Mr.  Leibnitz,  in  his  fifth  paper  to  Dr.  Clarke?  in  anfwer  to  the  Doflor's 
charge  againft  him  of  maintaining  the  doftrine  oifatt,  faith?  '•  As  to  the  notion 
<•  of  fatality,  which  the  Author  lays  alfo  to  my  charge,  this  is  anotlit;r  sinbi- 
•'  guity.  Tliere  is  a.fatum  mahometanntn-,  a  fatutr.  Jlolcum-,  lu'.d  a  fw.um  cLriJilj- 
*•■  num.  The  Turkijh  fare  will  have  an  c_^' J?  to  happet»,  even  though  its  r.-j;//? 
•'  fhould  be  avoided  ;  as  if  there  was  an  abfclute  necrjfity.  The  SvAcal  fate  will 
•♦  liave  a  mart  to  be  quiet>  lecaif  he  >nufi  ha-vi:  fatieiae,  ii.be:Lrr  he  iviU  or  rt'itt 
"  fince  it  is  impoflible  to  reliU  the  courfe  ot  things.  But  Mis  agreed  that  there 
•  »  is  K  fiitum  chr'iJl'ianutH^  a  certain  dejtiny  oi  evcxy  i\\\n^,  .refulated  by  the  fore^ 
•«  knuivlcd^i-  akdfrovider.ee  of  Gsd.  Fatum  ij  derived  fiomf.tii  ;  that  i£,  to  pro- 
«'  nou'tre,  to  decree  ;  andi  in  its  right  fcnlCi  it  fi^'tiities  the  decree  of  providence. 
•»  And  thofe  who  fuhmit  to  it  through  a  knoiviiJge  of  the  divine  perfeifianst 
«»  whereoi' the  love  of  God  is  a  conlequencci  have  not  only  patiunce,  uke  the 
"heathen  phuolophcrs,  but  arc  alio  au'entcd  with  wh.^.t  is  ordained  b}  God» 
»»  knowing  that  he  docs  every  thing  yi>-  the  hejl ;  and  not  only  for  the  greatejf 
»'  gycd  i.t  gt/iaal,  but  alfo  for  the  greateft  particular  good  of  thof.;  th-it  iove  liini- " 
See  a  CoUeSIijtt  cf  papen  uhich  pajftd  teiMeir.  Mr.  l.eii/:::x,  iirtd  Dr.  Ciarkci  p. 
»63,  165. 


138:  AnESSAYom  Part  I. 

it  appears  to  me,  he  hath  not  treated  that  eminent  Au- 
thor, in  many  refpciHis,  with  that  jufLice  and  candour 
which  diftinguilh  the  lovers  of  truth,  and  the  upright 
and  honeft  inquirers  after  it.  I  fcall-inflance  in  a  few 
particulars  : 

1.  The  Ex — r  hath  very  particularly  and  exprefsly 
condemned  him,  as  being  in  alliance,  in  fentinient, 
with  fata/ij?j^  epiciirians  and  atheijts^  becaufe  lie  main- 
tains the  opinion  ofr,n  abfolute  previous  certainty  and 
infallible  connexion  in  things,  and  exprefsly  denieth  a 
power  of  feif-determination  in  men  ;  and  yet  has  taken 
no  notice  of  the  arguments  by  which  Mr.  Edwards 
fupporteth  his  own  opinion,  and  refutes  thofs  of  his 
adverfary.  It  is  remarkable,  that,  through  our  Author'3 
whole  performance,  there  is  nothing  faid  to  expofe  the 
ibphiftry  of  the  arguments  which  Mr.  Edwards  hath 
made  ule  of  in  proof  of  an  infallible  antecedent  cer* 
tainty  of  all  events,  aird  Ihew  the  wcaknefs  and  futil- 
ity of  them  ;  and  that  his  clear  and  very  ftriking 
reafonings,  againfl  a  power  of  felf-determination  in 
men,  are  wholly  palTed  over  in  fdence.  Herein,  it 
appears  to  me,  our  Author  hath  done  juftice,  neither 
to  Mr.  Edwards,  nor  to  himfelf.  Not  to  Mr.  Ed- 
wards ;  in  fuppofrng  that  fome  incorreftnefs  of  ex- 
preilion,  or  even  fentiment,  rcfpeding  the  influence  of 
motives  upon  the  human  luill^  fo  to  weaken  the  force  ot 
liis  arguments  for  the  grand  point  in  debate  between 
the  Calvinifts  and  Arminians,  as  to  render  them  un-^ 
worthy  of  any  farther  notice,  or  i^egly  :  Nor  to  hivi- 
Jelj\  in  not  giving  arguments,  of  fucli  peculiar  perfpi- 

cuity  and  ftrength,  any  greater  weight  in  his  own 
mind, 

2.  Our  Author  frequently  afTerts,  that  Mr.  Edwards 
denieth  interiial  liberty^  or  that  the  ivill  is  free.  (Sec 
part  i'.  £cCt.  3.)  And  faith,  that  it  is'  contrary  to  the 
general  docTirine  of  his  book,  that  "  the  adts  of  the 
will  are  free.''  (See  p.  67 .^  All  that  our  Author  can 
with  juflice  found  this  charge  againfl  Mr.  Edv/ards 
upon,  is,  liis  conftantly  denying,    that  ads  of  the  will 

arc 


Sea.;VlIL  MORAL    AGENCY,  159 

.are  to  be  ccnfidered  as  the  fniit  of  our  oiun  pleafure  ; 
and,  that  this  is  a  conlideration  neceflary  to  either  the 
virtuoiifnefs  or  vicioufuers  of  volitions.  If  by  free 
is  meant  fomething  which  is  the  fruit  and  conjeqvence 
of  the  pleafure  of  the  mind^  and  that  no  a<fl  of  .tlie  will 
\%free  unlefs  it  is  the  effe^i  of  our  own  voluntary  defign^ 
Mr.  Edwards  did  indeed  deny  internal  freedom  :  but 
if  by  free  is  meant  voluntary  and  eleClive^  it  will  be 
obvious  to  any  one,  who  (liall  ,take  the  trouble  of  at- 
tending to  him,  that  he  wa^  very  far  from  denying 
internal  liberty  and  freedom.  Such  reprelentations, 
by  our  Author,  tend  to  give  a  wrong  view  and  idea  of 
the  true  and  real  fentiments  of  Mr.  Edwards. 

3.  Our  Author,  I  think,  hath  very  maifelHy  per- 
verted the  meaning  of  the  terms  natural  and  morale  as 
applied  to  the  abilities  of  men,  from  the  fenfe  in  which 
Mr.  Edwards  obvioufly  ufed  them  ;  and  would  'iioivk 
thence  infer,  that,  even  upon  that  Author's  own  prin- 
ciples, the  latter,  as  truly  as  the  former,  is  inconfiftcDt 
with  all  ideas  of  virtue  and  vice,  praife  and  bianje. 
That  Author,  in  part  i.  fed.  4.  of  his  book,  hath  ex- 
plained the  phrafes  natural  and  ?noral  inability^  with 
great  clearnefs  and  exaftnefs.  The  former,  he  repre- 
fents  as  being  inconfiltent  with  blame  ;  the  latter,  as 
in  no  degree  removing  the  grounds  of  it.  A  natural 
inability^  Mr.  Edwards  fuppofeth,  implies  rehftance 
made  to  will  and  endeavours  :  a  moral  inability  is  no- 
thing more  than  an  indifp.ofition  of  mind,  a  backward- 
nefs  and  flrong  averfion  of  will,  to  any  exertion  and 
endeavours.  The  former,  he  fuppoieth,  precludes 
blame  ;  the  latter,  not.  He  is  careful,  however,  to 
remind  his  readers,  that  though,  in  conformity  to  the 
common  ufe  of  terms  among  men,  he  giyeth  the  name 
moral  to  one  of  thefe  kinds  of  inability,  he  doth  not 
Tuppofe  that  nature  is  wholly  unconcerned  even  in 
fuch  a  kind  of  inability  as  is  generally  termed  77ioral  ; 
or,  that  there  is  not,  extrinfic  of  the  inability  itfelf^ 
a  reafon  or  ground  of  it,  in  the  nature  of  things.  la 
part  4.  fed.  4.  of  his  Inquiry,  Mr.  Edwards  hath  very 

S  2  clearly 


14©  An    essay    oh  Part  I. 

clearly  fliown  the  confiftency  oi  fuch  an  inability  or 
neceiiity,  as  this,  with  our  natural  notions  of  dtjert  / 
even  though  nature  is  concerned  in  it  ;  whatever  may 
be  the  incongruity  of  attributing  either  praifc  or 
blame,  where  natural  neceiiity  (according  to  the  com- 
mon and  mod  obvious  meaning  of  the  term)  taketh 
place.  Becaufe  Mr.  Edwards  had  faid,  that  the  nature 
of  things  is  concerned  in  moral  neceflity  (p.  31.)  and 
admits  that  -moral^  is  a  fpecies  o£ philojophical  neceflity 
(p.  294.)  the  Ex— r  pretends,  that,  upon  Mr.  Ed- 
wards's principles,  and  even  according  to  his  own  defi^ 
nitions^  there  is  a  neceiiity  in  the  volitions  of  men, 
which  is  utterly  inconfiftent  with  all  our  ideas  of  any 
defert  of  either  praife  or  blame.  Herein  the  Ex — r 
doth  not  give  the  real,  obvious  fenfe  of  the  Author 
upon  whom  he  animadverteth  ;  but  takes  advantage, 
by  varying  the  meaning  of  the  term  nature  from  the 
fenfe  in  which  Mr.  Edwards  ufeth  it,  to  reprelenthim 
as  being  inconfiftent,  both  with  himfelf  and  with  com- 
mon fenfe,  in  an  inftance  wherein,  upon  careful  and 
candid  examination,  he  will  probably  be  found  to  be 
inconfiftent  with  neither.  Nothing  farther  need  be 
faid  in  reply  to  the  remarks  of  our  Author  on  this 
head,  tlian  to  requeft  the  reader  carefully  to  review 
Mr.  Edsvards's  own  reafonings  upon  the  point,  in  the 
fore-rmentioned  feclions.* 

4.  Mr. 

*  As  fomc  feem  to  think  that  Mr.  Edwards  ufes  the  di{linc\ion  of  uatuml  an4 
n-sfql  inability  in  an  unnfual  fenfe.  and  have  charged  him  witli  introducing  a 
rew  phrafeology  into  the  church,  it  may  not  be  impertinent  to  quote  a  palfa^e 
Or  two  from  Toman's  Difcourfc  of  natural  and  moral  inipotency.  written  about 
a  leiituiy  a^o. 

This  diltincticn  ffays  he)  o^  natvral  7iTi.<\  moral  power,  or  imfiotency.  Is  not  ufcd 
to  attirm  or  deny  tlic  «.oir.ing  or  arifmg  of  one  or  either  of  them  fiom  r.aiure  :  fof 
1  am  not  now  fpcakin^  de  criglncy  whence  they  arife  ;  but  to  denote  the  Ipecies  or 
kinds,    and  the  eilcntial  diderence   of  their  nature,    come  they  which  way  th.ey 

\\\\\.     Tl)?.t  is  a  phyfical  or  natural  habit  or  adion,    that  is  neither laudable 

nor  vituperable />  ^jt^jft' ««'«/«  ;  that  a  man  can  neither  be  counted  good  and 
lionelt,  or  bad  and  dilhonclt,  for  his  agility  or  comelinefs,  duljiffsi  hlcckilhnefs, 
or  acutenefs  ;  but  may  be  (having  fuch  power  and  doing  accordingly)  admired, 
though  not  praifed  ;  and  for  the  defect  of  fucli  power  may  be  pitied,  but  not 
blamed  orpuniiiicd.  And  this  impotency  may  be  a  puniihment,  but  not  a  fin. 
The  moral  and  ethical  aci  or  habit  is  jud  contrary.  It  is  that  which  \\  laudable 
or  vitu|)crablc,  and  that  which  a  man  may  be  looked  on  as  honeft  or  dilhoneft 
for.  Now  natural  impotency  ii  always,  in  this  fenfe,  of  fomfthing  that  a  man 
cannot  d^,  if  he  would  never  fo  much  ,  or  hath  not  ths  very  faculty  of  willing  >t- 

Tl«e 


Seft.VIII.  MORAL   AGENCY.  141 

4.  Mr.  Edwards  hath  infifted,  that  the  virtuoiifnefs 
and  vicioufncfs  of  difpoiitions,  habits  of  mind  and  in- 
clinations, are  to  be  fought  wholly  in  thefe  difpofitions 
and  inclinations  themfclves  ;  and  not,  in  any  meafure, 
in  their  caufe.  This  do6lrine  of  Mr.  Edwards,  the 
Ex— *r  reprefentcth  in  fuch  a  manner  and  in  fuch 
terms  as  greatly  tend  to  betray  unwary  readers  into 
very  wrong  and  falfe  apprehenlions  of  the  real  opinion 
and  fcntiments  of  that  eminent  author.  He  fays 
(p.  57.)  '^  What  doth  it  amount  to  ?  The  plain 
"  truth  is"  (oa  Mr.  Edwards's  principles)  "  that 
*'  when  we  fet  ourfeives  to  judge  of  human  aftions, 
''•  we  muft  have  no  confideration  of  the  fource  of 
"  them,  but  entirely  detach  them  from  their  caufes.' 
*'  Be  the  efficient  caufe  who  or  what  it  will,  all  we 
*'  have  to  attend  to,  is  the  ellcft  produced — by  this 
"  we  muif  eltimate  the  goodnefs  or  wickednefs  of 
*' men — I"  The  term  action^  is  mod:  commonly  ap- 
plied to  external^  bodily  exertions.  It  is  a  didlate  of 
common  fenfe,  that,  in  judging  o^  aLlions^  in  this  feufe 
of  the  term,  we  muft  look  wholly  to  x\\c\v  fource^  and 
by  this'  only  eftimatc  the  goodnefs  or  wickednefs  of 
men.  Mr.  Edwards  is  fo  far  from  having  faid  any 
thing  inconliftent  with  this  opinion,  that  he  hath  offer- 
ed unanfwerable  arguments  in  fupport  of  it.  And  yet 
our  Author  hath  expreflcd  himielf,  on  this  head,  in 
terms  naturally  adapted  to  perfuadc  his  lefs  accurate 
and  judicious  readers,  that  Mr.  Edwards  was  fo  weak 
as  to  imagine  that  the  commendablenefs  or  criminality 
of  the  outward  actions  of  men  do  not  at  all  depend 

upon 

The  mir^il  impotericy  is  of  fomethin^,  that  a  man  bath  the  natural  faculty  to 
will,  or  can  do  it  if  he  would  ;  but  is  hindered  only  by  moral  vicious  habits 
Irorn  willing  or  doing  it.  (page  4.) 

Thi«  moral  impotericy  doth  not  excufe  from  fault,  9r  make  the  threat^nin^s 
unjuft.  Nay,  it  is  alio  in  thi?  contrary  to  natural  (which  I  would  have  you  ob- 
ferve  and  confider  well.  To  convince  you  of  the  great  dilVerence) ;  that  the  natural 
impoteiicy,  the  greater  it  is,  by  lb  much  the  more  it  doth  letien  the  fault  in  not 
.obeying  the  command  ;  and  the  leis  it  is,  by  fo  much  the  more  it  doth  >;icaten 
the  fault.  But  the  greater  it  [moral  impotency]  is,  the  greater  is  the  fault,  and 
more  blame-worthy,  and  farther  from  excufe  j  and  the  lefs  it  is,  the  lefs  faulty, 
(page  31.) 

If  any  one  defires  to  know  whether  Mr.  Edwards's  language  is  new,  and  be- 
fore unknown  to  i!ie  church,  let  hiji>  read  this  whole  difcoarfe  of  Truman. 


142  An    essay    on  Part  L 

■upon  the  internal  purpofes  and  defigns  from  -which  the 
actions  proceed.  In  this  inftance  our  Author,  I  ap- 
prehend, evadeth  the  force  of  Mr.  Edwards's  argij- 
Kient  ;  and  hardly  fhews  himfelf  the  candid,  fair  in- 
tjuirer. 

But  will  the  Ex-^r  infill:  on  the  confeqiience  which 
he  fuppofeth  to  follov/  from  thefc  principles  of  Mr. 
.Edwards  ?  He  lays,  "  He,  therefore,  that  with  one 
"  original  talent  makes  as  great  improvement  as  an- 
**  other  with  live,  is  no  more  praifeworthy — that  is, 
*'  is  not  accepted  according  to  that  he  hath.  He  that 
"  offends  againll  five  degrees  of  light,  originally  giv*- 
*'  en,  is  guilty  in  no  higher  degree  than  he  who  oflbnds 
*'  againft  but  one  degree  of  light."  I  know  not  by 
what  rule  of  reafon  our  Author  makes  this  inference. 
If  the  vicioufnefs  of  any  thing  lieth  in  the  nature  of  it, 
not  in  its  caufe  ;  is  this  a  confideration,  that  at  all  di- 
minifheth  the  difference  between  rebellion  againll 
different  degrees  of  light  ?  Will  our  Author  infift, 
alio,  that  the  difference  between  things  adlualiy  ex- 
ifting,  confiileth  not  in  the  nature  of  the  things  them- 
felvcs,  but  in  their  caufe  f  There  is  nothing  whereby 
we  can  determhie  the  ftrength  of  any  internal  difpo- 
iition,  but  by  the  degrees  of  difhculty  it  will  over- 
come, or  light  againll  which  it  will  rebel.  If  it  re- 
quires greater  flrengtli  of  inclination  and  difpofition 
to  refiif  five  degrees  of  ligiit,  than  to  refill  one,  there 
is  certainly  a  higher  degree  of  wickednefs  in  relilling 
five,  than  in  refifting  one  ;  efpecially  if  the  wickednefs 
lieth  in  the  nature  of  the  difpoiition  exerclfed,  and  not 
in  its  caufe, 

5".  Our  Author  pretendeth  to  quote  Mr.  Edwards, 
as  alferting  that  "  moral  evil  is  not  of  «  bad,  but  good 
*'  tendency.'*  (p.  72.)  For  this  he  referreth  his  rea- 
ders to  part  4.  feft.  9.  of  that  Author's  Inquiry.  I 
have  carefully  examined  that  feclion,  and  can  find  no 
Aich  affertion  in- it,  or  any  thing  akin  to  it.  Mr.  Ed- 
"w^ards  acknowledgeth,  that,  upon  his  principles,  it  mufl 
be  granted,  that  the  taking  place  of  fin  is  a  fruit  and 

effea 


Scc^.  VIIL  MORAL  AGENCY.  14J 

elTeft  of  the  divine  permifTion  and  difpofal.  And  to 
fliew  that  tliis  permiifion  and  difpolal  of  divine  provi- 
dence are  not  inconfiflent  with  the  divine  purity  and 
holinefs,  and  do  not  rcfieft  upon  the  moral  character 
of  God,  he  afTcrls  that  there  is  710  had  tendency  in  fuch 
perniiiTinn  and  difpofal.  ^He  faith  (p.  11$-)  '^  'Tis 
'*  not  oF  a  bad  tendency^  for  the  Ibpreme  Being  thus 
*'  to  order  and  permit  that  moral  evil  to  be,  which  it 
*'  is- beft  ihould  come  to  pafs.''  This,  any  one  may 
fee,  is  a  very  different  thing  from  faying  that  "  moral 
*'  evil  is  not  of  a  bad,  bat  good  tendency."  In  this 
pretended  quotation  there  is  at  leaft  the  appearance  of 
difingeiiuity  and  unfairnefs.  If  our  Author  had  care- 
fully attended  to  the  evident  defign  and  fcope  of  the 
fe<flion  upon  which  he  is  here  remarking,  1  think  he 
could  not  poifibly  have  made  fo  palpable  a  miflake. 
And  by  this  means  he  might  have  fpared  himfelf  the 
trouble  of  feveral  of  the  next  fuccecding  pages  ;  and,, 
of  his  pathetic  exclamation  on  the  fuppofed  advantages 
of  the  moffc  atrocious  crimes  tliat  are  committed  here 
in  our  world,  and  the  "  bafe  ingratitude''  of  mankind 
to  thefe  "  their  p-featell  bene  factors." 

6.  Another  inftance  wherein  our  Author,  I  appre- 
hend, hath  mifreprcfented  the  fentiments  of  Mr.  Ed- 
^'ards,  is,  his  charging  him  with  placing  the  criminal- 
ity and  wickednefs  of  a  number  and  feries  of  bad  vo- 
litions particularly  in  that  which  is  firfl:  and  original  in 
the  feries,  on  account  of  the  infeparable  connexion  of 
all  the  fucceeding  ones,  in  the  train,  with  it.  This  is 
the  light  in  which  our  Author  reprefenteth  him.  (p. 
48.  97.)  For  this  fentiment  in  Mr.  Edwards,  he  re- 
ferreth  his  readers  to  p.  48.  224,  225.  266.  70,  71. 
Mr.  Edwards  indeed  faith  (p.  48.)  *'  If  the  firft  ad  of 
"  the  will,  which  determines  and  fixes  the  fubfequent 
"  acTts,  be  not  free,  none  of  the  following  a^ls,  which 
*'  are  determined  by  it,  are  free.''  But  hy  free ^  as  he 
here  ufeth  the  term,  he  manifeftly  intends  the  fame  as 
felf-determined  :  and,  by  the  chain  of  reafoning  which 
he  is  here  purfuing,  would  flicw  the  ineonfiftency  of 

men 


144  An    E  S  S  A  Y    on  Part  L 

men  with  themfelves,  even  on  their  own  principles^  in 
pleading  for  a  power  of  lelf-determination,  as  efTential 
to  moral  liberty,  virtue  and  vice  ;  and,  that,  accord- 
ing to  their  ov/n  definitions,  it  is  utterly  inconceivable 
that  any  a6t  or  exercife  of  the  will  fhould  be  free* 
Mr.  Edwards,  in  p.  224.  inhfts  that  the  firfl  and  deter- 
mining ad:,  in  a  fcrics  and  chain  of  volitions,  is  as 
truly  the  fubjett  of  command,  as  the  coniequent  ones. 
And  likewife  tells  us,  that  ^'  'tis  this  ?}wre  efpecially 
"  which  is  that  which  the  command  or  precept  has  a 
''  proper  refpedl  to  ;  becaufe  it  is  this  adl  which  deter- 
"  mines  the  whole  affair  ;  in  this  adl  the  obedience  or 
*'  difobedience  lies  in  a  more  peculiar  manner."  To 
me,  indeed,  there  appeareth  no  reafon  for  fuch  a  re- 
prefentation  as  this  ;  "nor  any  ground  for  fuppofing  the 
fir  ft  volition^  in  any  feries  or  train  of  a(il:s  of  the  will, 
to  be  in  a  more  peculiar  manner  the  fubjeft  of  com- 
mand, than  any  of  the  fubfequent  ones.  Yea,  the  re-^ 
verfe  of  this,  in  many  cafes,  is  moft  manifeflly  true. 
For,  in  a  chain  and  leries  of  volitions  and  excrcifes 
terminating  on  the  fame  general  obje£i:,  the  mind  fre- 
quently exerteth  itfclf  with  more  ftrength  and  vigour 
in  its  fubfequent  exerciies,  than  in  that  which  is  origi- 
nal and  firfl  in  the  feries  ;  and  which  may,  in  fome 
fenfe,  be  faid  to  determine  the  reft.  Certainly,  it  is 
not  confiftent  with  this  Author's  own  principles,  to 
fuppofe  that  the  connexion  of  fubfequent  atJts  of  the 
will,  witli  that  which  is  firft  and  original  in  the  feries, 
or  the  determination  of  tlie  coniequent  acts  by  the  an- 
tecedent, {liould  be  any  reafon  for  making  the  firft  ef- 
pecially the  fubjecl  of  precept  and  command  ;  or,  for 
placing  obedience  or  difobedience  in  a  peculiar  niafincr 
in  the  firft,  and  not  in  thofe  which  follow  it. 

But  in  the  other  places  referred  to  by  our  Author, 
it  is  manifeft  that  when  Mr.  Edwards  denieth  freedom 
to  be  in  confequent  afts  of  the  will,  becaufe  of  their 
connexion  juith  foregoing  aCh^  he  doth  it  only  upon  the 
objector's  principles,  in  order  to  fliew  him  his  own  in- 
confiftency.      If  our  Author  had  carefully  kept  Mr. 

Edwards's 


Sea.Vm.  MORAL   AGENCY.  145 

Edwards's  defign  in  view,  he  would  not  have  repre- 
fented  him  as  lb  frequently  placing  th^  criminality  and 
wickednefs  of  a  number  and  chain  of  volitions  parti- 
cularly and  ejpecially  in  that  which  is  firft  and  original 
in  the  feries. 

7.  On  the  ftrength  of  the  fuppofition,  that  every 
kind  of  necelfity  is  equally  inconfiflent  with  our  natu- 
ral ideas  of  deiert,  of  praife  and  blame,  our  Author 
chargeth  Mr.  Edwards  (p.  83.)  with  being  "  caught 
in  his  own  fubtilty,''  and  inadvertently  fliding  into 
the  doftrine  of  fatalifm,  however  he  may  have  expref- 
fed  his  difmclinatic^ji  to  it.  What  the  Ex — r  meaneth 
by  fatalifm^  it  is  fufficiently  evident,  is  not  the  necef- 
fary  certainty  of  the  divine  cxiftence  and  exercifes, 
but  the  fubjeftion  of  every  event,  yea  of  all  intelligent 
exiftence,  in  every  form  and  mode  of  it,  to  a  neceffity 
which  is  equally  without  will,  without  wifdom,  and 
without  defign.  "  Upon  this  fcheme'^  (Mr.  Edwards's) 
faith  our  Author,  '•'-  it  follows,  that  the  adlions  of  all 
"  finite  beings  are  the  agency  of  the  Deity  ;  and  his, 
"  not,  properly  fpeaking,  ajremy^  but  inilrumentali- 
"  ty — a  fubjecStion  to  blind  neceflity  and  fate."  Mr. 
Edwards  hath  no  where  faid  or  intimated,  that  the 
divine  agency  is  the  fruit  and  e^ed  of  any  extrinfic, 
neceflary  caufe  ;  or,  indeed,  of  any  kind  of  neceiTity 
whatfoevef  :  and  where  the  Ex— ^r  finds  fuch  a  fenti- 
ment  or  conclufion  contained  in  any  thing  that  Author 
hath  faid  in  his  Inquiry,  I  am  at  a  lofsto  conceive.  It 
is  triie,  that  Mr.  Edwards  fuppofeth  the  divine  exift- 
ence,  even  in  every  mode  and  manner  of  it,  2.nece[J(iry 
cxiftence.  If  this  is  a  doftrine  "  plainly  on  the  fide 
of  fatality,"  we  readily  allow  that  his  reafonings  are 
on  that  fide  of  the  queftion.  And  if  there  is  no  way 
to  cfcape  the  fubtilties  of  that  obnoxious  doiflrine,  be- 
fide  that  of  denying  the  neceiJity  of  the  divine  exiftence, 
it  will  at  once  be  admitted  that  Mr.  Edwards  was 
ca\ight  in  them.  But  would  our  Author,  in  order  to 
avoid  the  dotStrine  of  fate,  deny  the  ahjolute  necelJity  of 
the  divine  exiltence — ^a  neceiiity  taking  place  equally 

T  ia 


146  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  L 

in  refpeft  to  the  exercifes  as  of  the  very  exijlence  of 
God  ?  Is  this  the  fort  of  fatality  which  our  Author  fo 
ftuclioufly  avoideth,  and  at  which  he  difcovers  fo  great 
a  difgufl  ?  If  this  is  the  cafe,  the  Ex— ^r's  words  ref- 
pe(fbing  Mr.  Edwards  (p.  83.)  with  a  little  variaticii 
may  juftly  be  applied  to  himfelf.  *■'  However''  our 
Author  "  hath  expoled  his  difinclination  to"  atlieiim 
•'  (in  which  we  doubt  not  his  fincerity)  we  think  his 
*'  reafoning  is  plainly  on  the  lide  oP^  it  ;  *•'  and  fup- 
^*  pofe  he  was  caught  in  his  own  fubtilty.'^  For  if  the 
divine  exiftence  and  volition  are  not  necefjarily  lukat 
they  are  ;  and  if  there  is  not  that  f^premacy,  efficiency 
and  power  in  him  and  in  his  government,  as  abfolutcly 
to  injure  the  taking  place  of  every  event^  under  this 
government,  exactly  agreeable  to  the  wife  purpofe  and 
delign  of  God  ;  it  will  be  no  longer  worth  while  for 
chriftian  divines  to  conteil  any  points  with  nthei/is  and 
infidels  ;  or,  even  to  expert  any  effectual  interpofltion 
in  favour  of  the  caufe  of  righteoufnefs  and  truth. 

Upon  the  authority,  notwithftanding,  of  Mr.  Ed- 
wards's maintaining  fuch  a  doftrine  as  this,  our  Au- 
thor, with  great  freedom,  ranks  this  eminent  cJirifiiaii 
divine^  with  heathen  philo fop  hers  and  others  who,  he 
fuppofeth,  harmonize  with  them  in  their  doftrine  of 
fate.  And  accordingly  he  hath,  in  the  clofe  of  his 
performance,  drawn  a  parallel  between  the  fentiments 
of  Mr.  Edwards,  and  the  dodrines  of  fuch  as  he  ima- 
gineth  have  been  abettors  of  thofe  heathenifh,  unphi" 
lofophical  tenets.  He  infoi'ms  us,  indeed  (p.  i^o.) 
that  he  doth  not  fuppofe  that  the  agreement  of  Mr. 
Edwards's  doctrines  with  the  fentiments  of  heathen 
philofophers  proves  them  to  be  faife.  But  if  it  Vv'as 
not  his  defign  that  the  confideration  of  the  correfpon- 
dence  of  Mr.  Edwards's  doftrine,  with  fome  things 
vv'hich  are  to  be  found  in  the  writings  df  Hobbs,  Spi- 
noza, &c»  fliould  have  the  weight  of  an  argument, 
with  his  more  fuperficial  readers  ;  it  is  difficult  to  find 
a  reafon  why  he  exhibited  this  refemblance  to  the  view 
cJf  the  publick,  and  fubjoined  his  "  fpecimen  of  coin- 
cidence''' 


Siea.  Vin.  MORAL    AGENCY.  147 

<:iclence"  to  his  other  performance.  This  is  an  argu- 
ment which  will  probably  be  uf  greater  weight  with 
iKjany,  to  prejudice  tlicm  againft  the  writings  of  this 
truly  j^reat  and  excellent  divine,  than  any  or  all  the 
cither  arguments  our  Author  hath  advanced  in  his 
whole  book.  Nor  is  it  eafy  to  fee  what  other  end  he 
would  have  in  vie\y,  in  comparing  the  doftrines  and 
fentiments  of  Mr.  Edwards,  with  fome  things  which 
are  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  fuch  as  have  obtained 
the  name  of  fatalifts^  in  fome  part  of  the  chriftian 
world,  than  to  raife  the  popular  cry  againfb  Mr.  Ed^ 
wards,  and  caft  an  odium,  both  upon  his  fentiments 
and  character.  It  might  have  been  much  more  fatis- 
fying  to  the  candid,  honcft  inquirers  after  truth,  for 
our  Author  fairly  to  have  anfwered  and  confuted  the 
arguments,  both  of  Mr.  Edvv'ards  and  thofe  with  whorri 
he  coincideth  in  fentiment,  in  favour  of  that  kind  of 
neceihty  of  events  which  is  urged  with  fo  much  (at 
lead)  appearance  of  reafon  and  argumentation  by  thofe 
learned  writers  ;  which,  however,  hath,  among  fome, 
obtained  the  obnoxious  and  unpopular  name  oi  fate. 
It  will,  probably,  upon  inquiry,  be  found  that  the  ad- 
vocates ^ViV  free  ivill^  or  they  who  affert  fucli  a  liberty 
of  will  as  \\\\^Y\^\.\\  a  freedom  from  all  kinds  of  necefjity'^ 
cannot  fupport  their  opinion  by  more  authorities,  or 
tliofc  of  greater  eminence  and  weight  among  both 
Heathens,  Jews,  and  Chriflians,  than  are  evidently  on 
the  fide  o't  neceffity^  and  have  ftrenuoufly  fupparted  it. 
The  Author  o^  t\\Q  philofophical  inquiry  cmtcerning  hii- 
7nan  liberty^  fuppofed  to  be  A.  Collins,  Efq.  fays,  that 
liberty  (meaning  that  freedom  from  ail  neceflity  which 
implies  contingency  of  events)  can  only  be  grounded 
on  the  abfurcl  principles  of  ii^/'?V«r^/7?/  Atheiits  ;  and 
that  "  ThtJ  Epicureaji  Atheijts^  who  v/ere  the  moil 
*'  popular  and  rnoft  numerous  feft  of  atheilts  of  anti- 
"  quity,  were  the  great  affertors  of  liberty."  As 
authorities  for  this  affertion,  he  quotes  Lucretius  and 
Euf.  and  then  proceeds  to  inform  us,  that  the  Stoicks^ 
"  who  were   the  moft  popular  and  moil  numerous  fed 

T   8  amonp; 


148  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  L 


cc 


among  the  religionaries  of  antiquity,  were  the  great 

*'  affertors  of necelfity."     His  authority  for  this  ai- 

fertion  is  Cicero  de  nat.  Deor.  L.  I.  "  The  cafe," 
continues  he,  "  was  alfo  the  fame  among  the  Jews, 
*'  as  among  the  Heathen.' — • — They  were  principally 
"  divided  into  three  feels,  the  Sadducees,  the  Pharifees^ 
*'  and  the  ElTcnes.  The  Sadducees,  who  were  efteem- 
""  ed  an  irreligious  and  atheJfUcal  fed,  maiiitaiued  the 
*'  liberty  of  jncmJ*  (By  liberty  is  here  meant  that 
fame  freedom  of  -will  which  is  termed,  both  by  our . 
Author  and  others,  Sifelfmoving^  I  elf-deter  mining  pow^ 
er.)  "  But  the  Pharifees,  who  were  a  religious  feft, 
"  afcribed  all  things  to  fife^  or  God's  appoiyitinent^** 
(by  which  this  v/riter  meaneth  one  and  the  fame  thing) 
"  and  it  was  the  firft  article  of  their  creed,  that  /^/^ 
*'  and  God  do  all  ;  and  confcquently  they  could  not 
*'  affert  true  liberty,  when  they  aiTertcd  a  liberty  to- 
"  gether  with  this  fatality  arid  necclTity  of  all  things. 
**  And  the  ElTenes,  who  were  the  moft  religious  fedt 
*'  among  the  Jews,  and  fell  not  under  the  cenfure  of 
*'  our  Saviour  for  their  hypocrify,  as  the  Pharilees 
*'  did,  were  affertors  of  abfolute  fate  and  necellity, 
*'  St.  Paul,  who  was  a  Pharifee  and  the  fonof  a  Phari- 
*'  fee,  is  fuppofed  by  the  learned  Dodwell  to  have  re- 
*'  ceived  his  doctrine  of  fate,  (S:c.  &c,  So  that  liber- 
*'  ty  is  both  the  real  foundation  of  popular  atheifm, 
"  and  has  been  the  profefTed  principle  of  the  atheifls 
*'  themfelves  ;  as,  on  the  other  fide,/^/^  or  the  neceffi" 
"  ty  of  events,  has  been  efteemed  a  religious  opinion, 
"  and  been  the  profeffed  principle  of  the  religious, 
"  both  among  Heathens  and  Jews,  and  alfo  of  that 
"  great  convert  to  chriftianity,  and  great  converter  of 
"  others,  St.  Paul."  {Sec  p.  54,  55,  56.  of  his  In- 
quiry.) The  fame  writer  tells  us  (p.  192.)  that 
*'  The  queftions  of  liberty^  necefity  and  ckajice  have 
"•  been  flibjefts  of  difpute  among  philofophers  at  all 
*^  times  ;  and  moft  of  thefe  philofophers  have  clearly 
'*  alFerted  neceility,  and  denied  liberty  and  chance. 
'*  Tliat    ''  The  queftions  of  liberty  and  neccfjity  have 

alfo 


Sea.  VIIL  MORAL   AGENCY.  149 

*'  alfo  been  debated  among  divines,  in  the  feveral  apes 
*'  of  the  chriitian  church,  under  the  terms  of  free  luill 
"  and  predeftination  :  and  the  divines  who  have  denied* 
^^  free  will  and  afTerted  predeftination^  have  enforced 
'*  the  arguments  of  the  philofopher,  by  the  confidera- 
"  tion  of  fome  do^^rines  peculiar  to  the  chriftian  reli* 
*■''  gion."  "I'his  writer  likewiie  quotes  Dr.  (Clarke,  in 
what  he  faith  upon  the  being  and  attributes  of  God,  as 
evidently  efponfing  the  do<ririne  of  neceffity  (fee  p. 
94.)  ;  to  which  the  DocHror  made  a  particular  reply  ; 
printed  with  "  A  colleftion  of  papers  which  paired 
"  between  the  late  learned  Mr.  Leibnitz"  and  the 
Doiffor. 

No  weight,  however,  is,  after  all,  to  be  laid  on 
fnch  authorities  :  there  being  fcarcely  any  opinion, 
however  ridiculous  or  abfurd,  but  what  may  be  fup- 
ported  by  authorities  both  ancient  and  modern,  as  well 
chrilHan  as  heathen. 

But  as  to  the  reafonablenefs  of  founding  any  argu- 
ment, either  of  the  truth  or  faKhood  of  any  opinion 
whatever,  merely  upon  its  correfpondence  \\nt\\  fome 
things  which  have  been  advanced,  either  by  the 
friends,  or  enemies,  of  chriflianity  ;  I  fliall  only  beg 
leave  to  refer  the  reader  to  what  Mr.  Edwards  him- 
felf  hath  faid  upon  this  fubjeft,  in  Part  IV.  Sedt.  6.  of 
his  Inquiry.  If  our  Author  had  kept  this  in  view,  I 
cannot  but  think  he  muft  have  felt  himielf  to  be  en- 
p:aged  in  a  very  fruitlefs  (not  to  fay  invidious)  em- 
ployment, while  he  was  preparing  his  '*■  Specimen  of 
coincidence"  for  the  view  of  the  public. 

Befide  the  injuftice  done  by  the  Ex — r  particular- 
ly to  Mr.  Edwards,  many  of  his  obfervations  and  rea- 
fonings,  it  to  me  appeareth,  are  injurious  to  the  caufe 
of  truth.  Some  fev/  inflances  of  unjuft  argumentation, 
and  of  conclufions  (I  am  humbly  of  opinion,  precipl- 
tantly  drawn)  it  may  not  be  improper  to  mention,  in 
the  prelent  fedion. 

Mr.  Edwards  ufeth  the  terms  vohmtary^  free  and 
detiive^  when  applied  to  the  internal  exercifcs  of  men, 

in 


15*  An   E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Parti. 

in  nearly  one  and  the  fame  fenfe  ;  and  in  many  of  his 
reafonings  they  are  convertible  terms.  Our  Author, 
♦hat  he  might  evince  the  terms  free  and  voluntary^ 
when  applied  to  moral  aftions,  to  be  of  very  different 
import  ;  and  make  it  appear  that,  for  an  action  tg  be 
twlimtary  is  no  proof  that  it  is  either  virtuous  or  vi-> 
tious  ;  endeavoureth  to  make  it  manifeft  that  Mr. 
Edwards's  definition  of  a  moral  aCi'ton.^  viz.  that  it  is 
voluntary^  includes,  not  only  the  actions  of  men,  but 
alfo,  thofe  of  the  brute  creation.  And  hovi^ever  diifo- 
ftant  it  may  be  from  the  dictates  of  the  common  fenf^ 
of  men,  to  imagine  that  the  actions  of  brutes  fall  un- 
der any  moral  denomination  ;  yet,  that  by  the  help  of 
metaphylicks,  we  may,  in  time,  bring  our  minds  to 
comport  with  fuch  an  w^q  of  language  and  terms,  fee 
p.  89,  90.  If  the  Ex — r  had  reflected,  that  there  is, 
ever)'  wa3/,  as  much  evidence  that  the  brute  creation 
correlpond  with  mankind  in  that  quality  of  their  nar 
ture,  Xh^t  their  aCli 071  s  are  Jelf-deter?nined^  as  in  this, 
that  they  are  voluntary  ;  I  cannot  but  think  he  would 
have  omitted  this  obfervation.  For  him  to  fay,  that 
a  power  of  felf-'detertnination  is  what  digniiieth  m.an 
above  the  brutes,  and  is  that  which  forms  the  grand 
diftin^lion  between  772oral  ^nA  g7ii-mal  nature,  is  altoge- 
ther without  authority  and  proof.  For  when  he  has 
proved  that  mankind  ure  invefled  with  fuch  uncommon 
powers,  and  that  fuch  a  power  is  neceffary  to  the 
morality  of  their  aciions,  we  fliall  be  equally  author- 
ized to  fay,  that  his  definition  includeth  the  adlons  of 
the  brutal  part  of  the  creation,  as  he  now  is,  to  raife 
fucli  an  objection  againfl  the  definition  adopted  by  us. 
For  he  {liould  remember,  that,  ripnit  his  principles^ 
there  is  no  more  evidence  that  the  a<R:ions  of  brutes  are 
"voluntniy^  than  that  they  2xq  J  elf-deter  7m7ied  ',  and  when 
he  hath  given  a  diftincPcion  of  human  volitions  from 
thofe  of  the  brute  creation,  whereby  it  will  appeal?" 
that  the  latter  cannot  be  fcif-determined,  though  the 
former  are  ;  his  mctaphyficks  will,  probably,  have 
fiirniihed  tis  with  a  dillinftioft  between  the  voluntary 

exercifes 


Sea.  VIII.  MORAL   AGENCY.  ijtx 

exercifes  of  mankind,  andthofe  of  the  lower  creation  ; 
whereby  v/e  rtiali  be  able  to  make  it  appear,  that  the 
former  are  of  a  moral  denomination,  though  the  latter 
are  not. 

Our  Author,  in  oppofition,  as  he  feemcth  to  fuppofe, 
to  Mr.  Edwards,  Itrenuouily  pleads  for  interTicd  lib- 
erty ;  by  which  he  evidently  meaneth  a  power  of  felf- 
determination.  (See  Part  III.  .Seft.  II.  and  p.  88.  92. 
97,  98,  99.)  Several  arguments  which  he  hath  made 
ufe  of  in  proof  of  fuch  a  liberty  as  this  in  men,  it  may 
be  proper  to  examine  in  thefe  remarks. 

*i .  The  Ex — r  would  gather  fome  proof  of  that  kind 
of  liberty,  which  he  fuppofeth  to  be  effential  to  the 
morality  of  atlion,  from  the  confideration  of  our  be- 
ing placed  upon  trial,  and  in  a  frate  of  probation. 
(See  p.  99.)  If  he  had  particularly  given  the  ideas 
neceffarily  included  under  the  terms  bei?tg  upon  trials 
it  would- have  been  more  eafily  difcoverable  w^hetber 
there  is  any  weight  in  the  argument  ;  but  as  he  hath 
not,  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  conclufion  is  jnft. 
For  my  own  part,  I  muft  confefs  that  1  know  of  no 
other  idea  conveyed  by  the  expreffion,  than  that  of 
having  J'om^  future  reward^  or  punifhment^  Jiijpended 
upon  our  prejent  condud.  What  the  dijpofiti07i  of  the 
creature  is  refpefting  the  propofed  reward,  if  he  be 
but  an  intelligent,  voluntary  agent,  doth  not,  that  I 
am  fenhble,  come  at  all  under  confideration,  in  deter- 
mining and  fixing  the  idea  of  being  upon  trial.  After 
angels  and  men  had  finned,  it  pleafcd  God  to  make  a 
propofal  of  mercy  to  the  latter  ;  though  he  pafTed  by 
the  former.  This  propofal,  from  the  Deity,  brought 
man  into  a  ftate  of  trial  ;  as  it  again  fufpended  his 
future  felicity,  upon  his  prefent  condud:.  Merely  the 
propofal,  however,  did  not  in  the  leaft  abate  man's 
natural  enmity  againft  God,  and  his  oppofition  to  him  ; 
or  excite  any  difpofition  or  inclination  to  a  compliance 
with  propofals  of  fuch  a  nature^  and  made  upon  fuck 
terms,  s.  To  the  fallen  angels,  no  propofals  of  mercy 
were  ever  made  3    their  itate  being  forever  decided^ 

and 


1/2  An    essay    on  J'artl. 

and  they  fixed  in  a  ftate  of  hopelefs,  remedilefs  ruin, 
by  their  original  fin  and  apoftacy.  Their  future  Hate 
being  abfointely  and  unchangeably  decided  by  what  is 
already  pafTed,  and  what  it  is  impoffible  to  recall,  they 
are  not  upon  trial  ;  it  being  infinitely  impoifible  they 
ihould  ever  do  any  thing  in  the  lead  degree  to  alter 
and  change  the  decifions  already  made  and  eftablifhed, 
rerpe<i^ing  their  eternal  exclufion  from  the  prefence 
and  favour  of  God.  But  if  it  fliould  pleafe  God  now 
to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  peace  With  them,  and  make 
propofals  of  pardon  and  mercy,  upon  terms  with  w^hicli 
nothing  would  prevent  a  compliance,  but  their  proud 
and  haughty  tempers  ;  this  would,  at  once,  put  them 
upon  a  fhate  of  probation  and  trial  ;  and  that,  even 
though  there  was  not  the  leall:  abatement  of  their  op- 
jpofition  and  malice  of  heart  againll:  God.  Such  a 
propofol  to  them  would  be  truly  fufpending  their  fu- 
ture Hate  upon  their  prejent  conduit  ;  which,  as  I 
apprehend,  is  the  principal  thing  intended  and  implied 
in  h^in^  upon  trial.  And  if  this  is  a  proper  definition 
of  a  flate  of  trial,  it  is  eafy  to  fee  that  it  doth  not 
imply  a  power  of  felf-determination.  If  the  idea  of 
a  flate  of  trial  is  nothing  more  than  one  being  in  a  ftate 
of  exiftence  wherein  our  future  happinefs,  or  mifery, 
is  fufpended  upon  our  prefent  exercifes  and  conduct  ; 
then  this  conlideration  aftordeth  not  the  leaft  argument 
in  fupport  of  our  Author's  hypothefis  refpcc^ting  the 
powers  whicii  are  elTential  to  the  rewardablcnef;,  or 
puniihableneis,  of  aftions.  Or  if  it  ihould  be  infiAed 
that  trial  necelfarily  includeth  the  idea  of  fomething 
fitted  and  adapted  to  be  a  proper  means  of  difcovcring 
t\\t  Jelf-denial  of  creatures,  and  making  manifefl  the 
ftrength  of  afFeftion  there  is  in  them  toward  God  ;  IHll 
this  would  make  nothing  in  favour  of  the  power  in 
queftion.  If  the  confideration  of  our  being  upon  trial 
affords  any  pretext  for  fuppofmg  that  mankind  are  in- 
vefled  with  the  powers  in  queftion  ;  it  can  be  only  on 
the  fuppofition  that  fuch  aftions  alone  as  are  felf- 
originated^  and  felf-moved,  and  do  not  arife  from  the 

influence 


Sedl.  VIII.  MORAL    AGENCY.  is^ 

influence  of  any  extrinfic  caufe,  are,  with  pi'opriety 
and  equity,  either  rewardable  or  punifhable. 

But  if  this  is  the  idea  our  Author  dcfigns  to  convey, 
by  reprefeuting  it  as  inconliftent  with  2.  J?  ate  of  trial  to 
fuppofc  that  thofe  atSlions  and  exerciies,  upon  which, 
eitlier  a  reward,  or  a  puniflinient,  is  fufpended,  fhould 
arife  from  any  thing  out  of  the  mind  as  their  caufe  ; 
he  hath  made  no  advances  in  his  argument  ;  it  is  barely 
a  repetition  of  the  old  objection,  under  a  new  form. 

It  is  very  evident  that  nothing  can  be  inferred,  in 
proof  of  the .  neceility  of  the  powers  in  queflion,  in 
order  to  the  commendableneis,  or  criminality,  of 
actions,  merely  from  the  confideration  of  our  bemg 
upon  trial.  If  aftions  niay  be  commendable  or  crim- 
inal in  beings  who  are  not  upon  trial,  then  the  con- 
/ideratio?i  of  our  being  upon  trial  determineth  nothing, 
either  the  one  way  or  the  other,  refpefting  the  powers 
which  are  neceffary  in  order  to  the  praife-worthinefs 
or  criminality  of  actions.- 

There  are  not  niany,  probably,  v/ho  will  exprefsly 
deny  that  the  aftions  and  cxercifes  of  angfels  in  heaven, 
and  of  the  devils  in  hell,  are,  the  one  as  truly  com- 
mendable, and  the  other,  criminal  ;  aS  au}'-  actions  or 
exercifes  that  ever  v/ere  or  will  be  performed  by  m.eu 
in  a  ftate  of  trial.  And  if  a<5lions  may  be  commenda- 
ble and  criminal  in  beings  who  are  not  in  a  ftatc  of 
trial  ;  then,  of  confeqaence,  our  bein'y  iipon^  trial^  af- 
fordeth  no  argrtment  of  the  necefllty  of  our  being  en- 
dowed v/ith  the  pov/ers  in  queftion,  in  order  to  our  bc- 
injT  jiijily  and  equitably  rewardable  or  pujiifhable  for  our 
aClions .  Merely  being  on  trial ^  rendereth  no  other 
power  requifite  to  the  commendabienefs  or  criminality 
of  a&ions  ;  than  are  necclfary  to  the  fame  pur])orc,  in 
beings  who  are  not  upon  trial.  Being  upon  trial, 
U  therefore^ 

*  Dr.  Wliitby  gre.itly  iiififteth,  that  a  power  of  fslf-dctsrinination  is  cfier.tial 
ta  a  Hate  of  trial ;  (Ice  p.  295.  300.  303.  4.08.  &c.)  and  yet  conccdeth  that  th* 
exercifes  of  an-^-ts  aic  praife-vvorthy  and  virtuous  ;  ai.d  of  dcvlh,  viciuus  and 
finful.  But  feeing  that  they  are  neceflaiyi  he  denieih  them  to  be,  the  one  re^ 
•uiard.ihU,  the  other  funij}jabl(.  But  if  the  Dodor  hadconfidere  i  that  tiic  actioni 
of  oLir  Saviom,  while  upon  earth,  were  in  a  proper  fcnfc  rt-uufjALU  i  ^hc  Wvuld 
probably  liavs  faen  the  inconclufivenefi  of  his  own  argument. 


354  An    E,S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  f . 

therefor,e,  arguetli  no  enlargement  of  powers',  beyond 
what  beings  are  endowed  with,  M-ho  are  not  upon 
trial.  And  if  the  adions  of  thofe  who  are  fo  confirm- 
ed in  a  ftate,  either  of  holinefs  and  happinefs,  or  of  fm 
and  mifery,  as  implieth  a  moral  inability  and  impoffi- 
bility  of  change  ;  are  neverthelefs,  the  one  com.m.end- 
able,  and  the  other,  criminal  ;  the  confequence  is 
obvious  that  fuch  an  inability  doth  not  deitroy,  or 
take  away,  the  moral  quality  of  actions  ;  or  hinder 
but  that,  this  notwithllanding,  they  may  be  either 
virtuous  or  vicious,  and  have  proper  defert  of  reward 
or  punifhmcnt. 

2.  Another  argument  advanced  by  our  Author,  in 
proof  of  fuch  a  power  of  action  in  man  as  implieth 
lelf-determination,  is  drawn  from  the  coniideration  of 
the  ufe  of  the-  means  of  grace  with  the  unregenerate, 
and  the  offer  made  to  thofe  of  that  character,  in  the 
gofpel.  (See  part  III.  fee.  II.)  He  faysj  p.  iii.  that 
"  jVIeans  are  ufed  with  unregenerate  linners  :"  and  on 
the  next  page,  that  ''  to  fpeak  of  m^eans,  and  deny 
cheir  conducivenefs  to  the  end,  is  an  affront  to  com- 
mon fenfe." — That  it  would  be  impeaching  fupreme 
wifdom  and  goodnefs,  tt)  fay  that  they  "  are  not  cal- 
culated in  the  be/l  manner  to  lead  Jhiners  unto  repejzt- 
ance.'"  And  he  aiferteth,  p.  144'.  that  to  fay,  "  the 
''  unreirenerate  have  not  vz  moral  power  to  ufe  the 
*'  means  Ox  grace,  is  the  fame  abfurdity  as  to  fay,  the 
**  means' have  no  tendency  to  the  end.'*  The  Ex — r's 
ai'gument,  if  I  rightly  apprehend  him,  is  t^  this  effed-, 
viz.  That  God  treateth  with  unregenerate  fmners  as 
moral  agents,  capable  of  being  influenced  by  moral 
motives — by  reafon  ;— that  he  offereth  pardon  and 
mercy  to- them  upon  condition  of  repentance — that  he 
inllrudts  them  fufficiently  into  the  nature  of  true  re- 
pentance— 'and  by  the  ftrongeft  and  moft  perfuafivc 
reafons  and  motives,  urgeth  and  preffeth  the  duty  upon 
unregenerate  linners  :  therefore  unregenerate  fmners 
are  not  under  that  moral  mability  which  excludeth  that 
liberty  and  freedom  which  imply  a  power  of  felf-de- 

terminatioii 


Sea.  VIII.  MORAL   AGENCY.  155 

fermination.  This  argument  of  our  Author's,  I  think, 
by  no  means  concludeth  in  favour  of  a  power  of  felf- 
iletermination.      For, 

1.  That  very  conducivenefs  which  he  fuppofeth 
there  is,  in  the  Fiieans  of  grace,  to  bring  hnncrs  to  re- 
pentance ;  is  in  dired  oppofition  to  the  power  in 
queftion.  Means  are  outward^  external thiw^s,^  defign- 
jed  and  fitted  to  bias  and  influence  the  mind  ;  and, 
upon  our  Author's  principles,  "  calculated  in  the  bed 
manner^' — not  to  unfetter  and  unftiackle  the  mind  from 
%\\c  power  and  influence  of  external  caufcs,  but  to 
bring  it  under  their  infiuejice  ;  in  order  tiiat  its  choice 
plight  be  by  that  influence,  directed  to  one  certain  jmr^ 
ticiUar  object  in  dilHnflion  from  all  others.  And  this, 
according  to  our  Author,  is  not  only  the  defign  and 
tendency  of  the  means  themfelves,  but  alfo  ef  ail  thofe 
divine  aids  and  airillances  vouchfafed  to  fmners  in  the 
life  of  them.  Now  that  there  mufi:  be  fuch  a  variety 
of  means  ufed  with  fmners,  in  order  to  bring  them  tt) 
repentance  ;  and  thefc  calculated,  adjufled  and  adapt"- 
ed,  hy  fuprenie  wifdom^  to  this  very  purpofe  ;  yea,  and 
more  than  all  this,  tlie  aids  of  divine  grace  it/elf  ac- 
companying thciTi  ;  and,  after  all,  thefe,  many  times, 
proving  inetfeclual :  furely  are  confiderations  which  are 
far  from  arguing  any  thing  in  favour  of  fuch  an  inter- 
nal liberty,  as  implieth  a  power  of  felf-determination  ; 
but  rather  prove  the  mind  to  be  under  fome  flrong, 
powerful  and  prevailing  influence  in  oppofition  to  the 
liberty  and  power  in  queftion. 

2.  Our  Author  conlidereth  it  as  an  abfurd  thing,  to 
fay  that  the  means  of  grace  have  no  tendency  to  bring 
men  unto  repentance.  He  thinks  that  the  queftion 
concerning  the  tendency  of  DLCans,  with  the  unregene- 
rate,  to  the  end,  is  fo  obvious  and  plain,  that  the  very 
propofmg  of  it  is  enough.  (Seep.  112.)  And  he  fpeaks 
of  thefe  means  as  being,  through  the  divine  concur- 
rence with  them,  efficacious.  How  this  confideration 
can  be  an  argument  in  favour  of  a  power  o^  (elf-deter- 
jnination^  I  can  by  no  means  comprehend.     For  what- 

U  2  ever 


156  A  N    E  S  S  A  Y    0  N  Part  I, 

ever  choice  of  mind,  or  aft  of  will,  taketh  place  under 
the  influence  of  external  caiijes^  is  fo  far  from  being 
felf-detennined^  that  it  is  determined  by  fomething 
wholly  and  entirely  out  of  itfelf.  As  far  as  the  means 
of  grace^  together  with  the  divine  aids  which  accom- 
pany them,  have  a  tendency  to  bring  fmners  to  repen-r 
tance  ;  fo  far  they  have  a  tendency  to  produce  fuch  an 
effe£l  in,  or  upon,  the  mind  ofafinner.  And  as  far 
as  thefe  means,  with  the  divine  aids  accompanying 
them,  have  a  tendency  in  them  to  produce  fuch  eft'efts 
in  the  fmner's  mind  ;  fo  far  this  effeft,  in  the  mind  of 
e  finner,  arifeth  from  the  influence  of  thefe  means  and 
the  divine  aids.  But  thefe  means  and  aids  being  extcr- 
nal  things  (I  mean  extrinfic  of  the  mind  itfelf)  as  far 
as  the  afts  and  exerciles  of  tlie  mind  are  under  their 
influence  5  fo  far  the  afts  of  the  mind  are  determined 
by  fomething  from  without  ;  and,  therefore,  not /elf" 
4et€rmined  ;  and  fo,  in  our  Author's  fenfe,  not  free.  • 
Not  only  is  this  argument  impertinent  to  the  Au- 
thor's purpoie  ;  but  it  is  inconfiilent  with  itfelf,  and 
with  other  things  frequently  allowed  in  his  book. 

1 .  The  E>:— r  often  concedes  that  mankind  are  in  a 
fallen  and  depraved  ftate.  He  fays,  (p.  61,  62.) 
Admitting  that  fuch  a  ftate  of  the  will  may  be  re^ 
quired  as  is  forever  i)npoffible  ;  this  can  be  only  on 
a  fuppofition  of  a  power  once  given  and  pofTefied, 
but  loft.*'     And   (p.  105.)      "  However  great  that 


cc 

«( 

*'  impotency  is  v/hich  is  derived  from  Adam,  there  is  a 
"  manifeft  difference  bstwxcn  a  moral  inability^  or  ne- 

<c 
cc 


ceility,  derived  from  the  fall  of  man,  and  alike  kind 
of  inability  or  nccelfity,  original  to  the  human  race.'' 
And  farther,  "  While  we  acknowledge  the  fallen  ft  ate 
''  of  our  nature^  and  the  impotency  derived  from  the 
*^  fall,  the  proper  queftion,  on  the  gofpel  plan,  is,  whc- 
*'  ther  falvation  is  offered  to  finncrs  on  practicable 
"  terms.-'  And,  p.  108.  he  fpeaks  of  means  which 
are  ufed  with  fmners  as  h^m^jTLjJicient . 

2.   Our  Author  is  careful  to  let  his  readers  know, 
tl^at  though  he  pleads  for  a  power  in  the  unregenerate 

to 


Sc^.  VIII.  MORAL    AGENCY.  157 

to  embrace  gofpel  offers,  he  doth  not  mean  exclufive 
of  the  bleifing  and  grace  of  God.  He  faith  (p.  loy.)' 
"  The  prefent  queftion  is  not,  whether  fallen  man  hatji 
*'  a  power,  independently  of  the  aids  of  grace^  to  accept 
"  the  gofpel  propofal.''  So  (p.  114.)  "  We  repeat 
*'  it,  to  prev^cnt  miftakcs,  that  when  we  fpeak  of  tb.e 
^'  ability  of  unregeneratc  men,  to  life  the  means  of 
*'  grace,  we  mean  not  indepeitdcnt  pozuer  in  themfelves  : 
*^'  (this  the  regenerate  have  not.") 

"I'o  allow  any  impotency  in  human  nature— any  mo- 
ral inability  derived  from  the  fall  of  Adam — is  not 
confiftcnt  with  that  internal  liberty,  that  power  of  felf- 
motion,  felf-determination,  which,  in  our  Author's 
view,  is  cfTential  to  the  morality  of  adllon.  The 
terms,  impotency^  moral  inability^  <fec.  when  applied  to 
men,  if  they  have  any  meaning  in  them,  mult  intend 
fome  weaknefs  and  imbecility  of  mind,  fome  unaptnefs 
to  its  proper  afts  and  exercifes  ;  together  v/ith  fome 
kind  of  pronenels  and  bias — fome  preponderating  ten- 
dency, in  the  ftate  and  circumftances  of  things,  either 
interna),  or  external,  or  both— to  that  fin  and  wi^ked- 
nefs  which  muft  finally  ifTue  in  our  eternal  ruin.  The 
terms  muil  certainly  denote  a  weaknefs,  corruption 
and  depravity  of  mind,  which  render  the  finncr's  reco- 
very lefs  likely,  and  more  difiicult  ;  and  wliich,  like- 
wife,  make  more  and  greater  means,  and  more  power- 
ful aids  of  divine  grace,  nccelTary  to  elfecT;  the  filvation 
of  the  fmner,  and  prevent  his  final  and  everlafting  def- 
truftion.  All  fuch  kind  o?  inability  and  impotency^  as 
far  as  they  prevail,  are  utterly  inconfiftent  with  that 
internal  liberty — that  power  of  felf-motion,  fclf-deter- 
mination — which,  in  the  fenfe  of  the  Ex — r,  is  cfrential 
to  the  morality  of  at^tion. 

To  aflert  tiiat  falvation  is  offered  to  finners  on  prac^ 
ticable  terms  (in  the  fenfe  wherein  our  Author  evident- 
ly ufeth  the  word)  and  that  fuch  means  are  ufed  with 
finners  as  are  fufficient  for  this  purpcfe,  is  inconfiifent 
with  all  ideas  of  any  impotency  and  inability  derived 
to  us  by  (.he  fall  of  Adam.     For  it  is  aiTerted  (p.  81.) 

that 


158  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ok  Part  I. 

that  notwithrtanding  all  Mr.  Edwards  hath  faid  to  the 
contrary,  natural  and  moral  power  are  the  Tame.  He 
furthermore  tells  us  (part  III.  left.  II.)  that  there  are 
means  inftituted  for  the  recovery  of  finneis,  which 
have  a  condiicivenefs  and  tc7idency  to  that  end  ;  and 
which  are  calculated  in  the  bejl  maruier^  by  supreme 
"WISDOM,  to  lend fmners  unto  repentance  :■. — that  divine 
aids  are  voiichfafcd  to  render  thefe  means  effeftual  ; 
and  that  finners  have  a  moral  poiaer  to  ufe  the  meaus 
of  grace. 

What  fort  of  an  inability  and  impotency,  v/ith  ref^ 
pe6t  to  doing  that  duty  and  complying  with  thofe 
terms,  which  are  the  condition  upon  which  eternal  life 
is  to  be"  bellowed,  Mrj/ can  be  under,  who  have  Juc/i 
excellent  means  for  attaining  it  ;  divine  aids  and  ^race 
afforded  and  vouchfafed  for  making  thefe  means  effec- 
tual ;  a  moral  power  to  ufe  thefe  means,  in  themlelves 
fo  conducive  to  the  end  ;  and,  finally,  nothing  requir- 
ed but  what  is  pratlicable — both  morally  and  naturally 
fo  :  I  fay,  what  fort  of  inability  or  impotency  mar^kind 
can  be  under,  in  refped:  of  an  end  fo  every  way  at-^ 
tainable  ;  and  duty  {o^  in  every  fenfe,  prafticable  ;  is, 
to  me,  quite  inconceivable. 

There  is  much  rcafon  to  think  that  our  Author  en- 
tirely excludeth  the  ideas  of  criminality  and  fmfulnefs, 
from  that  impotency  and  inability  which  he  luppofeth 
are  derived  to  mankind,  from  the  fall  of  Adam.  For 
the  power,  it  feems,  which,  the  unregenerate  have  to 
ufe  the  means  of  grdce,  is  as  plenary  and  extcnfive  as 
is  coniifLdnt  with  a  flate  of  dependence  on  God.  To 
this  purpofe  our  Author  tells  us  (p.  114-)  and  that 
M^ith  much  care  and  caution,  left  it  fliould  be  imagined 
that  he  denied  the  dependence  of  ujircgenerate  finners 
on  God,  "  "VVe  repeat  it,  to  prevent  miftakes,  that 
*'  when  we  fpeak  of  the  ability  of  unregenerate  men 
**  to  ufe  the  means  of  grace,  we  n)ean  not  independent 
**  power  in  themfelves  :  this  the  regenerate  have  not.'' 
But  notwithftanding  his  care  to  prevent  miftakes  ref- 
pefting  the   dependence    of   unregenerate   fmners   on 

God  ; 


Sc<rt.  Vllr.  MORAL  AGENCY.  15*9 

God  ;  his  readers  will,  perhaps,  not  miftake  his  real 
Jentiment^  if  they  fliould  imagine  that  he  fuppofetli 
u}ir(^  opener  ate  fmners  have  as  full  a  power,  to  all  intents 
and  piirpofcs,  to  do  every  thing  that  is  really  required 
of  them,  in  their,  prefent  iveak  Itate,  as  the  regenerate 
have  ;  or,  even  the  Angels  of  God  in  heaven.  For 
our  Author  exprefsly  denieth  (p.  116.)  *' that  any 
*'  are  commanded,  invited,  exhorted,  Sec.  to  exert 
*'  powers  and  faculties  they  are  not  pofleffed  of — to 
"  act  from  principles  they  are  not  endowed  with." 
And  faith,  that  it  '^  cannot  be  propofed  that  the  un- 
"  regenerate  Ihould  a<ft  from  the  higheft  fpiritual 
*'  principles/'  Here  our  Author  hath  fufficiently 
hinted  his  opinion,  that  there  is  no  impotency  or  ina-* 
'hility  in  human  nature  to  any  thing  which,  in  our  pre- 
fent flate,  is  required  of  us  ;  no  weaknefs  or  inability 
that  is  criminal  and  vicious  in  the  fight  of  God. 

Thus  our  Author  allow^eth  an  hnpotcicy  -SiW^  inability 
derived  from  Adam  ;  and  yet  infills  that  nothing  can 
juftly  be  required  of  mankind,  but  what  they  have  a 
mnral^  as  v/cll  as  natural^  power  to  perform  ;  and  that 
they  cannot  be  "  commanded — to  aft  from  principles 
rhey  are  not  endowed  v/ith."  He  fpeaks  of  means 
being  ufed  with  fnmers,  to  bring  them  to  repentance  ^ 
and  yet  giveth  fuch  a  view  of  their  powers  and  char- 
after,  and  of  the  requifitions  which  alone  can  juftly  be 
made  upon  them,  as  precludeth  all  neceffity  of  repent- 
ance, and  Icaveth  nothing  for  which  any  one  can 
properly  be  called  to  repent.  For  jiatural  inability  is, 
on  all  hands,  allowed  to  preclude  blame  :  and  yet, 
after  allowing  the  fallen  flate  of  human  nature,  anfd 
the  impotency  of  mankind,  he  infifteth,  that  "  if  the 
"  incapacity  be  real^  it  is  no  matter  under  what  namef 
"  it  goes  : — that  the  diftinftion  between  ?iatiiral  and 
''^  moral  is  nothing  to  the  purpofe.''  (p.  iiy.)  He 
admits,  "  that  fuch  a  ftate  of  the  will  may  be  requir- 
ed as  is  forever  impoffible.''  (p.  61,  62.)  Yet  inhft" 
eth,  that  mankind  cannot  be  required  *''  to  aft  from 
principles  they  are  not  eijdowed  with  j"  (fee  p.  116.) 

and, 


i6o  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Parti. 

and,  on  the  preceding  page,  challengeth  any  one  to 
{hew,  that,  upon  any  other  luppoiition,  the  gofpel  can 
be  a  privilege,  or  men  liable  to  a  greater  damnation 
for  abuiing  it. 

Our  Author  urgeth  the  conducivenefs  of  the  means  of 
grace  to  bring  fmners  to  repentance  ;  and,  that  the 
means  which  God  ufeth  with  linners  for  this  purpole^ 
'a.YQ  fhflcient :  yet  infills  (p.  109.)  that  the  application 
of  invitations  and  commands  is  cbnfilfent  with  a  free-^ 
clom  to  either  fide.  And  notwithftanding  the  variety 
of  his  pleac,  for  the  JiijficiGncy  of  means,  with  fallen^ 
depraved^  impotent  creatures  ;  it  is,  after  all,  to  be 
remembered,  that  whatever  action  taketh  place  under 
the  influence,  either  of  any  external  eaufe,  or  internal, 
preponderating  bias  of  mind,  is  not,  yea,  cannot  be 
free^  with  that  kind  of  liberty  which  is  efiential  to  the 
morality  of  action  t — whatever  aftion  is  not  [elf-deter- 
m'med^  felf-moved^  cannot,  with  the  lead  fhev/  of  rea- 
fon,  be  the  objeft,  either  of  difefteem  or  approbatiouo 
He  is,  likewife,  very  full  in  acknowledging  the  influ- 
ence of  divine  grace,  in  making  the  outward  means 
effectual  ;  and  yet  fuppofeth  that  fuch  a  liberty  as  ex- 
cludeth  all  infiiiencc  from  without,  is  elTentiai  to  tlie 
very  idea  of  defert  of  praife  or  blame. 

Thus  doth  it  appear  that  our  Author  ufeth  tlie  terms 
impotency^  moral  inability  ^fallen  pate  of  our  nature^  &c. 
as  mere  words  of  courfe  '  it  is  phrafeology  which  he 
adopts  in  compliance  with  cuflom,  and  the  prejudices 
which  a  narrow  education  hath,  fomehow,  ftrangcly 
riveted  on  the  minds  of  men.  However  frightful 
may  be  the  naimes,  fallen  ft  ate  ^  moral  innhil'ity^  depra- 
vity^ &c.  yet  our  Author  meaneth  no  other  than 
harmlefs  and  innocent  things.  Nothing  can  be  more 
unmeaning  and  infignificant  than  fuch-like  piu'afes  as 
thefe,  when  applied  to  men- — to  moral  chara(fters — on 
fuppofition  that  men  can  be  called  to  aCl  on  no  other 
principles  than  Jiich  as  tliey  have — to  exercife  no  other 
dijpofitions  than  fuch  as  they  are  endowed  with  ;  and, 
that  the  freedom  and  liberty  which  we  are  endowed 

v/iih 


Sea.Vllt.  MORAL  AdENCY.  161 

with,  by  nature,  excludeth  the  concurrence  and  oper- 
ation of  all  extrinfic  influence,  in  the  taking  place  of 
volition.  Our  Author  efpecially  and  particularly  de- 
nicth  tlie  dillin<^tibn  between  natural  and  7)ioral  ina- 
bility (p.  80,  81.)  and  hath  wrote  a  book  to  prove, 
in  oppoiition  to  the  dark  fuggeftions  of  men  of  gloomy 
apprehenfions,  that  mankind  are  now  endowed  with  a 
liberty  and  freedom  with  Which  no  fuch  impotency  and 
inability  can  conlift.  And  yet,  in  conformity  to  the! 
prevailing  prejudices^  he  himfelf  hath  adopted  thofe 
harfli  and  uncouth  epithets^  with  v/hich.  four ^  unmannerly 
bigots  have  lb  often  reproached  human  nature,  and 
branded  mankind.  It  might  have  been  prefumed, 
that  a  writer  who  cultivatetli  fuch  freedom  of  thought^ 
would  not  have^condefcendcd  fo  far  to  the  weaknefs 
and  prejudices  of  men. 

It  is  an  objecftion  which  hath  been  often  made  by 
Calviniflic  divines,  againft  the  doftrine  of  a  power  of 
Jelf-difterminatinn  in  the  will,  that  fuch  a  pawer  ill 
mankind  would  be  inconfiifent  with  the  extenfive  pro- 
vidence of  God,  and  that  abfolute,  unlimited  govern- 
ment which  he  excrcifeth  over  hia  creatures  ;  as  he 
would  hereby  become  liable  to  have  his  "  fchemcs 
thwarted,  and  his  will  refilled,"  by  his  creatures.  In 
anfwer  to  this  objeftion,  our  Author  quotes  Jackfoii 
againil  Coiiins,  (fee  p.  78.  marg.)  as  faying,  that' 
*'  The  fuperintendency  arid  government  of  God  are  of 
^'  the  moral  kind,  like  that  of  a  rational  rrionarch  over 
^*  jhis  fubjefts,  who  gives  them  laws,  enjoining  obedi- 
*•'  ence  to  them,  and  eflablifhing  them  with  rewards 
"  and  puniflnnents.*'  And  then  fays,  "  It  is  the  will 
^'  ofGod^  tliat  we  fiiould  a<ft  freely^  and  have  it  in  our 
''  power  to  do^  or  not  to  do^  liis  commandments.''  It 
may  by  fome,  perhapr.,  be  thought  ilrange,  that  a  Gen- 
tleman who  exclaim:-,  fo  loudly  againil  the  lentimenta 
and  principles  of  Mr.  Edwards,  as  involving  in  them 
the  opinion  that  fin  is  agreeable  to  the  divine  ivill^  fliould 
yet  makey//67/  a  reply  to  the  objedtion  under  confidera- 
tion.     If  it  is  agreeable  to  the  ivill  of  Cod^    that   ivc 

V  fliould 


1 62  An    essay    on  Part  L 

(Jioiild  have  it  in  our  power  to  do^  or  not  to  do^  his  com- 
mandmerds^  and  that  ive  ffiould  aCt  freely  ;  that  is,  that 
we  fhould  ufe  the  power  we  have  to  do  or  not  to  do 
his  commandments  as  we  pleaje  ;  it  appeareth  to  me 
au  indubitable  consequence,  that  the  ichemes  of  divine 
government  are  not  thwarted,  nor  his  will  /;/  a'tiy  Jehje 
relifled,  by  his  creatures,  when  they  uie  this  power  of 
theirs,  either  m  dijobeyinir^,  or  in  obeyin^^  his  command- 
ments. If  it  is  God's  will  that  we  fhould  have  a  power 
to  do  or  not  to  do,  and  that  we  fliould  ufe  this  power 
freely,  i.e.  indulge  the  liberty  ive  have  to  either  fide  ; 
it  is  a  fure  cafe,  tiiat  the  will  of  God  is  never  refifed 
by  our  exercifing  and  indulging  this  liberty  and  free- 
dom, whether  it  be  in  choofing  obedience  or  difbedience. 

Is  there  any  thing  in  the  fentiments  of  Mr.  Edwards^ 
that  upon  the  whole  it  was  agreeable  to  the  divine  mind 
and  w*ill,  for  wife  and  excellent  ends  to  be  by  that 
means  accompiifhed,  that,  fuch  an  event  as  fin  fliould 
take  place  in  his  fyftem  and  under  his  government  I  Is 
there  any  thing  in  the  doctrines  and  opinion  of  Mr. 
Edwards  upon  this  point,  that  hath  greater  appearance 
of  calling  reproach  upon  the  moral  character  of  God, 
or  a  more  dire<!l  tendency  to  lefTen  our  apprehenfiois^ 
of  the  divine  purity,  and  of  the  infinite  hatred  of  the 
Deity  to  fin,  than  is  here  advanced  and  very  fully  ex- 
prelled  I 

The  truth,  doubtlefs,  is,  that  the  fchemes  and  pur* 
poles  of  the  moral  government  of  God  are  not,  in  fact, 
thwarted  by  any  thing  that  ever  did,  or  ever  will,  take 
place  in  the  fyftem  ;  nor  his  will  in  this  fenfe  refifted. 
And  therefore  there  is  no  ground  for  fuch  an  objection 
as  this,  arifing  on  any  hand  from  the  confideration  of 
the  infinite  hatred  of  the  Deity  to  fin,  and  his  mofl 
flrid:  prohibition  of  it.  And  yet  when  we  coniider 
how  much  all  events  in  the  moral  world  depend  on 
the  volitions  of  rational,  intelligent  agents  ;  it  is  quite 
inconceivable  that  there  fliould  be  any  certainty  of  the 
accomplifhment  of  any  wife,  determinate  ends  of  moral 
government,  if  creatures  were  endowed  with  the  pow- 
ers 


Sea.  VIII.  MORAL   AGENCY.  163 

ers  infifted  on  by  our  Author  as  iiecefTary  to  moral 
adion. 

Upon  the  whole,  the  do<flrins  of  the  conflfijency  of 
the  moral  inability  of  mankind,  with  their  obligations 
to  obedience,  I  am  humbly  of  opinion,  ftandeth  upon 
a  firm  balls,  with  whatever  ingenuity  and  appearance 
of  reafon  our  Author  hath  managed  his  argument 
againlt  it  ;  and  that,  even  by  his  own  frequent  con- 
cellions  and  acknowledgment.  'I'he  expreffions  wliich 
he  fo  frequently  ufeth,  of,  the  fallen  ft  ate  of  our  nature^ 
the  inability  brought  upon  us  by  the  fall^  the  impoieucy 
derived  from  the  fall^  Sec,  if  they  have  any  meaning, 
and  are  not  mere  words  of  courfe  and  perfectly  infig- 
nificant,  do  certainly  imply  fome  fnch  prevailing  ten- 
dency in  the  ftate  of  things,  either  internal  or  external, 
to  certain^  determinate  actions  and  exerciies  of  the 
mind,  as  is  utterly  inconfiftent  with  that  power  of 
felf-motion,  felf-determination,  which  excludeth  the 
influeoce  and  concurrence  of  all  extrinflc  caufe.  If  it 
is  conceded,  that  the  adings  and  exercifes  of  the  minds 
of  men  may  be  of  a  moral  nature.^  confiftently  with 
their  arifing  \n  fome  degree  from  fome  preponderating 
bias  and  inHuence,  extrinlic  of  the  exercifes  and  deter- 
minations themfelves  ;  men  will,  probably,  find  no 
diificulty  in  their  m.ind,  in  allowing  fuch  an  ahfolute 
previous  certainty  of  all  events,  as  entirely  excludeth 
ell  ideas  of  felf-origination  of  volition.  Nor  can  our 
Author,  any  farther,  confidently,  urge  the  importance 
and  neceffity  of  fuch  a  power  ;  until  he  is  more  entire- 
ly liberated  from  the  common,  prevailing  prejudices 
of  mankind,  rcfpecSting  the  depravity  and  impotency  of 
human  nature  in  its  prefent  frate. 

I  am  therefore  humbly  of  opinion,  that,  although  the 
Ex — ^r  hath  Ihown  that/o;7z<?  things  which  Mr.  Edwards 
hath  faid  refpefting  the  influence  of  motives  upon  the 
minds  of  meUy  arc  not  altogether  jufl  and  correcft  ;  yet 
he,  himfelf,  hath  left  the  fubjed  not  lefs  in  the  dark 
than  he  found  it  :  and  therefore,  even  in  this  refpeft, 
hath  no  farther  ferved  the  caufe  of  truth,  than  to  dif- 

V  2  cover 


164  An  .E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  |. 

cover  fome  incorreClnefs  in  a  -writer  ofjiich  character  and 
eminence^  as  made  every  of  his  errors^  injome  fenfe^  per 
culiarly  dangermis  :  but  even  this  incorreftnefs,  how- 
ever real,  doth  not  appear  to  affe<!l:  his  general  argu- 
ment, or  endanger  it.  But  our  Author  hath  done 
nothing  to  the  purpofe,  tovi^ards  anfwering  the  argu- 
mepts  made  ufe  of  by  Mr.  Edwards,  in  confutation  of 
the  doftrine  of  a  power  of  felf-determinatipn  in  man  5 
or,  refolving  the  difficulties  with  which  he  hath  fliown 
that  the  opinion  itfelf  is  moll:  evidently  embarralied. 
No  where  hath  he  fhown  that  the  arguments  made  ufe 
of,  by  that  mafterly  writer,  are  fophiiUcal  and  evafive  ; 
or,  that  he  fhifteth  and  changeth,  and  appeareth  back- 
ward to  face  the  ftrongeft  objeftions  which  are  made 
againft  the  opinions  and  fentiments  which  he  endea- 
vours to  vindicate  and  fupport.  Nothing  hatli  our 
Author  faid  to  invalidate  the  arguments  by  which  Mr, 
Edwards  provetii  an  eftabliflied  connexion  in  things, 
and  an  infallible  antecedent  certainty  of  all  events  ; 
or,  to  fhew  their  weaknels  and  infufficiency  for  the 
fupport  of  a  doctrine  of  fo  much  importance  :  nor  yet 
doth  it  appear,  I  am  humbly  of  opinion,  that  he  hath 
ilarted  and  urged  any  objedlions  againft  the  fchemxC  of 
dodirine  advanced  by  that  excellent  divine,  but  fuch 
as  were  fufficiently  conhdered,  obviated  and  refuted, 
in  the  very  book  upon  which  he  is  animadverting.  I 
fay,  fu^ciently  ;  becaufe  our  Author  hath  no  where 
fhown  that  his  anfwers  to  objedlions,  and  folution  of 
difficulties,  is  not  juft  and  decifive.  The  fum  of  the 
Ex- — r's  objeftions  againft  an  infallible  previous  cer-r 
tainty  of  all  events  which  ever  take  place,  in  the  whole 
fyftem,  as  well  moral  as  natural.,  is,  as  I  have  before 
©bferved,  that  fuch  a  docTirine  reproacheth  the  moral 
charafter  of  God,  and  fuppofetli  him  to  be  the  author 
cf  fm  ;  which  is  inconllftent  with  all  our  ideas  of  him 
as  the  juft  judge  and  moral  governor  of  the  world  ; 
and,  therefore,  that  it  is  a  doftrine  neceflarily  leffening 
our  apprehenfions  of  the  purity  and  holinefs  of  the  dir- 
vine  nature,  and,  indeed,  quite  abolifl:iijig  a^id  throw- 
ing 


Seft.  VIII.  MORAL    AGENCY.  165 

ing  down  all  diftin£lion  between  moral  good  and  evil, 
virtue  and  vice. 

The  confideration  of  this  great  and  popular  objecflion 
fliall  be  my  next  bufinefs,  and  tlie  fubje<ft  of  the  enfu- 
ing  part  of  this  Elfay.  I  will  now,  therefore,  relieve 
the  patience  of  the  reader,  after  only  requefting  his 
candour  in  his  attention  to  what  I  may  oiFer  on  this 
important  fubjedt. 


^••■0~0''|V>>0-<>'"-<>'"'0""©""<»-"©""*>"-<>"-0.'"«m.«-»-.^...i<>M..«|>....»-..t>...0""«>i."<>..^>.-.0....<>,^ 


f  ^KT 


f64  An    essay    oh  Part  II, 


PART   II. 

TVherein  the  divine  agency  and  dijpofal^  refpeding  the 
taking  place  of  moral  evil  in  the  Jyjlem^  are  humbly  and 
carefully  inquired  into ^  and  particularly  confidered, 

THAT  the  Divine  Being  {liould  exert  any  pofi- 
tive  agency  and  influence  in  fuch  a  difpoial  of 
things  in  his  iyftem,  as  he  certainly  knew  would  be  in- 
fallibly attended  with  the  confequence  of  the  taking 
place  Q^  moral  evil^  hath  been  thought,  by  many,  an 
opinion  too  bold  and  daring  to  be  admitted  ;  involving 
in  if  the  moft  bafe  and  unworthy  apprehenfions  of  God, 
and  being  moft  reproachful  to  the  v/ifdom  and  purity 
of  his  laws  and  government.  Accordingly  we  find, 
that  the  great  objection  which  is  frequently  made  a- 
gainft  the  calviniflic  fcheme  of  doctrine,  viz.  that  it 
fuppofeth  God  to  be  the  author  of  fin,  hath  appeared 
fo  formidable,  that  writers,  in  general,  have  evaded  a 
direft  anfwer  to  it  5  and  endeavoured  to  faften  the 
fame  upon  their  adverfaries. 

And,  indeed,  that  God  fliould  be,  in  any  degree,  the 
Author  of  fin,  in  that  fenfe  in  which  the  term  author 
is  very  frequently  ufed,  is  a  fuppoiition  full  of  abfur- 
dity  and  bhifphemy  ;  and  incapable  of  being,  one  mo- 
ment, admitted.  The  term  author  very  frequently 
conveys  the  idea  o{ doings  performing-^  or  atting.  When 
%ve  fpeak  of  a  man  as  the  author  of  any  adlion,  or  faft, 
we  ufually  mean  the  fame,  as  ador  or  doer  of  it.  When 
we  {peak  of  any  perfon  as  being  the  author  of  a  piece 
of  wickednefs,  we  mean  the  fame  as  aCior  or  perpetrar 
tor  of  it.  .  When  fuch  an  idea  as  this  is  comprehended 
under  the  term  author^  there  is  fomething  fo  harlh  and 
grating — fomething  fo  abhorrent  from  all  our  natural 

notions 


Partil.  MORAL   AGENCY.  267 

notions  of  God,  and  of  the  equity  and  excellency  of 
his  moral  government,  in  the  opinion  that  he  is  the 
author  of  fin — that  it  may  reafonably  be  expefted  it 
will  immediately  difguft,  and  appear  fliocking  to  the 
natnr'il  realon  and  common  underllandings  of  men. 

If  the  doctrine  of  an  antecedent  certainty  of  all 
events,  and  a  fixed^  efiabli(hed  connexion  of  caufe  and 
efFe<fl,  as  well  in  the  moral  as  in  the  natural  world,  in 
this  fenfe  maketh  God  the  author  of  lin — if  it  is  a  doc- 
trine containing  in  it  To  blafphemoua  a  confequence, 
and  reflefting  flich  infinite  contempt  and  reproach  upon 
the  moral  character  of  the  righteous  and  glorious  Gov- 
ernor of  the  v/orld — it  ought  to  be  rejeded  with  the 
utmofl  abhorrence  ;  and  doubtlefs  ivill  be^  by  all  fuch 
as  have  any  regard  for  the  honour  of  God.  In  me,  I 
am  fare,  it  fiiall  not  find  an  advocate,  whenever  it  is 
made  manifefi;  that  it  canieth  in  it  fuch  an  implication. 

But  the  queflion  I  would  propofe  to  an  humble  and 
careful  inquiry,  is,  ff^hether  God  hath  tiot  J'o  difpojcd 
and  arranged  thiu^s^  in  his  fyfte^n^  by  his  own  pofttivs 
influence  and  agency:^  as^  in  effcCi^  in  fired  and  77iade  cer^ 
tain  the  exijQence  and  taking  place  of  fin  f — 'fVhether  he 
hath  not  put  forth  fuch  exertions  of  his  own  almighty 
and  refifllefs  power^  as  he  certainly  knew  would^  either 
mediately  or  ir,imediately^  iffue  injuch  an  event  f — Tea^ 
whether  the  infinitely  wife  and  holy  God  hath  not  exerted 
his  own  divine^ '  omnipotent  power ^  iji  fiich  a  way  and 
manner  as  he  adually  designed  and  purpose  Djhould 
be  followed  by  the  exificnce  and  entrance  of  moral  evil 
into  his  fy fern  f  *  To. 

*  The  whole  of  this  queftion  may  be  comprehended  in  the  inquiry,  IFkLtbef 
God  h.ith  not  DECREED,  cr  willed,  that  moral  e-vil  lliall  take  place  ?  We  know 
not  what  agency  there  is  of  the  Deity,  belides  the  exercijei  of  his  ivili  ;  nor,  what 
foiL-er  he  puts  forth,  more  than  iviUlng.  So  that,  on  the  whole,  the  only  inquiry 
is.  Whether,  all  things  being  taken  into  coiifiJeration,  it  were  not  the  w///  and 
furpcfe  of  Cod,  that  moral  evil  Ihould  exift  ?  Though  many  feem  to  think  it  an 
opinion  which  retiedeth  upon  the  moral  charadler  of  God,  to  imagine  any  ;)i5/fr/Ve 
furpcfe  and  difpcfal  in  the  Deity,  in  favour  of  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil  ;  yet  it 
is  au  opinion  molt  evidently  included  in  many  things  plainly  held  and  conceded 
to,  by  divines  of  almoll  every  denomination.  Thus  Dr.  'i'aylor  himfelf,  who 
frequently  objcdeth  againfl  tjie  calvinijiic  Ichenie  of  dodrine,  that  it  maketh 
God  the  author  of  fin  ;  (fee  his  Scrip.  Dnct.  edit.  II.  &c.  p.  no.  1^7.  146.  184. 
190.  hz.)  yet  tells  us,  that  fatan's  permiflion' to  tempt  us  «<  is  the  appointment  of. 
Goti  cur  Creator,  who  alone  is  wife,  and  who  alone  hath  a  right  to  appoint  our 

trials,'.* 


163  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  If . 

To  this  folemn  and  important  inquiry  would  I  now" 
addrefs  myfelf,  with  all  due  humility  ;  and  yet  with 
freedom  ;  craving  the  reader'*s  candid  and  critical  at- 
tention to  what  I  may  offer  on  the  fubje<^. 

If  it  can  be  made  evident  that  the  exiftencfe  and 
taking  place  of  fin  is  the  occafion  of  more  and  greater 
good,  in  tlie  fyftcm  ;  and  therefore,  that  it  was,  upon 
the  whole,  defirable  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  there 
fhould  be  fuch  an  event ;  and  if,  fal'thermore,  the  fup- 
poiition  of  a  pofitive  difpqfal  of  the  Deity  in  favour  of 
the  taking  place  of  this  event  ;  and,  in  fuch  a  manner 
as  to  injure  and  give  infallible  certriinty  of  its  exift- 
cnce  ;  doth  not,  at  all,  reproach  the  moral  charader 
of  God  ;  nor  is  any  way  inconfiftent  with  his  fpotlefs 
purity  and  holinefs,  and  his  infinite  hatred  and  averfion 
to  all  fm  : — -if  fuch  a  divine  difpofal,  refpetfling  the 
taking  place  of  moral  evil,  is  no  ways  repugnant  to 
his  drift  prohibitions  of  fm,  and  that  upon  fo  fevere  a 
penalty  as  the  eternal  death  of  the  linner  ;  nor,  in  any 
ineafure,  diminifheth  the  criminality  of  it  ;  or  render- 
eth  it  unfit  and  unreafonable  that  the  finner  fhould  be 
puniftied  for  it  : — if,  I  fay,  it  can  be  made  evident 
that  thefe  are  matters  of  undoubted  truth,  certainty 
and  importance  ;  the  principal  difficulties  and  obfla- 
cles  in  the  way  of  admitting  the  opinion  of  a  pofitive 
divine  agctuy  and  dijpojal  injurin<i  the  future  exiflence 
of  fuch  an  event,  and  giving  certain  futurity  to  it,  will 

then 

trials.''  (See  p.  156.)  And  that  the /'.7//7o'?j- :tnd  ^z/i/ifZ/Vw  of  children  fliould  be 
of  the  fame  degree  or  quality  witli  thole  of  their  progenitors  ^as  he  alloweth  that 
they  may  be)  he  tells  us,  "  can  truly  be  affigncd  to  no  other  caufe  belides  tbf 
♦'  'will  of  Goti,  who  wifely  appoints  to  every  man  his  conftitution  and  all  his  other 
••  trials  as  he  thinks  fit."  (p.  J91.)  And  yet  the  Doctor  alloweth  that  there  is 
danger,  great  dutigcr,  that  our  ftufiTal  appetites  and  palFions  fhall  become  irregular 
and  finliil,  in  a  worid/i  corrupt  and  Ji/ll  of  temptation  as  ours  is.  (p.  186.)  And 
'«  that  vje.  are  'very  apt,  in  a  world  full  of  temptation,  to  be  deceived  and  drawn 
•«  into  fin  by  bodily  appetites."  (p.  ii'i.)  Now  if  it  is  the  ni'ill  of  God  that 
we  Ihould  have  fuch  conllitufions  as  we  have,  and  appetites  and  paflions  fo  ex- 
pofing  us  to  fin  ;  and  U  he  huih  put  us  into  a  world  under  fuch  circumflances  as 
that  we  Ihall  be  excteding  aft  to  fin,  and  hath  appointed  that  we  Ihould  be 
fubject  to  the  temptations  of  the  devil  : — if  God  hath  appimed  all  thcfe  cir- 
cumltances,  which  are  univerfally  followed  by  men's  actually  committing  fin,- 
and  It  was  his  •will  that  thefe  occafions,  clrcumftances  and  caufcs  fhould  all  ac- 
tually exift  ;  all  this  Will  furcly  amount  to  very  little  Ihort  of  a  fcfitivi  di%in* 
difpofal  in  favour  of  the  cxiUwnce  and  tah-ing  plate  ol  moral  evil. 


S^ft.Ii  MORAL  AGENCY.  169 

then  be  removed  :  and  the  great»and  popular  objeftion 
ag:ainft  fome  of  the  important  doftrines  of  revelation — 
viz.  That  they  appear  to  make  God  the  author  of  fin — 
\v\\\  be  removed  ;  and  the  objedion  itfelf  will  appear 
lefs  formidable  than  hath,  often,  been  apprehended. 

If  thefe  things  can  be  made  evident,  and  are  clearly 
confident  vrith  reafon  and  the  common  fenfe  and  ap- 
prehenfions  of  men  ;  it  will  fm-ely  be  mianifeft,  that 
this  great  and  popular  objeftion  is  an  argument  capable 
of  being  ufed  to  much  better  purpofc,  and  greater 
advantage,  in  addreffbs  to  the  iinagination^  than  the 
underflanding  of  men. 

If,  moreover,  a  divine  agency  and  pbfitive  difpofal, 
giving  certainty  to  the  exiflence  of  moral  evil,  fliall 
appear  to  be  the  dii^aie  of  the  common  fenie  and  rea- 
fon of  men  5  and,  aho,  a  do<llrine  fully  alTerted,  and 
clearly  taught  and  held  up  to  view,  in  the  word  of 
God  ;  this,  it  is  prefunied,  will  be  fufficient  to  filence 
the  cavils  of  men  ;  and  thefe  are  confiderations  of 
fiifficient  weight  to  prevent  their  being  made  an  ob- 
jection againfl  any  doftrine  whatfoever. 

Thefe  are  fabjecTcs  which  I  would  propofe  to  a  hum- 
ble and  careful  inquiry,  in  the  following  feitions.  I 
have  only  to  aik  a  patient  and  fair  hearing  ;  and  that 
no  one  would  condemn  me,  without  giving  the  reafons 
I  offer  in  fupport  of  my  opinion,  a  careful  coniidei"a  • 
tion,  and  allowing  them  their  juil:  weight.  , 


Sect.     L 

tVherein  it  is  inquired^  PVJiether  the  exiflence  and  takiri'^. 
place  of  fin  are  Jiot  the  occafion  of  more  and 
G  R  L  A  T  i:  R  GOOD,;//  the  Jyflem^  than  cvAld  otherwije 
have  beeti  effected  and  produced  f. 

THAT  ftn  fhould  be,  in  fuch  a  fenfe  and  to  fucli  a 
degree,  the  occafion  oi' greater  good  in  the  uni- 
verfe,  aS  to  render  it  upon  the  whole  d  fir  able  that  it 

W  fhould 


iTo  An    E  S  S  A  Y    or^  P^ttlty. 

fhould  ever  adually  come  into  exiftencc,  is  an  opinion 
which  the  Author  of  the  Examination  of  Mr.  Edwards, 
&c.  thinks  is-very  extravagant,  and  that  it  containeth 
in  it,  confequences  which  are  very  fliocking  and  ab- 
furd.  He  fuppofeth  tliat,  upon  admitting  inch  an 
hypothecs,  it  will  follow,  "  That  the  law  of  man's 
'^  nature,  at  firfl,  was  imperfect — that  the  revolt  of 
*^  men  and  anp-cls,  was  in  compliance  with  the  end  of 
*'  their  being,  and  the  wife  and  gracious  intention  of 
**  the  Creator/'  (See  p.  74.)  That  fin  is  in  fad  fol- 
lowed with  greater  good,  our  Author  confidereth  a? 
matter  of  ''  mere  conjefture,  at  beft — without  any 
^^  folid  foundation.  For  (faith  he)  unlefs  we  can  tell 
^'^  what  would  have  been,  had  fm  never  entered  the 
*"'  world,  it  is  impoffible  we  fhould  be  able  to  judge, 
"  by  way  of  comparifon,  of  the  greater  good  confe- 
•'  quent  upon  it  ;  or  be  able  to  fay  that  it  is  befl  upon 
''  the  whole."  (p.  75.)  It  is  acknowledged  that 
where  the  obje6ls,  between  which  a  comparifon  is  to 
be  formed,  are  not  both  in  view,  we  cannot  judge  of 
them  by  way  of  comparifon.  But  as  to  the  two 
events,  viz.  the  taking  place  of  moral  evil  in  the  uni- 
verfe,  and  its  oppoiite  ;  a  little  confideration  may,- 
perhaps,  be  fuflicient  to  convince  us  that  they  are  ob- 
jects ^j'  G?ie  means  or  another  fo  far  brought  within  the 
compafs  of  our  view,  as  to  enable  us  to  form  a  com- 
paj-ative  judgment  between  them. 

And  that  we  may  be  enabled  to  form  a  Judgment  in 
the  prefent  cafe,  and  conclude  with  fome  degree  of 
certainty  that  fm  is  the  occafion  of  more  and  greater 
good,  in  the  iyllem,  than  would  or  could  have  been,- 
if  moral  evil  had  not  taken  place  ;  I  would  propofe 
the  following  arguments  to  confideration — after  pre- 
mifmg, 

I .  That  the  exiften-ce  and  taking  place  of  moral  evil^ 
and  the  iLniverfal  reigji  of  holinefs^  in  the  I'yilem,  are 
events  dire^ly  the  reverfe  of  each  other.  There  are 
no  two  objejfrs,  wherein  are  to  be  found  a  greater  di- 
vepfity,  or  a  more  dired  and  full  oppofition  to  each 

other, 


Seft.I.  MORAL    AGENCY.  171 

other,  than  in  holinefs  ^w^  fin.  There  is  no  degree  of 
communit)n,  harmony  or  agreement  between  them  ; 
nor  any  quality  which  they  polleis  in  common  with 
each  other.  There  is  ever  the  moifc  perfect  difcord 
and  variance  between  virtue  and  vice.  There  is  not 
the  Icaft  degree  of  concurrence  of  tendency  and  influ- 
ence^ in  holinefs  and  lin.  No  two  things  can  bcf 
more  oppofite  and  perfeftly  repugnant  to  each  other. 

2.  That  thefe  two  events  mufl  neccllarily  be  attend- 
ed with  a  great  and  remarkable  diverfity  of  ejj'eth  ; 
and  that,  through  the  whole  iuteiligenr  fyftem — the 
.creation  of  Gcd.  The  whole  moral  created  fyRcm, 
in  all  and  every  part  of  it,  feels  the  change  introduced 
by  the  taking  place  of  Ihi.  There  is  not  one  intelli- 
gent, moral  being,  within  the  whole  circle  of  created 
nature,  but  feels,  and  forever  will  feel,  his  circum- 
ftances  and  condition,  in  fonie  refpefts  or  other,  to  be 
greatly  altered  and  widely  different  from  what  they 
would  have  been,  if  moral  evil  had  never  made  its 
appearance  in  the  fyftem.  And  this  change,  moreover, 
is  fuch  as  will  affe£l  every  creature,  not  only  for  fome 
roniiderable  time  and  fpace,  but  will  reach  and  extend 
its  eifecls  to  endlefs  ages — to  eternity.  The  intro- 
^iuvlion  of  moral  evil  \^\\\  diverfify  the  circumftances 
of  every  individual  in  the  whole  fyftem  of  created  in- 
telligences, forever  and  ever. 

This  diverfity  of  eft'eih  in  tlie  moral,  created  fyftem, 
will  be  Infinite  ;  things  never  reverting  into  the  for- 
mer channel,  and  recurring  to  the  fame  circumftances 
as  if  fm  had  never  taken  place  ;  nor  even  approaching 
thereto  :  the  variety  of  circumftances  and  condition, 
on  the  other  hand,  continually  augmenting  and  in- 
ereafmg  to  eternity. 

The  il:hcme  and  method  of  divine  aolminiftratioR 
and  government  are  infinitely  diverllficd  by  the  intro- 
duction of  moral  evil — the  taking  place  of  fm  :  and  by 
this  means  inch  a  fcene  is  opened  in  the  moral  world, 
as  tendeth  exceedingly  to  raife  and  exalt  our  ideas  of 
the  power,  wiiilom  and  goodnefs  of  Him  who  fits  at: 

VV   2  the 


173  An    E  S  S  A  Y   ON  Part  II. 

the  head  of  the  lyftem,  and  whofe  powerful  arm  aloi »? 
holds  and  manageth  the  helm.  The  methods  of  gov- 
ernment, in  the  kingdom  of  God,  are,  in  general,  new  ; 
and  exceedingly  diverfe  from  what  they  would  have 
been,  had  fin  never  taken  place. 

This  oppofition  of  tendency  to  each  other,  in  hoi'mefs 
and  fin  ;  and  this  infinite  diverfity  in  the  Hate  and 
circumrtances  of  all  moral,  created  beings,  and  in  the 
whole  fcheme  and  plan  of  the  moral  government  of 
God  ;  I  take  to  be  matters  of  undoubted  certainty-^ 
indifputable  truth. 

Thefe  confiderations,  I  am  humbly  of  opinion,  may 
lay  a  foundation  for  determining,  with  fome  degree  of 
certainty,  the  expediency  and  propriety  of  fuch  a  dif- 
pofition  of  things,  fuch  a  method  and  plan  of  opera- 
tion, as  fhould  be  introductory  of  moral  evil^  and  cer- 
tainly followed  by  the  taking  place  of  fm  :  and,  enable 
us  to  form  a  comparative  judgment,  with  a  great 
degree  of  precifion,  between  the  degrees  of  good 
which  fhould  ariffc  and  a<!tually  be  accompliflied  in  the 
iyftem,  under  thefe  feverally  different  and  exceedingly 
diverfe  fchemes  and  methods  of  government  and  ad- 
miniftration. 

And  that  the  fcheme  of  government  and  plan  of 
operation  under  which  moral  evil  fliould  certainly  take 
place,  tend  to  the  greater,  yea,  far  greater,  good  of 
the  moral  world  ;  and  that  fome  very  dcfirable,  valu- 
able and  excellent  end  is  to  be  herein  anfwered,  vi'hich 
could  not  fo  well  have  been  accompliflied  in  any  other 
way  ;  may  appear  from  the  following  confideration. 

I.  It  is  altogether  inconceivable,  that  the  fcenesof 
fuch  infinite  diverfity  of  operation  and  effect,  fliould 
be  equally  beautifvl^  equ'ally  conducive  to  the  general  and 
greate/}  good.  That  plans  and  fcenes  of  operation  fo 
exceedingly  the  reverfe  of  each  other  ;  and,  of  events 
of  fuch  infinite  diverfity,  fuch  perfed;  and  full  oppofi- 
tion of  tendency  to  each  other  ;  both,  too,  attended 
\vith  confcquences  infinitely  extenfive  and  great  ; 
ihouid  yet  be  fo  exadliy  and  perfectly  balanced,  and 

equally 


Seft.I.  MORAL   AGENCY.  173 

equally  produftive  of  good,  as  to  leave  no  room  for 
infinite^  all-peyietrating  wifdom  to  diflinguifli  between 
them,  nor  ground  upon  which  a  preference  might  be 
formed  ;  is  a  fuppoiition  fo  very  extravagant,  that  no 
ferious,  thinking  pcrfon  can  poifibly  admit  and  entei-^ 
tain  it. 

If  w  I  s  DOM  gave  the  preference  to  a  plan  of  govern- 
ment and  fcene  of  operation,  wherein  Jin  fliould  never 
take  place — moral  evil  never  come  into  exigence — the 
wickednefs  which  taketh  place  under  the  divine  ad- 
miniftration  of  government  is  npt  only  in  its  nature  and 
tendency  reproachful  to  God,  but  fuch  an  aiflual  (lain 
and  blemifli  in  his  chara^Hicr  and  government,  as  it  is 
impoflible  ever  to  wipe  off  or  conceal.  The  fuppofi- 
tion  of  fuch  a  preference  of  wisdom  as  this,  moll 
evidently  chargeth  the  Deity  with  a  defeft,  either  in 
wifdom,  goodnefs,  or  power.  In  wi/dom — that  he  did 
not  forefee  and  devife  what  would  be  moft  for  the 
general  good  ;  or  in  goodnefs^  that  he  did  not  aftually 
choofe  and  prefer  it  ;  or  in  poiuer^  that  he  did  not 
accomplifh  his  own  wife  and  benevolent  deligns.* 

To  fuppofe  that  ends  and  purpofes,  equally  wife  and 
excellent,  fliould  be  brought  about  and  accomplLdied, 
under  methods  of  government  and  adminiftration  fo 
exceedingly  and  infinitely  the  reverie  of  each  other,  is 
putting  fuch  an  alternative  upon  the  Deity,  as  taketh 
away  all  poffible  room  and  ground  for  any  voluntary 
deternmiation  at  all,  in  the  cafe  ;  and  is  a  fuppofition 
which  maketli  it  abundantly  to  appear,  that  tlie  coming 
into  exigence  of  the  prefent  fyilcm,  fuch  as  it  aftually 
is,  in  diftinClion  from  any  other,  was  not  the  fruit  of 
luifdo'm — of  wife  defign  and  determination.  So  that  the 
Pfalmift,  when  Ipeaking,  in  PP.  civ.  24.  of  tlie  mani- 
fold  works  of  God,  was  under  a  grofs  miftake  in  fay- 

*  <«  God  is  an  cmnipsttnt  goodi  and  it  is  hi'?  peculiar  glory  to  hxmz,  g'^od  omX  of 
•'  fv/V,    thiit  by  tlie  oppoluion  and  liiltrc  of  carutlcs  liis  goodnefs  might  be  the 

"  mor,'  cunjf>ici/ous. 'Tis  an  impions  folly  to  imagine  tliat  God  was  either  de- 

«'  fedive  in  tcifdom,  not  to  know  wlut  was  the  beft  ftate  for  man  in  his  creation  ; 
»•  or  dcfedtive  in  goodncfsy  that,  knowing  it,  he  would  not  confer  it  upon  him  ; 
"  or  defective  in  po-wir,  that,  willing,  he  was  nnable  to  make  him  better." 
(See  Dr.  Buut  on  He  batmnny  of  the  di-jim  iitilb.::t::>  third  edition,  p-  47-) 


274  '         An   E  S  S  A  Y    on  Part  IL 

ing,  '*  in  -wifdom  haft  thou  made  them  all/'  or  ever 
apprehending  it  ;  but  he  afcribed  that  to  God,  which 
doth  not,  in  faft,  appear  in  his  works. 

Befides  : — To  fuppoie  that  the  good  to  arife  from 
this  diverfity  of  effect  and  operation  in  tlie  moral 
world,  was  fo  exaftly  and  equally  balanced  and  pro- 
portioned, in  thefe  fevcrally  different  plans  of  admin- 
iftration,  as  to  exclude  all  room  for  a  preference  of  the 
one  before  the  other,  implreth  that  it  was  not  an  unde- 
firahle  thing,  up5n  the  whole,  that  moral  evil  fliould 
take  place  and  come  into  exiftence.  It  implieth,  like- 
wife,  that  the  infinitely  wife  and  good  Being  did  not, 
himfelf,  prefer  a  method  and  fcene  of  operation  and 
government,  which  fhould  entirely  exclude  any  fuch 
event. 

\Vhen  the  univerfal  and  uninterrupted  reign  of  holi- 
nefs,  in  all  ages,  and  all  orders  and  ranks  of  beings, 
on  the  one  hand  ;  and  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil,  and 
its  amazingly  extcnfive  reign,  on  the  other  ;  were 
events  (to  fpeak  after  the  manner  of  men)  in  contem- 
plation in  the  divine  mind  (as  it  muftbe,  on  all  hands, 
admitted  that  God  had  a  perfecV  knowledge,  forefight 
and  view  of  all  poffible  exiftences  and  events) — if  that 
fyltem  and  fcene  of  operation,  in  which  moral  evil 
Ihould  never  have  exiftence,  was  actually  chojen  and 
preferred  in  the  divine  mind  ;  certainly  the  Deity  is 
infinitely  difappointed  in  the  ilTue  of  his  own  opera- 
tions— if,,  indeed,  they  may  be  called  his  oiun  :  and  it 
mufl  needs  be  that  his  will  is  infinitelv  more  crofTcd 
and  thwarted  by  that  fcene  and  courfe  of  events  which 
are  aftually  exhibited  to  view,  than  that  of  <^;zy,  or  all ^ 
other  beings  together,  in  this  extended,  complicated 
fyftem . 

II.  From  the  preceding  obfervations  it  is  abundant- 
ly manifeft,  that  the  plan  of  government,  and  fcene  of 
operation  and  events,  which  is  actually  furnifned  out  to 
view  in  the  prefent  fyftem,  was  the  fruit  of  choice — 
of  PRU  DENT,  WISE  DP:  SIGN.  Nothing  can  be  more 
difhonorable  and  reproachful  to  God,  than  to  imagine 

that 


Sea.t.  MORAL    AGEKCY.  175' 

that  the  fyftem  which  is  aftually  formed  by  the  divine 
hand,  and  which  was  made  for  his  pleafiire  and  glory, 
is,  yet,  not  the  fruit  of  wife  contrivance  and  defign. 
And  it  muft  be  equally  inconfiftent  with  all  our  ideas 
of  the  natural  as  well  as  moral  perfedlions  of  God,  to 
apprehend  that  he  had  not  in  his  view,  antecedent  to 
creation,  the  pofjibility  of  a  fyflem  of  intelligences, 
among  whom  there  fliould  be  no  defection  from  God. 
Our  Author  himfelf  fpeaketh  in  terms  naturally  tend- 
ing to  excite,  in  his  readers,  an  apprehenfion  that  he 
imagined  fuch  a  fyftem  a  conceivable  thing.  He  fays 
(p.  75.)  "  To  fay  it  (/?«)  could  not  have  been  pre- 
"  ven-ted,  is  faying  more  than  any  one  knows.**  And 
yet  he  faith,  "  How  fm  came  to  be  permitted,  is  more 
*'  than  any  one  can  comprehend."  The  very  fuppofi- 
tion,  however,  of  a  poliibility  of  a  fyftem  of  intelli- 
gences perfeftly  holy,  and  free  from  all  degrees  6f  fm  5 
doth  very  naturally  fuggeft  to  us  one  general  reafon 
for  the  exifterice  of  inch  a  fyftem  as  that  in  which  we 
now  are,  viz.  that  fome  more  wife  and  excellent  ends 
are  to  be  accompiiihcd  under  the  prefent  fyftem  of 
government  and  adminiftration,  than  could  have  been 
brought  about  in  a  fyftem  and  under  a  government 
wherein  no  inch  thing  as  moral  evil  took  place.  If 
we  admit  the  poilibility  that  fin  could  have  been  pre- 
vented in  the  moral  world  ;  how  can  we  otherv/ife 
reconcile  it  to  the  divine  character  and  government, 
that  fuch  an  event  hath  been,  in  faft,  permitted  to  take 
place — yea,  and  that  moral  evil  hath  been  fuffered  to 
fpread  over  fo  great  a  part  of  the  fyftem — otherwife 
than  by  fuppofmg  that  it  will  be  the  occafion  q? great- 
er good  in  the  univerfe,  than  could  otherwife  have 
been  accompliftied  ? 

When  we  confider  the  infinite  extent  of  the  wif- 
dom,  goodnefs  and  power  of  God,  and  take  into  view 
his  abfolute  fupremacy,  government  and  authority  ;  it 
muft  be  a  very  peculiar  Jlretch  of  imagination  and 
thought,  that  can  fuppofe  tiie  prefent  fyftem  of  events 
and  adminiftration  is  not,  in  all  its  parts,  the  fruit  of 

choice^ 


176  An    essay    on   -  Part  IL 

choice^  and  wife  defi^n  ;  and  Ihat,  in  preference  to  all 
other  fyftems  poflible  or  conceivable  ;— And  this  it 
certainly  could  not  be,  unlefs  Ibme  more  wife  and 
valuable  ends  were  to  be  accomplifhed,  than  could 
have  been  brought  to  pais  in  a  fyltem  wherein  there 
was  no  moral  evil.  However  great  and  infinite  may 
be  the  conceivable  variety  of  lyftems,  which  the  di-* 
vine,  omnipotent  mind  may  be  fuppofed  to  have  in 
view  ;  yet  they  may  be  all  comprehended  under  this 
one  general  diftinftion,  of  being  luith^  or  without  fin. 
And  between  fyftems,  in  this  general  view  only^  is  the 
comparative  judgment  to  be  formed,  and  the  prefer-* 
ence  to  be  given  of  the  one,  before  the  other.  What 
the  judgment  and  preference  of  the  divine  mind  in  fad 
were,  is  fufficiently  evident  in  event  : — an  authority 
upon  which  we' may  fafely  conclude  the  preferablenefs 
o^  fuch  a  Jyjlem  before  any  other  \  and,  that  fome  7;/or<f 
valuable  ends  will  be  accompliflied  in  the  prefent  {^j£■* 
tem,  than  could  have  been  under  any  other* 

Thefe  confidcrations,    it   may   poflibly  be  thought, 
are  fufficient  to  enable  us  to  judge,    by  zuay  ofceinpari^ 
Jon^    of  the  greater  good   confequent    upon  the  taking 
place  of  iin. 

However,  before  we  proceed  to  the  confideration 
of  the  other  arguments  from  whence  it  appeareth  that 
the  exiitence  of  }?ioral  evil  is  the  occafion  of  greater 
good  than  could  otherw.ife  have  taken  place,  it  may  be 
proper  to  make  fome  general  obfervations  re(pe<^ting 
the  GREATEST  GOOD,  to  Ihcw  wliat  it  is,  and  wherein 
it  doth  confifi;. 

And,  in  general    (as  far  as  it  rclateth  to  the  prefent 
queftion)    the  greateft  and  niofi  extenjive  exercije^   and 
the  nio  ft  full  and  complete  maiiifefiation  of  the  divine  per' 
fedions^  is  the  greatestgood. 

The  greatejl  good  of  the  univerfe  mufl:  neceflariVy 
be,    either  the  reaf    inherent,    neceffary  perfeCiions    of 
Jehovah  ;     or,    their   exercife    and  manifefi ation    in  . 
their  proper  and  genuine  fruits ,      Or,   in    other  words,- 
the  G  L  o  R  Y  o  f  God,  i  n  g  e  n  e  r  a  l,   is  the  greateft 

good. 


Sea. I.  MORAL  AGENCY.  177 

good.  The  ejjential glory  of  G  o  D  conHfleth  in  his  per- 
feci  and  infinite  fufficiency  for  great  and  excellent  things. 
It  is  unqiieilionably  defirable^  in  the  very  nature  of 
things,  that  this  fufficiency  of  the  D  e  i  t  V  for  great  and 
excellent  things^  {hould  be  manifefled  and  appear  in  its 
proper  and  genuine  fruits  and  eifecfts.  For  why  is  fucli 
a  fufficiency  for  great  and  excellent  things  defirable^  but 
that  it  may  actually  effecr,  produce  and  accomplifhthem  ? 
This  appearance  or  fuanifefiation  of  this  infinite  fuffi- 
ciency of  the  Deity  for  great  and  excellent  things,  in  its 
proper  and  genuine  fruits  and  effects  ;  is  what  conftitut- 
eth  his  declarative  gl ory  i  for  in  this  appearance^  exercife^ 
or  manifefiation^  it  effentially  confilleth.  PFhere^  there- 
fore, there  is  the  largeft  and  mod  extenfive  exercife  of 
the  divine  perfeftions,  and  the  falleft  appearance  anddif- 
play  of  the  infinite  fufficiency  there  is  in  GoD  for  great 
and  excellent  things,  in  its  geniline  arid  natural  fruits  and 
effetts  ;    there  is,  without  qucftion,  the  greatest 

GOOD. 

Thefe  considerations  would  naturally  lead  us  to  con- 
clude, that  the  infinitely  wife  and  good  God,  when  en- 
tering upon  the  work  of  creation,  would  infallibly 
choofe  fuch  a  fyftem  as  would  open  a  field  for  the  largelfc 
difulay  and  moil  extenfive  exercife  of  his  own  inherent, 
infinite  excellency  and  perfection.  If  the  true  beauty 
and  glory  of  the  infinite  fufficifciicy  there  is  in  God  for 
great  and  excellent  things,  confifleth  in  its  being  exer^ 
cifcd  and  put  forth  into  aCi^  and  appearing  in  its  genuine 
expreffions  and  natural  fruits  ;  reafon  would,  then,  teach 
us  that  the  wifdom  of  the  Deity,  when  he  was  entering 
upon  the  formation  of  a  fyftem,  for  the  very  purpofe  of 
cxercifing  and  difplaying  his  infinite  perfection,  would 
necelTarily  dire<rt  to  the  choice  of  fuch  an  one  as  would 
fpread  the  nioO:  extenfive  fcene  of  operation,  and  afford 
the  iargeft  field  for  the  difplay  of  the  iilexhauftible  trea- 
fures  of  his  perfection.  * 

X  .    It 

*  The  divine  moral  perfecliou  fummarily  confifts  in  ^(?5i///f/i.  Tlie  brightcrt 
difplay,  therefore,  of  ttie  moral  perfection  of  God,  i;.  the  fame  as  the  grc-atelt 
m:iaifeiUiLgn  and  higheft  exercife  of  trut  gisdntft.     TIis  tendency  ^i gondutji-,  iix 

its 


I7t  An    essay    on  Fart  11* 

It  may,  alfo,  be  proper  here  to  obferve  a  few  things 
refpediing  the  manner  of  effecting  the  greateft  good^  and 
the  way  ivherein  only  it  can  be  accomplijlied. 

It  hath  been  obferved,  that  the  greafeji  good^  as  fat 
as  it  relateth  to  the  prefent  argument,  is  nothing  dif-* 
ferent  from  the  fullefl:  manifeftaticn,  and  largeit  and 
nioft  extenllve  exercife  and  dilplay,  of  the  divine  per- 
fections, in  their  genuine,  proper  and  natural- fruits. 
And  it  muft  necefTanly  be  fo  :  for  if  the  inherent,  ne- 
ceiTary  perfe<^ions  of  the  Deity,  are  really  mo  ft  excel* 
lent  and  infinitely  great  ;  it  very  clearly  followeth, 
that  the  mofl:  full,  complete  and  extenfive  exercife  of 
thefe  perfections,  and  the  mofl  fenfible,  difcernible 
manifeftation  of  them  in  their  genuine  expreffions  and 
fruits,  is  the  greateft  good  which  can  be  produced  by 
creation,  and  appear  in,  and  be  accomplifhed  by  it. 

Tiiefe  things  being  confidered,  it  may  perhaps  ap- 
pear, that  the  exiftence  of  moral  e-uil  is  a  neceffary 
means  of  the  greateft  good  ;  yea,  if  the  moft  full  and 
extenfive  exercife  and  manifeftation  of  the  inherent  per- 
fections of  the  divine  nature,  in  their  genuine  eifeCls 
and  fruits,  is,  either  itflf  the  greateft  good,  or  necef- 
farily  involves  and  contains  it  ;  it  moft  certainly  fol- 
loweth, that  moral  evil  was  a  necefjary  means  of  the 
greateft  good.  Many  are  apt  to  confider  it  as  an  in- 
ftance  of  the  greateft  arrogance,  to  fuppofe  that  God 
could  not  have  accompliflied  all  the  wife  and  excellent 
ends  which  actually  appear  and  take  place  in  the  pre- 
fent fyftem  as  it  is,  if  moral  evil  had  never  taken 
place — That  it  doth  not  appear  but  that  he  might  as 
fully  have  manifefted  himfelf,  in  his- own  infinite  fuffi- 
ciency  and  perfection,  to  the  views  and  underftanding 
of  Iiis  creatures  ;  and,  tlierefore,  have  accomplifhed 
all  the  fame  excellent  ends,  if  he  had  fo  feen  meet, 
without  this  moft  melancholy  of  all  events.  'I'hey 
who  talk  or  think  in  this  ftrain,  ought  to  remember, 

I.  That  in  thofe  works  of  his,  wherein  he  is  pur- 

pofing 

its  exercifes,  is  to  do  and  produce  good.  Where  there  are  the  higheft  exercifes  of 
divine  goodnefs,  there  the  greateft  good  is  done.  The  higheft  exercifes  of  the 
divine  goodnefsj  neceflariiy  fuppofe  the  highell  good  to  be  elieded. 


Sea.  I.  MORAL    AGENCY.  179 

polinf^  to  difplay  his  moral  charafter,  and  make  a  real 
manifeftation  of  himrdf  to  tlie  iindcrflanding  and 
views  of  his  intelligent  creatures  ;  it  is  worthy  of  his 
willlora,  befitting  his  infinitely  glorious  character,  to 
adapt  himfelf  to  his  creatures,  and  accommodate  him- 
felf  to  their  capacities,  underflanding  and  powers,  in 
thofe  of  his  works  wherein  ar^  particularly  defigned  to 
be  exhibited  the  excellencies  and  beauties  of  his  inli- 
iiitely  fublime  and  amiable  charafter.  However  full 
and  infinitely  flrong  the  real  exercife  of  that  moft  glo- 
rious and  infinitely  amxiabje  and  beautiful  difpofition  of 
the  divine  mind  which  conftitutes  his  moral  character 
may  be  in  itfelf ;  yet,  if  the  exercife  is  not  in  fuch  a 
way  and  manner,  and  fo  fenfible,  as  to  be  difcernible 
and  perceptible  by  his  creatures  ;  the  end  of  creation, 
and  of  its  exercife,  is  not  anfwered  ;  and,  agreeable  to 
what  hath  been  before  faid,  the  greatejl  good  not  ef- 
fected and  produced. 

2.  The  lame  wifdom  which  will  direct  that  the 
Deity  fliould  accommodate  himfelf  to  his  creatures,  in 
the  exhibitions  he  is  making  of  his  perfections,  in  his 
works,  will,  likewife,  for  the  fame  reafons,  dired;  that 
he  fiiould  accommodate  himfelf  in  his  operations,  and 
adapt  himfelf  in  the  hsfl  conceivable  manner^  to  their 
underftandings,  capacities  and  powers.  That  if  one 
particiiiui  plan—r-one  definite  method  of  operation— fliall 
ferve  to  make  the  divine  charafter  more  fufceptiblc 
and  difcernible  by  his  creatures,  and  more  fully  and 
abundantly  exhibit  to  their  view  the  very  dijpofition 
which  is  inherently  in  him  ;  then  tliis  muft  be  the 
plan — this  the  method  of  operation,  which  will  infal- 
libly be  chofen  by  infinite  wifdom. 

3-  The  Deity  can  be  knov/n  by  his  creatures  only  in 
his  works  ;  and  his.  chara<fler  feen  and  underftood  only 
in  events  which  are  immediately  dijcernible  and  percepti- 
ble by  us.  it  is  incom.patible  with  the  idea  of  creature^ 
to  know  God  by  direcl^  i7Mf2ediate  perception^  or  in  the 
fame  way  wherein  we  know  ourfelves,  and  are  imme- 
diately perceptive  and  confcious  of  oiu"  own  thoughts 

X  2  and 


l8o  An    E  S  S  A  Y    oii  Part  II. 

and  CKcrcifes.  This  would  be  fiich  a  kind  of  union  of 
the  creature  to  the  Deity,  as  implieth  famenefs  of 
confcioufnefs,  and  abfohitc  divinity.  This  would  be 
that  fame  nearnels  and  union,  which  fubllit  between 
the  THREE  PERSONS  of  tlie  cver  bielTed  and  ado- 
rable  TRINITY. 

To  lay,  therefore,  that  God  cannot  make  known  his 
perfeftions,  otherwife  than  by  caufmg  them  to  appear 
in  fruits^  is  not  fetting  bounds  to  the  power  or  wifdom 
of  God,  but  to  the  powers  and  capacities  oi  creatures , 
It  is,  in  effed:,  only  faying,  that  God  cannot  make  his 
perfections  appear^  without  caufing  them  adiially  to  ap-* 
pear.  And  it  is  {o  'far  from  implying  any  limitation 
of  the  perfe«n:ions  of  the  Holy  One  of  Ifrael,  that  it 
only  implieth  a  limitation  of  the  powxrs  and  capacities 
of  created  beings-^imperfedion  neceffarily  cleaving  to 
them. 

Such  confiderations  as  thefe  would  naturally  lead  us 
to  conclude  that  God,  in  his  infinite  wifdom,  firfl 
formed  the  fyftem  with  a  particular^  exprej's  view  to 
the  moft  clear  and  fall  difcovery  and  manifeflation  of 
his  own  infinite  perfections — the  inherent  and  infinitely 
excellent  difpofition  of  his  divine  nature — ejpecially  in 
his  kingdom  of  redemption — That  all  things  were  moft 
perfectly  adjufted,  in  infinite  wifdo.m  ;  and  every  event^ 
of  whatever  nature  or  klnd^  which  was  ever  to  become 
extant  in  any  part  of  the  fyllem,  molt  exatlly  bounded, 
limited  and  circumfcribed,  by  the  fore-knowledge  and 
determinate  counfel  of  God. 

Thefe  obfervations  make  way  for  purfuing,  to  bet- 
ter advantage,  the  general  argument  under  confidera- 
tion  ;  and  making  it  mo-re  clearly  and  manifcfl-ly  ap- 
pear, that  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil  in  the  fyfrem  is 
the  occafion  oX  far  greater  good  than  ever  could  have 
been  accomplKhed  if  there  never  had  been  fin. 

The  following  excellent  ends  have  unqueflionably 
been  anfwered  by  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil^  or  the 
taking  place  of  fin. 

I.  The  exiftence   of  moral  evil  hath  undoubtedly 

occafioned 


Sea. I.  MORAL   AGENCY.  i8i 

occafioned  a  more  perfeft,  full  and  glorious  difcovery 
of  the  infinite  averfion  and  irreconcilable  hatred  of  the 
holy  and  pure  nature  of  G  od, .to  all  iin,  than  could 
any  otherwife  pofTibly  have  been  made  to  the  views  of 
creatures.  How  exceedingly  great  and  infinitely 
ftrong  the  oppofition  of  the  divine  mind  is  to  all  fin, 
and  his  utter  abhorrence  of  all  moral  evil,  and  aver- 
fion to  it  ;  are  more  clearly  and  perfeftly  delineated 
and  exprcjj'ed^  in  the  juft  punifliment  of  it,  than  it  is 
pofTible  or  conceivable  that  it  fliould  be,  in  any  other 
way.  The  averfion  and  hatred  of  the  divine  mind  to 
moral  evil,  are  exprcjj'cd  only  in  the  appearance  of  its 
oppofition  to.  it.  And  the  fuUeft  and  ftrongeil  appear- 
ance there  can  be,  to  the  views  of  creatures,  of  the 
oppofition  of  the  divine  nature  to  fin,  is  in  the  puniili- 
ment  of  the  finner.  There  is  no  other  way  for  the 
infinite  averfion  of  the  divine  mind  to  fin  to  appear  in 
fruits  atid  in  effeds^  than  in  its  punifliment.  Aiid  as 
this  infinite  purity  and  holinefs — this  mofi:  perfeft  and 
irreconcilable  hatred  of  the  divine  mind  to  moral  evil, 
are  the  peculiar  glory  of  God  ;  fo  all  the  appearances 
and  manifeftations  of  this  difpofition,  in  whatever 
God  doth,  are  lovely  and  excellent  :  it  being,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  moft  defirable  that  there  fliould  be 
made  the  mofi:  full  and  clear  difcovery  and  manifefta- 
lion  that  can  be,  of  this  dilpofition  of  the  divine  mind, 
to  the  views  of  intelligent  creatures  who  are  capable 
of  beholding  and  admiring  it. 

That  things,  therefore,  in  the  fyftem  of  God,  fiiould 
be  fo  ordered,  arranged  and  difpofed,  as  to  make  way 
and  afford  an  opportunity  for  thofe  wonderfully  glo- 
rious and  full  difcoveries  of  this  infinitely  excellent 
and  amiable  difpofition  of  the  pure  and  holy  nature  of 
God,  in  the  eternal  punifhment  of  fallen  angels,  and  of 
impenitent  finners  among  men  ;  and,  above  all,  in  the 
fuflerings  of  the  Son  of  God  ;  is  certainly  a  fruit  of 
infinite  wifdom  and  infinite  goodncfs.  For  never 
could  t)ie  appearances  of  this  difpolition  of  the  divine 
mind,   have  bt-en  lb  clear  and  flrong  to  the  views  and 

comprehenfion 


i82  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  11. 

comprehenfion  of  creatures,  if  moral  e\'il  had  not 
taken  place  ;  nor  any  thing  which  carried  in  it  proper 
defert  of  the  contempt,  diipleafure  and  anger  of  the  in- 
finite Beings  appeared  in  any  of  the  numbcrlefs  race  of 
the  creatures  of  God. 

II.  As  the  exiftence  o^  77ioral  evil  hath  occaHoned  an 
abundantly  more  clear  and  glorious  difcovery  of  the 
infinite  purity  of  the  divine  nature,  and  the  exceeding 
ftrength  of  his  avcrfion  to  fin  ;  fo,  alfo,  hath  it,  in  like 
manner,  laid  a  foundation  for  God^s  eflahUfning  his  fu- 
premacy,  authority  and  government  over  his  creatures, 
tjpon  a  more  fure  and  firm  bafis  than  there  would  have 
been  advantage  and  opportunity  for,  had  no  fuch  thing 
ever  appeared  in  event.  Now  all  creatures  do  or  will 
fee,  in  a  more  clear,  lively  and  afFe(fting  manner  than 
could  othcrwife  have  poflibly  been  difcovered  to  them, 
what  a  *'  fearful  thing  it  is  to  fall  into  the  hand  of  the 
living  God,''  and  the  infinite  hazard  they  run  in  pre- 
fuming  to  rebel  againft  him.  Notliing  fo  ellabliflieth 
^Jthe  authority  of  Jehovah,  in  the  minds  of  his  crea- 
tures, and  giveth  fuch  clear  and  awful  views  and  ex- 
alted ideas  of  his  majefly  and  fupremacy,  as  the  amaz- 
ing torments  and  jull  fufferings  of  the  enemies  of  God 
continually  before  their  eyes.  In  the  clear  and  full 
views  of  the  torments  of  the  damned  in  hell,  it  doubt- 
lefs  is,  that  the  eledl  x\ngels  and  Saints  in  heaven  are 
fupported  and  fecured  in  obedience,  and  in  perpetual 
allegiance  to  him  wlio  is  King  of  kings,  and  Lord  of 
lords.  By  this  means,  and  in  this  glorious  aft  of 
juftice  on  his  final  enemies,  God  hath  forever  eftab-^ 
lifhed  his  authority  through  his  wide,  extended  govern-^ 
ment  and  dominion  ;  by  tliis  means  eternally  fecuring 
the  perfect  obedience  of  all  creatures  of  every  rank 
and  order  :  So  that  peace  and  undifturbed  harmony 
fliall  forever  reign  among  all  who  have  not  yet  rebel-? 
led  againft  God.* 

III.  The 

*  When  I  fpeak  of  various  ranks  and  orders  of  creatures  who  are  fecured  in 
obedience,    and  over  w^ioin  the  divine  authority  is  eltablifhed,    by  means  of  the  , 
puniihment  ot  the  damned  iirhell ;    1  do  not  mean  tliat  any  reference  fliould  be 

had 


Sea.L  MORAL  AGENCY.  183 

III.  The  infinite  goodnefs  and  love  of  God  appear  in  a 
far  more  ftrong  and  glorious  light  to  the  views  of 
creatures,  than  they  ever  could,  if  moral  evil  had  not 
taken  place.  Though  this  event  hath,  in  no  degree, 
augmented  the  goodnefs  and  love  of  God  ;  yet  it  hath 
adminiftered  occafion  of  a  more  full  and  glorious  dif- 
covery  of  the  inherent  goodnefs  of  the  divine  nature, 
to  the  vieivs  a?2d  apprehen/ions  of  creatures^  than  there 
would  have  been  any  advantage  and  opportunity  for, 
if  there  had  never  been  any  fuch  event. 

The  event  and  coniequence  of  the  exigence  of  moral 
evil,  in  fad  are  the  mofl  furprifmg  difcoveries  of  the 
infinite  goodnefs  and  grace  of  God.  And  whatever  ir. 
the  end  in  which  the  work  of  creation  iiTueth,  in  event ^ 
"We  may  with  much  fafet)'-  conclude,  was  an  end  which 
God  himfelf  had  ultimately  in  view,  in  producing  zxQ2.* 
tion.  And  we  may,  with  equal  fafety,  conclude,  that 
with  a  fpecial  view  to  this  end  it  was  that  God  formed 
the  world,  and  arranged  things  in  that  particular  order 
which  we  behold. 

There  are  feveral  ways  wherein  the  infinite  goodnefs^ 
and  love^  and  marvellous  grncr'  of  God  now  appear  in 
an  abundantly  more  clear,  ftrong  and  glorious  light, 
to  the  views  of  creatures^  than  there  could  be  any  ad- 
vantage or  opportunity  for  them  to  difcover,  had 
moral  evil  never  taken  place.     Particularly, 

I.  In 

had  to  any  fuppofed  ranks  of  intelligent  creatures  inhabiting  the  feveral  bodies 
wliicli  compoie  this  fyftein  and  fiuround  our  world.  If  any  fuch  there  are,  they 
will  doubtlefs  receive  fome  flgnal  benefit  and  advantage  from  that  glorious  exer- 
cife  of  the  divine  autliority  \\  hich  appcareth  in  the  eternal  torments  of  the 
damned  in  hell.  On  the  contrary  ;  the  fuppofition  itfelf,  that  the  planetary 
worlds  are  inhabited  by  intelligent  beings,  notwithttanding  all  the  ingenious 
conjectures  of  men,  appears  tu  nie,  at  haji  extremely  uncertain,  and  without  any 
lolid  realbn  for  its  fupport.  The  j;encral  argument  of  God's  having  made  no- 
thing in  vain,  in  favour  of  this  luppofition,  1  am  humbly  of  opinion,  is  far  from 
being  fufTicient  for  the  fupport  of  fo  important  an  hypothelis.  Far  fhould  we 
be  tiom  having  any  realbn  to  confider  them  as  being  made  in  vain,  according  to 
my  apprehenfion  of  things,  if  we  Ihould  admit  that  they  are  utterly  deflitutc  of 
any  intelligent  inhabitant.  For,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  evidently  worthy  of 
God  that  he  ihould,  as  it  were,  take  ftate  upon  himfelf,  in  his  appearatice  upotx 
a  theatre  where  fuch  great  and  marvellous  defigns  are  carrying  on,  as  are  tranf- 
ai^ling  in  this  our  world.  And  when  the  principal  character  in  the  grand 
drama,  is  no  lefs  than  that  of  the  Son  of  God,  it  fccmsth  fit  and  fuitablc  to 
his  dignity,  that  the  fcene  fhould  be  hung  with  fymbols  and  enfigns  of  maj;;{ly  ; 
fitted  to  awaken  the  refpc£tful  awe,  and  engage  the  folcmi\  attention)  of  the 
fpeflators  and  fubjedts  orfo  fubliroe  and  noble  an  adion. 


184  An    P:  S  S  A  Y   ok  Part  11. 

1 .  In  his  oppofing  that  whicH^wf^ofeth  the  general 
good.  The  divine  love  is  as  confpiciious  in  its  oppo- 
lition  to  every  thing  which  is  detrimental  to  the  gene- 
ral good,  as  in  the  politive  favours  and  blellings  dif- 
fufed  nnder  God's  excellent  and  glorious  government  : 
as  the  afFeftion  of  a  jiift  and  generous  Prince,  and  his 
concern  to  promote  the  peace  and  tranquillity  of  his 
fabjefts,  are  as  evident  and  pleafmg  in  his  care  to  refijfl 
and  repel  their  enemies,  as  in  his  concern  to  diflufe  the 
pofitive  blellings  of  peace  ;  and,  as  confpicuoiis  in  his 
fleady  and  undiaken  refoiation  to  pnnifh  offenders 
againft  the  laws  and  peace  of  the  community,  as  in 
protecting  his  loyal  and  obedient  fubje^ts  in  the  quiet 
pofTefllon  of  their  properties  and  rights. 

So  the  love  of  an  affectionate  and  faithful  hiifbandy 
though  other  wife  it  had  never  been  queftioned,  appear- 
cth  in  far  more  winning  and  pleafmg  light  upon  occa- 
fion  being  afforded  of  his  iliewing  his  jufl,  manly  and 
generous  refentment  of  any  abufive  treatment  of  his 
wife.  P\.v\d.  file  herein  becometh  fenfible  of  a  Jlrength 
and  fervor  of  love — a  clofenefs  of  union  of  heart  to  her, 
of  which  flie  never  before  could  have  any  clear  ideas 
and  jufl  conceptions.  x\nd  this  difcovery  cannot  but 
be  exceedingly  pleafmg  and  ravifhing  to  the  wife.  So 
the  infinite  extent  of  the  divine  love,  and  the  amazing 
ib'ength  of  the  union  of  heart,  of  the  glorious  Sum  of 
all  being,  to  the  general  and  greatefl  good  ;  appear  in 
a  more  admirably  flrong  and  amiable  light  in  the  infi- 
nite flrength  of  his  oppofition  to  fm  and  wickednefs, 
and  to  fuch  as  obflinately  oppofe  tlie  good  of  the  lyf- 
tem,  than  they  pollibly  could  have  done  to  the  views 
of  creatures^  if  moral  evil  had  never  taken  place. 

2.  The  divine  goodnefs  and  love  -ap-pezr  particufar/y 
free^  generous  and  conjpicuoiis^  from  the  confideration 

of  the  exceeding  unworthinefs  and  vilenefs,  and  tliC 
utter  ill-defert,  of  fuch  as  are  made  the  fubje£ts  oi  di- 
vine grace.  The  teflimonies  of  divine  goodnefs  might, 
undoubtedly,  have  been  exceedingly  flrong  as  well  as 
innumerable,  if  no  fm  had  ever  dillurbed  the  peace, 

and 


Sea.  I.  MORAL  AGENCY.  fSj- 

and  interrupted  the  harmony,  of  the  nioral,  created 
world.  But  never  could  it  have  been  fo  abundant ly 
nianifeft  to  the  vieius  of  creatures^  that  the  bkiiings, 
the  natural  good,  diffufed  through  the  univerfe,  had 
theii-  I'oiirca  entirely  in  the  free^  diffufive  nature — the 
iujinite  benevoicnce  and  munificence^  of  tfie  divifie  mind 
and  difpofition.  The  more  unworthy  the  objeft,  the 
more  doth  all  good  appear  to  proceed  from  the  very 
nature  of  hint  who  beltoweth  it  ;  and,  to  take  its  rife 
purely  in  the  temper  and  difpofition  which  are  inherent 
m  him.  As  the  cafe  now  in  fact  is,  in  bellowing;  mercy 
and  favour  upon  fmners,  the  divine  Being  appeared  to 
be  fdlf-moved,  i.  e.  to  adt  from  the  inherent  goodnefs 
of  his  own  infinitely  pure  and  benevolent  natutre  ;  to 
be  merciful,  bccaufe  it  is  his  nature  to  be  merciful. 
As  the  characters  of  mankind  really  are^  it  abundantly 
appeareth,  that  God  fiiewcth  mercy  and  doeth  good 
for  his  own  fake— hQc^L-M^G  it  is  his  pleafure,  his  delight, 
and  the  higheft  ^^ratification  of  his  own  infinitely  a- 
miable,  pure  and  lioly  nature  ;  and  becaufe  it  is  that 
wherein  his  own  infinite  felicity  and  enjoyment  confifl:. 
Hence  divine  love  is  fpoken  of,  in  fcripture,  with  this 
mark  of  difhinftion — that  it  is  exercifed  toward  the 
wicked^  the  ill-defervin^.  And  the  Deity,  when  he 
purpofeth  a  manifeftatiou  of  lovd  which  /hall  fhew  itfelf 
to  be  divine,,  in  diflindtion  from  any  thing  which  ever 
appeared  here  in  our  fallen  world,  in  the  charafters 
inofi;  efteemed  and  revered  among  men  ;  fingletli  out 
the  ungddly  for  the  uibjefts  of  it  :  herein  commending; 
his  love  towards  us,  that  vjhile  we  were  yet  fmners^ 
Chrijl  died  for  us ,     Rom.  v.  8. 

3.  The  love  of  a  friend  is  manifeftcd  by  the  hazards 
to  which  he  will  expofe  himfelf,  and  the  dangers  and 
lulferings  to  which  he  will  fubmit,  for  us.  The 
ftrength  of  love  appe-areth,  in  that  which  it  will  do  for 
us.  Adverffty  tricth  the  ftrength  of  friendfliip^ 
by  adminifi-ering  peculiar  opportunities  for  its  exer- 
cife  and  afliftancc.  Hence  the  vulgar  proverb,  A 
friend  in  need^  is  a  friend  indeed.     The  fame  fentiment 

Y  is 


i8"5  A>r  E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  IL 

is  thus  exprefTed  by  the  wife  man,  Prov.  xvii.  17.  "  A 
friend  loveth  at  all  times^  and  a  brotlier  is  born  for 
adverfity '^  Nothing  fo  endeareth  any  one  lo  us,  as 
his  cordial  friendfbip,  and  the  tokens  of  a  ftedfaft, 
unalterable  aifeftion  and  love,  when  we  are  forfaken, 
deftitute,  and  in  diftrefs  :  nothing  difcovcreth  inch 
ftrength  and  fervor  of  affeftion,  fuch  clofe  and  inti- 
mate union  of  heart  to  us.  Thus  the  tender  and  footh- 
ing  friendfhip,  the  kind  affiftance  and  generous  confi- 
dence, of  an  affectionate  hufband,  for  a  poor,  weak, 
helplefs  woman,  who  is  forfaken  and  abandoned  of 
every  other  helper  and  friend,  will  be  the  moft  com- 
forting cordial,  and  the  flrongeft  teflimony  of  connu- 
bial love  ;  deferving  the  moft  generous  and  grateful 
returns.  And  for  a  hufband,  beholding  a  helplefs  yet 
ungrateful  wife  in  fome  imminent  danger,  and  incapa- 
ble of  being  aflifted  and  relieved  otherwife  than  at  the 
hazard  of  his  own  fafety  and  life  ;  yet  in  thefe  circum- 
flances  to  forget  all  her  ingratitude  and  infidelity,  and 
boldly,  though  calmly,  plunge  himfelf  into  the  moft 
imminent  danger  for  her  fafety  and  relief,  and  aftually 
refcue  and  fave  her — how  peculiarly  tender  and  affeft- 
ing  would  be  her  feelings — how  foft  and  pleafmg  her 
fenfations,  if  fhe  had  any  gratitude,  ingenuity  and 
love  1  To  find  in  a  hufband  to  whom  fhe  had  been 
unfaithful,  yet  fo  tender,  fo  endearing  and  faithful  a 
friend  ;  in  whofe  love  flie  may  confide,  and  to  whofs 
bofom  fli©  is  invited  to  return  :  to  find,  I  fay,  in  fuch 
an  one,  an  unalterable  afiPedion,  and  fuch  flrength  of 
love  as  will  brave  and  defpife  dangers  for  her  fafety  ; 
muft  certainly  give  fo  convincing  a  proof,  lo  ftrong  a 
teflimony,  of  unconquerable,  invincible  love,  as  can- 
not fail  exceedingly  to  delight  and  ravifh  the  heart, 
•where  there  are  the  leafl  remains  of  gratitude  and 
love. 

Under  what  figure  or  emblem  is  the  divine  love, 
tovv^ards  his  chofen  ones,  fo  often  reprefented  in  the 
word  of  God,  as  this  ?  The  holy  Spirit  himfelf  could 
find  no  other  fimiiitude  fo  aptly  to  exprefs  to  our  un- 

derji  abiding 


Sea.  I.  MORAL    AGENCY.  187 

derjianding  and  co7nprehenfion  the  wonderful  ftrength, 
extent  and  freedom  of  the  divine  love.  Chrift  Jeius 
iiimrelf  is  frequently  reprelented  as  a  bridegroom  ; 
and  the  church,  his  fpoufe.  When  He  beheld  us  in 
our  infinitely  ruined  and  guilty  ftate,  purfued  by  the 
wrath  and  vengeance  of  Almighty  God  ;  notwithftand- 
ing  our  bafe  ingratitude,  abominable  proftitution  and 
infidelity,  he  not  only  calmly  ventures  into  the  midft 
of  danger,  but  even  fubmits  to  death  itfelf,  and  fuf- 
taineth  the  infinite  weight  of  the  divine  wrath,  for  us  , 
bimfelf  becoming  a  curfe,  and  bearing  our  fins  in  his 
own  body  upon  the  tree,  for  us.-  And  now,  having 
purchafed  redemption  for  his  people,  he,  with  infinite 
r-ondefcenfion  and  indulgence,  inviteth  us  to  put  our 
trufl  in  him,  and  freely  to  caft  all  our  cares  and  bur- 
dens upon  him — pouring  our  complaints  into  his  bo- 
fom,  with  the  fuUeft  affurance  of  finding  in  him  an  in- 
finitely powerful  protector,  and  cordial,  faithful  and 
indulgent  friend. 

Nor  is  it  the  church,  which  is  redeemed  from  among 
men^  that  alone  receiveth  the  benefit  of  the  great 
things  done  for  linncrs  r  but  the  whole  family  in  hea- 
ven Viave  herein  ftronger  teflimonies,  and  more  lively, 
affecting  and  engaging  difcoveries,  of  the  infinite 
depth,  perfedtion  and  purit}'-  of  the  divine  love, 
than  they  woultl  otherwife  have  been  capable  of  re- 
ceiving :  wliich  difcoveries,  doubtlefs,  wonderfuilv 
open  and  enlarge  their  friendly  and  benevolent  hearts, 
and  exceedingly  increafe  their  felicity  and  joy  in  God. 
That  this  is  verily  the  cafe,  is  evidently  held  forth  in 
the  parable  of  our  bleifed  Lord  concerning  the  loll 
fheep.  Matt,  xviii.  12.  where  it  is  reprefented  as  a 
peculiar  ornament  and  teftimony  of  the  divine  love, 

Y  2  that 

*  V/e  are  not  to  fiippofe  that  the  fuffcring^  of  Chrift  were,  ftriclly  fpeiiking, 
i'ljiniu  :  though  very  extreme,  they  were  neverthelcl's  fmite.  I'he  wraih  whicli 
ex.lti  in  the  divine  mind  againft  finners,  is  really  without  bounds,  and  truly  in- 
tiiiite.  Tills  dii'plcal"i*re  of  Cod  with  linneri,  ChiiA  endured  in  its  natural  and 
genuine.etiods :  and  that  to  inch  a  degree,  and  in  luch  incaAire,  as,  coii(iderii\^ 
the  infinite  dignity  of  his  pcifon,  were  as  really  lulKcicnt  lo  cftablilh  the  divine 
auihority,  and  manifeft  God's  infinite  haired  of  iniquity,  as  tliough  this  difplea- 
J'ure  had  fallen  ca  the  finjier,  and  funk  hiui  into  tndlefs  perdition. 


An    ess  a  Y    on  Pan  II, 

that  -'  the  Son  of  man  came  to  fave  that  which  was 
loft."  The  concern  of  the  good  {hepherd  for  one  loft 
fhetpy  is  a  teftimony  of  his  aftetTiion  and  regard  for  the 
flock  ;  as  it  (heweth  what  pains  lie  will  take  to  recover 
^vcn  one.  So  the  divine  Being,  agreeable  to  this  iimil- 
itude,  manit'efleth,  in  the  falvation  of  finners,  not 
merely  his  love  to  us  ;  but  the  infinite  benevolence 
and  goodnefs  of  his  holy  and  pure  nature  in  general, 
to  the  abundant  joy  and  greater  felicity  of  every  vir- 
tuous being  in  the  v/hole  intelligent  fyflem. 

IV.  Another  valuable  end,  occafioned  by  the  exifl- 
ence  of  moral  evil,  is  the  peculiar  preparation  to  which 
it  formeth  fuch  imperfe(ft  creatures  as  men,  for  re- 
joicing in  God,  and  beholding  and  enjoying  the  infi- 
nite beauty,  riches  and  glory  of  his  free  and  abundant 
grace.  Nothing,  like  diilrefs  and  a  fenfe  of  danger, 
prepareth  the  heart  for  relifhing  affiftance  and  relief. 
Nothing,  like  a  fepfe  of  guilt,  ingratitude  and  unwor- 
thinefs,  formeth  and  fitteth  the  heart  for  rejoicing  in 
grace.  Such  is  the  imperfe(rtio,n  of  human,  and  indeed 
of  all  created,  nature,  that  things,  to  our  view,  are 
greatly  illuilrated  by  their  oppolites  ;  and  every  char- 
after  and  quality  appear  heightened  by  contrail.  Thus 
hunger  preparetl;  for  relifliing  food  ;  and  ficknefs,  for 
enjoying  health.  So  -wearinels  prepares  for  reft,  and 
fweetens  it  to  us  ;  and  darknefs,  for  making  the  light 
welcome  and  acceptable  to  us.  Hence  the  morning, 
light  is  a  known  emblem  of  joy  ;  and  the  period  of 
our  Ibrrows  is  often  compared  to  the  fteeing  of  the 
fJiadoius  of  the  flight.  Relief  5s  never  fo  acceptable  and 
grateful,  as  when  our  diflreifes  are  at  their  height  : 
itnd  never  is  any  fo  ready  to  aci^nowledge,  and  fo  pre- 
pared to  behoid,  the  glory  of  free,  fovereign  grace, 
as  when  he  hath  the  deepcft  fenfe  of  his  own  infinite 
vilencfs  autl  unworthinels,  and  moil;  feniibly  feeleth 
his  helplefinefs  and  dependence.  Hence  it  is  one  of 
the  charaftcrs  of  divine  grace^  which J)nrticiil(frly  tq- 
commendetli  it,  that  ils  ailiflance  and  relief  are  fo 
opportune— fo  peculiarly  feafpiiable  apd  timely.  Ac- 
cordingly 


.Scd^.I.  MORAL    AGENCY.  i8$ 

cordingly  \vc  find  it  faid,  liai.  xlix.  8.  "  Thus  faith 
"  the  Lord,  in  an  acceptable  time  have  I  heard  thee, 
"  and  in  the  day  of  faivation  have  I  helped  thee  :" 
that  is,  when  relief  and  alliilance  were  moil  needful. 
Agreeably  Chrift  is  reprefented  as  being  anointed 
*'  to  preach  good  tidings — to  proclaim  the  acceptable 
*'  year  of  the  Lord-— 2Lud  co?;.'fort  ail  t/iat  mourn. ^'  Ifai. 
Ixi.  I,  2.  Therefore  it  is  that  the  evangelical  Pro- 
phet, forefeeing  by  faith  the  coming  of  "  that  juft  one," 
exclaimeth  in  thole  tender  and  animating  ftrains-,  liai. 
lii.  7.  "  How  beautifnl  upon  the  mountains  are  the 
"  feet  of  him  that  bringeth  glad  tidings,  that  publiiheth 
*'  peace,  that  bringeth  good  tidings  of  good,  that  faith 
'^  unto  Zion,  T  h  y  G  o  d  r  e  i  gn  et  h." 

Here  are  fome  few  of  thofe  valuable  ends  which  ap- 
pear to  have  been  occafioned  by  the  exiflence  of  moral 
evil,  in  the  fyftcm. 

Now,  that  the  taking  place  of  iin  hath  opened  a 
wider  and  more  exteniive  field  of  operation,  and  iprcad 
a  icene  for  a  more  full  diiplay  and  manifcilation,  and 
Itrong  and  clear  dilcovery,  of  the  divine  perfections, 
js  a  faft,  of  which,  I  think,  there  cannot  poilibly  be 
any  dtniht.  The  eternal  deilruc^tion  of  ilnners,  it  can- 
not pofiibly  be  conceived,  will  be  any  Jiinclrance  or 
obfiritdion  to  thoie  manifeltations  of  the  divine  fulneis, 
fufiicicncy  and  goodnefs,  v/hich  he  will  make  towards 
the  choien  veiiels  of  his  mercy  and  grace.  There  is 
jiot  the  leait  realon  to  imagine  that  the  exiflence  of 
moral  evil  will  be  the  occaiion  of  preventiri'^  the  dii- 
coycry  of  any  thing  which  is  really  //.'  the  Deity ^  to  his 
cledt — the  virtuous  part  of  the  fyflem  of  created  intel- 
ligences. Nor  can  it  be  fuppoied  that  there  will  be 
any  thing,  occafioned  by  the  taking  place  of  fin^  in  any 
degree  to  obftrncl  the  faints*  vifion  of  the  divine  per- 
fe<^tion,  and  tiicir  apprehcniion  and  underflanding  of 
his  character  in  its  true  bcautv  and  excellencies,  in  the 
outward  exhibitions  which  are  made  of  it  :  unlefs, 
indeed,  the  eternal  deflruclion  of  ilnners  is  a  (lain  in 
i;he  divine  tharaiTtcr,  and  \\\<t  dark  part  of  it,  which 

ought 


190  A  N    E  S  S  A  Y    o  N  Part  XL 

ought  to  be  kept,  as  much  as  pofllble,  out  of  view  ; 
left  it  fhould,  in  the  apprehenfion  of  creatures,  fpread 
a  cloud  over  the  ways  of  God,  and  draw  a  veil  over 
the  luftre  and  brightnefs  which  would  otherwife  have 
been  made  vifible  to  creatures,  in  the  uninterrupted 
reign  of  holineis,  and  univerfai  felicity  and  happinels 
of  the  creation.  Now,  however  nigh  this  reprefenta^ 
tion  of  the  matter  may  approach  to  the  apprehenfions 
which  fome  entertain  of  the  divine  difpenfations  to- 
wards his  creatures,  in  the  eternal  deftruftion  of  fln- 
ners  ;  yet  nothing  can  be  more  palpably  impious  and 
abfurd.  On  tlie  contrary,  it  is  an  obvious  and  certain 
truth,  that  punitive  juftice  is  a  real  and  great  excellen- 
cy of  the  divine  character  ;  and  that  there  is  fcmething 
infinitely  amiable,  grand  and  beautiful  in  the  triumphs 
of  the  Great  King  over  his  obilinate,  impenitent 
enemies.  So  far  is  the  eternal  deftru^lion  of  finners 
from  obfcuring,  in  any  degree,  the  divine  pcrfeftions, 
that  it  is  an  event  whicli  greatly  illuflrates  them  in 
their  infinite  lovelinefs  and  true  beauty.  Creatures  have 
^//  t/ie  advanta^Fe  for  difcovcring  the  divine  excellency 
and  glory,  m  the  exercijes  of  his  mercy  and  goodnejs  to- 
luardthe  r.hofen  ohje6Is  of  his  favour^  wdiich  they  could 
poflibly  have  had,  if  there  never  had  been  any  fuch 
thing  as  moral  evil  in  the  fyftem  ;  yea,  and  if  what 
hath  been  faid  is  jnft,  far  greater  :  and,  fuperadded  to 
all  this,  they  have  the  advantage  of  that  full  and  abun- 
dantly clear  difcovery  which  is  made  of  the  divine 
purity,  goodnefs  and  love,  in  the  eternal  deltruclion 
of  the  wicked. 

If,  therefore,  a  fuller  and  more  abundant  difcovery 
and  rxianifeftation  of  the  divine  perfeaions,  is  2i  greater 
good^  than  a  lefs  clear  and  vifible  exhibition  of  tbem  ; 
then,  doubtlefs,  the  exiflence  of  moral  evil  is  the  occa- 
fion  of  greater  good.  And  if  a  more  abimdant  and 
extenfive  exercife  of  infinite  excellency^  in  the  produc- 
tion of  its  natural  fruits  and  genuine  efFe(fts,  is  a 
greater  good  than  a  lefs  extenfive  exercife  of  it  ;  it 
will  unqueflionably  follow,    that  where  there    is  the 

moil 


St^.t  MORAL    AGENCY.  191 

moft  clear  and  abundant  manifeflation  of  the  divine 
perfections,  tkere  is  the  greateft  good.  To  fay  that 
the  mort  extenfive  and  abundant  exer ciCe  of  hT/inite  ex- 
cellency^ in  the  production  of  its  genuine  fruits  and 
effects,  is  not  a  greater  good  tlian  a  Icfs  full  and  ex- 
tenfive exercife  of  it  ;  is  to  fay  that  infinite  excelleiicyy 
when  it  exerteth  its  productive  influence,  doth  not 
tend  to  produce  good:  or,  that  more  and  greater 
fruits  of  infinite  excellency  are  not  z.  great n-  good  X\\2Si 
lefs  and  more  fparing  fruits  of- it  :  either  of  which  is 
perfectly  contradi(fiory  and  abfurd. 

Nothing,  I  apprehend,  can  be  further  necefTary  in 
order  that  the  following  propofitions  may  gain  univer- 
fal  credit  and  affent,  than  barely  to  have  them  plainly 
cxprejj'ed  and  imderfiood^  viz.  That  the  divine  good- 
nefs  and  love,  which  particularly  appear  in  God's  op- 
pofing  his  enemies  and  fuch  as  oppofe  themfelves  to 
the  public  good,  could  not  have  appeared  if  there  had 
been  no  enemies  for  him  to  oppofe  : — That  the  advan- 
tage of  authority  which  is  particularly  gained  by  the 
cverlafling  dcilruftion  of  finners,  could  jiever  have 
been  gained  had  there  been  no  fmncrs  to  deflroy  : — • 
That  the  infinite  purity  and  holinefs,  and  the  averfion 
of  the  divine  mind  to  fui,  which  is  particularly  exer- 
cifed  atid  made  manifefi  in  the  punifhment  of  finners, 
cduld  not  have  been  exhibited  in  its  fruits  to  the  view  of 
creatures^  if  no  fuch  thing  as  moral  evil  had-  come  into 
exiftence  in  the  fyitem.  Thefe  are  certainly  manifclt 
and  felf-evident  truths.  There  needeth  no  long  chain 
of  reafoning  to  introduce  us  to  the  knowledge  of 
them — no  ftring  of  metaphyfics  to  lead  us  to  certainty 
in  fuch  points  as  thefe. 

From  thefe  confiderations  it  indubitably  and  demon- 
ftrably  appeareth,  that  moral  evil — the  exidence  of 
fm — hath,  in  faCt,  been  the  occafion  of  far  more  and 
greater  ^00^  than  ever  could  any  otherwife  have  been 
produced. 

But  however  clear  and  conclufivc  our  reafoning  and 

argumentation  may  appear  to  be,  in  the  prefent  cafe  ; 

•  it 


192  An    essay   CiJ  Part  It. 

it  will,  probably,  be  more  fatisfaftory  to  the  minds  of 
people,  to  find  that  the  opinion,  that  7}ioral  evil  is  the 
occalion  of  greater  ^ood^  is  an  opinion  evidently  fa- 
voured by  the  exprefs  declarations  oi  the  word  of  Cod  ; 
and  that  this  idea  is  there  plainly  fuggefled  to  us. 

W^hen  the  matter  is  properly  attended  to  and  confi- 
dered,  it  will  probably  appear  that  the  fcriptiires  are 
not  wanting  in  their  teftimony  to  the  truth  of  the 
opinion  under  confideration.  I  fliall,  therefore,  before 
I  finifh  the  feftion,  mention  a  few  texts  of  fcripture 
which  plainly  and  manifestly  imply  that  the  exiftence  of 
moral  evil  is  the  occafion  oi greater  goodi 

I.  That  the  taking  place  of  fin  hath  been  the  occa-* 
fion  o^ greater  good  in  the  fyftem,  is  manifeftly  implied 
in  feveral  things  faid  by  the  Apoflle  Paul^  in  the  fifth 
chapter  of  his  epiftle  to  the  Romans.  Where  he  draw- 
eth  the  parallel  between  Adam  and  Chrifl  ;  reprefent- 
ing  them  both  as  fuflaining  a  public  character,  and 
their  conduct  as  having  a  vaft  and  extenfive  influence 
upon  the  feveral  different  public  bodies  of  which  thefe 
two  perfons  Were  the  heads  ;  he  taketh  fpeeial  care 
that  this  grand  diftincil-ion  be  preferved  and  kept  up, 
notwithftanding  the  fimilitude  of  their  character  ill 
other  refpefts,  viz.  That  the  bene/lis  and  advantages 
ariiing  from  Chrift  on  the  one  hand,  far  outweigh  and 
overbalance  the  dijadvantages  arifnig  from  the  ill  con- 
duct and  wickednefs  of  Adam,  on  the  other.  He  fays, 
ver.  15.  "  But  7iot  as  the  offence,  fo  alfo  is  the  free 
''■gift.  For  if,  through  the  offence  of  one,  many  be 
*'  dead  ;  much  more  the  grace  of  God,  and  the  gift  by 
"  grace,  which  is  by  one  man,  Jefus  Chriftj  hath  a^ 
"  bounded  unto  many.''  Here  he  intimateth,  that 
grace  aboundcth  to  a  greater  extent  tlian  the  offence 
itfclf  hatli,  over  which  grace  is  triumphing  :  that  it 
extends  farther  than  to  a  bare  reparation  of  the  damage 
done  by  the  offence  ;  making  it  the  occafion  of  word* 
good — a  more  abundant  flow  of  goodncfs  and  grace. 
And  that  this  was  a  thing  in  defign  with  the  Deity,  is 
very   evident   from   what,   is    faid   in    the    20th   ver. 

"  Moreovel*, 


Sea. I.  MORAL  AGENCY.  195 

*^  Moreover,  the  law  entered,  that  the  offence  might 

"  aboand  :  but  where  fm  abounded,  grace  did  muc]t. 
*'  more  abound/'  Now  if  the  taking  place  of  fin  hath 
been  the  occafion  of  the  abounding  of  grace,  it  hath 
been  the  occafion  of  the  abounding  of  Good^  That 
which  doth  not  produce  good^  as  the  fruit  of  its  excr- 
cife,  cannot  be  grace.  There  is  no  grace  in  doing  any- 
thing wherein  there  is  no  good.  But  where  grace  is 
exercifed,  there,  it  is  evident,  good  is  produced  as  its 
effeft.  And  if  grace  aboundeth,  even  beyond  the  of- 
fence ;  or,  more  than  the  offence  itfelf  which  is  the 
occafion  that  grace  is  exercifcd  ;  then,  furely,  there  is 
more  good  effefted  by  grace,  than  there  was  evil  or 
detrhnent  by  the  ofience.  \f  grace  is  goodnefs-,  and  the 
exercife  of  grace,  doing  good  ;  it  cannot  truly  be  faid, 
thai:  grace  hath  abounded  more  than  the  offence^  unlefs 
the  good  produced  by  it  is  greater  than  the  evil  or  detri- 
ment occafioned  by  the  offence.  But  if  grace  more 
than  repaireth  the  damage,  and  maketh  good  the  lofs, 
lultained  by  the  offence  ;  it  is  unqueflionably  true, 
that  fm  hath  been  the  occafion  of  greater  goocL  If  the 
offence  liath  been  the  occafion  of  the  grace,  it  hath  been 
the  occafion  of  all  that  hath  been  produced  by  this 
grace.  And  il grace  is  goodnefs,  wherever  it  is  "exer- 
cifed  it  produceth  good.  And  if  it  hath  abounded 
more  than  the  offence^  then  the  good  which  it  hath  pro- 
duced is  greater  than  the  evil  introduced  by  the  offefice*. 
And  if  the  good  produced  by  grace  is  greater  than  the 
evil  introduced  by  fin,  then  (in  hath  been  the  occafion 
of  greater  good  than  would  have  been,  if  this  event  had 
never  taken  place. 

Thefe  realbnings  are  plain,  and,  I  am  humbly  of 
opinion,  conclufive.  It  appeareth  to  be  a  main  point, 
with  tlie  Apoftle,  to  make  it  evident  that  the  grace 
which  is  exercifed  through  Chrifl,  more  than  maketh 
good  the  damages  occafioned  by  the  fall  of  Adam,  and 
accruing  from  it.  If  fin  halh  occafioned  the  abounding 
cf  grace  ^  it  hath  occafioned  the  abounding  of  goodnefs . 
And  if  there  is  more  grace  exercifed  than  there  would 

Z  have 


1^4  An    essay    ok  Partlii 

liave  been  if  there  had  been  no  fuch  thing  as  moral  evil 
in  the  fyftem  ;  there  is,  of  confequence,  more  goodnefs 
exercifed  than  there  would  have  been,  had  there  been 
no  moral  evil*  And  if  the  divine  goodnefs,  when  it  is 
exercifed,  doth  good^  and  is  produclive  of  good  ;  the 
more  the  exerciies  of  it  abound^  the  more  good  is  eifecft-' 
ed  and  produced.  It  is,  therefore,  a  doftrine  plainly 
taught  by  the  Apoflle,  that  fin  is  the  occafion  of  great* 
er  good.  *  In  this  view  of  the  matter  the  Pfalm iit  had 
good  reafon  to  fay,  as  in  Pfal.  Ixxvi.  lo.  "  Surely 
•■'  the  wrath  of  man  fliall  praife  thee  ;  the  remainder 
"  of  wrath  fhalt  thou  reftrain."  He,  doubtlefs,  faw 
that  the  wickednefs  of  men  would  be  the  occafion  of 
greater  honour  and  glory  to  God,-  and  in  this  way 
work  his  prailes  :  which  is  jufi:  the  fame  as  to  fay, 
that  it  will  be  the  occafion  oi greater  Good. 

2.  Our  Saviour  himfelf  gave  full  teftimony  to  this 
truth.  It  appeareth  to  be  his  defign,  by  the  parable  of 
the  loft  fheep,  Luke  xv.  to  fhew  the  peculiarly  Ilrong 
and  lively  emotions  of  joy,  which  fhall  be  occafioned 
in  heaven  by  the  falvation  o^  fmners.  He  fays,  ver. 
7.  "  I  fay  unto  you,  that  likewife  joy  fl;all  be  in  hea- 
"  ven  over  07ie  Jinner  that  repenteth,  more  than  over 
*'  ninety  and  nine  jiiji  perjons  which  need  no  repent- 
*'  ance."  The  inhabitants  of  heaven,  being  perfecftly 
benevolent^  rejoice  moft  in  the  greutcft  good.  A  lejs 
good  Q.2.nnot  occafion  more  joy  in.  them,  than  a  greater  ^ 
this  would  be  iaconliitcnt  with  the  perfect  benevolence 

of 

*  This  is  the  conflrv;«fiion  which  Dt.  Taylor  rp.peatediy  puts  on  the  text  under 
t-oniideration.  He  thinks  it  abundantly  maniicftt  tiiat  it  was  the  deiign  and 
purpole  of  tlic  Aportle,  in  the  parallel  which  he  runneth  between  Adam  and 
Chrift,  to  preferve  this  important  diltinction,  viz-  That  the  l/fn^fiis  accruing 
fronr  the  death  of  QlxnUfar  cutivilgh  and  vi'erhalavce  the  dijadvanlages  occafion- 
ed by  the  fall  of  Adarr.  He  tells  us  (in  his  Scripture  Doctrine  of  Orijjina!  Sin, 
■p.  39.)  that  •«  Something  in  the  free  gift  in  Chiift,  anfwereth  to  fometiiinj;  in 
"  the  c^f»f f  of  Adam.  But  have  a  care,  faith  the  Apoftle,  you  do  not  imltine 
"  that  they  are,  in  all  refpcds,  parallel,  and  that  the  free  gift  is  jujl  of  the  fame 
**  extent  with  the  offence  and  its  confequences.  Though  no>^(  1  intend  to  draw 
*'  a  comparifon  betwixt  them,  yet  you  ought  to  know,  that  xhc\gT-uce  and  baieft: 
«' in  the  Redeemer  ov  E  u  r  L  ow  and  abound  y^zr  3f>'o;7</ the  confequences,  the 
««  ill  etleds,  of  the  tiift  ottence  "  So  p.  44.  that  God  hath  "  in  Chrift  beftow- 
«•  ed  benefits  and  bleffings  upon  mankind,  of  his  mere  favour,  far  excteding  and 
**■  abounding  hryjnd  the  confequences  of  Adam's  fin."  To  the  fame  purpofft 
doth  the  Dodor  exprefs  hinilelf  in  p.  58.  239.  and  eUcv.hcre  in  his  book. 


Sea.  I.  MORAL    AGENCY.  195 

of  their  hearts.  And  if  the  falvation  o?  one  finne?- \V2^7. 
not  2t.~ great i^r  good  than  the  happinefs  of  ninety  and  nine 
juft  perfons  who  need  no  repentance  ;  how  is  it  con- 
cc-ivable  that  there  fhould  be  more  joy  in  heaven  over 
one  (Inner  that  repenteth,  than  over  ninety  and  nine 
juft  perlbns  who  need  no  repentance  ? 

There  is,  undoubtedly,  more  goodnefs  exercifcd  in 
the  falvation  of  one  finner^  than  would  or  could  have 
been  in  the  happinefs  of  ninety  and  nine  juft  perfons 
who  need  no  repentance  ;  and  a  brighter  difplay  of 
all  the  divine  perfections,  which  is  the  great  good  of 
the  intellcclual  fyflem  :  otherwife  it  could  not  occafion 
greater  joy  iu  the  inhabitants  of  heaven,  whole  hearts 
rejoice  mnft  in  the  ^reatefl  good.  And  if  there  is  more 
goodnefs  exercijed  in  the  former  cafe,  than  in  the  lat- 
ter ;  there  is',  of  confequence,  more  good  a(^ually  ef- 
fefted  and  produced.  If  the  former  event  was  not  a 
greater  good  than  the  latter  ;  it  would  be  utterly  un- 
accountable that  it  fliould  occafion  greater  joy  in 
heaven — as  being  an  event  more  pleafmg  to  the  bene- 
volent fpirits  who  inhabit  it.  Accordingly, 

3.  The  exercifes  of  divine  mercy  and  g  r.a  c  e  arc 
reprefented,  in  fcripture,  as  the  grand  objeft  in  view, 
even  in  creation,  and  the  great  and  ultimate  end  for 
v/hich  our  world  itfelf  was  made.  Therefore  Paul 
faith,  Ephef.  iii.  8,  9,  10.  "^  Unto  me,  who  am  lefs 
'*  than  the  leaft  of  all  faints,  is  this  grace  given,  that  I 
"  fiiould  preach  among  Gentiles  the  iinj'earchable  riches 
"  of  Chrift  ;  and  to  make  all  men  fee  what  is  the  fel-^ 
"  lowfliip  of  the  myftery  which  from  the  beginning  of 
''  the  world  hath  been  hid  in  God,  vjho  created  all 
"  things  by  'Jejus  Chrift  :  to  the  intent  that  noiv  unto 
"  principalities  and  powers^  in  heavenly  places ^  ??nght  be 
^^  h^ioxvn  BY  THE  CHURCH  the  manifold  ivifdorn  of 
^^Wjod.'*  The  church  is  the  mediuni  through  which 
this  manifold  wifdom  of  God  is  to  be  fecn,  and  to  ap- 
pear. Therefore  is  it  reprefented,  that  God  created 
all  things  by  Chrift^  to  fliew  the  infinite  importance  of 
the  'tnediatorial  character  in  the  divine  fyllcm  of  gov- 

Z  2  ■cnunent 


156  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  P^rt  II. 

eminent  and  adminiftration  ;  and,  that  this  charader 
lay  at  the  very  bottom  and  foundation  oi  even  the  cre- 
ation. Accordingly  Paul  tells  us,  CololT.  i..i6«  that 
*'  all  things  were  created  by  him  (Chrifl)  and  for  him/' 
And  ver.  17.  that  "  by  him  all  things  confift.'*  And 
ver.  15.  that  he  is  "  t\\tfirf}  horn  of  every  creature." 
And  he  is  faid,  Rev.  iii .  14.  to  be  "  the  beginning  of 
the  creation  of  God.'*  And  xiii.  8.  he  is  ftyled  a 
**  lamb  ilain  from  tYie  foiindatioji  of  the  world."  Thefe 
titles  and  epithets,  and  this  manner  of  expreffion, 
plainly  lead  us  to  confider  the  invefliture  of  the  fecond 
perfon  in  the  glorious  Trinity  with  his  mediatorial 
office  and  character,  as  being  original  in  all  God's 
works,  and  the  foundation  of  them  all  ;  and,  that  the 
difplay  of  the  divine  perfections,  which  is  made  in  this- 
charader,  was  Xht  great  and  ultimate  end  of  creation. 
This  is  the  good  which  God  defigned  to  bring  about 
and  accompiilh,  in  and  by  the  work  of  creation  : 
which  will  by  no  means  admit  the  fuppofition,  that  fo 
great  good  could  be  effected  in  any  other  way.  No- 
tiiing  can  be  more  abfurd  and  inconfi'flent  with  the  di- 
vine perfeftions  and  character,  than  to  fuppofe  that  a 
method  of  adminiftration,  and  of  the  exhibition  of  the 
divine  perfed:ions,  fo  infinitely  expenjive^  fhbuld  be 
chofen  by  the  moll  perfect  and  confummate  wifdom  ; 
unlels  greater  good  was  to  be  effxsfted  />;  this  luay,  than 
could  be  in  any  other.  It  is  infinitely  unlikely  that  the 
wife  and  good  God  fhould  make  choice  of  fo  expensive 
away  for  accompli{hing  an  end,  no  better,  and  no 
more  valuable,  than  might  have  been  accomplifhed 
without  this  expence. 

4.  Chrift  Jefus  is  faid  to  be  the  brightnefs  of  the 
Father's  glory,  and  the  exprefs  image  of  his  perfon. 
Heb.  i.  q.  Which  words  manifeftly  intimate  z/pecial 
dijplay  of  the  divine  excellencies  and  perfe<ftions-*a 
peculiar  efflilgenty  of  the  divine  glory,  in  the  perfon 
and  charafter  of  Chrift.  And  if  the  exiftence  of  moral 
evil  hath  been  the  occailon  of  Chrift's  glorious  under- 
taking ;  then  it  has,  likewife,  been  the  Qccaiion  of  the 

Ipecial 


Sea.  I.  MORAL    AGENCY.  197 

fpecial  effulgence  of  the  divine  glory,  and  of  the  ap- 
pearance of  that  peculiar  brightnefs  which  fiiines  forth 
in  the  great  work  of  redemption.  If  Chrift  is  the 
brightneis  of  the  Father's  glory  ;  the  Godhead,  then, 
is  doubtlefs  exhibiting  itfelf  to  view  with  Jpeci.il  and 
peculiar  clearnejs^  in  the  perfon,  offices  and  charafter 
of  Chrift.  But  can  any  imagine  that  God  is  doing 
i'omething  peculiarly  for  his  honour  and  glory  ^  and  v/hich 
he  defigneth  as  a  Jpecial  bripjitnejs  and  effulgence  of  his 
infinitely  perfect  and  excellent  nature  ;  and  yet  that 
710  fpecial  a7id  peculiar  good  is  effedled  and  produced  ? 
How  doth  or  can  the  Deity  moft  difcover  his  glory, 
but  in  doing  the  niofl  good — cffe(fling  the  moft  excel- 
lent and  valuable  ends  ?  Nothing  can  be  more  re- 
proachful to  God,  than  to  fuppofe  that  there  'wa.  fpecial 
exercij'e  of  his  perfeftions,  and  a  particular  manifeftation 
of  them,  in  fruits  ;  and  yet  that  no  greater  good^  no 
more  valuable  erids^  are  thereby  effected  and  accom- 
plilhcd.  This  would  be  the  fame  as  to  fay,  that  the 
peculiar  c>:cellency  and  glory  of  the  divine  Being  doth 
not  confift  in  an  ability  and  difpolition  to  do  the  moft: 
excellent  things. 

5.  Another  argument  in  favour  of  the  opinion  under 
confideration  may  be  drawn  from  the  exprefs,  manifeft 
defign  of  the  Deity,  in  raifing  up  Pharaoh,  and  fufter- 
ing  ib  long  his  moft  bold,  arrogant  and  daring  oppofi- 
tion  to  him  ;  and  tlic  very  great  good  which  was, 
through  this  means,  accompliflicd. 

It  is  very  manifeft  that  ihe  oppofition  of  Pharaoh 
and  his  people,  to  the  God  of  Ifrael,  turned  out,  in 
event,  greatly  to  the  honour  of  God.  It  was  the  oc- 
cafion  of  his  being  fignally  honoured,  and  wonderfully 
glorified.  A  peculiar  good  hy  this  means  was  effected 
— a  great  and  wonderful  eftablifliment  of  liis  authority 
and  fupremacy — a  fear  of  his  great  and  glorious  name 
— an  extenfiye  fpread  of  the  knowledge  of  it — and  a 
great  awe  and  reverence  of  Jehovah  begotten  in  tlie 
hearts  of  men.  Tbefe  are  ends  peculiarly  valuable 
and  excellent,  and  -.vorthy  to  be  accomplift:ed  at  great 

expence. 


I9&  An    ess  a  Y    on  Part  II. 

cxpencc.  Therefore  God  faith,  Excel,  ix.  i6.  "  And 
*'  in  very  deed  for  this  caujfe  have  I  raifcd  thee  up, 
*'  for  to  ihew  in  thee  my  power  ;  and  that  my  name 
**  may  be  declared  throughout  all  the  earth.*' 

Pharaoh  and  his  people,  who  fo  oppreffed  Ifrael, 
very  manifeftly  in  figure  reprefented  fatan  and  his  chil- 
dren. They  were  defigncd  as  a  figurative  reprefenta-» 
tion  of  the  powers  of  darknefs,  engaged  againfl  Chrift 
and  his  glorious  caufe.  The  people  of  Ifrael,  in  a 
figure,  reprefented  the  whole  Church  of  Chrift.  There- 
fore it  is  that  the  faints  in  heaven,  who  have  gotten 
the  vidlory  over  fatan,  are  reprefented,  Rev.  xv.  3. 
as  finging  the  fong  of  Moses  and  the  fong  of  the 
Lamb.  And  if  the  oppofitipn  of  Pharaoh  and  his  peo- 
ple, to  the  God  of  Ifrael,  was  the  occafion  o^ greater 
pood  ;  doubtlefs  the  oppofition  of  fatan  and  his  fol- 
lowers, to  Chrift,  will  likewife  be  the  occafion  of 
greater  good.  If  the  fm  of  one  is  over-ruled  to  greater 
good,  the  fm  of  another,  alfo,  is  ;  and,  without  quel- 
tion,  the  fm  of  all.  So  that,  upon  the  w^hole,  it  is 
abundantly  evident,  there  will  be  more  glory  to  God, 
and  more  good  in  the  fyftem,  than  if  fm  had  never 
taken  place. 

Other  arguments  to  the  point  in  hand  might  be  col- 
Jefted  out  of  the  holy  fcriptures  ;  but  1  ftudy  brevity  : 
and  the  obfervations  which  have  been  already  made 
upon  the  exprefs  declarations  of  the  v/ord  of  God,  are 
fuificient  to  fliew,  that  the  opinion  of  greater  good 
being  occafioned  by  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil,  was 
not  unknovi^n  to  the  facred  writers  ;  nor  is  this  a  doc- 
trine of  human  invention,  upon  which  the  Jcriptures 
are  fllent,  and  into  which  they  give  us  r.o  light  and 
information. 


S  LC't. 


Sea.n.  MORALAGENCy,  199 


Sect.     II. 

Shewing  that  it  luns^  upon  the  ivhole^  a  dcfirahle  things 
that  MORAL  i^witfliould  take  place  in  the  fy/iem* 

IF  it  is  once  admitted,  that  the  exigence  of  moral 
evil  is  the  occafion  of  greater  good  ;  and  that  it 
was  a  neceffary  means  of  h.3.vlng  th€  greate/^  good  ef- 
fecT:ed  and  produced  ;  it  will  follow,  of  courfe,  that  it 
was,  upon  the  whole,  a  defirable  thing  that  fuch  aa 
event  fliould  take  place  in  the  intelligent  lyflem.  If  a 
greater  good  is,  upon  the  whole,  defirable,  in  prefer- 
ence to  a  lefs  ;  then,  doubtlefs,  every  thing  which  is 
neceirary  to  the  accomplifhment  of  the  greater  good, 
is  alfo  clefirable.  To  fay  that  any  end  is,  upon  the 
whole,  defirable,  is  to  fay  that  all  the  necelTary  means 
6f  tlie  accomplifliment  of  this  end  are  alfo  defirable. 
To  fay  that  any  end  is,  upon  the  whole,  defirable  ; 
and  yet  that  the  means  through  which  alone  this  end 
is  capable  of  being  effccfted  and  accompliflicd,  are, 
upon  the  whole,  undeiirable  ;  is  perfeftly  contradifto- 
ry  and  abfurd.  For  however  undefirable  the  means 
may  be,  in  themfelvcs  confidered,  and  for  their  own 
iake  ;  yet  if  the  expence  of  the  means  is  not  equal  to 
the  gain  attending  the  end  ;  the  means,  however  dif- 
agreeable  in  themfelves,  yet,  upon  the  whole,  and  in 
a  relative  view  of  them,  are  defirable.  If  the  Good^ 
contained  and  comprehended  in  the  final  iflue  and 
event,  outweighs  and  overbalanceth  the  evil  attending 
the  means  which  are  necejj'ary  in  order  to  the  accom.- 
plifliment  of  it  ;  in  that  cafe  the  end,  confidered  in 
its  whole  connexion,  and  in  its  neceffary  relation  to 
the  means  whereby  it  is  effected,  may  with  truth  and 
propriety  be  faid  to  be  defirable  and  good.  And  if  the 
exiftence  of  moral  evil  is  a  necelTary  means  of  the 
greater  Good  ;  there  can  be  no  reafonable  obje<ftioa 
againft  the  taking  place  of  fuch  an  event  ;   but,  on  the 

other 


aoo  AnESSAYon  Part  IT. 

other  hand,  a  perfectly  benevolent  heart  wetild  naturally 
and  necefTarlly  defiie  the  exiflence  of  it. 

Only,  I  requcft  that  the  following  things  may  be 
carefully  remembered  and  kept  in  mind,  when  I  Ijpeak 
of  the  defirahlenejs  of  fuch  an  event. 

1.  That  there  is  nothing  in  the  nature  rtf  moral  evil 
which  is  in  itfelf  defirable  ;  this,  the  argument  under 
confideration  doth  not  fuppofe.  There  is  nothing  in 
the  nature  of  fm,  but  what  is,  in  itfelf  and  for  its  own 

Jake^  infinitely  abominable  and  hateful.  Sin  is  perfectly 
hateful  in  itlelf,  and  in  its  own  nature,  for  being  what 
it  is,  without  any  relation  to  any  thing  out  of  itfelf, 
either  as  caiife  or  effed.  Such  is  the  intrinfic  nature  of 
fin,  that  it  is  abfolutely  impoffible  that  the  pure  and 
holy  mind  of  God^owXdi  view  it  otherwife  than  with  the 
mof}  entire  and  perfed  abhorrence* 

Nor  is  there  any  thing  in  fm,  of  iu  hat  ever  other 
event  it  may  he  the  occafion  and  means^  that  is  not  al- 
together hateful  and  abominable  in  the  eyes  of  good 
and  holy  men.  Yea,  let  it  be  the  occafion  of  what  elfe 
it  wnil,  it  is  eficntial  to  the  character,  and  is  one  prin- 
cipal evidence,  of  true  goodncfs,  utterly  to  hate,  abhor 
and  deteft  it.  And  the  more  any  one  groweth  in 
grace,  and  increafcth  in  hoiinefs  and  nearnefs  to  God, 
the  more  will  he  neceffarily  hate  fm,  and  be  difpleafed 
with  it. 

2.  There  is  nothing  in  the  tendency  of  fin,  on  nc« 
count  of  which  it  is  delirable.  Whatever  Good^  fin 
may  be  the  means  and  occafion  of,  through  the  over- 
ruling hand  of  infinite  wifdom.and  power  ;  ftill  there 
Is  720  tendeiicy  in  moral  evil  itfelf  to  any  Good^  which 
might  reafonably  induce  any  one  to  choofe  and  prefer 
the  exiflence  of  it. 

If  the- Deity  taketh  occafion,  from  the  exigence  of 
moral  evil,  to  bring  about  any  thing  whizh.  is  valua- 
ble and  good  ;  it  is  by  refifting  the  natural  ten- 
dency of  moral  evil  itfelf,  and  over-ruling  it  as  a 
means  of  tlie  accomplifhment  of  an  end  direClly   the 

reverj.e 


Seft.  !I.  MORAL    AGENCY.  idl 

reverfe  of  that,  to  which  moral  evil  itfelf  naturally 

tendeth.* 

3.  It  is  only  in  a  relative  vieiv  that  the  exigence  of 
mnral  evil  can,  with  any  propriety,  be  faid  to  be  de- 
firable.  It  is  eafily  conceivable  that  fomething,  which 
is  very  evil  and  undefirable  in  itfel.f\  and  for  its  ozvn 
j'ake^  may  yet  ftand  fo  related  to  fomething  which  is  in 
itfelf  good  and  excellent^  as  to  make  it^  upon  the  whole, 
defirablc.  An  event,  which  for  its  own  fake  is  jnllly 
to  be  dreaddd  and  abhorredj  may,  ncverthelefs,  fland 
{b  related  to  another  event,  w'hich  is  in  itfelf  and  for 
its  own  fake  very  dc fir  able  ^  as  to  become  the  objed:  of  a 
virtuous  and  benevolent  delire.  There  is  nothing  in- 
conceivable in  fuppofing  the  fame  event  to  be,  in  on6 
view,  defirable  ;  andj  in  another,  undefirable.  A  very 
ftrong  and  pregnant  inftance  of  this  fort  we  have  in 
the  death  of  Chriit.  Such  was  his  abhorrence  of  the 
fufferings  which  were  before  him,  that  he  prayed  the 
Father,  that,  *'  if  it  were  poffihle^  that  cup  might  pafs 
from  him. '*  Mat.  xxvi*  39.  And  yet  nothing  is  more 
evident  than  that  this  event,  considered  in  all  its  con- 
fequcnces  and  connexions,  was  ckofsn  and  confidered 
as  being  defirahle  by  our  bleffed  Lord.  For  when,  his 
foul  being  troubled^  he  prayed,  '*  Father,  fave  me 
from  this  hour  ;"  he  immediately  addeth,  "  But  for 
*■*  this  caufe  came  I  unto  this  hour.  Father,  glorify 
*'  thy  name."  John  xii.  27,  28.  Here  is  an  event, 
wliich,  it  is  abundantly  evident,  our  Saviout-,  in  o?ic 
view  cfit^  exceedingly  dreaded  and  abhorred  ;  yet,  iiz 
another^  made  the  objeft  of  an  aiftual  preference  and 
choice.  To  fuftcr  God^s  difpleafure,  and  die  under 
his  wrath,  our  Lord  confidered  a  very  great  evil ;  and 

A  a  yet, 

•  •«  Sin  in  its  own  nature  hath  no  tendency  to  gooJ ;  'tis  not  an  apt  medium, 
»•  hath  110  proper  rjicacy,  to  promo'e  the  glory  of  God  i  fo  far  is  it  from  a  dirtr^  . 
"  contributing  to  it,  that  on  the  contrary  it  is  moft  real  diihonour  to  him.  But 
*"  as  a  black  groimd  in  a  picture,  which  in  itfelf  only  defiles,  when  placed  by  art 
««  fcrs  off  the  hrii^hter  roloui-;,  and  brif^htens  their  bcrauy  ;  fo  the  evil  of  lin, 
"  which,    confidered  abfolutely,    obfcures    the  glorv  of   God,    yet,    by  the  over- 

•  »  rulint;  difpofition  of  his  providence,  it  fervcs  to  iliurtrate  his  name,  and  malce 
«'  it  tmrf  gl ,rlotis  in  the  eftccm  of  rcafonable  creatureb.  IFlthout  the  fin  of  mart, 
M  there  had  been  no  place  Jar  the  moji  frifici  cxcrcfr  of  hh  goodnef."      (See  Biitit 

♦  T  the  bjt'7,toity  of  the  Ji-:'ine  ar.riiurt/,  edit.  ill.  p'.  2l,  Zi.) 


*2<>2  An    Ifc  S  S  a  Y    01*  Part  If, 

•yet,  ill  its  real  relation  to  that  great  ai^d  infinite  good 
efFe6led  by  the  death  of  Chrifl,  and  its  connexion  with 
it,  it  was  really  preferred  and  chojen  by  our  bleffed 
Lord. 

Thefe  things  being  preniifed,  I  proceed  to  offer  x\\t 
following  arguments  to  confideration,  in  proof  of  its 
being  upon  the  luholez.  defirable  thing  that  moral  evil 
fhould  come  into  exiflence. 

It  is  abiblately  defirable,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
that  the  greattji  good  fliouid  be  actually  effecled  and- 
produced.  The  idea  of  good  ahv^ays  implieth  defira- 
blenefs.  Every  thing  which  is  good^  is,  in  that  view, 
and  fo  far,  deiirable  :  to  fuppofe  the  contrary  is  con- 
tradiftory  and  abfurd.  The  greater  any  conceivable 
good  is,  the  more  defirable  is  it  that  it  fliOuld  come 
into  exiflence.  The  great  eft  good^  therefore,  is  mo  ft 
defirable  ;  a  heaft  perfeftly  benevolent  and  virtuous 
will  mofl  ardently  delire  it,  and  be  perfectly  let  upofi 
it. 

2 .  That  wliich  is  defirable,  upon  the  iuhole^  is  deiira- 
ble confidered  in  all  its  relations^  confequences  and  con- 
nexions. When  an  event  may  be  faid,  upon  the 
.whole,  to  be  truly  defirable  ;  all  the  means  which  are 
neceffary  to  the  exiftence  of  that  event,  are  alfo  de- 
iirable. To  fuppofe  any  thing,  though  defirable  in 
atfelf  and  for  its  own  fake,  yet,  in  a  relative  view  and 
in  connexion  with  the  neceffary  means  of  its  accom- 
piifliment,  undefirable  ;  ij  to  fuppof(*  that  //  is  not^ 
upon  the  whole^  all  things  being  confidered,  a  defirable 
thing  that  the  event  Ihould  come  into  exiftence.  But 
when  an  event,  confidered  in  all  its  relations  and  con- 
nexions, is  really  deiirable  ;  that  is  a  confideration 
which  rendereth  it  a  defirable  thing  that  thofe  fubor- 
dinate  events,  which  are  neceffary  means  of  its  accom- 
plifhment,  fhould  alfo  come  into  exiflence.  When  wc 
wifli  for  an  event,  we  wifli  for  every  thing  which  is 
neceffary  to  that  event,  and  neceflarily  connefted  with  : 
it.  And  though  the  means  may  be,  in  their  nature  and 
on  their  own  account,  undefirable  5    yet,  in  a  relative 

vievvy 


Sjeft.  II.  MORAL    AGENCY.  20? 


o 


view,  and  confidered  as  in  connexion  with  the  event, 
they  are  delirable.  Nor  doth  it  argue  any  love  to  the 
means  for  t/ieir  own  fnke^  for  any  one  really  to  defire 
and  vvi/li  for  them.  This,  alio,  may  be  illuftrated  by 
that  very  marvellous  event,  the  death  of  Chriit.  The 
crucifixion  of  the  Lord  of  glory  ;  confidered  as  tranf^ 
aded  by  finners^  and  being  the  ftrongeft  oppofition  to 
infinite  excellency  and  goodnefs,  and  a  mofl  furprifing 
cfFedt  of  the  enmity  of  the  hearts  of  men  againfl  God  ; 
was  the'  moll  abominable  and  hateful  event  that  was 
ever  tranfacfled  here  in  our  world  :  And  yet  this  fame 
event,  confidered  in  its  relation  to  the  glory  of  God 
and  the  falvation  of  fmners,  was  the  moftdefirable  and 
happy  event  that  ever  took  place  in  any  part  of  the 
iyftem.  This  being  an  event  which  hath  lb  favour  a-' 
hie  an  afped  upon  the  felicity  of  lofl  men  ;  we  do  not 
hear  mankind  complain  of  it  2.^  firajige  doCirine^  utterly 
incoif/ijrent  with  the  idea  of  the  great  and  infinite  evil  of 
fin^  to  reprefent  the  death  of  Chrift  as  being,  upon  the 
whole,  a  defirable  event.  And  if  the  crucifixion  of  our 
Lord  was,  upon  the  whole,  a  dehrable  event ;  then 
that  conducft  of  the  Jews,  which  was  neceflary  to  the 
taking  place  of  this  event,  was  alio  defirable.  But 
ttiis  conduct  of  the  Jews  was,  in  itfelf,  infinitely  evil 
a,nd  finful  ;  and,  therefore,  -in  itfelf,  molt  abominable 
and  hateful.  Yet  even  this  conduct,  wicked  and  finful 
as  it  was,  in  the  ftate  wherein  things  then  aftuaily 
were,  and  in  its  relation  to  that  which  was  the  great 
and  principal  end  of  the  death  of  Chrift,  was  unquef- 
tionably  defirable.  Nor  are  men  wont  to  exclaim 
againfl  it  as  a  dodlrine  tending;  to  licentioufncfs,  when 
the  crucifixion  of  our  Lord  is  reprefcnted  as  upon  the 

whole  a  defirable  event. It  therefore  followeth, 

3.  That  whatever  llandeth  in  fuch  a  relation  to  an 
event  which  is  defirable  upon  the  whole^  as  to  be  effen- 
tial  to  the  exiftence  of  that  event,  and  a  necelTaiy  means 
of  its  taking  place,  is,  alfo,  itfelf  defirable.  It  is  defi- 
rable that  that  event,  whatever  it  is,  fhould  take  place, 
without  which  the  greatefl  good  cannot  be  accomplilh- 

A  a^  ^  ed^ 


^94  An    E  S  S  A  Y    on  Part  IL 

cd,  and  fomething,  which  is  upon  the  whole  defirable, 
cannot  come  into  exiftence.  Whatever  fin,  therefore, 
is  a  necejj'ary  means  of  the  prertefl  good,  it  is  a  defirable 
thing  that  it  fhould  exilt  and  take  place  in  event.  But 
it  hath  been  before  fhown,  that  fm  is  the  occafion  of 
greater  good  :  yea,  and  that  the  imperfe£tion  of  created 
nature  is  fuch,  that  this  greater  good  could  not 'p^{[ib\y 
be  effefted  without  the  intervention  of  fm,  or  the  tak- 
ing place  of  moral  evil  in  the  fyflem. 

4.  It  is  defirable,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  the 
difpofition  of  the  divine  mind  tov/ards  fm,  fiiould  moft 
clearly  and  fully  appear  to  the  views  and  apprehenfions 
of  rational,  intelligent  creatures.  7'hat  which  is  lovely 
and  beautiful  m  iifcif^  mufl  alfo  be  lovely  and  beautiful 
in  its  appearance.  That  which  is  excellent  in  its  exift- 
ence,  mufh  likewife  be  excellent  m  its  exercije.  That 
which  it  is  a  defirable  thing  that  it  fhould  ("x//?,  is  alfo 
a  defirable  thing  Ihould  be  exercifed  :  for  if  the  exercije 
is  not  defirable,  the  exigence  alfo  is  not  defirable.  \i 
\t  is,  therefore,  a  defirable  thing  that  the  real  hatred  of 
the  divine  mind  to  Jin  fliould  exifi^  it  is  a  defirable  thing 
that  it  Ihouid  be  exercifed.  And  if  it  is  a  defirable 
thing  that  hatred  of  the  divine  mind  to  lin  fhould  be 
mamfcfled  and  appear^  it  was  a  defirable  thing  that  there 
ihould  h^.  fiiitabU?  objeds  toward  whom  this  difpofition 
of  the  divine  mind  might  be  manifcfled  and  appear. 
If  it  is  a  defirable  thing  that  the  hatred  of  the  divine 
mind  to  fin  fhould  be  exercifed^  it  is  of  courfe  a  defira- 
ble thing  that  there  fnould  be  fome  proper  objcifls  to- 
Tvard  wliom  to  exercife  it.  And  on  whom  is  it  poUible 
that  God  fhould  exercife  and  raanifeft  his  hatred  of  fin, 
but  the  finner  f  It  is,  therefore,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
defirable  that  fuch  beings  as  finners  fhould  exift  in  the 
intelligent  fyflem  :  conlequently,  a  defirable  thing  that 
moral  evil  fnould  come  into  exiftence, 

5.  That  exercife  of  the  divine  gocdnefs,  which  is, 
in  fcriptare,  by  way  cf  eminence,  called  grace,  is 
reprefcnted  as  the  very  glory  of  the  divine  nature  ; 
and  the  difplay  and  difcovery  of  it,  the  great  and  prin- 
cipal 


Sci^.  II.  MORAL    AGENCYo  205- 

cipal  end  of  creation.  And  as  it  was,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  defirable  that  the  riches  of  divine  jnercy  and  grace 
ftiouid  be  manifefted  and  difplayed,  and  appear  and  be 
exhibited  in  their  natural  and  genuine  fruits  ;  fo  it  was 
delirable,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  there  fhould 
c:<:ift,  foraewhere  in  the  intelligent  fyflem,  objccls  of 
mercy  or  of  grace.  It  is  eafy  to  fee  that  tiiere  could 
have  been  no  room  for  jjiercy  and  grace  to  be  exercifed, 
had  moral  evil  never  taken  pjace.  The  holy  and  vir- 
tuous, who  never  rebelled  againft  God,  though  tliey 
have  not  in  them  any  proper  dejert  of  that  favour  and 
goodnefs  which  is  conilantly  exercifed  towards  them  ; 
yet,  it  is  very  evident,  are  not  properly  objeds  of 
viercy  and  grace.  The  mercy  and  grace  of  God  are 
exercifed  only  toward  finners — the  ill-deferving.  The 
divine  goodnefs  never  could  have  appeared  in  that 
peculiar  glory  and  brightnefs,  which,  in  fcripture,  are 
called  GRACE,  if  there  had  been  no  Tinners  to  become 
the  fubje<^s  of  it.  And  as  mercy  ij\A  grace  are  repre- 
fented  as  being  the  peculiar  glory  a-nd  perfeLiion  of  God  ; 
fo  was  it  peculiarly  deferable  that  they  fliould  appear, 
and  be  exhibited  in  thjeir  fruits,  to  the  views  of  intelli- 
gent creatures.  And,  therefore,  it  was  a  defirable 
thing,  and  what  would  be  the  objed  of  the  real  wifli 
of  an  infinitely  benevolent  heart,  that  there  might  be 
and  exift  a  proper  andjiiitahle  occafion  for  the  exercife 
and  dlfcovery  of  that  peculiarly  beautiful  and  glorious 
attribute  of  God  called  grace  :  confequently  it  was 
really,  in  the  nature  of  things,  defirable  that  moral 
evil  Hiould  take  place.  As  it  was,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  defirable  that  the  peculiar  brightnefs  and  glory 
of  the  divine  charafter  Ihould  appear  ;  fo  was  it  defi- 
rable that  there  fiiouid  be  fome  ?nedium  through  which 
creatures  might  be  ehablcd  to  behold  it.  Without 
Jo^ue  niedimn^  it  folioweth  from  what  hath  been  before 
faid  refpecling  the  natural  ijn^erfcCUon  infeparable  f-om 
the  very  idea  ofc  R  f.  AT  u  R  E,  and  the  inability  of  crea- 
tares  to  behold  and  perceive  the  divine  perfections  any 
otherwifc  than  as  appearing  ia  fruits  and  cffeds,  that 

they 


2o6  Aw    ESSAY    on  Fart  II. 


they  nCvcr  could  behold  and  apprehend  that  in  God, 
which  is  called  his  grace.  There  cun  be  no  nicdhim 
through  which  creatures  are  capable  of  beholding  dijr 
vine  mercy  and  grace^  but  that  nirworthinejs  and  ill-de- 
fert  there  is  in  a  Unner.  And  that  unworthinefs  and  ill^ 
defert^  every  one  may  fee,  cannot  exilt,  unlefs  there  is 
a  finner — unlefs  moral  evil  taketh  place. 

If  It  is  only  acknowledged,  that  the  mercy  and  grace 
of  God  are  his  peculiar  glory ^  or  a  peculiar  brightnefs 
and  full  exercife  of  his  inherent  excellency  ;  it  v/il| 
manifeflly  follow,  that  the  exercises  of  divine  mercy 
and  grace  do  peculiar  good  in  the  fyftem,  and  efFexft 
purpofes  and  deligns  which  are  peculiarly  excellent  ; 
being  produdlive  of  a  more  valuable  endthdin  could  have 
been  elTefted  without  the  difcovery  and  ^xercife  of 
them. 

If  the  fyftem  would  have  been  a^  perfed  and  complete 
without  moral  evil  ;  the  divine  character,  of  courfe, 
would  have  been  as  excellent  and  beautiful -withcmt  that 
in  it,  which  peculiarly  and  ejpec.ially  appeareth  and  is 
manifefted  both  in  tlie  exerciies  of  his  7^2(f;Yj  and^r<7<:<f, 
and  alfo  in  the  eternal  punifhment  of  the  wicked.  For 
in  a  fyftem  perfe<^ly  without  fin,  there  w^ould  never 
have  been  any  occalion  for  thefe  peculiar  glories  of  the 
Deity — Xhh  Jplendor  of  the  divine  chara«5ler  ;  nor,  op- 
portunity for  the  leaft  degree  of  the  exercife  thereof. 
And  certainly  the  divine  character  would  be  as  abfo- 
lutely  perfect  without  that  which  never  could  be  exer- 
cifed  and  appear  in  fruits — there  being  no  pojjible  oppor- 
tunity for  it,  as  with  it.  And  if,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  the  divine  cliaracler  might  have  been  as  abfo- 
lutely  perfeft  and  complete  without  Ihat'in  God,  M'hich 
peculiarly  appeareth  and  is  manifcfled,  both  in  the  ex- 
ercifes  of  his  grace  toward  the  vefTels  of  his  mercy, 
and  the  exercifes  of  his  power  and  juftice  toward  the 
vefTels  of  his  wrath  ;  it  then  foUoweth,  that  this  mercy 
and  this  juftice,  in  thefe  peculiar  exerci/es  of  them.,  are 
not  elfential  to  the  abfolute  perfection  of  the  divine 
charatfler.     If  there  might  have  been  a  fyftem  equally 

perfect 


Scc^.lL  MORAL   AGENCY-  -207 

perfed  as  the  prefent,  without  fin  or  moral  evil  in  it  ; 
then  there  might  have  been  a  chara<^er  equally  perfed 
as  that  v/hich  now  belongeth  to  Jehovah^  i.  e.  abfo- 
liitely  complete  and  fitted  for  every  excellency  which 
con  Id  ever  appear,  and  adequate  to  every  valuable 
purpofe  which  could  ever  be  effefted,  without  thofe 
particular  qualities  which  are  manifefled  in  the  exerciles 
(if  77iercy^  and  oi  punitive  jiijiice.  And  if  it  was  poifible 
tliat  there  ihould  have  been,  in  the  nature  of  things,  a 
eharader  fo  abfolute  and  complete,  without  mercy  and 
punitive  jufiice  ;  then  there  is  no  neceihty,  in  the  na<^ 
tare  of  things ^  for  the  exiftence  of  thefe  peculiar  attri-* 
bates  and  qualities.  And  if  there  is  no  neceflity,  ia 
the  nature  of  things,  for  the  exiftence  of  them  ;  then 
they  do  not  exift  hy  a  neceffity  of  nature.  And  if  they 
do  not  exift  by  a  neccllity  of  nature,  they  are  no  part 
-of  the  being  and  character  of  Him  vA\o  doth  exift  by  a 
neceffity  of  nature — the  neceffliry  Being,  who  is  God. 

.So  inconfiftent  and  atheiftical  is  it,  to  fuppofe  that 
there  might,  in  the  natufc  of  things,  have  been  perfec-^ 
tion  of  charader,  i.  e.  adequatenejs  to  the  inofl  valuable 
purpofes  and  deftiriis^  without  mercy  and  punitive  jujlice  I 
(As,  it  is  undoubtedly  certain,  every  valuable  purpofe 
that  could  have  been  accompiiflied  in  a  fyftem  perfe£tly 
free  from  moral  evil,  might  have  been  eifes^ed  without 
fhefe  attributes  and  qualities.)  And  /o  inconfiftent 
crnd  atheiftical  is  it,  therefore,  to  fuppofe  that  there, 
might  have  been  perfcciion  ofdefign  and  operaiiofi  in  the 
formation  and  management  of  a  fyftem  entirely  free 
from  all  moral  evil  and  ftn  f 

Thefe  conftderations,  I  am  humbly  of  opinion,  do 
fully  and  clearly  prove,  that,  upon  the  whole,  it  was  a 
defirable  thing  that  moral  evil  ftiould  come  into  exift- 
ence :  Yea,  aud  that  it  muft  of  neceffity  be  fo,  and  could 
fiot  otherwife  be,  tlian  that  an  infinitely  perfect  and 
benevolent  Being  would  choofe  and  prefer  the  cxiflence 
of  filch  an  event. 

It  may,  however,  in  fome  meafure  fervc  toilluftrate 
the  argument   under  confi deration,    and  occafiou   its 

carry  in"* 


20d.  An    E  S  S  A  Y    oi^  J>art  It. 

carrying  more  full  convi(5lion,  to  mention  one  or  two 
of  the  evil  and  bad  confequences  which  will  certainly 
follow  from  the  fuppofition  that  the  exiftence  of  moral 
evil — the  taking  place  of  fm — in  the  fyflem,  is,  upon 
the  whole,  an  undefirable  event. 

1.  If  it  would  really  have  been  better,  upon  the 
whole,,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  moral  evil  fhould 
never  have  come  into  exiftence  ;  then  God  hath  not 
ordered  and  difpofed  things  in  fo  excellent  a  manner, 
and  to  fo  good  advantage,  as  they  might,  in  the  nature 

-of  things,  have  been  ordered  and  difpofed.  To  fay 
that  there  could  not  have  been  a  fyftem  v/ithout  fm,  and 
yet  that  fuch  a  fyftem  would  have  been  moft  perfe<fl 
and  complete  ;  is  to  fay,  that  there  could  not  have  been 
a  fyftem  which  was  ahjolutely  perfed  :  And  this  is  td 
fay  that  abjolute  perfection  is  an  impolFxble  thing  ; 
which  at  once  denieth  it  to  be  in  God,  or  in  his  fyf- 
tem of  operation  and  adminiftration^  To  fay  that 
there  could  have  been  fuch  a  fyftem,  and  that  fucli  an 
one  would  have  been  more  pt^rfeCi  ;  is,  therefore,  tb 
fay  that  God  hath,  not  ordered  and  difpofed  things  in  a 
manner  fo  perfe(^  and  excellent  as  that  wherein  they 
are  capable  of  being  ordered  and  difpofed.  Confe- 
quently,  the  traces  of  infinite  unjdom  and  confmmruite 

Jkill  do  net  appear  in  the  difpofition  and  arrangement 
of  things  under  the  prefcnt  fyftem  of  government  and 
adminiltration  : — But,  I  may  rather  faj'',  the  traces  of 
grofs  over-fight  and  7mj}ake.  Yea,  and  it  will  follow, 
that  we  have  no  reafon,  from  any  thing  which  we  can 
fee  and  behold,  either  in  the  word  or  works  of  the 
God  of  Ifrael^  to  conclude  that  he  is  abfolutely  perfe<fi:  ; 
but  the  fulleft  aft'arance,  on  the  contrary,  that  he  is  in* 
finitely  far  from  it. 

2.  If  it  is  in  any  degree  undefirablc,  upon  the  whole, 
that  moral  evil  iLould  come,  into  exiftence  ;  it  is  a 
thing  infinitely  undefirablc.  If  the  undefirablenefs  of 
fuch  an  event  is  urged  from  the  confideration  of  the 
evil  7intur€  of  fm  ;  the  fame  argument,  if  it  will  prove 
any  thing,  will  prove  this  event  to  be  infinitely  vnde- 

firable. 


Sca.n.  MORAL  AGENCY*  609 

firable,  i.  e.  that  it  is,  upon  the  whole,  an  infifiitely  nn* 
defirable  thing  that  moral  evil  (hould  ever  come  into 
exiitence.  For  if  the  undefirabienefs  of  the  exifience 
and  takinri  placf  of  fuch  an  event,  arifeth  from  the  con-» 
jl deration  of  the  evil  nature  and  tendency  of  the  event 
itj'elf-;  the  undefirabienefs  of  its  exiftence  is,  doubtlefs, 
in  proportion  to  the  evil  nature  and  tendency  offin^ 
But  the  nature  and  tendency  of  fin  being  perfctflly  evil, 
and  infinitely  fo  ;  any  undefirabienefs  of  the  exiitence 
of  the  event  ariftng  froni  the  nature  of  it^  muft,  alfo, 
be  perfeA  and  infinite*  The  argument,  therefore, 
drawn  from  the  evil  nature  of  fin,  to  prove  that  it  was 
an  undefirablc  thing,  upon  the  whole,  that  any  fuch 
event  fliould  ever  take  place  in  tiie  inteileftual  fyftem  ; 
if  it  proveth  any  thing,  wil}  prove  that,  upon  the  whole, 
all  things  being  conlidered,  and  the  final  ilfue  of  the 
prefent  fyftem  and  fcene  of  operation  being  taken  into 
view,  it  was  a  moft  perfectly — ^yea,  even  infinitely  un- 
defirable  thing  that  there  ever  Ihould  be  any  fuch 
event. 

3 .  If,  therefore,  the  exiflence  of  moral  evil  in  the 
fyftem,  was  an  event,  on  the  whole,  fo  exceedingly 
undefirable  ;  good  men  will  always  regret  and  lament 
it,  and  be  unhappy  under  the  thought  that  fuch  an 
event  hath  been  ever  fulfered  to  intrude  itfelf  into  ex* 
iftcnce.  The  more  men  increafe  in  virtue  and  bene- 
volence, the  more  do  they  iucreafc  in  their  averfion 
to  the  nature  and  tendency  of  lin.  And  the  more  theii* 
minds  are  opened  and  extended  in  the  knowledge  and 
view  of  truth,  the  more  do  they  fee  and  difcern  of 
the  evil  nature  and  tendency  of  lin.  If,  therefore,  the 
exiftence  of  moral  evil  was,  upon  the  whole,  an  unde- 
firable ev^ent  j  the  more  good  men  increafe  in  virtue 
and  knowledge,  the  greater  will  be  their  folicitude, 
impatience  andunhappinefs.  And  when  they  arrive 
in  a  world  of  perfeft  virtue,  and  fall  and  clear  light  ; 
where  all  ignorance  and  error  fliall  be  done  away,  and 
every  corrupt  inclination  and  paflion  be  mortified  and 
fuppreffed  f    they  will  be  entirely  overwhelmed  with 

B  b  the 


21Q  An    essay  oh  Ti^hU» 

the  decpeft  forrow  and  mofl  perfeft  regret  :  and  hea* 
ven,  inftead  of  being  a  place  of  light  and  joy,  wiU 
afford  them  a  more  gloomy  fcene,  and  melancholy 
view  and  profpecl  of  .things,  than  they  ever  yet 
imagined  and  beheld.  An  increafe  of  liglit  and  greater 
maturity  of  virtue,  inflcad  of  being  a.meanjs  of  mereafi 
ing  happinefs,  as  hath  generally  been  fuppofed,  will 
ferve  only  more  and  more  to  convince  of  the  fatal 
error  which  is  in  fadl  to  be  found  in  the  fyftem  oi" 
God  ;  and  the  full  light  of  eternity,  inflead  of  iilling 
the  foul  with  the  moll:  perfect  pleaiure  and  delight, 
will  give  ingxpreflible  pain  and  anguilh  cf  heart. 

4.  If  it  is  an  undeiirable  thing  upon  the  whole  that 
moral  evil  Ihould  take  place,  God  himfelf,  w-ho  hath 
an  infinite  love  of  righteoufiiefs-*-of  moral  excellency 
and  beauty,  m.uft  be  infinitely  more  croffed  and  difapr 
pointed  in  this  event,  than  any  or  all  other  beings  in 
the  whole  fyiflem.  The  averfion  of  the  divine  mind 
to  the  evil  nature  of  fin,  is  infinitely  greater  than  thai 
of  all  created  intelligences  together.  And  if  the 
thought  of  this  event  is  fitted,  and  in  its  nature  tendeth 
to  give  pain  and  anguifh  to  the  virtuous  part  of  the 
creation^,  much,  yea  infinitely  more  is  it  fitted  and  doth 
it  tend  to  give  pain  and  anguifh  to  the  infinitely  virtu- 
ous and  all-comprehending  mind  of  Go^.  If  the  infi- 
nite and  all-feeing  mind  of  the  Deity  had  the  leaft  de- 
gree of  reludlance  to  theexiftence  of  fuch  an  event  in 
his  fyftem  ;  he  had  an  infinite  relu (fiance  to  it  :  for 
there  is  no  property,  quality  or  excellency  of  the  di.« 
vine  mind,  which  is  not  infinite.  And  if  the  divine 
will  was  really  and  truly  in  oppofition  to  the  taking 
place  of  fuch  an  event  ;  of  confequence  it  was  infinitely 
oppofed  by  the  coming  into  exiflence  of  tliis  event,  and 
was  rcfifted  with  4uch  an  amazing  degree  of  ftrength 
and  power  as  entirely  fruftrated,  vanquiftjed  and  over- 
came it.  So  that,  upon  the  principle  of  the  real  un* 
defirabiencfs  of  the  taking  place  of  moral  evil  in  the 
fyftem,  Jehovah  is  the  moft  mijer-ihle  being  i>i  the 
aniverfc  j  and  his  glorious  mind  is  overwhelmedwitii 

infinite 


Seer  HIo  MORAL   AGENCY.  sit 

infinite  forfow,  grief  and  diflrefs.  Thefe  coiifidcra- 
tions,  I  am  humbly  of  opinion,  do  clearly  fiiew-^yc^i^ 
perfe^fy  demonfira'te^  that  in  the  viev^^  of  the  Deity, 
that  is,  in  the  view  of  impartial^  perfeCl  reaJon—JlriCl^ 
exnd  truths  it  was- not,  on  the  whole,  all  things  being 
confidered,  an  mdefirable  thing  that  moral  evil  fhould 
come  into  exigence.  And  when  it  is  proved,  to  the 
oonvi(fbion  of  the  underllandings  of  men,  that  the  ex* 
iftence  of  fuch  an  event,  in  the  intelicifilual  fyftem, 
was  not,  upon  the  whole,  undcfirable  ;  people  will 
meet  with  no  diJfficnUy,  1  apprehend,  in  admitting  the 
rcafonablenefs  of  the  fuppofition,  o?  the  pofitive  defira-' 
biennis  of  the  exiftence  and  taking  place  of  fuch  aa 
event. 

S  E  O  T.      III. 

IVhcrein  it  is  pie^n  that  fuch  a  pofitive  divine  agency 
a?id  difpofal^  as  ivouldgive  INFALLIBLE  CERTAINTY 
to  the  exiflence  o/*  ^roE.AL  EVIL  z«  the  Jyftem^  are 
not  incoJtJIJient  with  the  purity  and  holinejs  of  Cod, 

IF  fuch  a  difpofal  of  tilings  as  fhall  give  infallible  cer- 
tainty of  the  exifrence  of  moral  evil  in  the  lyflem, 
ind  aftually  iffue  in  that  event  ;  and  if  God's  adjufling 
and  arranging  thingli  in  a  manner  and  order  tending  to 
fuch  an  ilfue  ;  is  wife  and  proper — agreeable  to  the 
di<9:atc5  of  the  moft  perfe£l  and  confammate  wifdom— 
it  will  be  abundantly  manifeft  that  fuch  a  pofttive  dif- 
p'tfai  and  agency  as  would  infallibly  inf/e  the  future  ex- 
iftence  and  taking  place  of  moral  evil  in  the  fyftevi^  is  not 
incojififtent  with  the  purity  and  ho^nefs  of  God.  For, 
I.  That  which  is  not  inconfiftent  with  perfe(n:  and 
confammate  wifdom,  is  not  inconfiftent  with  the  moft 
perfect:  purity  and  holinefs.  Whatever  is  not  incon-* 
fiftent  with  perfeft  wifdom  to  defign^  diilate  and  dired  ; 
is  not  inconfiftent  with  the  pm*ity  and  holinefs  of  the 
moft  wife  Being,  to  effed  and  acconipUPt.  Wifdom 
licver  diifiatcth  any  thing,  inconfiftent  with  purity  and 

B  b  2  holinefs. 


212  An    E  S  S  a  Y    on  Part  II. 

holinefs.  Where  wifdom  app^oveth,  pnri^y  and  holi- 
Ziefs  equally  approve.  Whatever  oftendethi  purity,  is 
forbidden  by  wifdom  :  for  thefe  two  attributes  per- 
fectly harmonize  w^ith  each  other. 

It  is  the  part  o^  ivifdom  to  form  noble  and  excellent 
defigns  ;  and  to  devile  the  beft  means  and  methods  for 
accomplifhing  them.  This  fcems  to  be  the  peculiar 
end  and  principal  province  of  wifdom.  Noble  and 
excellent  ends^  together  with  a  prudent  adjuftment  and 
adaptednefs  oi  means  to  the  accomplifbment  of  them, 
are  the  ftrongeft  teiiimonies  and  indications  ofM^fdom. 
In  botli  thefe  ways  is  the  wifdom  of  God  indubitable, 
and  unqueftionab'ly  clear,  in  fuch  an  adjufbment  and 
difpofition  of  things  as  would  give  certain  futurity  to 
the  event  in  queflion.  For  it  hath  been  fhown  that 
the  taking  place  <3f  fin  hath"  been  the  occallon  of  an 
abundantly  more  perfed:  and  complete  exhibition  of 
the  divine  perfeftions,  to  the  views  of  creatures  ;  and 
a  more  fall  and  perfe*^  manifeftation  of  them  in  their 
proper  and  genuine  fruits,  than  could  poffibly  have, 
been  made,  if  moral  evil  had  never  cxifted.  And, 
confequently,  that  there  is  a  more  dear  underftanding, 
and  perfec'l  and  fenfible  perception  of  the  divine  excel- 
lencies, in  the  f^^llem  of  created  intelligences,  than 
there  would  have  been,  if  fm  had  never  taken  place  ; 
and,  ofcourfe,  ?7iore  good  dojze  in  the.  ^y9icm..  It  hath 
been  fhown  that  the  exiftcnce  of  moral  evil  hath  k>een 
the  occafion  of  Jar  more  arid  greater  good  in  the  iyfteni  ; 
yea,  of  greater  good  than  could  poffibly  have  been  ef- 
fected otherwife  tiian  by  the  intervention  of  moral 
evil. 

And  if  this  is  in  fl^dt  the  cafe,  (which  I  beg  leave, 
after  what  hath  been  faid  upon  it,  to  confider  as  being 
certainly  proved,)  there  is  na  room  left  to  queftion 
tiie  Vr-ifdom  of  the  projedion  of  Inch  a  fyflem  as  this, 
in  all  the  variety  of  its  parts  :  or,  to  imagine  that  the 
moral  evil  which  taketh  place  in  it,  indicateth  any  want 
of  prudent  for^fi^ht  and  wile  defigUc  But  rather,  if 
what  hath  been  faid  is  jufl,  the  exigence  pf  moral  evil 

in 


Sea. III.  MORAL    AGENCY.  213 

in  the  fyftcm,  when  the  fcene  is  fo  far  opened  to  view 
as  to  enable  us  to  judge  of  the  ifFue  of  things,  is  a  cer- 
tain proof  and  pregnant  inflance  of  the  confummate 
wifdom  of  the  Grand  Prpjeftor  of  this  extended,  com- 
plicated fyftem. 

And  when  we  confider,  farther,  howa-fcene  of  guilt, 
mifery  and  wickednefs  prepares  fuch  imperfeft  crea- 
tures as  we  are,  for  3  proper  and  entire  fubmiffion  to 
God,  and  for  apprehendin^g  the  mercy  and  grace  of 
God  in  their  abundant  riches  and  freedom  ;  and  moit 
fenfibly  rclifliing  and  apprehending  that  ialvation  and 
relief  which  is  provided  for  finful  men,  in  the  gofpel  of 
Chrift  :  I  fay,  when  we  duly  attend  to  thefe.co^fidera- 
tions,  and  give  them  their  proper  and  j nil  weight  ;  we 
fliall  not  have  any  occafion  to  apprehend  any  defeCi  of 
wifdom,  in  the  means  and  methods  of  God's  own  de- 
viling for  cifecling  the  greateft  good,  and  accomplifhing 
the  mod  valuable  ends  of  creation.  But,  on  the  con- 
trary, if  we  examine  with  honed- Tind  upright  hearts, 
we  cannot  but  difcern  in  the  prejer,'t  Jyftem  of  divine 
adminiftration  and  governments  Uotwithflanding  the 
moral  evil  which  cometh  into  exiilcnee  under  it,  the 
ftrongeft  marks  and  mort  evident  traces  of  pcrfeci, 
confummate  wifdom  and  fkill. 

It  is  abundantly  manifcft,  that  God's  adopting  the 
prefent  plan  of  operation,  and  fyftem  of  adminiftration 
and  government,  hath  in  faCl  been  the  occafion  of  the 
exillence  of  moral  evil.  And  that  God  forefaw  this 
event,  and  forefaw  it  to  be  infallibly  connedled  with 
that  particular  exertion  of  his  own  power,  which 
fhould  be  productive  oijiich  a  Jyftem  as  he  hath  created^ 
is  what  cannot  be  denied,  without  avowed  oppofition 
to  the  word  of  God.  Was  this  exertion  of  the  divine 
power  under  the  direftion  of  wijdoui  f  Is  it  w^orthy 
the  charafter  ziiA  wifdom  of  God,  to  form  fuch  a  fjf 
teni^  and  in  fuch  a  manner  to  ad'i^ft  and  balance  the 
various  parts  and  pioportions  of  it  ?  But  if  a  fyflemj 
fo  formed,  balanced  and  adjufted  \\\  its  feveral  pro- 
portions and  parts  as  is  in  fad  attended  and  follQwed 

by 


214  A^    E  S"S  A  V  6 if  fdrtlt 

by  the  t aid n'g" place  o'f  flw,  is  no"  rej^roaclt  to  the  wif* 
dom.  of  God  U'/ie7i  at^ually  appearing'  in  event  ;  it  is 
BO  ref^rrtach  to  the  wifdoiil  of  God,  to  Aippofe  fuch  a 
iyflem  to  ejcift-in  div-ine'  defipi^  eveii  in  a  full,  particu- 
lar and  perfect  view  of  its  being  attended  and  follow^ 
cd  by  fdch  an  event.  If  moral  evil  is  not  a  real 
blemifh  in  the go"vemme)it  of  God  ;  it  is  as  little  io, 
confidered  as*  exifling;  in  divine  dafign.  Nothing  can 
be  vrife,  as-  appearing  in  event^  which  is  unwife,  as 
entertained  in  defign.  That  which  is  no  argument  of 
at  defefi  inwifaortl,  when  exifling' /«  rr^^w/',  will  never 
argue  any  defccH:  of  wifdom,  as  entertained  in  purpofe 
(iffd  defign.  If  it  Was  wife  in  the  Deity  to  enter  upon 
a  fyfte'irt  <5f  operation,  V^'hich  fhbuld  in  fail  be  accom- 
panied and  follovv'ed  by  flich  an  event  ;  it  was  equally 
wife  iri  him,  a£^ually  td  fore-ordai?i  fach  an  event,  and 
to  difpole  and  order  things'  ivith  an  exprcfs  purpofe  and 
deftgjt  to  give  infallible  futurity  to  the  exigence  of 
moral  evil'-^the  tailing  place  of  fin.  And  I  fee  not 
how  any  one  can -fuppofe- that  fuch  a  divine  agency  and 
foritive  difpof'al  of  things  as  (liall  give  infallible  certainty 
to  the  exifience  of  fuch  aPx  event,  is  any  blemifii  in  the 
charafterof  tlie  fupreme  Govei^nor  of  tlie  univerfe,  or 
indicatcth  any  defcvll  of  wifdom  in  him,  or  is  any  way 
unworthy  of  him  ;  without  imaginhig  that  the  mora! 
evil  now  in  tlie  lyflcm,  is  an  aCiual  reproach  to  God  ; 
rendering  it  impolfible  that  intelligent  creatures  ihftuld 
perfe£lly  and  entirely  acquiefce  in'iiim. 

To  fay  that  God  did  not  forefee  any  fuch  event  as 
being  certainly  and  infallibly  conne(^ed^  by  way  of  confe- 
quence,  with  his  own  pofitive  agency  and  dijpojal^  vs, 
to  relieve  one  attribute  at  the  e5:pcnce  of  another  : 
which  doth  no  honor  to  the  name  of  God.  But  it  is, 
on  the  other  hand,  moft  reproachful  to  him,  to  fup- 
pofe  that  any  thing  which  God  hath  ordered  and  done, 
renderetll/«f-^  ajalva  needful  for  his  chara£iter.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  exceedingly  manifefl,  that  what- 
ever in  event  is  no  ar-rument  of  defeft  of  wifdom  in 
the  fyilem  arid- government  of  God,-  would  be  no  ar- 
gument 


Sccl.  m.  MORAJL   AGENCY.  a^ 

gument  of  any  dcfcffl  in  wlfdom,  confidered  as  enters* 
tained  in  po/Jtiv.e  purpoje  and  dejign*  If  the  event  of 
moral  evil,  'when  in  a6iual  exiftence^  doth  in  ifuCt  not 
render  the  divine  wifdoni  quellionable  and  rufpicious  ; 
furely  it  can  afford  no  pretext  for  calling  the  fame 
vvifdom  in  queition,  when  coniidered  as  ejiifling  ia 
divine  purpoj J  anddi'fipn.  To  fay  otherwife,  would  be 
the  fame  as  to  urge  that  the  lejs  is  an  argument  of  im» 
perfeiTlion,  where  the  greater  is  not  :-^<~-a  method  of 
argumentation  very  ill  adapted  to  adminifter  convic*- 
tion.  He,  tlierefore,  who  will  be  bold  enough  to 
venture  on  a.fuil  and  confident  belief  that  the  prefent 
fyftem,  in  ull  and  every  of  its  parts  and  events^  is  wifely 
ordered  and  difpofed  ;  need  apprehend  no  danger  in 
^(Taredly  Kelieving  that  yi^*:/?  a  fyftem^  in  all  its  parts ^ 
did  a<StnaHy  previouily  exiit  in  divine  purpofe  and  de* 
Jlgn.  Coniequently,  fuch  a  divine  difpofal  as  infallibly 
infured  the  exiftence  and  taking  place  of  moral  evil  ; 
yea,  and  of  Jet  purpofe  and  with  exprejs  -vieiv  to  this 
event  ;  is  no  argument  of  any  the  leafl  defeat  in  the 
V'ifdom  of  God  :  and  therefore  is,  in  no  way,  incon-r 
iiflent  with  his  purity  and  holinefs, 

II.  It  is  in  no  degree  inconiiftent  with  the  divine 
purity,  for  the  Deity  to  exert  a  pofitive  agency  for  the 
pioduftion  of  that  which  is  necelTary  in  order  to  a 
more  full  and  perfcd  difcovery  of  the  purity  and  hoIi» 
neis  of  God,  and  a  more  bright  and  glorious  manifef^ 
tation  of  it.  Purity  and  holinefs  are  not  oppofcd  by 
thofe  exertions  of  divine  power  which  are  neceflary  in 
order  to  a  more  clear  and  perfecb  difccvery,  and  2. 
more  full  and  complete  exerciie,  of  holinefs  and  purit}?^, 
God  difcovereth  no  liking  and  approbation  of  lin,  in 
any  exercifes  of  power  which  have  for  their  obje<a  and 
final  caufe^  a  more  perfc«fl  difcovery  of  the  hatred  and 
averfion^  of  his  holy  and  pure  nature,  to  fin.  God 
doth  not  manifeft  an  approbation  of  fin,  in  any  things 
which  he  doth  with  a  view  to  render  viiVole  his  hatred 
to  it ;  and  which,  in  faft,  ferveth  as  a  medium  to  crea^* 
iurss  .of  a  more  clear  and  perfe(?:  difcovery  .of  this 

aveifion 


21(5  Aw    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  '  Part  IL 

averfion  and  hatred.  Thefe  things  are  obvious. 
>  Nov/,  as  was  obferved  before,  whatever  is  the  aftual 
ilTae  and  event  of  the,  divine  operations,  that^  we  may 
conchide,  was  the  finaicaufe  and  reafon  of  them,  and 
the  objeft  really  in  view  in  t^iofe  operations.  The 
end  which  appearetli  to  be  eventually  anfwered,  by  the 
cxifVencc  and  taking  place  of  moral  evil,  was,  doubt- 
lefs,  the  end  in  vieiu  in  thole  operations  and  difpofals 
which  were  the  caufe  and  ground  of  the  exidence  of 
fuch  an  event.  But  that  the  exiflence  of  moral  evil 
hath  been  the  occafion  and  reafon  of  afuller  manifefla- 
tiori  and  clearer  difcovery  of  the  fpotlefs  purity  and 
holinefs  of  God,  and  the  infinite  oppofition  of  the  di- 
vine mind  to  fin,  than  otherwife  would  have  been  ever 
made  ;  is  what  cannot,  1  think,  with  the  leaft  reafon, 
be  denied.  We  may,  therefore,  fafely  conclude,  that 
/////  was  an  objed  in  viezu,  in  that  agency  and  thofe  di- 
vine operations  which  gave  certainty  to  the  future  ex- 
iflence of  moral  evil,  and  w'ere  the  caufe  of  it.  Whe- 
ther a  manifeftation  of  the  hatred  of  God  to  fin,  and 
the  infinite  averfion  of  his  holy  and  pure  nature  to 
moral  evil,  were,  the  07//y,  or  cliirf  and  principnl^  end 
of  this  agency  and  operation,  is  not  neeeHary  to  be 
determ.ined  :  it  is  fufiicicnt,  in  the  prefent  cafe,  if  it 
appeareth  that  it  was  a?i  end  leally  and  ultimately  in 
view.  For  if  it  is  manifefi:  that  any  particular  divijic 
agency  and  difpofal  had,  for  their  objeft,  a  more  per- 
feft  difcovery  of  the  infinite  hatred  and  oppofition  of 
the  divine  mind  to  fin  ;  it  will  be  abundantly  evident, 
that  fuch  an  agency  and  difpofal  are  not  repugnant  to 
the  divine  purity  ;  and,  in  their  nature  and  operation, 
inconfiilent  with  the  divine  hatred  to  fin  ; — Unlefs, 
indeed,  the  infinitely  wife  and  all-knowing  God  hath 
been  guilty  of  fo  grofs  an  overfight  and  millakc,  as 
totally  to  fubvert,  by  his  ovvm  agency  and  operation, 
the  very  end,  defign  and  obje<St  in  view,  in  that  very 
agency  and  operation.  But  no  one  can  imagine  that, 
the  divine  Being  is  capable  of  fuch  over  fight  and  mifr 
take.  Ifj  therefore,  the  cxillcnce  of  moral  evil  hatb 
..    -  been 


Se6l.in.  MORAL   AGENCY.  217 

been  the  occafion  of  a  more  perfect  difcovery  and  ma- 
uifeilation  of  the  divine  purity  and  hatred  of  fin  ;  and 
if  we  may  fafely  conclude  that  this  manifeftation  and 
difcovery  were  the  end  in  view — tlie  objedlive  ground 
of  that  divine  agency  and  difpofal  which  gave  certainty 
to  tlie  exiRence  of  moral  evil,  and  were  the  caufe  of 
it  ;  it  maft  then  be  abundantly  manifeft  and  clear,  to 
any  one  who  v/ili  examine  with  impartiality  and  can- 
dour, that  fach  a  divine  agency  and  difpofal  of  things  as 
Ihould  certainl)'^  be  followed  by  the  taking  place  of  fin , 
are,  by  no  means,  inconfiftent  %\atli  the  divine  purity 
and  holinefs  ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  in  their  iffue  and 
event,  exhibit  the  fLrongeft  evide-hces  and  moil:  abun- 
dant teftimonies  of  tiie  infinite  flrength  of  the  oppofi- 
tion  of  the  pure  and  holy  nature  of  God,  to  fin. 

III.  Whatever  divine  agency  and  dilpofal  are  the 
occafion  and  means  of  a  more  perfeft  and  full  difco- 
very and  manifeflation  of  the  divine  goodnefs  and  love  ; 
are,  in  no  meafure,  inconfiftent  with  the  purity  and  holi- 
nefs of  God.  The  divine  purity  and  holinefs  fumma* 
rily  confill:  in  lovr?.  Whateve;r  manifefteth  love,  man- 
ifcileth  alfo  holinefs  and  purity.  Whatever  manifefl:- 
eth  a  difpofition  of  mind,  which"  hath  for  its  objeciithe 
preateft  general  oood  ;  doth,  to  an  equal  degree,  mani- 
feft  love :  for  in  fuch  a  diipofition  as  this  it  is,  that 
love  primarily  and  effentially  confifteth.  But  it  hath 
been  before  proved,  that  moral  evil  is  the  occafion  of 
greater  s^ood^  in  the  fyfiiem,  than  could  otherwife  have 
been  eneded  and  produced.  Confequentiy,  2l  purpoje 
and  d.'ifign  in  the  divine  mind,  and  an  agency  and  dif- 
pofal of  the  divine  hand,  which  fhould  be  eventually 
introducT:ory  of  moral  evil,  into  the  created  fyftem  ; 
are  no  way  inconfifient  with  the  divine  cliarader,  or 
repugnant  to  his  holinefs,  his  purity,  his  love. 

W^hen  God,  in  his  moral  kingdom  and  government, 
aclually  effefteth  the  mo  ft  excellent  purpofes  anddefigns  ; 
it  very  ill  becometh  his  creatures,  to  find  fault,  and  be 
diiTatisiled  with  the  means  and  methods  which  his  in- 
finite wildom  hatli  chofen  for  producing  and  accom- 

C  c  plifaing 


iiS  An    essay    on  i^art  Ilv 

plifhing  them.  When  the,  end  is  confefTedly  good^ 
why  will  not  that  juflify  the  means  by  and  through 
iv kick  It  was  efteded  ?  He  that  is  not,  upon  the 
whole,  difTatisiied  with  the  end  acco?7iplifhed^  will  not 
be  difTatisfied  with  the  means  whereby  it  is  efftfied  :  to 
iind  fault  with  the  latter,  will  be  ineonfiftent  with  his 
approbation -of  the  former.  He  that  is  not  diiTatisfied 
with  that  character  of  the  Deity,  of  which  fin  hath 
been  the  occafion  and  means  of  a  more  perfect  and  fuU 
difcovery  and  manifeftation  ;  will  not  be  difTatisfied 
with  tiiat  charafter  of  the  Deity,  which  exhibiteth  him 
as  difpofing  things  in  his  fyflem  in  f  uch  a  manner  as 
fliall-  infure  the  exiflence  and  taking  place  of  fin.  He 
who- is  convinced  that  the  divine  goodnej's  and  love  ap- 
pear in  a  more  ftrong  and  glorious  light  than  could 
have  been,  if  moral  evil  never  had  taken  pl'ace  ;  will 
never  fuppofe  that  fach  a  divine  agency  and  difpofai 
as  gave  certain  futurity  to  the  ^xiflence  of  fuch  an 
event,  are  inconfiflcnt  with  the  goodnefs  and  love  of 
God.  I  m.ay  fay  farther  :  he  who  doth  not  imagine 
that  the  appearances  and  manifeftations  of  the  goodnefs 
and  love  of  God  are  aCiually  leffened  and  diminiflied  by 
means  of  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil,  aiid  the  entrance 
of  fin  into  the  fyflem  ;  will  never  imagine  fuch  a 
pofitive  agency  and  difpofai  as  give  certainty  to  this 
event,  to  be  inconfiftent  with  the  goodnefs  and  love 
of  God.  For  that  which  doth  not,  upon  the  whole, 
hinder  and  obflrucl  the  appearances  of  divine  love  ;  is- 
not  inconfiflent  with  divine  love.  7hat  liiufl  be  a 
very  ilrange  and  uncommon  kind  of  a  repugnancy  and 
sppofition  to  love^  and  extremely  weak-^yea,  utterly 
■without  Jlrength^  1  o  as  even  to  ceafe  to  be  nppofition 
and  repugnancy  /  v/hich,  in  its  tendency  and  utmofl 
exertion,  doth  not,  in  the  lead  degree,  hinder  and  ob- 
ftru<fl  the  appearances  and  manifeflations  of  love. 

But  will  any  one  prefume  to  fay  that  the  appearand- 
bcs  of  divine  love  and  goodnefs  are  adually  diminifhed 
and  lefTened  by  a?iy  thing  that  doth  exifl,  and  hath,  in 
facby  taken  place  ?     Any  one  that  will  fav  this,  mufl 

of 


Sect.  III.  MORAL    AGENCY.  219 

of  courfe  fav,  that  the  divine  charaftcr  doth  not  appeir 
to  be  abfolutely  and  in  the  higheil  degree  perfect  in 
j^oodnefs  and  love  ;  which  is  at  once  to  renounce 
Jf.  novAH,  the  God  of  Ifrael.  And  if  nothing  which 
iiath  ever  taken  place,  hath  really  lefTened  and  pre- 
vented the  appearances  of  divine  love  ;  then  nothing 
that  has  ever,  in  facft,  taken  placed  hath  been  in  Juch  a 
Jenje  inconfiftj?tt  with  the  divine  love,  as  to  argue  any 
iicficlj  and  indicate  any  deficiency  of  goodnefs,  in  God. 
And  if  nothing  that  hath  ever  taken  place  is,  in  this 
fcnfc,  inconfiftent  with  the  goodnefs  of  God  ;  then 
that  difpofal  and  agency  of  his,  which  made  certain 
the  exiftcnce  of  moral  evil,  were,  in  no  degree,  in- 
confident  with  the  divine  goodnefs  and  love. 

And  upon  the  argument  refpefting  a  fuppofed  incon- 
fiftency  of  a  divine  agency  and  difpnjal  in  favour  of  the 
exiflence  of  the  event  in  queftion,  with  the  purity  and 
holinefs  of  God  ;  I  v/ould  obferve,  once  more, 

IV.  That  no  mere  exercife  of  power  doth  at  all, 
of  itfelf,  illuftrate  atid  difplay  moral  charader.  By  a 
mere  difcernnisnt  of  the  natural  power — the  ftrength 
there  is  in  the  Lord  of  hofts — we  never  could  form 
any  judgment  of  the  qualities  of  his  mind — his  moral 
attributes  and  charadter.  None  of  the  exertions  of 
tlie  }nere  power  of  God,  do,  in  themfelveS  abfolutely 
confidercd,  either  oppofe^  or  concur  ivilh^' the  divine 
goodnefs.  The  only  way  wherein  the  exertions  of 
power  illuflrate  charader^  is  by  the  ends  which  its  ex- 
ertions accompHQi — the  purpofes  which  they  effeft. 
If  the  exertions  of  power  are  under  the  direcTtion  of 
wijdom  ;  they  are,  then,  confident  with  a  perfeft  moral 
charaihr  :  if  they  are  not  under  the  direftioii  and  gui- 
dance of  wi/do?7i  ;  they  do,  of  courfe,  difcover  imper- 
f'eCiion  of  moral  character.  When  exertions  of  power 
are  not  under  the  direftion  of  wife  defig^n^  they  are  a 
blemilh  in  tlie  moral  charafter  of  the  being  whofe  ex- 
ertions they  are.  But  when  poiuer.  is  exerted  to  efed 
excellent  purpofes  and  defigns,  it  then  ferves  as  an  or- 
nament of  the  moral  charadler,  illufcrating  and  dif- 
piaying  it.  C  c  2  If 


220  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  II. 

If  the  jM-efent  fvflicm,  in  all  its  parts,  is  beautiful  and 
excellent,  and  every  way  worthy  the  divine  Architeft  ; 
no  exertions  of  the  divine  power,  of  which  the  prefent 
fyftem,  <is  it  is^  is  the  fruit  and  eifci^,  are  inconfillient 
with  any  part  of  the  moral  character  of  God.  *  And 
if  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil  is  not  fuch  a  blemifh  in 
the  fyftem,  as  to  be  a  reJal  blemifli  in  the  moral  char- 
a(fter  of  the  glorious  Contriver  and  Architeft  ;  it  will 
raanifedly  follow,  that  a  pofitive  divine  agency  and 
difpofal,  which  (liould  have  for  their  effeft  the  exiftence 
of  moral  evil,  are  neither  a  blemifh  in  the  moral  char- 
after  of  God,  nor  inconfiilent  with  any  attribute  of 
it.  But  if  the  exiftence  of  fm  is  the  occafion  oi greater 
good^  confidered  merely  as  an  event,  diftinft  from  its 
innate  qualities,  it  doth  honour  to  God.  And  if  the 
exiftence  of  this  event,  in  this  view  ofit^  doth  honour 
to  God,  being  the  occafion  of  a  more  full  and  perfect 
difcovery  of  the  excellencies  of  his  moral  charafter  ; 
then  the  exertions  of  power,  which  are  the  caufe  and 
reafon  of  the  exiftence  of  fuch  an  eifedl,  are  fo  far 
from  being  reproachful  to  the  purity  and  holinels  of 
God,  that  they  rather  ^crwe  to  illuftrate,  eftablifli  and 
confirm  this  infinitely  excellent  and  glorious  charac- 
ter. 

Sect. 


*  We  have,  ftriflly  fpeaking,  no  other  idea  of  the />07/^fr  of  Coo,  than  that  of 
the  connexion  of  events  with  his  will.  His  jmivtr  iiuendeth  nothing  more  than 
that  tcill  of  his  which  hath  events  wiiich  arc  its  objects  connected  witii  it.  But 
ihe />c«/c-r  of  God  i"  generally  leckoned  not  among  his  moral  attributes.  The 
tyercife  of  this  jicwer  is  unqueftionably  under  the  direction  of  wifdom,  and 
therefore  fcrveth  to  difplay  moral  chaiaclcr  :  but,  confidered  merely  as  that  •with 
•which  J'-ick  events  ci  are  its  ohjfFts  are  cornifSfcn,  it  is  no  part  of  tiie  moral  chur~ 
aEi:r  ot  God-  The  wt  l  l  of  God,  wiiich  is  the  rule  of  tiuty  to  creatures,  is  iiis 
bene-i>nlevce  and  love — that  difpolition  whereby  he  h  necelliuily  pleafed  with  love 
and  benevolence  iu  his  creatures.  And  as  this  benevolence  and  love  are  th«  only 
m.,ral,  ffiritual  beauty  of  the  divine  nature  ;  by  fuch  a  d'fpofiicn  only  is  it  poflTible 
for  creatures  to  be  ipirituaUy  united  to  him,  and  pieaie  and  obey  him.  This 
lets  us  fee  that  that  iviH  of  the  Deity  wjnch  givcth  exiftence  and  being  to  events, 
and  that  -rviil  of  his  which  is  expreiiod  in  (he  precepts  of  his  vfy,al  laiv,  are  no 
more  the  fame,  than  the  ft-uer  and  the  holy  nature  oJ  God  are  one  and  the  fame. 


Seft.  IV.  MORAL    AGENCY,  221 

Sect.    IV. 
Objedions  confiderzd  and  rsfutsi. 

ALTHOUGH  an  anfwer  to  the  principal  objedlions 
which  can  be  made  againfl;  the  dodtrine  of  a  fpe- 
cial  divine  agency  and  diipofal,  giving  infallible  cer- 
tainty to  the  future  exiftence  of  moral  evil,  hath  been, 
as  I  apprehend,  in  a  confiderable  mcafure  anticipated, 
in  the  preceding  fe^lions  ;  a  more  particular  and  crit- 
ical examination  of  them,  however,  may  ferve  more 
fully  to  illultrate  the  fubjeft  under  confideration  ;  and, 
probably,  will  not  be  unfatisfadtory  to  the  reader. 
'J  his,  therefore,  fliall  be  the  fubject  of  the  prefent 
fection. 

Ob  J.  \.  For  God  to  put  forth  any  pofitive  exertions 
of  his  own  divine  and  almighty  power,  which  Ihould, 
either  mediately  or  immediately,  be  prodiKflive  of  fuch 
an  effeCt  ;  and,  whereby  he  a(fiually  purpofed  and  de- 
figncd  to  bring  moral  evil  m^o  exiftence,  in  the  fyftem  ; 
neceiTarily  importeth  fome  degree  of  approbation  of 
ryioral  evil  itfc[f\  in  the  divine  mind.  For  if  God  doth 
not,  in  fome  degree,  approve  of  fm  ;  why  doth  he  put 
fortli  any  act  of  his  own  divine,  refiftlels  pow-er,  luith 
an  exprefs  purpofe  anddcfign  to  the  exiitence  and  taking- 
place  of  fuch  an  effeft  ? 

Ans.  In  order  to  invalidate  effeftually  the  objecTiion 
before  us,  feveral  things  mufl  be  particularly  confider- 
ed.      And  I  would  bbferve, 

I .  That  for  God  to  put  forth  fome  pofitive  exertion 
of  his  own  divine  power,  which  he  deigned  fhould  be 
produftive  of  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil,  by  no  means 
neceifarily  implieth  any  degree  of  approbation  of  fm, 
or  the  lead  reconcilablen^fs  of  mind  to  the  evil  nature 
of  it.  There  is  nothing  abfard  and  inconfiftent,  as 
hath  been  before  obierved,  in  fuppofing  that  the  fame 
objc«.T:,  or  event,  (liould  be  approved  of  and  confidered 


S22  An    essay    on  Part  II. 

as  being  defirable  in  one  vieiv  of  it  ;  and,  at  the  fame 
time,  confidered  as  being  undefirable,  and  be  greatly 
difapproved  of,  in  another.  Inftances  of  this  kind  are 
not  uncommon,  among  men.  How  often  do  we,  witli 
pleafure  and  cheerfulneis,  fubmit  to  pain  and  fufterings 
witli  a  view  to  the  attainment  of  fome  greater  good, 
and  tlie  pofTeffion  of  higher  degrees  of  felicity  ?  And 
yet  any  one  would  be  thought  to  reafon  in  a  manner 
very  inconclufive  and  precipitant,  who  (liould  go 
gbont  to  prove,  by  inflances  of  this  kind,  that  human 
natm'e  is  enamoured  of  mifery,  and  that  mankind  arc 
lovers  of  pain  and  fuffering.  And  yet  this  condn(n:  of 
iTiankind  affordeth  as  much  reafon  for  concluding  that 
huynan  natiirs  is  reconciled  to  mifery,  as  a  pofitive  di- 
vine difpofal  in  favour  of  the  exiflence  of  moral  evil^ 
doth,  for  concluding  that  the  divine  nature  is  recon- 
ciled to  fm.  If  it  is  conceivable  that  human  nature 
ftiould  choofe  fuffering  and  pain^  confiftently  with  a 
perfect;  averfion  and  abhorrence  of  all  fnffering  ;  it  is 
equally  conceivable  that  the  divine  Being  may  cjioofe 
and  prefer  the  exiflence  Q>i  moral  evil ^  confillcntly  with 
his  utter  averfion  and  perfeft  abhorrence  of  all  fm. 

Ob  J.  The  cafes  are  far  from  being  fnnilar  and  pa- 
rallel ;  and  there  is  no  pretext  for  reafoning  from  the 
one  to  the  other.  For  7nan  is  but  a  weak,  helplefs  and 
dependent  creature,  having  a  great  degree  of  imper- 
fc<£tion  neccflariiy  cleaving  to  him  ;  and,  therefore, 
may  be  necejjitated  to  feek  the  highcfl  felicity  of  his 
nature,  through  perils,  fuffering  and  danger.  But 
this  is  infinitely  far  from  beijig  the  cafe  with  the  fu- 
preme  Being  ;  who  is  poflelTed  of  infinite  Jufjicier.cy  and 
f'ulnefs.,  and  needcth  no  fuch  difagreeable  7?ieans  of  at- 
taining his  own  higheft  felicity  and  enjoyment. 

Ans.  Whatever  fulnefs  and  fufficiency  there  m.ay 
be  in  God — as,  doubtlefs,  they  are  abfolutely  infinite 
and  boundlefs  ;  his  dealings  are,  yet,  with  creatures 
who  are  imperfeCI  ;  and  the  manifeftations  and  com- 
munications which  he  is  making  of  himfelf,  are  to 
ci-'catures  who  are  extremely  dull  of  receiving  ajid  <?ip- 

prehciiding  ; 


Seft.IV.  MORAL  AGENCY.  223 

prehending  ;  and  who  can  difcern  the  characTi-er  of  the 
Deity,  and  receive  the  knowledge  of  it,  only  through 
certain  means  adapted  to  their  infirmity,  weaknefs  and 
imperfcftion.  And,  confeqiiently,  Godhimfelf,  what- 
ever  is  his  own  inherent  luificiency  and  fulnefs,  if  he 
will  treat  with  fuch  as  ?7ioral  beings^  and  nlake  himjelf 
hiown  to  them^  is  necejjitated  (not  by  a  natural  necef^ 
fity,  oat  of  himfelf,  to  which  even  tiie  //>// ^v??^/*?,  the 
felf-exiflL^nt  and  omnipotent  Beings  is  not  I'ubjedt  ;  but 
by  a  neceinty  of  fitnefs — of  reafon  and  fuitabienefs) 
to  accommodate  htmfelf  to  their  weaknefs  and  im^ 
■pcrf'eCIinn  ;  ard  make  w^q  of  fach  means  of  inftruiftion 
and  communication,  as  are  bed  adapted  to  convey  the 
knowleq^ge  of  himfelf  to  creatures  of  tlieir  imperfect 
vievvs  ar.'i  dull  appreheniion.  This  confideration  may 
make  it  equally  necefj'ary  (though  not  with  the  very 
Ja',ne  kind  of  neceinty)  for  tiie  Deity  to  make  ufe  of 
certain  means  and  iiijiruments  for  the  accompliflmient 
of  his  ends,  which  are  in  their  nature  and  for  their  oiun 
Jakes  difagreeable  to  him  ;  as  for  men  to  fubmit  to 
things  which  are  difagreeable  and  painful  to  them,  in 
order  to  their  highell  felicity  : — it  being  carefully  kept 
in  memory,  however,  that  the  uje  of  thefe  means  is  far 
from  being,  in  the  jdme  fenfe^  painful  and  difagreeable 
to  the  Deity,  as  aftual  pain  and  fufterings  are  difagree- 
able to  creatures .  It  is,  therefore,  as  fuppofable  that 
the  Deity  fhould,  by  fome  pofitive  exertions  of  his 
own,  either  mediately  or  immediately,  bring  moral 
evil  into  exiftence,  confiftently  v/ith  his  infinite  hatred 
of  moral  evil,  and  the  averfion  of  his  own  holy  and 
pure  nature,  to  the  nature  of  all  fin  ;  as  it  is  fuppofa- 
ble that  mankind,  who  love  happinefs  and  hate  mifery, 
fliould  yet,  with  pleajure-  and  cheer fulnejs^  fubmit  to 
pain  and  fuffe rings — it  being  effential  to  their  very  na- 
tures perfeftly  to  hate  and  abhor  mifery  and  pain. 

2.  God  alRireth  us,  by  the  prophet  Ezekiel,  that  he 
hath  no  pleajure  in  tiie  death  of  the  wicked — the  death  "^ 
of  him  that  dieth  5   but  that  the  wicked  turn  and  live, 

Andn 

.  *  Clnp.  xviii.  23»  32.  anixxslii.  !i. 


i24  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  11 . 

And,  by  his  Apoftle,  that  he  would  have  all  nien  to 
be  laved,  and  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  truth.*' 
And  yet  nothing  is  more  evident  than  that  there  is  a 
pofitive  agency  of  God — pofitive  exertions  of  divine 
power — in  and  for  the  eternal  death  and  utter  delrruc- 
tion  of  finners  :  therefore  pofitive  exertions  of  his  oivn 
divine  and  almighty  power  ^  for  the  produCiion  of  an  event 
in  which  //<?,  himjelf  affiireth  us  that  he  hath  no  plenfure. 
And  if  the  Deity  may  put  forth  his  own  divine  power, 
for  the  produtlion  of  one  event  in  which  he  hath  no 
pleafure  ;  why  may  he  not,  alfo,  for  another  f  If  he, 
by  his  own  refiftlefs  and  almighty  power,  adlually 
produceth  the  eternal  deflruftion  of  a  (inner,  without 
having  any  pleafure  in  it,  why  is  it  not  quit«  as  fup- 
pofable,  and  every  way  as  agreeable  to  common  ienie, 
that  he  fhould,  by  his  own  agency  and  power ^  produce 
the  exiftence  of  moral  evil,  and  eff'ed  this  event,  with- 
out the  leaft  degree  of  pleajednefs  of  mind  with  it,  or 
reconcilabienefs  to  the  nature  of  it  \  It  is  as  contrary 
to  the  nature  of  God  to  take  pleafure  in  the  mijery  of 
his  creatures,  as  in  their  Cms .  Yet  he  effeCis  the  for- 
mer event,  while  Himfclf  affureth  us  that  he  hath  no 
pleafure  in  it  :  Why,  then,  may  he  not,  alio,  the  lat- 
ter ;  without  our  charging  him  with  taking  pleafure  in 
it  ? 

So,  alfo,  there  is  as  little  apparent  harmony  between 
that  ivill  of  the  Deity,  whereby  he  would  liave  all  men 
be  faved,  and  many  of  the  exertions  of  his  pofitive 
agency  and  power  ;  as  there  is,  between  that  will  of  hh 
•whereby  he  really  hatetli  lln  with  an  infinite  hatred, 
and  tho/e  pofitive  exertions  of  power  whereby  he  ^  either 
mediately  or  immediately,  bringeth  moral  evil  into 
exillence.  And  yet  the  harmony  of  uvV/,  with  the 
operation  of  power  in  the  former  cafe^  no  one  will  pre- 
fume  to  call  in  queftion  :  as  unqueftiGnahle  is  the  har- 
^lony  of  will^  with  the  exertions  of  power ^  in  the  lat- 
ter. 

The  fubftance  of  the  objeclion  under  confideration 

is 

*  I  Tim.  ii.  4. 


Se<a.IV.  MORAL  AGENGY.  i2i 

is  really  this,  viz.  That  it  is  inconfiftent  with  the  pu- 
rity and  holinefs.of  God  to  put  forth  an  aft  of  povjer^ 
which  Oiall,  either  mediately  or  immediately,  be  pro- 
duftive  of  ail  efFeft  that  hath  fomething  in  its  nature 
really  repugnant  to  the  nature  of  hclinefs. 

But  will  the  objeftor  abide  by  the  opinion,  that  it  is 
inconililent  with  the  nature,  the  purity  and  holinefs  of 
God,  to  exert  an  aft  of  his  own  almighty  and  refiftlefa 
power,  which, fhall,  either  mediately  or  imm.ediately, 
be  produftivc  of  an  effeft  containing  fomething  in  its 
nature  repugnant  to  the  nature  of  holinefs  ?  It  is  evi- 
dent in  faft  that  thofe  exertions  of  divine  power, 
which  gave  birth  to  creation,  were,  at  leaft,  the  pri- 
mary and  mediate  caiife  of  the  exiflence  of  moral  evil. 
And  no  friend  even  to  natural  religion  will  deny  that 
God  had  a  perfeft  forefight  and  knowledge  of  this 
event,  as  a  certain  con/equcnce  of  the  exercife  of  that 
almighty  power,  which  he  aftually  put  forth  in  pro- 
ducing creation. 

Farthermorc  : — The  Deity  is  conflantly  putting 
forth  afts  of  that  fame  almighty  power  which  caufed 
creation,  in, producing  effecTis  which,  in  their  nature, 
are  repugnant  to  the  nature  of  holinefs  :  I  mean,  iu 
the  pref'ervation  of  finners.  If  finners  are  dependent 
on  God  for  the  continuation  of  their  exiftence  ;  the 
continuance  of  their  exiflence  is  an  effeft  of  the  power 
of  God.  And  if  the  continuation  of  the  exiflence  of  a 
fmner  is  an  effeft  of  fome  exertions  of  the  power  of 
God  ;  then  the  continuance  of  finful  exijience  is  ari^ 
effeft  of  divine  exertion.  And  if  the  continuation  of 
finful  exiflence  is  an  effeft  of  fome  exertions  of  divine 
power  J  then,  of  confequence,  fuiful  exi/ience  it/elf-— 
moral  -evil — is  the  effed^  of  v/hich  fome  exertions  of 
divine  power  are  the  caufe.  If  the  divine  purity  and 
holinefs,  from  fomething  in  the  very  nature  of  thefe 
qualities,  muft  neceffarily  lay  a  reflraint  upon  fuch 
exertions  of  divine  power,  as  would  neceffarily  be 
prodiidive^  originally ^  of  finful  exiflence  ;  the  fame 
s.ttribute::  would,  for  the  fame  reafon,  lay  a  reflraint 

D  d  upon 


226  An    ess  a  Y    on  Part  II, 

upon  the  exertions  of  divine  power,  which  fhould  have 
for  their  efFe£l,  the  continuation  of  the.  being  of  a  finner 
"^the  prefervation  offinftd  exiftence.  If  it  is  effentiai 
to  the  harmony  of  the  divine  attributes,  that  the  power 
of  God  fliould  oppofe  tlie  exiftence  of  every  event,  the 
internal  nature  and  quality  of  which  is  repugnant  to 
holinefs  and  oppofite  to  the  natu7'e  of  it  ;  it  is,  of 
courfe,  as  effential  to  the  harmony  of  the  divine  attri-' 
bates,  to  oppofe,  in  the  exertions  of  his  power,  the 
continuation  of  finful  exiftence,  as  to  oppofe  its  original 
creation  and  produdion.-  For  there  is  as  real  an  oppo- 
fition  to  hoHnefs,  in  the  exertions  of  that  power  which 
caufe  the  prejervation  of  finful  exiftence  and  the  con- 
tinuation of  its  being  ;  as  in  thofs  exertions  of  power 
which  have,  for  tlieir  effect,  the  original  creation  and 
produdion  of  finful  exiftence  :  or,  rather,  there  is  no 
oppofition,  at  all,  to  holinefs,  in  either.  If  it  is  effen- 
tial to  the  harmony  of  the  divine  attributes,  that  the 
power  of  God  fhould  oppofe  the  exiftence  of  ftn,  as 
really  and  in  the  fame  fenfe  wherein  his  pure  and  holy 
nature  oppofeth  the  nature  of  fm  ;  it  muft  as  neceffari- 
ly  oppofe  the  continuance  of  this  exiftence,  as  the  be- 
ginning of  it.  For  that  which  carrieth  in  it  no  oppo- 
lition  to  the  continuation  of  iinful  exiftence,  containeth 
in  it,  no  oppofition  to  tlie  beginning  of  fuch  exiftence. 
If,  therefore,  God  may,  confiftently  with  his  infinite 
hatred  of  fin,  and  without  importing  the  leaft  appro- 
bation of  it,  preferve  finful  nature  and  being  i7i  exiflence  ; 
he  may,  likewiie,  in  perfeft  confiftency  wUh  his  purity 
and  holinefs,  produce  finful  nature  and  being,  and  bring 
it  into  exiflence.  But  the  truth  and  confiftence  of  the 
former  is  witneffed  hyfadl^  and  attefted  by  owrconfant 
and  daily  experience  :  it  is,  therefore,  no  valid  objec- 
tion againft  the  trutli  of  any  doftrine,  that  it  inferreth 
the  reality  and  certainty  of  the  latter  * 

Ob  J.  II.  To  fuppofe  the  Deity  to  exert  any  aftive 
power  which  is  either  the  mediate  or  immediate  cauje 
of  finful  exiftence,  neceffarily  iinplieth  a  preference, 
in  the  divine  mind,  of  the  exiftence  and  taking  place 
..  •  of 


Sed.IV.  MORAL  AGENCY.  257 

of  fuch  an  event  :  And  if  the  will  of  God  preferreth 
this  event  ;  then,  it  is  in  favour  of  it  :  And  if  the  divine 
will, is  in  favour  of  this  event  ;  then,  it  doth  not  oppofe 
it.  But  it  is  abundantly  manifeft  that  the  divine  Being 
is,  every  where  in  fcripture  reprefented  as  having  an 
infinite  cppofition  in  his  holy  and  pure  nature — his 
ivill-^to  (in  ;  therefore,  for  him  to  have  a  inill  to  cauje, 
either  mediately  or  immediately,  the  exiftence  offome,^ 
thing  to  which  his  whole  nature  andivill  are  in  perfCiSl 
oppofition  ;  neceffarily  implieth  perfeci  cppofition  in  the 
will  of  God  to  itfelf.  •  It  mufl,  therefore,  of  necellity 
be  that  Gpd,  either  doth  not  hate  fin  with  an  infinite 
hatred  ;  or,  that  he  never  did  put  forth  any  aft  of 
power  to  caufe^  either  mediately  or  immediately,  the 
exiflence  of  moral  eviL  But  no  one  v/ill  prefume  to 
affert  the  former  ;  therefore,  every  one  muft  necefTar 
rily  be  obliged  to  aflent  to  the  latter  ;  which  effectual- 
ly fubverteth  the  opinion  under  confideration. 

Ans.  In  order  effeftually  to  invalidate  the  objeftion 
before  us,  I  would  hambly  fubmit  to  confideration, 
the  few  following  obfervations  :  wherein,  if  the  reader 
{hould  obierve  a  repetition  of  fome  th*  igs  which  have 
been  already  advanced  on  the  prefent  argument,  I 
v/ould  crave  his  candour  and  patience  ;  offering  this 
as  my  apology,  that  the  nature  of  the  objeftion  re- 
quireth  it. 

I .  There  is  nothing  irrational  or  inccnfiflent  in  fup- 
pofing  the  fame  will — the  fame  uniform  difpofition — to 
^prefer  an  event  in  one  view  ofit^  and  perfedlly  oppofe, 
hate  and  abhor  it,  in  another.  Yea,  it  v/ould  argue 
inconfiftency  either  to  approve  or  difapprove  of  the 
fame  objeft,  in  different  and  oppofite  views  of  it,  at  one 
and  the  fame  time.  There  cannot  be  a  more  pertinent 
inftance  to  illuflrate  this  obfervation,  than  the  death 
and  fufferings  of  Chrift.  This  was  an  event,  in  one 
view  of  it,  very  defirable  and  glorious  ;  in  another, 
infinitely  to  be  abominated  an.d  abhorred.  In  one 
view  of  it,  it  was  an  event  the  moft  honourable  to  the 
divine  charafter  of  any  one  that  ever  yet  took  place  : 

D  d  2  in 


tit  An   E  SS  A  Y    ON  PaitIL 

in  another,  the  mod  reproachful  to  God  of  any  a.£k 
that  was  ever  perpetrated  here  in  our  fallen,  rebellious 
world,  /jt  one  view  of  it^  for  a  man  not  heartily  to 
approve  of  it  and  rejoice  in  it,  would  be  a  flrong  and 
irrefragable  argument  of  his  enmity  againft  God  ;  in 
another^  for  him  to  fail  in  with  it  and  approve  of  it, 
^vould  be  an  argument  as  pregnant  and  irrefiftible,  of 
an  utter  difafFed:ion  to  him.  The  fame  uniform,  harr 
monious  difpofition,  therefore,  mufl,  of  neceffity,  ap- 
prove of  this  event  in  one  view  of  it  ;  and  utterly  dif- 
approve  of  it  in  another.  So  the  holy  and  fm- hating 
God  really  approveth  of  this  event,  complexly-  confider- 
ed  ;  though  it  neceflarily  involved  the  moft  horrid 
and  abominable  wickednefs  in  it  ;  For  this  was  an 
event  which  v/as  brought  about  according  to  the  de-^ 
terminate  counfel  and  foreknowledge  of  Cod  ;  and  was 
determined  by  the  divine  counfel  to  be  done. "^  Now  if 
God  before  deter^nined  this  fad  to  be  done  ;  if  this 
event  came  into  exigence  according  to  his  determinate 
counfel  ;  it  is  abundantly  manifeft  that  the  Deity  may 
determine  the  exiftence  of  an  event,  confidently  with 
his  infinite  hatred  and  abhorrence  of  it.  And  if  God 
may  determine^  in  his  own  ijifmite  mind^  that  an  event 
jhall  certainly  exifl:,  confidently  with  his  utter  hatred 
and  averfion  of  mind  to  it ;  he  may  likewife,  unquefr 
tionably,  put  forth  pofitive  exertions  of  his  own  al- 
mighty power,  which  fliall  certainly  ifTne,  in  event, 
in  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil,  in  perfe<5i  confiflency 
and  harmony  with  that  will  of  his  whereby  he  infi- 
nitely hateth  and  abhorreth  all  lin. 

2.  In  thofe  exertions  of  the  power  of  God,  which 
ifTue  in  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil^  the  objeft  of  the 
divine  volition  is  far  from  being  the  fame  as  the  objeft 
of  his  will  in  his  infinite  hatred  and  avei Tion  to  fin. 
And  where  the  ohjeds  of  volition  or  aff'e«fi:ion  are  not 
the  lame,  but  quite,  diverfe  from  each  other  ;  it  is  cf- 
fcntial  to  the  harmony  of  the  difpofition  with  itfelf, 
and  the  uniformity  of  its  exercifes,  that  there  fliould 

bCJ 
*  Afts  ii.  20.  and  iv.  28 


Sea:.  IV.  MORAL    AGENCY.  229 

be  a  proportionable  diverfity  of  the  volitions  and  af- 
fecHiions  themrelvcs.  In  producing  all  effeds^  of  what- 
ever kind,  the  direCl^  wmiediate  objedl  of  divine  voli- 
tion, is,  the  exertions  of  his  own  pow&r  :  The  mediate 
end  ultimate  objed  of  divine  volition^  is  that  end  which 
appeareth,  in  the  ilTue  and  event,  to  be  effedted  and 
accompliflied  by  means,  or  through  the  intervention, 
of  that  effeift  of  which  the  exertions  of  the  power  in 
quefUon  are  the  caufe.  And  whenever  the  Deity  xy;/- 
letk  an  exertion  of  power  for  the  produd:ion  of  any 
effed ;  he,  doubtlefs,  willeth  at  the  fame  time  that 
event  which,  ultimately  and  in  the  i[fue^  appeareth  to 
have  been  produced  and  brought  into  exigence  through 
the  intervention  and  means  of  that  effl-d  which  arofe 
out  of  the  exertions  of  the  power  in  queftion  as  its 
caufe.  Thus  if  the  Deity  exerteth  an  adl  of  power, 
either  mediately  or  immediately,  to  produce  the  ex- 
iftence  of  moral  evil  ;  the  dired^  immediate  objed  of 
divine  volition,  it  is  evident,  in  that  cafe,  is  the  exer- 
tions of  his  own  divine  and  almighty  power  :  God,  di- 
rectly and  immedi-itely,  choofeth  to  put  forth  fuch 
certain,  definite  a6ts  of  power.  But  the  ultimate  ob-^ 
jeft  of  the  divine  volition,  in  the  exertions  of  the 
powxr  in  queftinn,  is  the  effeft  which  is  ultimately 
produced  or  brouglit  into  exigence,  by  means  of  thefe 
exertions  of  power  :  and  this  is  tlie  [greater  good. 
Tlie  will  of  God  nextly  and  immediately  tcrminateth 
upon  certain,  definite  exertions  of  his  power  ;  v.lti- 
7Hately^  upon  tlie  greater  good  in  this  way  to  be  eife»5ted. 
If  thefe  obfervalions  arc  juft,  I  tliJnk  it  itioit  mani- 
fcftly  appeareth,  that  there  is  not  the  leaf):  degree  of 
oppofition  of  the  divine  will,  in  tliofe  exertions  of  his 
power  v/hich  produce,  either  mediately  or  immediate- 
ly, the  exigence  of  moral  evil,  to  thofe  exercifes  of 
will,  in  God,  whereby  he  hateth  fin  with  an  infinite 
hatred  :  yea,  fo  tar  from  it,  that  there  is  the  moll 
evident  agreement  and  harmony  between  them.  To 
confider  rnora^  evil  as  a  fruit  of  the  divine  di/pofal^  God 
5[nay  will  it  3  and  yet,  when  coniidered  in  lelation  to 

the 


230  Aw   E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  IL 

the  human  purpofe  and  defign  in  it^  infinitely  hate  and 
abhor  it.     This  may  be  illuftrated  by  the  following 
example.     God  had  threatened  that  he  would  fend  the 
King  of  AlTyria,  whom  he  flyleth  the  rod  of  his  anger, 
'  againft  an  h5^pocritical  nation  ;  and  againft  the  peo- 
'  pie  of  my  wrath   (faith  he)    will  I  give  a  charge  to 
'  take  the,  fpoil,  and  to  take  the  prey,  and  to   tread 
'  them  down  like  the  mire  of  the  flreets.     Howbeit, 
'  he  meaneth  not  fo^    neither  doth  his  heart  think  Jo  ; 
'  but  it  is  in  his  heart  to  defiroy  and  cut  off"  nations  not 
^  a  few."     Ifai.  x.  5.  6,  7.     Here  it  is  evident  that  the 
Deity  Tvilled  that  deitru<Stion  and  defolation  which  were 
made  by  this  proud  Aflyrian.    And  it  is  not  lels  abun- 
dantly evident,  that  he  viewed  his  condu£l,  in  dellroying 
and  laying  wafte  the  cities  of  his  people,  with  intinite 
hatred,  abhorrence  and  contempt :   for  he  faith   (ver, 
12.)    "  Wherefore  it  (hall  come  to  pafs,  that  when  the 
**  Lord  hath  performed  his  whole  work  upon  mount 
"  Zion,  and  on  Jerufalem,  I  will  punifti  the  fruit  of  the 
*'  ftout  heart  of  the  King  of  Aflyria,  and  the  glory  of  his 
*'  high  looks."     And  yet  no  one,  I  prefume,  embold- 
ened by  this  injlance^  will  venture  to  exhibit  a  charge 
of  inconfiftency  againft  God.      Neverthelefs,   there  is 
all  the  appearance  of  inconfiftency  in  this  conduft   of 
the  Deity,  which  is  urged  in  the  objeftion  under  coH" 
fideration  againft  that  divine  agency  refpc£ling  the  e::- 
iftence  and  taking  place  of  moral  evil,  which  is  pleaded 
for  in  the  prefent  argument.      And  for  the    Deity   to 
ivill  a  pofitive  exertion  of  his  own  divine  and  almighty 
power,  which  ftiould  be  the  caufe^  either  mediately  or 
immediately,   of  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil,  no  more 
implieth  any  oppofition  to  that  will  of  his,  whereby 
he  hateth  fm  with  an  infinite  hatred  ;    than  the  will 
whereby  he  put  forth  that  power,  by  which  he  allifted 
and  ftrengthened  this  King  to  deftroy  and  lay  wafte  the 
cities  of  his  people,  contained  fome  oppofition  to  that 
Tvill  of  his,  whereby  he  looked  upon  this  conduft  of 
the  proud  AfTyrian  with  itifinite  hatred  and  abhorrence. 
It  is  by  no  means  inconfiftent,   to  fuppofe  that  the 

Deitv 


3ea.  IV.  MORAL   AGENCY.  231 

Deity  may  will  an  object,  on  one  account^  which  he 
hateth  and  abhorreth,  on  another  :  this  would  argue  no 
dppolkion  of  will  to  itfelf,  or  inconfiftency  in  the  De- 
ity. It  doth  not  appear  in  any  degree  inconfiftent  with 
the  divine  hatred  of  fin,  to  fuppofe  that  God  ihould 
will  the  exiflence  of  it,  on  account  of  fomething  en- 
tirely the  reverfe  of  that  for  which  he  hateth  and  ab- 
horreth it  :  or,  that  he  iliould  choofe  the  exiftence  of 
fuch  an  event,  for  a  reafon  exceeding  diverfe  from 
that,  for  which  he  is  utterly  and  infinitely  averfe  to  it. 
IVhatever  other  objedions  may  be  of  weight  againfl: 
God's  ajHiually  luilling  the  exijlence  of  moral  evil ;  yet, 
that  it  argueth  inconfiftency  with  that  "will  of  his  where- 
by he  hateth  fin  with  an  infinite  hatred,  and  oppofition  to 
it,  can  be  of  none  ;  if  it  is  poflible  that  the  exiflence  of 
fuch  an  event  fliould  be  chofen  on  one  account^  and  ab- 
horred on  another.  And  that  it  is  poflible  that  the  ex- 
iflence of  fuch  an  event  Qiould  be  chofen  on  one  ac~ 
county  and  be  abhorred  and  abominated  on  another^ 
&ppeareth  evident  from  inftances  which  have  already 
been  adduced  ;  particularly  that  of  the  death  of  Chrift. 
The  leaft  attention  will  convince  any  one,  that  this  , 
was  an  event  injo??ie  rcJpeCis  exceedingly  defirabie  ;  in 
others^  to  be  utterly  detefted  and  abhorred. 

It  hath  alfo  been  already  obferved,  that  fmful  exifl- 
ence is  the  only  polTible  medium  through  which  crea- 
tures can  have  that  full  and  clear  difcernment  and  dif- 
covery  of  the  purity,  righteoufnefs  and  juftice  of  God, 
which  are  exhibited  in  the  eternal  deftrutStion  of  the 
finner.  And  as  thefe  perfedions,  in  the  Deity,  are 
defirabie  in  themfelves  and  in  their  own  nature  ;  fo 
they  are  in. all  the  appearances  and  exhibitions  of 
them  :  and,  confequently,  it  is  defirabie  that  the  moft 
full  and  perfeft  difcovery  that  can  be,  fhould  be  made 
of  them  to  the  views  of  creatures.  And  if  fo,  then  fin- 
ful  exiftence,  confiderecL  as  a  nece(fary  medium  of  this 
difcovery^  is  defirabie.  And  if  it  is  the  only  poifible 
medium  through  v/hich  this  full  and  perfe<n:  difcovery 
could  be  made  to  the  views  of  creatures  j    then,  con- 

fidered 


232*  An    ESSAY'on  Part  H. 

fldercd  merely  under  this  predicament,  creatures  might 
defire  the  exiftence  of  fuch  an  event,  confiftently  with 
their  utter  abhorrence  of  the  jiature  of  it.  And  if 
finful  exiftence  is  the  only  poffible  medium  through 
which  creatures  can  receive  this  moft  perfeft  and  full 
difcovery  ;  then,  of  confequence,  it  is  the  only  poffible 
medium  through  which  the  Deity  can  make  this  dif- 
covery to  creatures .  For  it  argueth  no  defedl  oi power 
in  the  Deity,  to  fay  that  he  cannot  make  a  difcovery 
to  the  vieivs  of  creatures^  in  a  way  wherein  it  is  impojft^ 
hie  for  them  to  receive  it.  And  if  fmful  exiftence  is  a 
nece[fary  medium  to  fo  defirable  an  end  ;  for  the  Deity 
to  will  and  defire  it  07i  this  account  and  i?:  this  view  of 
it  J  argueth  no  inconfiftency  with  that  w/7/of  his  where- 
by he  abliorreth  and  detefteth  it ;  nor,  oppofition  to  it. 
That,  on  account  of  which  fin  is  hateful  and  unde- 
firable,  is  its  tendency^  and  the  oppofition  of  it  to  God. 
All  fin  acftively  oppofeth,  and  in  elFect  denieth,  the  fov- 
ereignty  and  fupremacy  of  God.  All  fin,  in  exa<ft  pro- 
portion to  the  degree  of  its  finfulnefs,  oppofeth  God  } 
and  oppofeth  that  object  and  end,  which  were  chiefly 
and  ultimately  in  the  view  of  the  divine  mind,  in  ex- 
erting his  almighty  power  in  the  produftion  of  the 
created  fyftem.  There  is  no  fin  in  any  thing,  which 
hath  in  it  no  pofitive  oppofition  to  God,  nor  any  degree 
of  aiftive  tendency  to  an  end  diverfe  from  that  which 
engaged  the  divine  mind,  when  he  put  forth  his  al- 
mighty, irrefiftible  povv'er,  in  producing  the  creation. 
On  account  of  this  tendency  and  oppofition,  fin  is  in- 
finitely to  be  detefted  and  abhorred.  But  however 
evil  and  deteftable  fm  may  be,  on  account  of  this  op- 
pofition and  tendency  ;  it  may,  neverthelefs,  be  excel- 
lently adapted  as  a  medium  through  which  a  difcovery 
may  he  made,  to  creatures,  of  the  infinite  averfion  and 
hatred  there  is  in  the  divine  mind  to  that  very  tenden- 
cy in  fin  which  conftituteth  the  infinitely  evil  nature 
of  it.  And  yet  becauje  it  may  he  a  means  of  a  more 
pcrfecl  and  full  difcovery  to  creatures^  of  the  infinite 
cppolltion  of  the  divine  mind  to  the  nature  a7id  tendency 

of 


Sc^.rV.  MORAL  AGENCY.  233 

df  it  ;  no  one  can  infer  from  thence,  with  the  leajft  ap- 
pearance of  reafon^  that  there  is,  in  favft,  no  oppofition 
of  tendenc}'-,  in  fm,  to  the  glory  and  fupremacy  of 
God.  And  if  there  is  no  inconfiftency  in  fuppofing 
that  fm  may  be  the  occafion  and  means  of  difcovering 
fomething  which  hath,  in  it,  ptrfed  oppofition  to  the 
nature  of  fin  }  there  is,  of  courfe,  no  inconfiftency  of 
that  will  of  God,  wliich  is  manifeRed  and  necellarily 
implied  in  thofe  exertions  of  power,  which  are,  either 
'  mediately  or  immediately,  the  caufe  of  the  exiftence  of 
moral  evil  ;  to  that  revealed  will  of  his,  whereby  the 
Deity  looketh  on  all  fin  with  infinite  hatred  and  ab- 
horrehce  t  which  confideration,  1  think,  is  a  fuilicient 
anfwer  to  the  obje«£tion  in  queftion. 

Thus  have  I  confidered,  I  apprehend,  the  principal 
and  mofl  weighty,  as  well  as  mod  plaufible,  objeiJIions 
which  can  be  made  againft  the.doftrine  of  a.  fpecial^ 
pofitive  divine  agency  and  difpojnl  in  favour  of  the  exift- 
ence of  77z^ral  evil.  Whether  the  objections  have  been 
fairly  and  juftly  ftated,  and  allowed  their  due  weight, 
the  candid,  intelligent  reader  muft  judge.  The  objec- 
tions which  have  been  confidered  in  the  prelent  lec- 
tion, both  centre  in  nearly  one  and  the  fame  thing  : 
•but  I  thought  it  beft  to  put  them  into  thefe  different 
•forms,  the  rather  that  they  might  appear  in  their  full 
ftrcngth  ;  and,  alfo,  that  opportuiiity  might  be  had  for 
a  more  full  and  perfeft  confutation  of  them.  Whether 
what  hath  been  faid  is  any  confutation  at  all  of  the  prin- 
cipal objecflions  agai;'ift  a  fpecial  divine  agency  and  di/pO' 
fal  in  favour  of  the  exiftence  o^  moral  evil^  and  giving 
infallible  futurity  and  certainty  to  the  taking  place  of 
fin^  1  (hall  now  leave  to  the  judgment  and  confidera- 
ijon  of  others  ;  and  proceed  to  take  the  fenfe  of  ths 
holyjtriptures  on  the  important  point  before  us. 


E  e  •  5*  c  T. 


29f  An    E  S  S  A  Y   oh  Part  IL 


S    £   C   T.      V. 

Coniaining  fo-rne  fcriptiire  evide^ice  of  a  fpeiial  d'roine 
as^ency  and  difpojal^  ^^ii'/;^^  ynfallible  cartamty  to  the 
exijtence  of  mo-ral  evil. 

HAT  hath  been  already  faid  upon  the  fiibjecft, 
very  manifeflly  fheweth  the  extravagancy  and 
ablurdity  of  the  fuppodfition,  that  the  taking  place  and 
coming  into  exiftence  of  moral  evil,-  was  a  thing  out 
of  the  divine  view,  and  altog-ether  befide  the  purpofe 
and  intention  of  God.  And  the  holy  fcriptures  are  fb 
far  from  repr(?fenting  it  as  being  contrary  to  the  real 
purpofe  of  God,  that  there  fhouki  ever  be  any  fuch 
event,  that  they  plainly  teach  us  the  preordination  of 
it,  in  the  divine  defign  ;  manifeflly  leading  us  to  con- 
fider  the  prefent  fyilem,  as  it  is  in  all  ajtd  every  oj  its 
parts ^  as  the  fruit  of  wife  purpofe  and  defign.  There 
are  many  things  in  the  holy  fcriptures,  which  make  i-t 
abundantly  evident,  not  only  that  God  forejanjo  the  ex- 
iflehce  of  fach  an  event  ;  but  that  he  alfo  foreordained 
and  predetej-mined  it  :  And,  that  the  taking  place  of 
fin  was  an  event  which  fo  fully  entered  into  the  divine 
defign,  and  was  fo  effential  a  part  of  it  ;  that,  without 
it,  the  great  and  principal  end  of  creation  itfelf  could 
not  be  accomplilhed.  Who  can  read  over  the  word 
of  God,  and  take  into  vie^v,  and  carefully  confider, 
the  great  and  marvellous  work  of  redemption  as  there 
exhibited,  in  its  glory  and  importance  ;  without  being 
ferioufly  of  opinion,  that  it  v/as  the  real  purpofe  of 
God,  that  moral  evil  fhould  come  into  the  world  ? 
When  we  confider  the  importance  of  the  mediatorial 
character,  in  the  fyftem  ;  and  how  much  it  lieth  at 
bottom  of  all  the  divine  works  ;  and  remember  how- 
much  the  kingd'om  of  redemption  is  reprefented  as  the 
grand  end  ultimately  in  view,  in  creation  ;  it  muft,  at 
leaft,  be  very  difficult  for  us  to  frame  the  apprehen- 

fion, 


Se£l.V.  MORAL    AGENCY.  235 

fion,  in  our  own  minds,  that  God  had  no  pofitive  pur- 
pofes  refpeftino;  the  exiftence  and  taking  place  of  fin. 
And  to  fuppofe  that  moral  evil  came  into  the  world  in 
oppofition  to  a  pofitive  purpojh  of  the  divine  mind  ref- 
.  pedting  its  exiftence,  a  little  attention  will  convince 
any  one,  is  attended  with  confeqnences  at  leaft  as  em- 
harralfing  and  perplexing,  as  the  fuppofition  r.^  a  pofi- 
tive divine  agency  and  difpofal  in  favour  of  the  exift- 
ence of  fuch  an  event. 

Can  any  one  read  over  (for  inftance)  the  hiftory  of 
the  family  of  Jacob  until  their  deliverance  from  the 
Egyptian  bondage  under  the  hand  of  Mofes,  without 
having  it  ftrongly  imprefied  upon  his  mind  and  under- 
ftanding,  that,  for  wife  reafons,  thofe  fliocking  pieces 
of  cruelty,  barbarity  and  wickednefs,  which  diftinguifti 
that  particular  period,  were  predeterviinc^d  and  fore- 
ordained oi  (jodi.  Refpefting  that  unnatural  piece  of 
conduct  of  the  fons  of  Jacob,  in  felling  their  brother 
Jofeph,  the  good  man  himfelf  dire<5tcth  their  view 
(under  the  confufion  into  which  his  difcovery  of  him- 
felf to  them,  in  Egypt,  had  flung  them)  to  the  hand, 
and  wife  difpofal  and  agency,  of  God,  in  the  whole 
affair.  Thus  he  faith.  Gen.  xlv.  5.  Novj  tJierefcre  be 
7iot  grieved  nor  ajigry  ivitfi  yourjelves^  tliat  ye  Jold  me 
hither ;  for  God  did  fend  ?ne  before  yon  ^  to  preferve  life. 
And  ver.  8.  So  now  it  was  not  you  that  Jent  7ne  hither^ 
but  God.  Upon  this  reprefentation  of  the  matter,  by 
Jofeph,  to  his  brethren,  we  may  remark  the  few  fol- 
lowing things  : 

I .  That  a  pofitive  efliciency  and  difpofal,  in  this  af- 
fair, is  manifeftiy  afcribed  to  God.  There  is  no  inti- 
mation of  any  way,  whereby  God  fcnt  Jofeph  into 
Egypt,  otherwife  than  by  pofitively  difpofing  things, 
in  his  providence,  in  that  very  way  and  manner  in 
which  they  actually  came  to  pais.  And  fuch  a  pofitive 
difpofal  in  favour  of  that  event,  is  a  difpofal  of  all 
that  feries  of  events,  in  all  their  variety  of  circumftan- 
ces  and  connexions,  through  means  of  which  that 
great  event,  which  was  tlie  ift'ue  of  all,   finally  took 

E  e  2  place. 


2^&  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  II. 

place.  And  this  is,  certainly,  a  politive  divine  agency 
and  difpofal,  which  Viad  for  its  objcifl",  either  mediate- 
ly or  immediately,  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil. 

2.  The  perfon  who  made  thefe  obfervations  and 
reflections,  and  who  afcribed  fo  much  to  the  divine 
agency  in  that  remarkable  fcene  and  feries  of  events, 
was,  hirufelf,  a  man  of  eminent  piety  and  godlincfs. 
The  hiflory  of  his  life  furnifheth  us  with  fnfficient 
teftimonials  of  his  integrity  and  iiprightnefs  of  heart. 
He  {hewed  that  he  feared  God — that  he  made  the  Lord 
his  confidence  and  truft,  under  the  uncommon  trials 
and  temptations  v/hich  he  was  called  to  encounter,  in 
the  flrange  land.         Therefore, 

g.  When  Jofeph's  brethren  were  ftruck  with  a  fenfe 
of  their  barbarity  and  wickednefs  in  the  treatment  they 
had  given  him,  we  cannot  fuppofe  that,  m  order  to 
aiTuage  the  grief,  and  mitigate  the  pain,  of  fuch  a  con- 
vi(Stion,  this  good  man  had  the  leaft  thought  of  direft- 
ing  their  view  to  the  hand  of  God  in  the  affair,  in  fuch 
a  Icnfe  and  manner  as  fliould,  in  the  leaft  degree,  ob- 
Icnre  their  wickednels,  or  lefTen  the  criminality  of  it 
in  their  own  eyes.  This  would  be  to  take  the  blame  of 
that  wicked  conduft  off  from  them,  and  fix  it  upon 
God  :  a  eondu<S  of  which  we  cannot  reafonably  fup- 
pofe one  of  Jofeph's  chara<^er  would  be  guilty. 

4.  What  Jofcph,  therefore,  had  in  view,  was,  not 
to  abate  their  convictions,  or  diminifh  the  fenfe  which 
they  had  of  their  own  wickednefs  ;  but,  to  bring  the 
divine  hand  into  view,  and  the  real  and  great  good 
v/hich  God  hadtcken  occafion,  through  means  of  their 
wickednefs,  to  elfevSt.  This  is  the  only  method  whereby, 
relief  can  be  adrainiflered  to  the  penitent  heart,  pained 
and  burdened  v/ith  a  lenfe  of  its  wickednefs.  Nothing 
but  a  conviction  of  the  divine  agency  and  difpofal 
bounding,  circumfcribing  and  afcertaining  every  e- 
vent,  of  whatever  nature  and  kind,  and  directing  all 
things,  in  the  wifeff  manner,  through  the  bell  adapted 
means,  to  the  moil  happy  and  glorious  iillie,  can  en- 
tirely relieve  the  real  pain,  anxiety  and  cUfrrels  of  a 
proper  and  genuine  conviClion  of  fin.  5.  If 


Sea.  V.  MORAL   AGENCY.  537 

5".  If  jofeph  conducted  wifely  and  prudently  in  this 
matter,  it  appeareth  that  the  moCt  proper  and  fuitable 
method  to  relieve  the  broken,  penitent  and  benevolent 
heart,  of  that  anxiety  and  diftrefs  which  muft  necef- 
farily  be  occafioned  by  an  effcftual,  proper  conviction 
of  fin,  and  a  profpe6l  of  the  extenfive  reign  of  wick- 
ediiefs  here  in  our  world,  is,  to  bring  the  divine  liand 
and  agency  particularly  into  view,  and  reprefent  every 
event  ^  of  iu  hat  ever  nature  or  kind^  as  cftming  into  ex- 
igence as  a  fruit  of  the  divine  difpofal^  and  under  the 
direcftion  and  influence  of  his  infinite  and  unerring 
wifdom.  The  expreffions  here  ufed,  are  fuch  as  moll 
manifeilly  lead  us  to  confider  the  wicked  condudl  of 
the  brethren  of  Jofeph  as  the  effeCl  of  which  fomc 
pofitive  divine  difpofal  and  agency  were  the  canfe. 
He  faith  exprelily,  So  noiv  it  was  not  you  that  fent  me 
hither^  but  God.  It  is  true,  that  the  ends  of  divine 
providence,  and  the  views  of  Jofeph's  brethren,  in 
one  and  the  fame  feries  of  events,  were  exceedingly 
the  reverie  of  each  other.  As  he  faith  (Gen.  1.  20.) 
But  as  for  you^  ye  thought  evil  again f  7/ie  ;  hut  God 
meant  it  unto  (rood.  God's  view  in  di.pofing.,  and  their 
view  in  ading,  one  and  the  fame  thing,  were  infinitely 
different  from  each  other.  But  yet  the  pofitive  dif- 
pofal and  efficiency  of  God,  ifliied  in  an  event  which 
"was  great  wickednefs  in  the  aftors  of  it. 

The  divine  agency  and  dilpofal,  as  canfe  of  the  ex- 
iRence  of  moral  evnl  as  its  effed^  are  fpoken  of  in  terms 
I'lill  more  flrong  and  expreHive,  relative  to  the  con- 
duft  and  wickednefs  of  Pharaoh,  the  proud  oppreffor 
of  the  people  of  God.  V/iicn  God  firfl  fent  Mofes 
unto  Pharaoh,  to  demand  liberty  for  the  people  of 
Ifrael  to  go  three  days  journey  into  the  wildernefs  to 
do  facrifice  to  Jehovah,  he  at  the  fame  time  foretells 
the  utter  rcfufal  of  this  haughty  tyrant  ;  and  faith  ex- 
prefsiy,  (Exod.  vii.  3.)  I  will  harden  Pharaoh's 
HEART,  and  jnultiply  my  fig'is  and  7?jy  wonders  in  ihci  land 
of  Egypt.  Accordingly  it  is  faid,  (ver.  13.)  A)id  he 
Hx^RDENED  pHARAgH^s  HEART,  that  hc  hearkened  not  unto 

them. 


438  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  Part  IL 

them.  The  fame  form  of  expreilion  is  iifed  refpc^ing 
the  fame  matter  (Exod.  ix.  12.)  And  the  Lord  har-^ 
DENED  THE  HEART  OF  Pharaoh  ;  and  he  heafkeTKfd  net 
unto  them^  as  the  Lord  fpake  by  Mo/es.  And  when 
God  foretelleth  the  farther  plagues  and  ftill  forer 
judgments  which  he  had  prepared  for  Pharaoh,  and 
was  bringing  upon  him,  he  faith  (ver.  16.)  And  in 
very  deed  for  this  cmife  have  I  roijed  thee  up  ^  for  tofliew 
in  thee  my  poiuer  ;  and  that  jny  name  may  be  declared 
throughout  all  the  earth.  It  is  difficult  to  find  terms 
more  ftrongly  and  emphatically  to  exprefs  a  pofitive 
defign  and  purpofe,  in  the  Deity,  in  favour  of  tiie  ex- 
iflence  of  moral  evil,  and  a  divine  agency  and  difpo- 
fal  giving  infallible  futurity  and  certainty  to  the  exill- 
ence  and  taking  place  of  a  fcene  of  wickednefs  moft 
provoking  to  the  holy  God,  and  abominable  and  hate^. 
ful  in  his  eyes.  He  not  only  foretold  the  wickednefs 
of  Pliaraoh  as  what  miglit  come  to  pals,  but  as  what 
fliould  infallibly  come  to  pafs.  Nor  doth  he  reprefent 
barely  his  defign  to  fujfer  and  permit  it  ;  but,  alfo,  his 
pofitive  purpofe  oi  aciually  cifeding^  by  Jo?ne  pofitive 
agency  and  di/pcjal  of  his  oivn^  this  hardnefs  in  Pharaoh's 
heart. 

To  fay  that  God  only  permitted  Pharaoh  to  harden 
his  own  heart,  or,  at  moft,  no  more  than  laid  the 
temptation  before  him,  by  no  means  cometh  up  to  the 
idea  conveyed  by  the  pofitive^  exprejs  declarations  of 
the  text  :  or,  if  it  did,  ftill  it  would  not  in  any  meaf- 
mre  relieve  the  difficulty,  for  the  removal  of  which 
theic  foftening,  lenient,  timid  expreffions  were  in- 
vented. For, 

1.  If  the  divine  Being  had  been  as  averfe  to  the 
taking  place  of  Pharaoh^s  wickednefs,  as  his  holy  and 
pure  nature  is  to  the  nature  of  fm  ;  he  could  with  in- 
finite eafe,  have  delivered  and  led  forth  the  tribes  of 
his  people,  without  the  leave  of  this  haughty  tyrant, 
or  his  beinvT  ever  at  all  confulted  in  the  cafe. 

o 

2.  If  the  Deity  Vv'^as  really  as  averfe  to  the  event  of 
the  fm  and  wickednefs  of  Pharaoh,  as  his  nature  is  a- 

verie 


Sea.V,  MORAL    AGENCY.  239 

verfe  to  the  nature  of  fin  ;  he  would  furely  never  have 
pcr;nitt€d  it,  when  his  people  might  as  well  have  been 
delivered,  had  he  fo  {^tw  fit,  without  fuch  a  temptation 
ever  having  been  laid  before  Pharaoh  to  tranfgrefs  in 
a  manner  To  bold  and  daring.  And,  leaft  of  all,  ox\. 
thir.  luppolition,  v/ould  he  have  laid  T/^c-aV?/  occafun; 
find  temptation  to  fin,  before  one  fo  peculiarly  apt  and 
fitted  to  be  drawn  into  the  fnare,  as  Pharaoh  was  ;  but 
would  have  been  particularly  careful  not  to  have  ad- 
miniftered  any  occafion,  in  his  providence,  for  in- 
creaiing  the  obftinacy  and  rebellion  of  fo  hardened  a 
finner.*  Whereas, 

::;.  The  whole  affair,  as  recorded  by  Mofes,  carrieth 
in  it  the  moft  manifcil  marks  of  defign.  Every  cir- 
cuinflance  hath  this  appearance  ;  and  all  carry  the  face 
of  a  previous  purpofe,  and  politive  intention,  of  the 
righteous  Governor  of  the  world,  that,  for  fome  wife 
reaibiis,  ^11  this  horrid  fcene  of  wickednefs  fhould 
actually  come  to  pafs.  Moles,  doubtlefs,  had  an  equal 
concern  for  the  honour  and  glory  of  tlie  divine  char- 
acter, with  thofe  who  imagine  it  fo  reproachful  to  the 
Deity  to  corifidcr  the  taking  place  of  moral  evil  as  a 
fruit  and  effect  of  a  politive  divine  agency  and  difpofal. 
And  if  he  had  once  thought  that  the  divine  character 
would  have   been    endangered,    by  reprefenting  the 

wickednefs 

*  If  we  fuppofe  that  will  of  the  Deit\',  with  which  the  exiftence  of  thole  e- 
vents  wliich  are  its  objects  is  connetledi  and  the  exertions  of  wluch  give  i>eing  to 
any  event,  to  be  the  fame  as  his  frec^ptlfe  wili  to  his  creatures  ;  it  is  as  really 
dllhonourable  and  reproachful  to  Cod>  to  fay  that  he  <>ermhteth  fin,  as  to  fay 
that,  by  iomz  pr.Jiii-ve  agency  and  difpofal.  He,  either  mediately  or  immediately, 
caufeth  the  exiftence  of  it.  For  it  is  as  truly  and  infinitely  contrary  to  the  p-t- 
efptive  'wii!  of  God,  \rt  permit  fin,  as  adhialiy  lo  cctnmand  ■an^  cnjnin  it.  But  if 
the  creative  and  f  receptive  will  of  God  are  not  the  fame,  we  have  no  occaliou  iox 
the  ^eritle  (and,  I  may  fay,  in  this  place  infigniticant)  tenn  permit,  in  order  to 
relieve  our  imaginations  ;  it  implying  no  ir.confifteucy  to  fuppofe  tliat  God» 
eitlier  mediately  or  immediately,  by  fome  exertions  of  his  own  almighty  p'^;wer, 
gave  certainty  to  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil.  But  be  this  as  it  will,  the  term 
permit,  in  this  ufe  and  application  ot  it,  carrieth,  every  v.'ay,  as  real  a  rcficiliini 
upon  the  moral  charadier  of  God,  as  the  terms  pofitr-je  agency  and  difp(ful  .■  "the 
former  implying  Ibme  degree  of  that  f.imc  reconcilablenefs  of  the  divine  mind  to 
moral  evil,  which  is  apprehended  to  be  implied  in  the  latter.  It  is  a  tcirn. 
therefore,  in  my  humble  opinion,  which  hath  been  improperly  ufed  ;  tending  to 
relieve  only  the  imaginations  of  men  ;  and  that  by  begetting  in  the  mini!  an  ap. 
prehenfion  of  certain  powers,  in  creatures,  wliich  do  not  belong  to  them  ;  and, 
of  a  certain  negleSi  in  pro-vidcnc:,  and  carileffn(fi  in  the  divine  mindi  which  are 
inriniteJj'  reproachful  to  him. 


»^o  An    essay    on  Part  II. 

wickednefs  and  obftinacy  of  Pharaoh  aS  the  eff'eCl^  of 
which  a  pofitive  divine  agency  and  dilpofal  were,  ei- 
ther mediately  or  immediately)  the  cmj'e  ;  furely  he 
would  have  exprefTed  himielf  in  a  manner  more  cau- 
tious and  guarded,  on  fo  delicate  a  fubjecl ;  and  not 
iuffered  his  relation,  as  it  unqneftionably  doth,  to 
carry  in  it  fuch  vifible  marks  of  a  pofitive  divine  pur- 
pole  and  defign  giving  birth  to  a  feries  of  the  mofl 
bold  and  daring  wickednefs.  Mofes  could  not  have 
made  ufe  of  terms  more  flrong  and  exprellivc,  if  he 
had  actually  defigned  to  reprefent  a  politive  divine  a- 
gency  and  difpofal  as  giving  previous  infallible  cer- 
tainty to  any  fcene  or  feries  of  events.  And  if  all 
thefe  expreffions  are  to  be  fo  analyzed  and  fubtilized, 
and  perfectly  interpreted  away,  as  to  convey  no  idea 
of  its  being  more  agreeable  to  the  divine  purpofe  and 
intention  that  this  fcene  of  wickednefs  fliould  tak« 
place,  t\i^nt\\Q  fiatnre  and  evil  o?  {\n  are  to  the  holy 
and  pure  nature  of  God  ;  we  mufl  forever  defpair  of 
determining  any  do<flrine  whatfocver  by  the  word  of 
God  ;  nor  ever  prefume  to  receive  the  moft  plain, 
familiar  and  exprefs  affertions  of  it,  as  a  fufiicient  au- 
thority for  any  opinion. 

The  defign  of  God  in  raifing  up  Pharaoh,  as  ex-' 
preffed  in  Exod.  ix.  16.  the  Apoflle  Paul  adduceth  in 
proof  of  the  doftrinc,  that  it  is  not  of  him  th'.:tvoilleth^ 
nor  of  him  that  runneth^  but  of  God  that  fJiewcth  mercy  ; 
and  quotes  this  very  text  in  fupport  of  it  (Rom.  ix. 
17.)  from  whence  he  drawetli  this  conclufion  (ver. 
18.)  Therefore  hath  he  7nercy  on  whom  he  will  have 
772ercy^  nnd^vhovi  he  will  he  hardenetJi.  Paul  himfelf 
was  not  infenfible  of  the  objc<ftion  which,  at  this  dif- 
tance  of  time,  is  made  againft  a  doftrine  lo  unpopular 
as  that  of  the  abfolute  fovcreignty  of  God,  in  the  fal- 
vation  and  damnation  of  fmners.'  Accordingly  he 
flateth  the  objection,  in  the  next  words,  in  the  fame 
manner,  and  nearly  under  the  fame  form,  in  which  it 
is  urged  at  the  prefent  day,  againll  the  fame  doctrine. 
He  faith,  Thou  wilt  fay  then,  why  doth  he  yet  find  fault  f 

For 


Sccft;  V.  MORAL   AGENCY.  241 

For  who  hath  refijled  his  will  f — As  much  as  to  fay, 
"  If  God,  himfclf,  hath  hardened  the  heart  of  any  one  ; 
''  it  is  juil  as  he  made  it,  and,  therefore,  juil  as  he 
'•  would  have  it  be  :  and  if  it  is  juft  as  God  would 
"  have  it  be^  what  pretence  can  there  be  that  his  will  is 
"  refifledf  And  how  can  there  be  any  criminality  or 
"  offence,  where  there  is  no  reiiflance  to  the  divine 
*'  will  I'*  Here  are  the  only  two  objections,  of  any 
confiderable  degree  of  plaufibility  or  weight,  which 
any  one  can  make  againft  a  pofitive  divine  agency  and 
difpofal  giving  certain  futurity  to  the  exigence  of 
moral  evil.  The  yfr/?  is,  that,  on  this  fuppoiltion, 
God  hath  no  reafon  to  find  fault ;  thQ  fecond^  that  there 
is  no  evil  or  criminality  in  fin.  In  order  to  remove 
thefe  objeftions,  and  take  off  their  force,  Paul  bringeth 
into  view  the  abfolute  fupremacy  and  fovereignty  of 
God  ;  and  the  unreafonablenefs  of  the  creature's  ob* 
je£ling  againll  the  Creator^  for  any  of  his  a('h  in  mak- 
ing the  creature  fuch  as  he  really  is.  He  faith  (ver» 
21 .)  Hath  not  the  potter  power  over  the  clay  of  the  far,ie 
lump^  to  make  one  veffel  iifito  honour^  and  another  unto 
difJionour  f  Before  the  veffel  is  formed,  there  is  nothing 
in  the  lump  to  determine  one  part  unto  difhonour, 
more  than  anotlier  ;  or  the  contrary  ;  which  fneweth 
that  this  iimilitude  was  not  made  ufe  of,  in  order  to 
reprefent  the  right  which  God  hath,  after  he  has  adu- 
ally  formed  the  whole  race  of  men  infin^  to  fave,  and  to 
caft  otf,  according  to  his  fovereign,  wife  and  arbitrary 
will.  For  mankuid,  being  in  fin,  were  already  formed 
to  be  vejfels  unto  d' [honour^  i.e.  deferving  of  wrath  : 
confequently  the  fovereignty  of  God,  in  ordaining 
who  ol  firiful  men  fhall  finally  periQi,  is  not,  with  any 
propriety,  reprefented  by  the  fovereignty  of  the  potter 
in  forming  different  veileh  out  of  one  and  the  fame 
lump.  It  muft,  therefore,  be  the  evident  purpofe  and 
defign  of  the  Apollle,  to  reprefent,  and  teach  us,  that 
our  being  originally  either  holy  or  finful^  is  not  the 
fruit  and  cff^eCl  of  our  own  free  will  and  ciioice  ;  but 
that  our  firlt  or  original,   either  holy  or  finful^  exer- 

F  f  cifes, 


242  An    E  S  S  a  Y   ofT  Part  IL 

cifes,  are  originated  wholly  by  fome  foreign,  extrinfic 
cauf'e^  and  come  into  being  as  its  effed,  Velfels  made 
by  the  potter  are,  either  unto  honour,  or  unto  dif-' 
honour,  merely  and  folely  for  being  ivhat  they  dre^ 
and  Juch  as  they  are  ;  without  any  reference  whatever 
being  had  to  the  defign,  purpofe  or  fiiill  of  the  potter^ 
Jufh  fo  of  mankind  ;  tliey  are  either  to  honour,  or  to 
diOionour,  i.e.  holy  or  fmful,  without  any  confidera- 
tion  at  all  of  the  cauje  of  their  virtue  or  vice,  whether 
it  is  internal  or  external  ;  in  the  Deity,  or  in  them-* 
felves.  And  in  this  jenje  had  God  the  fame  right  to 
form  one  vefiel  unto  honour,  and  another  unto  dif- 
honour,  as  the  potter  hath  over  the  clay  :  And  this  is 
but  the  natural  confequence,  of  what  the  fcripture 
faitli  concerning  Pliaraoh,  jull  quoted  by  the  z'Xpoille  : 
Even  for  this  same  purpose  have  I  raised  tree  up. 

Thus  is  the  Apoftle  Paul  as  full  in  the  do<n:rine  of  a 
poutive  divine  efficiency  and  difpofal,  giving  certain 
futurity  to  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil,  as  language  can 
,  well  exprefs  :  aiTerting  that  God  hardeneth  whom  he 
will  ;  and,  in  pi'oof  of  it,  quoting  the  exprefs  words 
of  God  himfelf  to  Pharaoh,  wherein  he  lignifieth  to 
that  cruel  and  obftinate  tyrant,  that  how  great  foever 
his  opposition  might  be  to  the  God  of  Ifrael,  he  was 
not  able  to  frultrate  and  difappoint  his  defigns  and 
counfcb  :  for  it  was  he,  himfelf  (the  very  God  whom 
Pharaoh  oppofed)  that  raifed  him  up,  of  exprefs  pur- 
pofe and  defign,  Juch  a  creature  as  he  was^  in  order  to 
lay  the  foundation  of  opening,  to  the  beft  advantage, 
thofe  wonderful  and  marvellous  fcenes  which  were 
exhibited  in  the  land  of  Egypt,  in  the  delivery  of  his 
chofen  people,  and  the  deilruftion  of  their  enemies. 

However 

*  It  cannot  with  any  propriety  be  urged,  that  it  is  iinji'J}  in  God  to  bring 
moral  beings  into  exiftence  in  fin.  Jujilce  or  ivjufiice  are  exercifed  only  in  17?/- 
!i  wating  moral  characters,  and  the  confequent  treatment  of  the  fubje<3s  of  them. 
No  inji-jlice  can  be  done,  by  the  Deity,  to  any  creature-,  where  liis  character  is 
not  improperly  eftimated.  When  a  being  pr>frjfeth  a  moral  charader,  and  not 
before,  he  is  fufceptible  of  injujiice  on  account  of  it.  But  that  excrcife  of  the 
will,  or  power,  of  God,  which  hath  for  its  objed  the  exiilcnce  of  a  moral  being, 
either  finful,  or  holy,  contains  in  it  no  ejiimation  whatever  oi  his  charader  ;  andj 
in  tlie  nature  of  things,  can  do  him?  neither y«/?/ff  nor  the  contrary. 


Se6l.  V.  MORAL  AGENCY.  245 

However  difguftful  and  unpopular  this  reafoning  of 
the  Apoftle  may  be  in  our  day,  the  iiappy  tim^,  we 
hope,  will  come,  when  thefe  Icriptures,  as  w^ell  as 
others,  iliall  be  underftood  in  their  true  fimplicity, 
perfpicuity  and  beauty  ;  and  the  Spirit  of  God  be  lb 
plentifully  poured  out,  that  the  palfions  and  corrup- 
tions of  men  fliall  not  be  irritated  by  plain,  evangelical 
truth  ! 

There  are  various  reprefentations  in  fcripture,  the 
plain  and  moft  natural  conftru(^ion  of  v/hich  clearly 
convey  the  idea  of  fome  Ipecial  divine  efficiency  and 
diipofal,  as  caufe^  of  the  exiftence  and  taking  place  of 
moral  evil,  as  its  effecL  We  have  an  inflance  of  this 
kuid,  whicli  i 5  very  clear  and  illuflrating,  in  the  cafe 
of  the  king  of  Affyria.  God  calleth  him  the  rod  of  his 
anocr  ;  and  faith,  that  the  fiaff  in  His  handy  i.  e.  the 
power  by  which  this  proud  monarch  fmotc  and  de- 
(Troyed  the  nations,  was  God's  own  indigiuition.  And 
God  faitli,  that  he  will  fend  him  a^ainft  an  hypocritical 
nation  ;  meaning  the  Jews  ;  and  that  he  lu ill  give  him 
a  charge  to  take  the  J.poil^  and  to  take  the  prey^  and  to 
tread  doiun  like  the  ?nire  of  the  ft  reels.  Then  God 
mentioneth,  by  the  Prophet,  the  great  and  exceedingly 
wide  difference  there  was  in  the  views  of  this  haughty 
and  afpiring  prince,  from  his  own  wife  and  righteous 
purpofes  in  the  fame  event  and  work.  The  Affyrian 
monarcli  would  arrogate  all  the  glorj'-  of  liis  conquefl 
to  himlblf,  and  attribute  it  to  the  power  of  his  ov*'n 
arm  :  wliereas.  he  was  no  more  than  a  rod,  in  the  hand 
of  the  wife  and  righteous  Governor  of  the  world,  for 
correcting  and  chaftifing  the  people  of  Ifrael,  There- 
fore God  faith,  that,  luken  the  Lord  hath  performed  his 
whole  work  upon  7?wnnt  Zion^  and  on  JeruJale7H^  I  will 
piiniOi  the  fruit  of  the  ft  out  heart  of  the  king  of  .-Iffyri:!^ 
and  the  glory  of  his  high  looks.  But  however  eiic6:ual 
the  appointment  and  difpofil  of  God  might  be,  in  the' 
cafe  ;  this,  by  no  means,  excufed  tlie  proud  A[Jyrian 
from  the  wickednefs  of  which  he  was  guilty  in  accom- 
plifliing  the  purpofes  and  decrees  of  God.     Accord- 

F  f  2  inglv 


$44  An    E  S  S  A  Y    on  Part  II. 

ingly  we  find  that  the  Lord  expoftulates  with  him  upon 
the  exceeding  unrealonableneis  of  his  proud  and  aj-ro- 
gant  boafting,  in  the  following  manner.  Shall  the  nx 
boaft  itj elf  again Jl  him  that  heweth  therewith  f  Or  fliall 
the  fail)  magnify  itfelf  again f  him  that  fiaketh  it  f  As 
if  the  rod  pioidd  flake  itfelf  a  gain fl  them  that  lift  it  up  ; 
or  as  if  the  faff f ion  Id  lift  up  itfelf  as  if  it  were  no  wood. 
Seethe  whole  account  in  Ifai.  Chap.  x. 

From  this  reprefentation  of  the  matter  it  is  abun- 
dantly evident,  that  the  very  aftions  and  conduft  of 
this  afpiring  prince,  which  were  fo  exceedingly  pro- 
voking to  God,  and  for  which  he  %vas  refolved  to 
punifh  him,  were,  neverthelefs,  moft  abfolutely  and 
infallibly  predetermined  by  the  all-wife  God.  The 
defigns  of  the  Deity,  in  raifing  up  one  of  fuch  a  char- 
a<rter,  and  the  views  of  this  wicked  monarch  in  what 
he  did  in  execution  of  the  divine  purpofes  and  counfels, 
were  infinitely  diverfe  from  each  other  ;  fo  that,  al- 
though the  thing  was  done  which  God,  in  his  counfel 
and  by  an  efficient  determination  and  unfrullrable  de^ 
cree,  had  ordained  fhould  come  to  pafs  ;  yet  man 
fmncd,  and  exceedingly  provoked  the  Lord  in  doing 
it.  And  it  is,  indeed,  very  manifeft,  that  the  wife 
and  benevolent  purpofes  and  defigns  of  the  Deity,  in 
his  kingdom  and  government,  cannot  be  carried  on 
and  perfected,  without  the  exiflence  and  taking  place 
of  ntoral  evil.  And  yet  fin  is  not  the  lefs  odious  and 
hatcfiil,  becaufe  of  its  fubferviency  to  the  divine  pur^- 
pofes  and  defigns  ;  any  more  than  the  over-ruling 
hand  of  Divine  Providence,  in  making  the  aftion  of  a 
man,  which  he  defigned  as  an  injury  to  his  neighbour, 
the  means  of  fome  great  and  particular  good  to  him, 
maketh  that  atftion  lefs  odious  and  criminal. 

Farthcrraore  ;  It  is  exceedingly  manifeft,  that  the 
greatePc  piece  of  wickcdneis  wiiich  iiath  been  perpe- 
trated here  in  our  world,  took  place  in  event  in  confe- 
qucnce  of  the  divine  counfel,  and  a  Special  determina- 
tion of  the  Deity  giving  infallible  certainty  and  futu- 
rity to  the  event  :    I  mean,    the    crucifixion    of  our 

blefled 


Sca.V.  MORAL    AGENCY.  J24J' 

blefled  Lord.  It  is  extremely  difficult,  if  not  impofli* 
ble,  for  any  one,  who  is  not  greatly  prejudiced  an4 
llrongly  prcpoiTeffed  in  favour  of  feme  particular^ 
darling  fentiment,  to  read  over  the  hillory,  given  in 
the  holy  fcriptures,  of  this  moft  horrid  facfl,  without 
conceiving  an  idea  of  fome  pohtive  divine  determina- 
tion giving  abfolutc  certainty  and  futurity  to  this  e-  • 
vent.  Thus  is  it  faid  (Afts  ii.  23.)  Him  beijig  deliv- 
ered by  the  determinate  connjel  and  foreknoivledge  of 
God^  ye  have  taken^  and  by  wicked  hajids  have  crucified 
and Jlain.  Here  it  is  reprefented  that  our  Lord  was 
delivered  up,  not  only  by  the  foreknowledge,  but  by 
tiie  deterininnte  counjel  of  God — a  counfel  which  gave 
infallible  certainty  to  the  event.  Accordingly  we  find 
our  Lord  himfelf  faying,  (Luke  xxii.  22.)  j4nd  truly 
the  Son  of  pian  goeth  as  it  zuas  determined.  To  the 
fame  purpofe  is  it  faid,  (Afts  iv.  27,  28.)  For  of  a 
truth  ngnin(l  thy  ho!;'  child  Jcfus  iuko7?2  thou  ha/1  anoint- 
ed both  Herod  a7id  Pontius  Pilate  with  the  Gentiles 
and  the  people  of  Ifrael  were  gathered  together.  For 
to  do  whatfoever  thy  hand  and  thy  counfel  before  deter- 
mined to  be  done.  And  in  Acts  iii.  17,  iS.  the  cruci- 
fixion of  Chrift  is  reprefented  as  being  an  accomplifa- 
ment  of  the  purpofes  of  God,  and  a  fulfilment  of  the 
de(igns  of  his  providence.  For  Peter,  addrcfiing  him- 
felf to  the  murderers  of  Chrift,  faith,  And  now\ 
brethren^  I  wot  that  through  ignorance  ye  did  it.^  as  did 
alfo  your  rulers  :  but  thofe  things  which  God  before  hiad 
/hewed  hv  the  ??ioiith  of  all  his  Prophets^  that  Chrifi 
fiouldjuffhr,  he  hath  fulfilled. 

How  fuch  a  determination  and  agency  as  thefe 
words  do  moft  infallibly  imply,  can,  with  the  leafl 
propriety,  be  applied  to  God,  in  fuch  a  cafe  as  this.,  if 
he  hath  the  fame  averlion  to  the  taking  jolacc  of  any 
fin,  as  he  hath  to  the  evil  nature  and  auality  of  fin,  is 
quite  inconceivable  and  incomprehenfible.  And  were 
it,  in  firt,  the  cafe,  that  the  averfion  of  the  divine 
mind  to  the  coming  into  exiftence  of  fuch  an  event, 
^nd  his  averfion  of  aatilre  to  the  nature  of  fin,  were 

one 


S46  An    E  S  S  A  Y    011  Part  IT. 

-one  and  the  fame  ;  we  cannot  fee  why  Peter  was  not 
guilty  of  the  mofi:  horrid  blafphemy,  in  iifing  language 
as  he  did  ;  and,  in  moft  manife'fliy  afcribing  futh  a 
purpofe  and  determination  to  God,  as  is  plainly  incon- 
liftent  with  the  purity  of  God,  and  the  averlion  of  his 
holy  and  pure  nature  to  the  nature  of  fin.  But  if  the 
averfion  of  the  divine  mind  and  will  to  the  exiflence 
and  taking  place  of  moral  evil,  and  the  averfion  of  his 
holy  and  pure  nature  to  the  nature  of  fm,  are  not  of 
equal  extent,  and  one  and  the  fame  ;  the  whole  con- 
troverfy  is  at  an  end,  and  the  grand  difficulty  remov-^ 
ed,  which  was  in  the  way  of  admitting  the  fuppofition 
of  fuch  a  pofitive  divine  agency,  efficiency  and  difpo- 
fal,  as  gives  infallible  certainty  and  futurity  to  the  ex- 
iltcnce  of  moral  evil. 

If  the  terms  and  phrafes  made  ufe  of  in  the  holy 
fcriptures,  and  which  have  been  referred  to,  in  the 
preient  argument,  do  not  imply  fome  pofitivp  deter- 
rainatlon  of  the  divine  mind  in  favour  of  the  exiflence 
of  fuch  events  as  he,  neverthclels,  chargeth  upon  men 
as  the  iiigheft  wickednefs  ;  I  fee  not  how  it  is  in  the 
power  of  language  to  do  it.  And  if  they  can  be  iok 
explained  as  to  confilt  with  an  equal  averfion  of  the 
divine  mind  and  will  to  the  exiflence  of  fuch  events, 
as  there  is  in  the  divine  nature  to  the  tiature  of  vioral 
evil  ;  it  will  be  to  no  purpofe  to  pretend  to  fix  any 
precife  meaning  to  terms,  or  ever  endeavour  to  deter- 
mine any  point  by  reafoning  and  argumentation.  If 
fuch  like  expreflions  as  Cod's  hardening  the  hearts  of 
711611^  repeated  over  and  over,  and  that  with  an  exprefs 
declaration  that  God  purpofely  and  with  this  very  de- 
fign  railed  up  men  of  hard  hearts,  that  he  might  fl^ew 
in  them  his  power,  and  caufe  his  name  to  be  declared 
through  the  earth  ;  and  thefe  very  texts  and  expreffions 
quoted  and  improved  by  an  injpired  writer^  in  eflab- 
liiliing  the  dodrine  of  the  abfolute  fovereignty  of  God 
in  having  mercy  on  wliom  he  will  have  mercy,  and 
whom  he  will,  hr-rdcning  ;  I  lay,  if  fuch  terms  and 
expreifions  as  theie,  reiterated  and  ufed  with  particular 

eini)haiis, 


Sea.V.  MORAL  AGENCY.  ^7 

emphafis,  as  terms  of  great  importance  in  an  argument 
upon  fome  of  the  fundamental  doiftrines  of  revelation, 
can  yet  be  fo  analyzed  and  explained,  as  to  leave,  in 
the  minds  of  men,  no  apprehenfion  that  the  fovereign 
God  and  righteous  Governor  of  the  world  is  any 
more  or  othervvife  reconciled  to  the  exiftence  of  moral 
evil,  and  its  coming  into  the  fyilem,  than  his  holy  and 
pure  nature  is  to  the  nature  of  fm  ;  it  will  be  forever 
in  vain  to  attempt  to  decide  any  controverly  wli.itever 
by  the  word  of  God  ;  and  it  will  be  utterly  unfafe  for 
any  man  to  lay  much  weight  upon  it.  But  if  the 
Deity  hath  not  been,  from  eternity,  as  utterly  and  in- 
finitely averfe,  in  his  whole  mind  and  will,  to  the  ex- 
iftence  of  fuch  an  event,  as  his  7?ioral  nature  is,  to  the 
moral  quality  of  It  ;  the  confcquence  plainly  is  that 
when  he  expreffeth  his  hatred  of  fin,  to  his  creatures, 
in  his  prohibitions  of  it,  he  dolh  not  mean  to  exprefs  to 
them,  in  thefc  prohibitions,  the  infinite  diffatisfaiftion 
wliich  the  taking  place  of  fuch  an  event  in  his  fyftem 
hath  given  him  ;  or  the  irreconcilable  averfion  he 
eternally  had  to  the  being  and  exijicnce  of  fuch  an 
event. 

That  it  was  the  pnfitive  defigfi  and  purpofe  of  God, 
that  moral  evil  Jhould  come  into  exiflence  in  his  fyf- 
tem, and  even  rife  to  that  aftonifhing  height  to  which 
it  hath  rifen  here  in  our  world,  what  canbe  more 
evident  from  the  word  of  God  I  Or  how  is  it  in  the 
power  of  language  to  exprefs  a  pofitive  divine  pur- 
pole  in  favour  of  the  exiftence  of  fuch  an  event,  more 
fully  than  it  is  done  in  the  word  of  God  ? 

We  fee,  moreover,  that  the  whole  work  and  fab- 
rick  of  redemption,  in  its  infinite  beauty  and  vaft  ex- 
tent, mofl  evidently  depended,  for  its  accomplidi- 
ment,  upon  the  taking  place  of  moral  evil.  And  that 
the  Deity  fhould  concert  fo  marvellous  and  extenfive 
a  plan  of  operation — a  plan  wherein  the  tranfcendent 
fulnefs,  fufficiency  and  glory  of  his  own  holy  and  pure 
natare,  were  to  appear  in  a  brighter  light,  and  ihine 
forth  with  a  more  glorious  fjplendour  than   in   all   his 

other 


248  An    E  S  S  A  Y    ON  fart  11. 

other  ways  and  works  ;  I  fay,  that  the  Deity  fhould 
concert  iuch  a  plan  of  operation,  before  even  the 
foundation  of  the  world  (as  it  is  abundantly  evident 
that  he  did)  and  yet  entertain  no  pofitive  purpofe  that 
moral  evil  fhould  ever  come  into  exiftence,  is  what 
appcareth  to  me  quite  inconceivable  and  incompre- 
henfibie.  We  have  the  moft  obvious  reafons,  there- 
fore, for  concluding  that  there  was,  from  eternity, 
a  pofitive  purpofe,  in  the  divine  mind,  that  moral 
evil  ilio.uld  come  into  exiltence. 


p--<S^'^'(S>^iit'''l![:'-<!:^<0><S^-^-<S>'<iP-^-'S^-CS>''!£^'^ 


CONCLUSION. 


MORAL    AGENCY.  S49 


CONCLUSION. 


PON  the  whole,  I  am  humbly  of  opinion^  that 
the  fcheme  of  doftrine  which  implieth  an  infal- 
lible connexion  in  things,  and  an  abfolutc  previous 
certainty  of  all  events,  as  well  in  the  moral  as  in  the 
natural  world,  ftandeth  upon  a  firm  and  fure  bafis  ; 
and  that,  notwithftanding  the  many  hard  and  reproach- 
ful names  with  which  it  is  loaded,  and  which  at  the 
prefent  day  are  fo  liberally  thrown  out  againfl  it,  it  is 
capable  of  a  jull,  folid  and  rational  defence. 

There  is  nothing  in  thefe  doftrines,  as  hath  been 
fliown  in  the  preceding  fe(Si:ions,  tending  in  any  degree 
to  lelTen  our  apprehenlions  of  the  exceeding  evil,  turpi- 
tude and  hatefulnefs  of  fm  ;  or,  furnifhing  the  fmncr 
with  any  juft;  pretext  and  excufe  for  his  fin.  There  is 
nothing  in  thefe  fentiments  inconfiflent  with  the  ideas  of 
defert  either  of  praife  or  blame  ;  or  that  precludeth  the 
ufe  of  means  and  tlie  endeavours  of  men,  and  rendereth 
ufclefs  that  wifdom,  prudence,  fagacity  and  forelight, 
with  which  the  Author  of  our  beings  hathe^idowed  us. 
And  there  is  nothing  in  this  fcheme  of  dod:rinc,  1  may 
farther  add,  that  appeareth  to  reflecl  any  reproach 
upon  the  moft  high  God,  or  that  implieth  in  it  any 
thing  inconfiitent  with  his  fpotlefs  purity  and  holinefs, 
rendering  any  of  his  difpenfations  dark,  myflerious 
and  unintelligible.  On  tiic  other  hand,  I  think  it  a- 
bundantly  evident  that  the  fcheme  of  fentimer^ts,  con* 
tained  in  the  preceding  pages,  hath  a  very  manifefl 
and  apparent   tendency  to  raiils  and  exalt  our  ideas  of 

G  o-  the 


i^o  An   E  S  S  A  Y    oiT  Con- 

the  wifdom,  goodnefs,  fovereignty  and  fnpremacy  of^ 
God  ;  to  convince  us  of  the  infinite  extent,  wifdom 
and  excellency  of  his  government  ;  and  are  excel- 
lently fitted,  in  their  nature,  to  form  our  minds  to  an 
entire  confidence  in  God,  the  great  Governor  of  the 
world,  a  quiet  fubniilfion  to  his  will,  and  cheerful 
acquiefcence  in  his  difpofals,  however  otherwile  dark 
and  myfterious  they  may  appear  to  the  narrow  and 
extremely  imperfect  views  of  men.  No  other  fcheme 
of  doftrine,  as  to  me  it  appeareth,  can  ever  reconcile 
the  prefent  fyftem  as  it  is  in  all  its  parts,  together  with 
that  fcene  of  events  which  is  aftually  furniihed  out  to 
view,  with  perfe<Pc,  confummate  wifdom  and  fkill,  and 
infinite  fufiiciency  and  abfolute  fnpremacy.  Upon 
any  other  fcheme  of  doctrine,  it  mull  be  a  thing  upon 
the  -whole  greatly  to  be  lamented,  bewailed  and  de-= 
plored,  that  any  fuch  thing  as  moral  evil  ever  made 
its  appearance  in  the  intelligent  fyftem  ;  affording  a 
■view  and  profpeft  of  things  that  cannot  fail  of  giving 
pain  and  diftrefs  to  every  pious  and  benevolent  heart  : 
arid  which,  confequently,  muft  more  nearly  and  fenfi- 
bly  affeft  the  divine  mind  ;  filling  it  with  deeper  for-  . 
row,  and  infinitely  more  painful  and  pungent  regret. 
A  God  fabjeft  to  fuch  paliions  and  feelings  as  thefe 
cannot  be  Jehovah,  the  God  of  Ifrael  ;  but  a  mere 
creature  of  the  imaginations  of  men,  infinitely  beneath 
him..  On  the  other  hand,  facli  is  tlie  extent  of  the 
divine  Avifdom  and  power,  and  fuch  is  the  abfolute 
fupremacy  of  God,  that  nothing  can  be  more  irrational 
and  inconfiflent,  than  to  fuppofe  that  any  one  of  that 
almoft  infinite  varietv  of  events  which  ever  hath  or 
will  have  taken  place,  doth  yet  come  to  pafs  without 
the  knowledge  of  God,  or  otherwife  than  under  the 
direftion  of  his  all-powerful  providence  :  or,  in  fuch 
a  fenfe  contrary  to  his  will,  as  to  give  him  tlie  leaft 
kind  of  unealinefs  and  pain  ;  or,  fo  that  upon  the  uhole 
it  would  really  have  been  more  pleafing  to  him  that 
fuch  an  event  never  fliould  have  come  into  exiflence  ; 
or,  that  it  fiiould  have  been,  in  any  fenfe  or  degree,     | 

different 


-cluflon.  MORAL    AGENCY.  25-5 

diifereiit  from  what  it  adliially  is.  And  to  admit  the 
contrary  fuppofition  implieth  many  things,  in  it,  as 
incoijfiitent  with  all  om'  ideas  of  God,  and  as  reproacli- 
fiil  to  his  great  name,  as  it  is  imagined  or  ftippofcd  are 
contained  in  the  opinion  reipecting  that  divine  agency 
and  difpolal  giving  certain  futurity  to  the  ex.iftence  of 
moral  evil,  which  hath  been  urged  and  defended  in  the 
foregoing  fediions. 

This  view  of  the  matter,  alfo,  which  hath  been  ex^ 
hibited  in  the  preceding  pages,  tendeth  greatly  to  illuf- 
trate  and  manifcft  the  importance  of  the  mediatorial 
charader  in  the  fyftem  of  God  :  and  to  convince  us 
that  there  could  not  have  been  abfolute  perfeftion  of 
dcfign,  without  the  exillence  of  fuch  a  character.  If 
what  hath  been  faid  upon  this  fubjeft  may  be  for  the 
honour  of  the  divine  Redeemer,  the  glory  of  his  char» 
a(fter,  and  a  means  of  promoting  his  mediatorial  pur- 
pofes  and  defigns  ;  it  will  be  a  matter  of  but  very 
little  importance  what  is  faid,  or  thought,  of  the 
writer,  it  hath  not  been  my  defign  to  irritate,  iliig- 
matize  or  reproach  :  but  my  defign  hath  been  to  vin- 
dicate that  fcheme  of  do(^lrine  wliich,  it  appeared  to 
me,  is  moft  manifeftly  contained  in  the  holy  jcriptures  ; 
and  freely  and  without  reHraint  to  expofe,  as  far  as  I 
was  able,  the  weaknefs  and  fopliiflry  of  thofe  reafons 
and  arguments  which  have  been  made  ufe  of  in  order 
to  overthrow  and  fubvert  it.  But  whatever  may  have 
been  my  own  private  views  and  deligns,  I  am  not  in- 
fenfible  that  I  expofe  myfelf  to  cenfu'^e,  by  advancing 
and  endeavouring  to  defend  a  fcheme  of  doArine  fo 
obnoxious  and  unpopular  as  that  which  is  contained  in 
tlic  preceding  performance.  However,  i  think  I  may 
juftly  expeO,  it  of  thofe  who,  upon  perufai  of  what  I 
have  offered  oh  the  fubject,  fliall  think  fit  to  cenfurc 
and  condemn  me,  that  they  provide  a  clear  and  perti- 
nent anfwer  to  the  reafonings  by  which  I  have  endeav- 
oured to  fupport  my  opinion.  "W^hat  weight  is  really 
to  be  laid  qu  fiicli  like  reafonings,  and  how  far  they 

G  e  2  are 


252 


An    E  S  ^  a  Y,    &c. 


Conclufioii. 


are  concliifive  and  jufl; ;  it  is  not  for  me  to  deterinine  ; 
but,  fuch  as  they  are,  they  are  now  cheerfully  fubmit- 
ted  to  public  inlpc<ftion  ;  and  the  caule  committed  to 
Hinx  who  judgeth  righteous  judgment,  and  who,  in  his 
own  tinae  and  way,  will  make  his  own  gloriouj;  truth 
t»  triumfili  andprevaij, 


APPENDIX. 


A  N 


APPENDIX 


TO    THE   PRECEDING 


ESSAY; 


CONTAINING 


OBSERVATIONS 


O  N 


Dr.  Dana's  Examination 

OF    THE    LATE 

REV.   PRESIDENT   EDWARDS'S 

Inquiry    on    Freedom    of    Will, 

CONTINUED. 


Q,..,..,    <.«■.....••<.•<••<•«•.-<••<■■<••<•■<•■••»<••<••.••<•<••<■■<••< ,..4..,..,..,.....1 ,.  ....,-4..,.., .,..,..,..  ^) 


A    N 


APPENDIX,   &c. 


OON  after  the  firfl  publication  of  the  preceding 
v3  "  Eflay  on  Moral  Agency/'  the  public  werepre- 
fented  with  Dr.  Darta's  *'  Examination  of  the  late 
Rev.  Prefident  Edwards's  Inquiry  on  Freedom  of 
Will,  Continued."  But,  as  the  arguments  in  favour 
of  tliat  IiypotheQs  refpecling  human  liberty,  which  tlie 
Doftor  advocated  in  his  /ir/i  examination,  received 
but  little  additional  fupport  from  hh  Jecond  ;  the  pub- 
lic vvoidd  not  have  been  troubled  with  any  remarks 
upon  it,  had  not  a  new  edition  of  the  Effay  been  pro- 
pofed  to  the  Author.  Upon  this  propofal  being  made, 
a  number  of  relpedlable  Gentlemen  have  given  it  as 
their  opinion,  that  a  few  remarks  might  be  made,  to 
advantage,  on  the  "  Examination  Continued."  This 
v/;]l  be  attempted  in  the  following  Appendix. 

'^I'lie  Autlior  is  not  wholly  infenfible  of  the  evils  too 
commonly  attendant  on  controveriial  writings.  Po- 
lemic writers  are  not  without  the  paffions  and  failings 
incident  to  human  nature  in  general.  Hence  they  are 
expofed  to  leave  reafoning  for  declamation  ;  and, 
fometimes,  quit  the  field  of  argument,  for  that  of  per- 
fonal  invecflive.  It  is  much  to  be  lamented  that  v/rit- 
ings  on  the  moft  grave  and  folemn  fubjefts  fliould  ever 
be  fuUied  by  paribnal  refieftion.  The  caufe  of  truth- 
needs  no  fuch  weapons  of  defence  :  nor,  doth  it  ever 
receive  any  advantage  from  them.  The  love  of  truth, 
fupcrior  to  every  perfonal  confideration,  is  never  in- 
imical 


4  APPENDIX. 

imical  to  the  perfon  who,  we  may  apprehend^  has  de-- 
Viated  from  the  paths  of  truth. 

Wifliing  not  to  depart  from  the  fpirit  with  which  a 
controverfy  on  the  important  fubjeft  before  us  merits 
to  be  handled  ;  the  candour  and  attention  of  the  public 
are  rcquefted,  while  we  fubmit  to  the  perufal  of  our 
readers  the  following  obfervations  on  the  fubjecfts  of 
God's  decree  and  agency,^  and  the  freedom  and  liberty  of 
men . 

That  men  are  the  proper  caufes  of  their  own  acfls  of 
will,  is  an  opinion  efpoufed  by  Dr.  Dana.  The  caufe 
of  vioral  volitions,  he  confiders  as  being  in  the  mind 
itfelf  which  is  the  fubjeft  of  them  :  and,  thinks  that  he 
has  offered  fufhcient  proof  "  that  moral  volitions  pro- 
ceed from  a  caufe  in  moral  agents.''  He  afferts,  that 
"  moral  agents  are  themfelves  the  efficients  of  their 
"  own  volitions.''*  He  fully  expreffes  it  as  his  opin- 
ion, that  ''  If  the  caufe  of  the  exercifes  and  actions  of 
••'  moral  agents  be  not  in  themfelves,  then  the  Deity 
"  is  the  proper  efficient  caufe  of  them."§  The  Dodlor 
fuppofeth  there  can  be  no  medium  betwixt  a  power  of 
felf-determination  in  men,  and  the  uniyerfal  efficiency 
of  God,  with  refpeft  of  human  aftions.  Therefore 
he  feels  it  to  be  important  to  eftabliffi  the  dodtrine  of 
a  power  of  felf-determination.  But,  Is  this  doftrlne 
capable  of  defence  ?  Will  it  admit  of  a  rational  fup- 
port  ?  It  is  very  immaterial,  in  the  prefent  cafe,  whe- 
ther we  confider  the  agcnt^  the  ma?^^  the  wind^  or  the 
ivrll  itfelf  as  the  caufe  of  internal,  voluntary  exercifes. 
Whatever  be  the  caufe^  it  muft  be  fomething  which  is 
voluntary  and  adive :  otherwife  it  is  immaterial  whe- 
ther the  caufe  be  internal,  or  external.  For  men  to 
be  the  involu7itary  caufes  of  their  own  afts  of  will,  is 
no  privilege — gives  them  no  pre-eminence.  If  the 
caufe  of  exercifes  of  will  in  men  be  involuntary^  it  is 
of  no  importance  to  determine  whether*  it  be  interna!, 
or  external.  If  our  wills  be  moved  by  an  involuntary 
caufe.,  it  matters  not,  as  to  our  freedom,  whether  that 

caufe 

♦  p.  21,  25,  41,  &c.  &  p- 2-;. 


APPENDIX.  S 

eaufe  be  within,  or  without  : — be  it  which  it  maj'-,  it 
poflefTes  none  of  the  qualities  of  a  caufe — it  doth  no- 
thing, it  produceth  no  eifedl.  To  fay  that  a6ls  of  will 
are  the  elfeft  of  an  invohmtary^  is  the  fame  as  to  fay 
tliat  they  are  the  etfe<5t  of  an  inadive^  caufe  :  and,  this 
is  as  much  as  to  fay  that  they  are  the  effefts  of  no  caufe 
at  all,  i.  e.  not  effects.  Accordingly,  we  find  that  the 
Do(n:or,  though  he  ftrenuoufly  urges,  and  endeavours 
to  defend,  the  doftrine  of  a  povver  of  felf-determina- 
tion  in  men,  does  not  plead  that  afts  of  will  in  moral 
agents  are  not  effedis  ;  or,  that  they  come  into  exig- 
ence without  a  caufe:  but,  that  "  moral  agents  them- 
*'  felves  are  the  efficients  of  their  own  volitions— that 
*'  mor^l  volitions  proceed  froni  a  cauje  in  moral  a- 
**  gents." 

If  moral  volitions  proceed  from  a  caufe  in  the  agents 
themfclves,  this  caufe  mufl  hQvoliintary  ;  othcrwife  it 
could  not  effed  a6ls  of  will.  And,  if  it  be  a  voluntary 
caufe ^  it  differs  not  from  n7L  ad  of  the  "will :  and,  there- 
fore, men  are  to  be  confidered  as  the  caufes  of  their 
own  a£ts  of  will,  hy  their  own  ads  of  will — they  are' 
i}i\^. efficients  of  their  afts  of  will^  hy  ads  ofivilL  If  it 
be  not  by  an  aft  of  will  that  the  agent  produceth  his 
own  acts  of  will  ;  By  what  aft  is  it  \ — -How  doth  he 
produce  them  ?  What  doth  a  man  do  in  order  to> 
produce  an  aft  of  will  \  If  he  doth  any  thing,  he  ex- 
ercifeth  an  aft  of  will  :  and,  therefore,  exercifetli  an 
aft  of  will,  in  order  to  produce  an  aft  of  will.  This 
m^iil  be  the  way  in  which  moral  agents  efffcd  their  own 
afts  of  wilL  And  yet,  by  the  fuppofition,  this  aft  of 
will  is  excrcifed  in  order  to  produce  the  fir  ft  aft  of 
will  ;  and  vnuft,  therefore,  be  antecedent  to  it.  It  is 
the  caufe  of  an  aft  of  will  that  we  are  feeking  after, 
Caufe  is  always  prior  to  its  effed.  Whatever  is  the 
cauJe  of  an  aft  of  will,  muft  be  prior  to  that  aft  of  will 
Svhich  is  its  effcd,  -  The  caife  of  an  aft  of  will  in  a 
moral  agent,  muft  precede  that  ad  of  will  in  the  agent 
which  is  effcded  by  it.  But,  afts  of  will  in  moral 
agents  have  not  been  eternally  fucceiiive — the  fucceed- 


6  APPENDIX. 

ing  cauled  by  the  preceding  one.  "We  want  the  caiife 
of  Xhc  firji  in  t\\Qjeries.  To  fay  that  the  firji  was 
caiijed  or  effeCied  by  an  antecedent  one^  is  a. contradic- 
tion in  terms.  We  might,  with  as  much  propriety, 
fay  that  this  fir  ft  caujed  itfelf  :  and,  therefore,  that 
"  volition  jQ^rings  from  itfelf ;"  which  the  Uoftor  lays 
"  is  a  very  different  thing  from  faying  that  the  Jubjecl 
"  is  the  caufe  of  it.''*  Let  the  reader  judge  whether 
it  be  different.  If  there  be  a  dilference,  let  it  be  point- 
ed out.  To  fay  tliat  the  firfl  aft  of  will  in  a  moral 
agent  was  caufed  by  an  aft  of  will  of  this  fame  moral 
agent,  cannot  be  materially  different  from  faying  that 
the  firft  aft  of  will  fprang  from  itfelf.  And,  if  the/z>y? 
fprings  from  itfelf,  all  the  refl  may  as  well.  We  are 
fenfible  that  it  is  a  contradiftion  in  terms,  to  lay 
that  volition  fprings  from  itfelf — and,  not  lefs  con- 
t'radiftory  and  abfurd,  to  fay  that  the  volitions  of 
moral  agents  fpring  from  a  voluntary  caufe  in  the 
agents  themfelves.  But,  this  lies,  and  lies  as  a  dead 
weight,  upon  the  advocates  for  a  power  of  felf-deter- 
mination  :  we  are  not  anfwerable  for  it. 

Would  thefe  gentlemen  gain  any  advantage  to  theit 
caufe,  by  urging  that  it  is  not  by  afts  of  will,  but  in 
fome  other  way,  that  moral  agents  ejfeCi  their  own  vo- 
litions ?  If  they  would,  let  them  take  it,  and  wel- 
come. If  it  be  not  by  their  own  exertions  that  moral 
agents  effeft  their  afts  of  will,  Hov/  is  it  ?  Do  moral 
agents  do  any  thing  without  exertion  f  And,  have 
they  any  exertions  befides  voluntary  ones  ?  Can  any 
thing  they  do  without  an  aft  of  will  (could  there  bs 
any  fuch  thing)  be  called  their  a6l  f  And,  could  this 
autliorize  us  to  confider  them  as  the  caujes  of  their 
own  afts  of  will  ?  To  fay  that  men  are  the  involun- 
tary cauies  of  their  own  afts  of  will,  is  the  fame  as  to 
fay  that  they  are  720  caiifes  at  all  of  them  ;  and,  this  is 
to  fay  that  they  are  not  the  caujes  of  their  own  afts  of 
will. 

The  doftrine  of  a  power  of  felf-determination,  or 

of 


APPENDIX.  7 

oC  a  power  in  men  to  produce  and  effect  their  own  a<fls 
of  will,  is  every  way  embarraffed.  In  getting  rid  of 
one  difficulty,  we  run  directly  upon  another — Difii- 
cuhies  on  every  fide  incumber  it. 

iihonld  we  fay  that  men  are  the  defignwg  caufes  of 
their  own  adls  of  will,  it  would  afford  no  relief.  If 
by  defigning  caufe,  be  meant  volimtary^  this  would  be 
the  fame  as  to  fay  that  men  are  the  defigning  caufes  of 
their  own  defig^is-^thc  voluntary  caufes  of  their  own 
volitions.  And,  every  one  muft  fee  that  this  is  faying 
nothing  ;  or,  nothing  to  the  cafe. 

When  the  Doftor  oucrs  himfelf  as  a  profeffed  advo- 
cate for  a  power  of  fclf-determination  in  men  ;  it  was 
furely  incumbent  on  him  to  provide  fome  tolerable 
anfwer  to  the  cbjedions.  He  ought  to  have  fliown 
the  fallacy  of  the  arguments  which  are  urged  as  utter- 
ly fubverfive  of  every  idea  of  fuch  a  power.  He  had 
ihefe  arguments  before  him,  both  in  Mr.  Edwards's 
inquiry,  and  in  the  ''  Effay  ;*'  though,  as  he  juflly 
obferves,  ''  handled  with  more  appearance  of  reafon"* 
in  the  former.  The  reafonings  againft:  the  exillence 
and  poffibility  of  fuch  a  power,  if  capable  of  it,  merit 
an  anfwer  ;-^without  confuting  them,  no  man  ought 
to  imagine  he  can  v/rite  fuccefsfully  in  vindication  of 
fuch  a  pcv/er. 

But,  we  would  not  proceed  too  fail  ;  nor  forget 
that  the  Do(rtor  progreiTeth  in  his  argument  in  favour' 
of  the  power  in  quellion,  in  his  "  Examination  contin- 
ued.'' In  the  firft  Sedion,  M'hich  is  written  profeffed- 
ly  on  the  fubjeft  oi  Jclj-deterniination^  lie  urgeth,  as  a 
proof  of  its  exiftence,  the  power  men  have  to  fv.j'pend^ 
delihernte  and  examine.  It  mufl  be  fuppofed  that  he 
here  means  a  power  in  men  to  Jitjptnd  ads  of  ivill : 
otherwife,  How  can  this  be  an  argument  in  favour  of  a 
power  of  felf-detcrmination  f  Snfpe7iding  an  a<ft  of 
will,  is  the  fame  as  ceafing  to  v:ill.  And,  if  men  have 
not  this  power  of  fufpending,  they  are,  of  courfe,  p^t/- 
five  in  the  caufes  of  their  exercifes  of  will  3  and,  there- 

H  h  2  fore, 

♦p.  142, 


t  APPENDIX. 

fore,  not  felf-determined — not  themfelves  the  efficients 
of  their  own  afts  of  will.  If  men  have  not  a  power 
not  to  exercije  any  aft  of  will  at  all,  What  is  this  fiif^ 
pendiJi.g  pQiuer  f  What  affiftance  do  men  gain  from  it 
in  effeCiing  their  own  acls  of  will  ?  if  it  be  not  a  pow- 
er in  this  fenfe  to  J'nfpend^  it  is  too  late  for  any  advan- 
tage to  be  derived  from,  it  in  caufing  the  a<5l  of  the  will. 
The  aft:  of  the  will  has  already  gained  exiflence  : — it 
has  efcaped  the  vigilance  of  this  fufpending  power, 
and  gotten  quite  out  of  its  reach. 

But,  what  is  this  power  men  have  of  fufpending  afts 
of  will  ?  Is  it  a  power  which  without  any  exercije—^ 
ivithout  a^ny  exertion^  produceth  its  efFeft — even  the 
eifeft  of  a  total  Jup pre'. fion  of  volition  f  This  will  not 
be  pleaded  :  this  would  make  tlit  povjcj-  nothing  ;  and, 
the  thing  e'ffeCled  by  it^  nothing-^a  power  Vvhich  doth 
nothing  and  effecls  nothing,  Much  a  power  is  worth 
nothing  ;    no    one   will  envy  others  the  polTeflion   of 

If  fufpending  and  deliberating  are  voluntary^  they 
give  no  affiffcance  to  the  power  of  felf-deterniination. 
The  Doftor  was  aware  of  this  objeftion.  His  anfwer 
is,  ''  That  a  moral  agent  either  hath  power  to  origin- 
*•'-  ate  a.n  aft  of  fufpenfion,  and  fo  bring  himfelf  into 
*'  the  view  of  new  motives  ;  or  the  fufpending  aft 
"  proceeds  from  a  motive  extant  in  the  mind  at  the 
*'  lame  indant  with  fome  motive  to  immediate  eleftion 
^'  or  aftion."* 

The  Doftor  here  fpeaks  of  fufpenfion  as  an  ad  :  he 
mull  me^n  ait  ad  of  the  vdnd^  or  will.  This  aft  he 
fnppofes  to  be  originated  by  the  agent  ;  or,  to  proceed 
from  a  motive  extant  in  the  mind  at  the  fame  inftant 
with  fome  motive  to  immediate  eleftion  or  aftion. 
Perhaps  the  terms  eleClicn  and  adion  are  meant  to  be 
applied  to  certain  particular  ads  of  the  will  in  diflinc- 
tion  from  others — to  fjch  as  the  fchoolmen  term  /?77- 
■perate  in  diflincTiion  from  immanent .  When  the  mind 
di liberates  ?^nd  is  in  a  flate  oi  fnfpenfe  with  refpeft  tq 

external 

•p.  i8. 


APPENDIX,  9 

external  adion^  volition^  or  the  hnmnnent  aCJs  of  the  will^ 
zve  uot/n/pazded :  If  they  were,  What  kind  of  delib- 
eration could  there  be  in  the  cafe  ?  So,  when  it  de- 
liberates  with  refpcft  to  the  truth  or  propriety  of  any 
propofition  made  to  it,  the  will  is  not  in  a  iiate  oi  Ju/- 
penfe^  if  the  term  mean  any  thing  in  opix)rition  to  ;;zo- 
tlon  and  aciinjt.  Siijpcnfion  and  deliberation  imply  vo~ 
litinn^  as  truly  as  election  and  adion.  Nor  is  it  to  be 
fnppofed  that  that  ad  of  the  will  which  is  implied  by 
the  term  deliberate^  is  moved  and  excited  by  any  motive 
whatever  as  its  cauje.  Motives  are  not  caujes  which 
by  their  own  aftion  and  influence  move  and  excite  the 
will.  Reafons  both  for  and  noaiufl  the  choice  of  an 
object  prefented  to  the  intelleftual  view,  may  exift  in 
the  mind  and  be  difcerned  by  it  at  the  fame  time.  In 
this  cafe  men  deliberate  ;  but,  not  luithout  any  ad  of 
will.  And,  in  this  cafe,  there  is,  on  the  whole,  no 
motive  to  immediate  eledion  ;  and  the  will  is  not  de- 
termined to  it. 

Two  things  mull  be  taken  for  granted  in  the  Doftor's 
argument,  in  order  to  give  it  weight,  neither  of  which 
a,re  true.  The  firll  is,  that  in  fufpenfion  of  eled:ion 
and  action  there  is  no  motion  or  exercife  of  the  will  : 
the  fecond  is,  that  motives  are  caufes  of  the  exercifes 
of  M'-lll.  If  deliberating  and  fufpending  with  refpeft 
to  fome  future  eletftion  and  aftion,  be  itfelf  an  act  of 
will  ;  this  will  no  more  prove  the  mind  to  be  felf-de- 
termined,  than  any  of  its  future  eleftions  and  actions. 
A  power  of  felf-determination  may  as  well  be  inferred 
from  thofe  volitions  which  are  here  termed  eledion  and 
adi&n^  as  from  thofe  in  which  it  deliberates  and  juf- 
fends.  Beftowing  different  names  upon  different  acfts 
of  the  will,  contributes  nothing  to  the  argument  in 
favour  of  a  power  of  felf-determination.  And  \i  mo- 
tives have  no  caufal  influence  to  produce  acls  of  will,  a 
variety  of  them  m.ay  exifl  in  the  intellectual  view  at 
the  fame  time  that  the  will  is  in  exercife  with  refpeft 
to  other  objecHrs.  Tiie  queftion  before  us  is  not  whe- 
ther volition  be  caujed  by  the  influence  of  ^natives  in 

diltinction 


to  APPENDIX. 

diftin^tion  from  ht'ing  felf-d€ter?mned :  but,  whether 
the  cau/e  of  human  volition  be  ivithin  the  viind^  or  ex- 
trinfic  of  it.  And,  that  adl  of  the  will  wherein  we  de- 
liberate  and  fufpend  with  refpecl  to  fome  future  elec- 
tion and  a<rtion,  no  more  takes  place  without  a  motive 
than  any  other  aft  of  the  will  :  nor,  is  this  motive  any- 
more excited  by  the  mind^^  than  the  motives  to  its 
other  exertions. 

The  Doctor  fpeaks  of  a  power  of  awakening  in  our-' 
felves  motives  to  Jujpend,  Does  he  mean  that  the  ful- 
pending  ad:  awakens  its  own  motives,  and  then  thefc 
motives  produce  the  lufpenfion  ?  Is  there  this  agree- 
able play  of  mind  and  motive  alternately  operating- 
begetting,  and  then  being  begotten  of  each  other  ?  Or 
is  the  originati72g  ad:  withrefped:  to  fufpenfion  without 
any  motive,  fovereignly  exerted  in  order  to  bring  the 
mind  within  the  reach  of  .motives,  that  it  may  be 
governed  by  them  ?  And  are  thefe  motives,  thus  fove-r 
reignly  awakened,  thofe  in  the  vieM^  of  which  the  mind 
is  determined  to  iidpend  I  Certainly  not  :  but,  thofe 
ads  of  the  will  which  are  originated  by  the  mind,  are 
"without  motive,  and  fovereignly  put  forth  in  order  to 
awaken  in  this  fame  mind  motives  to  fome  future 
adion. 

If  men  awaken  in  themfelves  motives  \o  fufpend^  the 
originating^  jelj-detcrmined  ad  of  the  mind,  is  not  the 
ad  of  fujpenjion^  but  that  ad  which  awakens  in  the 
7mnd  a  motive  to  fufpend.  To  originate  an  ad  of  fiif- 
penfion^  and  to  awaken  in  ourjelves  motives  to  fulpend, 
m^uO:  be  two"  very  different  ads.  A  power  to  perform 
the  firji^  renders  a  power  for  the  lafi  qnite  unnecef- 
fary.  He  who  can  origuiate  an  ad  of  fufpenfion,  has 
no  need  of  a  power  to  awake??.  i?7  himJelf?notives  to  fuf- 
pend. ''The  fir/i  of  thefe  may  be  without  a  motive,  as 
well  as  the  laji.  And,  where  an  originating  power  is 
poiTcfTed,  the  mind  has  no  need  of  the  round-about  way 
of  firjl  fovereignly  conflituting  its  motives,  and  then 
being  influenced  by  them  : — Efpecially,  as  there  might 
be  danger  in  that  cafe  that  the  mind  would  7icgative 

the 


APPENDIX.  ir 

the  prcfent  motive  to  fufpenfion  ;  and,  have  the  fame 
ground  to  go  over  again.  How  long  this  power  of 
aivnkenino  and  neirativing^  motives,  migjit  retard  the 
ad:  of  fufpenfion,  is  utterly  uncertain.  And,  after  all, 
this  fufpending  power  is  the  proof  that  men  poffefs  a 
power  of  felf-determination  ! 

Nothing,  in  fhort,  is  more  unintelligible  than  the 
idea  of  a  poiver  in  men  to  caufe  and  produce  exercifes  of 
will  in  tbemfelves — a  power  back  of  the  will,  and  be- 
hind it,  puihing  and  crowding  it  into  adion.  And, 
yet  this  power  mufl  be  exercifed  by  men  in  order  to 
their  putting  forth  aClscfwill:  confeqiiently,  muft  be 
a  power,  the  exercife  of  which  implies  and  contains  in 
it  no  aft  of  will :  and,  therefore,  men  muft  be  wholly 
involuntary  in  it,  and  in  its  exertions — a  power,  be  it 
in  or  out  of  ufe,  of  v/hich  men  can  have  no  manner  of 
confcioufnefs  or  perception.  This  power  is,  perhaps, 
the  fame  as  the  Dodor  means  by  moral  capacity »  He 
tells  us,  ^'  the  author  of  our  beings  is  the  proper 
*'  caufe  of  our  moral  capacity — this  capacity,  the  efFeft 
"  of  his  inlpiration,  is  the  proper  cauje  of  volition."^ 
This  capacity,  therefore,  in  order  to  be  a  proper  caufe ^ 
midt  be  exerted.  If  it  be  not  exerted,  it  can  produce 
no  eitcd.  This  the  Dodtor  feenis  to  allow  :  for,  he 
hnmediately  adds,  "  It  may  be  well  improved,  or 
neglefted  and  perverted."  But,  if  it  be  exercifed,  it 
mnd  be  exercifed  voluntarily  ;  otherwife,  the  ads  of 
will  consequent  upon  it  are  the  effeds  of  an  involnntczry 
caufe.  And  if  fo,  How  can  moral  agents,  as  the  Doc- 
tor airerts,§  be  themfelves  the  efficients  of  their  own- 
volitions  ?  But,  if  this  capacity  be  voluntarily  exert- 
ed. How  is  it  the  caufe  of  volition  ?  Doth  it  caufe 
that  ad  of  will  whereby  it  is  exerted  in  order  to  pro- 
duce an  ad  of  will  ?  Is  the  capacity  the  caufe  of  that 
life  of  itfelf  whereby  it  is  improved  or  neglededf 
How,  and  in  what  way  is  it,  that  it  muft  be  im^proved, 
in  order  to  its  own  improvement  ;  or  negleded,  in 
order  to  the  negled;  and  perverfion  of  itfelf  ?     How 

moral 


12  APPENDIX. 

moral  capacity  fliould  be  the  proper  caufe  of  volition^ 
needs  to  be  explained.  Every  attempt  to  explaih  fuch 
a  proportion,  however,  mufl  ferve  to  confute  it. 

But  no  further  argumentation,  it  may  perhaps  be 
thought,  need  be  had  on  this  lubjeft.  Nothing  is 
more  inconiillent  ■with  itfelf  than  the  idea  of  a  power 
of  felf-deterniination .  Language  allords  no  phrafe, 
compofed  of  fo  fmall  a  number  of  terms,  which  con- 
tains more,  or  more  palpable,  abfurdities. 

Before  we  leave  the  fubjed:,  however,  it  may -not  be 
impertinent  to  flate  fome  of  the  conjequences  which 
naturally  flow  from  the  fuppofed  exiftence  of  this 
power  of  fclf-determination  in  men — a  power  of  awak- 
ening in  themfeWes  new  motives,  and  negativing  tlie 
old.  If  fuch  a  power  imply  things  inconfiflent  with 
acknowledged  truths,  and  the  plain  declarations  of  the 
word  of  God  ;  tiie  exifcence  of  it  is  not  to  be  admit- 
ted, or  fuppofed. 

1 .  The  admiifion  of  this  fuppofed  power  in  men, 
cffeftually  fub verts  the  docftrine  of  the  divine  decrees ^ 
By  the  decrees  of  God  are  to  be  underftood  the  deter- 
inination  of  iiis  will  that  certain  objcfts  or  events  flialt 
exift.  Whatever  God  hath  decreed  {l:all  take  place, 
certainly  will  take  place  :  otherwife,  his  counfel  will 
not  Hand.  If  his  decree  extend  to  human  volitions, 
and  to  the  free  adtions  of  men,  thofe  volitions  and 
actions  of  men  which  are  the  obieds  of  fuch  a  decree, 
will  infallibly  come  into  exiflence.  To  fuppofe  a  di- 
vine decree  confiflent  with  the  uncertainty  and  contin- 
gency of  the  exiitence  of  its  objeft^  is  to  make  //  no- 
thing ;  or,  to  make  the  purpofes  of  God  with  refpe(fb 
to  the  future  exiftence  of  objects  and  events,  no  more 
to  be  conlided  in,  or  relied  on,  than  thofe  of  weak, 
impotent  men. 

If  there  be  indeed  contingency  and  uncertainty  with' 
refped  to  the  exigence  of  thofe  thing^s  which  Cud  has 
declared  /hall  come  to  pafs  ;  his  declaration  can  a0brdj. 
no  juft  ground  of  confidence,  to  his  creatures.  Yet, 
the  declarations  ai;d  predictions  of  the  word  of  God, 

extend 


APPENDIX.  Ij 

Extend  to  the  voluntary  adiovs  and  de/igus  of  men  : — . 
yea,  tliefe  are  principal  objcv^s  of  the  decrees  of  God 
revealed  in  his  holy  word  :  at  lead,  there  are  a  great- 
er number  of  decrees  and  declarations  refpefting  the 
free  aftions  of  men,  and  the  events  which  ncceflarily 
involve  and  imply  them,  than  with  rcfped:  to  anything 
elfe.  And  if  there  be  uncertninty  with  refpe<^  to  their 
taking  place,  How  can  we  confide  in  divine  j^redic- 
tions  \ 

But  if  men  have  a  power  of  ori^htating  their  oivn 
acfs  of  will — if  they  are  themfelves  the  ejici^nts  of  their 
own  volitions — if  the  intelligent  fpirit  be  the  can/e  of  its 
own  volitions^  How  is  it  conceivable  that  the  exigence 
■of  thefe  volitions  ihould  be  made  previoully  certain  by 
a  divine  decree  f  If  a  divine  decree  hath  made  the  fu- 
ture exiftence  of  the  afts  of  the  will  certain,  the  c.ve;- 
r//^  of  thofc  a(Sts  of  will  is  certainly  and  infallibly  con- 
nected with  the  decree  ;  and,  therefore,  certainly 
and  infallibly  connecT:ed  with  fomething  extrinfic  of 
the  moral  agent  v/ho  is  the  fubje<St  of  them.  If  fome- 
thing extrinfic  of  moral  agents  has  made  the  exiftence 
of  their  volitions  certain,  the  exiftence  of  thefe  voli- 
tions depends  on  that  out  of  the  agent  himfelf  which 
gave  certain  futurity  to  them. 

On  the  other  hand  ;  if  men  are  the  efficients  of  their 
own  atfti?  of  wnll,  and  poil'efs  a  power  of  ori^inntin^y 
theiti  ;  none  but  moral  agents  themfelves  can  give  ex- 
iltence  to  their  afts  of  will.  And,  if  no  one  but  man 
can  give  exiftence  to  his  a<fts  of  will,  no  one  eife  can 
make  their  exiftence  certain.  But,  if  the  exiftence 
and  certainty  of  the  volitions  of  men  depend  on  the 
fubjo(fts  of  them  ;  tiicir  exiftence  and  certainty  do  not 
depend  on  the  will  and  decree  of  God.  And,  if  their 
exiftence  do  not  depend  on  the  will  and  decree  of 
God,  we  may,  then,  determine  there  is  no  divine  de- 
cree concerning  them.  What  ideas  can  we  have  of  a 
divine  decree  that  certain  human  volitions  fli^ll  takfi 
place,  which  neverthelcfi  gives  iio  cert.iinty  of  their 
coming  into  exiftence,  and  on  which  their  exiftence  is 
independent  ?  I  i  '  If 


t4  APPENDIX, 

If  human  volitions  are  independent  on  the  decree  and 
will  of  God  for  their  exiftence  ;  then,  thofe  events, 
alfo,  which  are  dependent  on  the  volitions  of  men, 
.  and  which  cannot  take  place  otherwife  than  as  the 
effeifls  of  human  volitions,  mud  be  equally  independ- 
ent on  a  divine  decree.  And,  whatever  comes  into 
exiftence  independently  of  a  divine  decree,  cannot  be, 
the  object  of  inch  a  decree.  On  this  hypothehs,  What 
Is  there  left  to  be  the  object  of  a  divine  decree  ?  To 
what  latitude  may  we  admit  that  the  decrees  extend  ? 
Surely,  no  further  than  to  God's  own  immediate  afts  ; 
or,  thofe  things  which  He,  either  mediately  or  imme- 
diately, effecfts  by  his  own  almighty  power. 

Bat,  to  fuppofe  human  volitions  to  be  effeded,  eU 
ther  mediately  or  immediately,  by  the  power  of  God, 
will  not  admit  men  themfelves  to  be  the  efficients^  the 
cmifes  of  their  own  acts  of  will.  Therefore  the  divine 
decrees,  it  mull  not  be  admitted,  extend  to  the  ifiternal 
exercifes  of  man.  Yet,  the  exter7ial  aCiions  and  conduCi 
of  men  depend  on  their  internal  exercifes — their  voli* 
tions.  Neither  may  the  latter,  then,. be  the  objefts  of 
a  divine  decree  giving  certainty  to  their  exiftence,  *any 
niore  than  the  former.  To  few  things  indeed,  there- 
fore, and  thofe  the  leail  importafit  in  God's  moral 
kingdom,  may  it  be  admitted  that  the  decrees  of  God 
extend. 

What,  then,  fliall  we  make  of  our  Bibles  ?  And, 
what  of  the  numberlefs  divine  decrees  there  publiflied 
refpecting  human  ad:ions — the  purpofes  and  condu<fi: 
of  men  ?  The  taflc  of  reconciling  the  fcripture-doc- 
trine  of  the  divine  decrees  with  a  felf-determining 
power  in  men  with  refpeft  to  their  ov/na£i;3  of  will,  it 
may  be  prefumed  will  not  be  executed,  or  even  under- 
taken, by  the  Dodlor. 

2.  The  admiiiion  of  this  fuppofed  power  of  felf- 
determination  in  men,  not  only  fub verts  the  do^rine  i 
of  the  decrees  of  God,  but  that^  alfo,  of  his /orfX^ow- 
ledge.     The   foreknowledge   of  the   Deity   implies  a 
certainty  of  the  exillence  of  the   things  foreknown. 

With 


APPENDIX.  15 

With  refpe^b  to  any  event,  the  future  exigence  of 
which  is  uncertain,  it  may  be  that  it  fliall  never  take 
place.  And,  if  it  may  be  that  it  fhall  never  take  place, 
it  cannot,  at  the  lame  time,  be  certain  that  it  will  ever 
exifl.  To  fay  thaf  it  is  certain  that  fome  particular 
event  will  exift,  and  yet  it  may  he  that  it  never  fliali 
come  into  exiftence,  is  abfurd.  It  is  the  fame  as  fay- 
ing that  it  is  certain  that  it  will  exifl:,  and  yet  it  is  un- 
certain whether  it  will,  or  not.  Whether  the  divine 
foreknowledge  caufeiJi  the  certainty  of  the  future  ex- 
iftence of  things  foreknown,  or  not  ;  it  evidently  fup- 
pofes  and  neceljarily  implies  this  certainty.  Knowledgp 
implies  certainty.  When  there  is  no  certainty  with 
re{]iC(ft  to  the  future  exigence  of  events,  there  can  in 
the  nature  of  things  be  no  knowledge  that  they  will 
exill.  Uncertainty  of  the  futurity  of  their  exiftence, 
nccelfarily  precludes  a  knowledge  of  their  future  exift- 
ence. 

Hence  it  is  evident  that  tliere  is  certainty  of  the  fu- 
ture exiftence  of  every  event  which  is  the  objecl  of 
the  foreknawledge  of  God .  And,  if  the  foreknowledge 
of  God  extend  to  all  future  events  whatever,  even  all 
events  which  ever  were  future,  as  it  certainly  doth  j 
it  clearly  follows,  not  only  that  there  is  tiow  a  cer-^^ 
painty  with  rcfpe<£lto  all  future  events  which  ever  will 
be,  tiiat  they  ftiall  take  place  ;  but,  alfo,  that  with 
refpecft  to  all  paft  events  of  every  kind,  there  was  an 
antecedent  certainty  of  their  exiftence.  This  certainly 
follows  upon  the  admiffion  of  the  abfolute  uniyerfality 
of  tjie  divine  foreknowledge  refpedting  all  events. 

Whatever  events  are  certain  as  to  their  future  ex- 
iftence, are  fo  necefjarily  and  in  their  own  nature  ;  'or, 
their  exiftence  is  made  certain  by  fomething  elfe.  The 
certainty  of  their  future  exiftence  muft  lie  in  the  things 
thcmfelves  ;  or,  it  muft  arife  from  fomething  v/lthout 
them.  But,  if  the  events  wliicli  are  the  objcds  of  di- 
vine foreknowiediie,  are  in  their  own  nature  certain  of 
future  exiftence  ;  their  future  exiftence  is,  in  the 
higheft  fenfe,  necejj'ary  ;   and,  it  is  not^  and  cannot  be, 

I  i  2  i« 


16    .  APPENDIX. 

i-ii  the  pov.-er  of  any  being  or  tiling  without  them,  to 
prevent  their  exiftcnce.  That  which  has  certainty  of 
future  exidence  afide  from  any  thing  out  of  itlelf, 
cannot  be  prevented  coming  into  cxidence  in  any  way 
whatever.  But,  to  fuppofe  this  kind  of  certainty  with 
refpecft  to  the  events  which  are  the  objcfts  of  the  di- 
vine foreknowledge,  would  introduce  a  mofl  abjolute 
fatality-^^i  fatality  incontroulable  by  the  Deity  him- 
ielf;  and,  a  fatality,  which,  .according  to  the  advo- 
cates for  a  power  of  felf-determination,  is  utterly  fub- 
verfive  of  every  idea  of  human  liberty. 

It  being  admitted  that  there  is  certainty  of  the  future 
exiftence  of  all  thofe  events  which  are  the  objects  of 
the  foreknowledge  of  God  ;  it  therefore  follows,  that 
the  certainty  of  their  exiftence  arlfes  from  fomething 
out  of  themjelves .  And,  What  other  fource  of  cer- 
tainty of  any  future  exiftence  can  there  be,  than  the 
decree  or  will  of  God  ?  If  there  can  be  any  other 
fource  of  certainty  of  that  ivhich  now  is  not — which 
hath  no  exifience  in  itfelf  Is  God  omnipotent  ?  Is  He 
the  fountain  of  all  being  ?  Are  all  things  dependent 
on  Him,  and  on  his  will  and  plcafure  ?  Certainly, 
no  :  but,  there  is,  and  muft  be,  fome  other  original 
.fource  of  being  and  exiftence — fome  other  powerful 
and  operating  caufe  which  brings  forward  events  in 
their  time  and  order. 

If  the  volitions  of  men  be  the  obje^nis  of  \\\^  fore- 
knowledge of  God  ;  it  indubitably  follows,  that  there 
is  an  antecedent  certainty  of  their  exiftence.  And,  if 
there  be  an  antecedent  certainty  of  the  exiftence  of 
thofe  volitions  of  men  which  are  forefeen  by  the 
Deity  ;  the  certainty  of  their  exiftence  muft  be,  either 
dependent^  or  independent^  on  the  will  of  God.  If  it 
be  independent  on  the  will  of  God,  there  muft  of  ne- 
ceflity  he  fome  other  fource  of  tlieir  exiftence  tiian  the 
will,  or  power,  of  God  :  and,  on  whatever  they  are 
dependent,  their  exiltence  muft  be  fo  conne(^ed  \\A\\\ 
forne  caufe  out  of  thcmiclvcs,  that  they  cannot  be  con- 
jideied  ai  contingent  events. 

To 


APPENDIX.  17 

To  fay  that  men  are  dependent  on  God  for  their 
capacity  for  volition  and  action  ;  but,  that  volition  and 
aCiion  are  dependent  only  on  men  who  are  the  agents, 
will  afford  no  relief ;  unlcfs  it  be  denied  that  there  is 
an  antecedent  certainty  that  human  volitions  an4 
ndtions  will,  in  faft,  be  w^hat  they  arc,  and  no  other. 
If  there  be  this  antecedent  certainty,  it  is  then  certain 
that  men  will  exert  their  capacities  in  fuch  volitions 
and  actions  only  as  do  take  place  :  and,  confequently, 
previoufly  certain  that  they  would  be  exerted  in  one 
particular  way,  and  in  no  other- — An  idea  as  utterly 
inconfiftent  with  the  Doctor's  notions  of  liberty,  as 
that  of  the  moft  abfolute  decrees. 

But,  if  there  be  no  antecedent  certainty  that  the  ca- 
pacity for  human  volition  and  aftion  will  be  exerted 
in  fome  particular  acts  of  will  in  diftinftion  from  all 
others  ;  there  is,  of  courfe,  no  certainty  that  any  par- 
ticular acfis  of  will,  in  diltinftion  from  sU  others,  fhall 
actually  come  into  exiftence.  And,  if  there  be,  in 
faft,  no  antecedent  certainty  that  thole  afts  of  will 
which  really  do  come  into  exigence,  fliall  take  place 
in  diiHncT:ion  from  all  others  ;  it  cannot,  before  they 
do  exift,  be  known  to  be  certain  that  they  will  exiH;. 
""I'hat  which  is,  in  itielf,  uncertain,  cannot  in  the  na- 
ture of  tilings  be  known  to  be  certain.  To  fuppolb 
even  tlie  Deity  to  k72ow  them  to  be  certain,  is  to  fup- 
pofe  that  his  knovjleclgc  is  contrary  to  the  reality  and 
truth  of  things.  The  Deity  can  know  things  to  be, 
no  otlierwile  than  they  are.  If  human  volitions  are 
contingent  in  cUliinCiion  from  bein^  ctrtaitily  and  infalli- 
hly  connected  ivithjome  antecedent^  extrinfic  caufe^  they 
can  be  known  by  the  Deity  no  otherwife  than  as  being 
contingent.  And,  this  feems  to  be  the  light  in  which 
the  Dodtor  views  the  foreknowledge  of  God  as  it  re- 
i]")ecls  the  voluntary  ac^tions  of  men.  For,  he  quotes, 
with  approbation,  the  following  paflage  from  '^  ^Iher- 
7iethy^s  dij courfe'  on  divine  oniniJcienceJ'^  "  Forcknow- 
"  ledge  has  no  influence  at  all  upon  tlie  nature  of 
*'  things,  to  make  the  Icalt:  alteration  in  them.     The 

"  events 


i8  APPENDIX. 

^^  events  which  are  necefTary  are  foreknown  as  nccef- 
"  fary  ;  ^nd  thofe  which  are  contingent  and  voluntary, 
*'  are  foreknown  no  otherwife  than  as  contingent  and 
**  vohmtary."*  It  cannot  be  fnppofed,  that  either 
this  writer,  or  the  Do6lor,  fuppofes  that  any  events 
are  in  their  oivn  nature  necefTary,  or  necefTary  witli 
that  kind  of  neceffity  which  is  predicable  of  the  divine 
exigence.  This  would  be  a  fentiment  too  grofs  to  be 
admitted  by  any  chrifiiian  Divine.  Not  only  To,  but 
it  would  be  mofl  evidentl)'-  and  palpably  contradi<ftory 
to  all  the  Author's  ideas  of  human  liberty.  By  nccej- 
Jary  events,  muft,  therefore,  be  underflood,  fnch 
events  ps  are  certainly  an4  infallibly  connefted,  in 
their  exiflence,  with  Tome  antecedent,  extrinTic  canTe. 
By  contingent  and  voluntary  cwcw^^^  mnft,  accordingly, 
be  underflood,  Tnch  events  as  are  neither  necefTary  in 
themTclves,  and  in  their  ov/n  nature,  nor  necefTary  by 
being  infallibly  connefted  in  their  exiflence  v/itli  any 
thing  out  of  themfelves  which  now  doth  exift.  la 
what  other  light  can  this  Author  be  underflood,  when 
he  Tpeaks  of  contingent  and  voluntary  .events^  in  dif- 
tincStion  from  thoTe  whicti  are  neceff'ary  f  To  Tpcak 
of  an  event ^  that  is,  Tomething  which  hath  beginninj^  of 
exiftence^  as  necefTary  in  any  other  TenTe  than  as  infal- 
libly and  certainly  connected  with  Tomething  out  of 
jtTelf,  antecedently  exilling,  is  an  abTurdity.  Confe- 
quently,  this  cannot  be  tlie  necedity  to  which  contin- 
gency  and  voluntarinejs  are  oppoTed.  We  have,  there- 
fore, Tufhcient  authority  to  conclude,  that  by  contin- 
gent and  voluntary  events^  are  meant  Tuch -events  as 
are  neither  necejjary  in  themfelves  by  a  necejjiiy  of  na- 
tu/e^  nor  neceffary  by  beij7g  certainly  .'^nd  infallibly  con-' 
7ie(led^  as  to  their  exifience^  uuihfomething  out  of  them- 
felves luhich  doth  now  adually  ex  if.  TheTe  are  the 
events  which  are  foreknown  by  the  Deity  no  otherwife 
than  as  contingent  and  voluntary.  God's  foreknov/- 
ledge  of  them  muft,  therefore,  be  a  foreknowledge  of 
an  utter  uncertainty  of  their  future  exiflcnce  ariinig, 

either 

■■*  p.  T04, 


A  P  P  E  N  D  I  5c.  19 

either  from  any  thing  in  the  nature  of  the  events 
themfelves,  or  from  their  connexion  with  any  thing 
out  of  themfelves.  And,  where  (hall  language  be 
found  more  fully  and  ftrongly  to  exprefs  a  real  uncer- 
tainty of  their  future  exiftence  ?  What  knowledge, 
then,  is  it  pofiible  the  Deity  fiioukl  have  relative  to 
their  future  exiflence,  but  a  knowledge  that  it  is  ut- 
terly uncertain  whether  they  will  ever'exill  or  not  J 
But,  are  thefe  the  ideas  we  are  to  entertain  of  the  di- 
vine foreknowledge  .''  Ij:'  I'o,  What  prc-eminency,  as  to 
the  knov/ledge  of  many  futurities,  hath  the  Deity 
above  men,  yea,  the  weakefl  of  men  ? 

It  is  by  no  means  fuggeiied  that  thefe  are  really  the 
ideas,  either  of  Mr.  Abernethy,-  or  the  Do<il-or.  Un- 
doubtedly they  would,  both,  reprobate  them.  But, 
How  will  they  avoid  thefe  confeqiiences  upon  the  hy- 
pothefis  they  adopt  ?  If  they  can  fairly  rid  themfelves 
of  them  in  confiilency  v/ith  their  opinions  refpetfting 
the  contingency  of  human  anions,  they  will  do  a  very 
eflential  fervice  to  the  republic  of  letters.  But,  to 
reconcile  divine  prefcience  with  human  libert}'',  (the 
Dodor  undoubtedly  means  a  power  of  felf-determina- 
tion)  he  advertifetli  his  readers  in  the  beginning  of  hi$ 
feftion  on  foreknowledge,  is  a  tafl^  Vv'hich  he  is  not 
about  to  undertake.  Ke  rather  fuppofeth  no  human 
underftanding  capable  of  difcerning  their  confiftency 
with  each  other.  He  ranks  this  with  thole  fubjefts 
which  are  *'  high  and  too  wonderful  for  us  ;"  fuch 
as  the  divine  eternity  and  infinity^  the  trinity  unAfatis- 
fadion^  Sec,  But^  would  the  Doftor  fuggeft  that  there 
is  the  like  apparent  inconfiftency  and  contradi<^tion  in 
thefe  doftrines,  as  in  the  luppofition  that  things  which 
are  in  fa£i:  contingent^  and  uncertain,  as  to  their  future 
exijlence^  fhould  be  foreknown  f  How  difcouraging 
this  to  every  attempt  to  vindicate  thefe  do£trines,  ancl 
the  fcheme  of  chriilianity  in  general,  againft  tlie  ob- 
jeftions  and  cavils  of  infidels  1  Speaking  of  thefe 
dodrines,  of  the  fcheme  of  chriftianity,  and  of  thei 
moral  government  of  Ggd,   the  Do£lor  fays,    "  Al- 

**  though 


26  APPENDIX. 

*'  though  we  have  fuch  evidence  in  general  of  th^ 
"  truth  and  reality  of  the  things  above-mentioned,  as 
"  in  a  manner  compels  our  belief;  yet,  when  the 
"  queftion  is  put,  How  can  thefe  things  be  ?  we  dif- 
*'  cern  infuperable  difficulties^— 2X  the  fame  time  we  ar^ 
*'  confcious  infidelity  would  involve  us  in  difficulties 
*'  ftill  greater."*  But,  is  the  human  race  fated  to 
Tuch  injupcrakle  difficulties^  v/hich  ever  fide  of  the  quef- 
tion  be  embraced,  relative  to  the  truth  and  dodrines 
of  chriftianity  ?  Why  has  not  the  moll  perfe£r  fcep- 
ticifm  long  ere  now  fpread  itfelf  over  the  far  greater 
part  of  the  human  race  \  When  it  is  inquired  how 
thofe  things  v/hich  have  been  embraced  and  confeiTed 
by  the  chriftian  world  in  all  ages  can  be  ;  the  Do6tof 
fays  we  difcern  infuperable  difficulties :  but,  at  the  fame 
time  the  Docftor  is  confident  that  infidelity  wduld  in- 
volve in  it  ftili  greater  difficulties  ;  yea,  he  fays  that 
we  are  confcious  that  it  would.  Is  not  the  Dodor 
confcious,  alfo,  that  the  infidel  and  the  fccptic  would 
deny  this  ?  is  he  not  confcious  that  they  would  dif- 
pute  the  juftnefs  of  the  fcales  in  which  he  weighs 
tnfiiperahles^  and  takes  the  different  degrees  of  their 
weight  ? 

That  the  being  and  attributes  of  God  are  incompre- 
henfiblc^  no  one,  it  is  prefumed,  will  deny.  But,  by 
no  means  doth  it  follow  from  thence  that  there  are 
injuperahle  difficulties  attending  the  belief  of  his  exift- 
ence  and  perfe(n:ions.  The  lame,  alfo,  may  be  faid 
reipec^ing  the  fchcme  of  chriftianity,  and  the  moraJ 
government  of  God.  But,  to  fuppofe  that  our  belief 
of  the  exigence  of  objects  and  things  vv'hich  we  camiot 
comprehend^  involves  the  fame //////p^r<?Z'/i' difficulties  as 
the  foreknowledoe  of  the  exiflence  of  that  which  is, 
neverthelefs,  abjoluttly  uncertain  and  contingent  ;  pays 
but  a  poor  compliment  to  divine  revelation. 

It  is  by  no  means  apprehended  that  it  was  the  Doc- 
tor's defign  to  weaken  the  evidence  of  divine  revela- 
tion in  general,    or,  of  the  important  docflrines  of  it. 

But; 

*   p.     97-. 


APPENDIX.  21; 

Bat,  if  the  fubjecls  of  divine  revelation,  in  the  mo{l- 
important  articles,  be  in  faft  attended  with  dilTiculties. 
that  are  infnpernble-^y^i^  as  infuperable  and  unfur-- 
mountable  as  are  contained  in  the  hypothecs  that  it 
can  be  foreknoun  that  events  will  take  place  where  it 
is  utterly  uncertain  whether  tliey  will  ever  exift,  or 
not  ;  How  can  we  expect  that  the  belief  of  divine  res^- 
elation  will  ever  become  very  general  ;  much  more, 
that  it  will  ever  have  an  univerfal  fprcad  in  our 
world  ? 

But  further  ;  fome  of  the  Docftor's  obfervations 
rerpedljn^  the  divine  prelcience,  made  with  much  juf- 
tice,  if  we  miltake  not  are  perfedlly  iilconlillent  with 
all  the  ideas  he  expreireth  of  human  liberty.  He  fays, 
'■''  'i'o  him  who  calleth  things  that  are  not  as  though 
*'  they  were,  and  with  whom  a  thoufand  years  are  as 
"  one  dav,  the  knowledge  of  futurity  is  prejent  knoxu- 
"  led^e."'^  It  may  reaibnably  be  concluded  that  the 
Doftor's  idea  is,  that  thofe  objecT:s  and  events  which 
2ir:e  future  to  us,  wliofe  knowledge  and  perceptions  are 
juccejjlue^  have  prejent  ex'fience  in  the  divine  mind,  or 
view  :  otherwife  God's  knowledge  of  futurity  would 
not  differ  from  the  knowledge  which,  in  fome  cafes^ 
lue  obtain.  For,  he  jullly  obferves,  that  "  In  an  in- 
"  finite  underftanding  there  is  no  before  or  after — no 
"  fuGceffion  of  ideas. '^  Yet,  if  the  objefts  of  the  di- 
vine foreknowledge  have  not  the  fame  prefent  exift- 
ence  in  the  mind  of  God  as  they  ever  will,  or  can, 
have  ;  the  divine  ideas  muft  of  neceflity  be  fuccedive. 
Thefe,  perhaps,  are  ?dib  the  ideas  of  Mr.  x\bernethy, 
when  he  faith,  *^'  The  futurity  of  contingent  events  is 
''  real — a  free  aftion  now  done,  was  yellerday,  or  in 
*'  any  preceding  point  of  duration,  as  truly  future,  as 
**^  it  has  to  day  actually  come  to  pafs."§ 

If  the  free  actions  of  men  have  alwa^^s  had  prefent 
exiftcnce  in  the  divine  mind— if,  before  they  took 
place,  they  had  real  futurity.  In  what  fenfe  is  it  that 
they  arc  <ontiTigeritf     There  could  be  no  contingency 

K  k  with 

*p.  97.      ^p.  104, 


12  APPENDIX. 

with  refpe<fl  to  them,  inconfiftent  with  their  having 
real  futurity  before  they  took  place  ;  or,  inconriftent 
with  their  having  prejent  cxifence  in  the  divine  mind  : 
therefore,  no  cimtin^enry  inconfillent  with  a  moft  abiO" 
lute  and  infallible  antecedent  certainty  of  their  future 
exiftencc.  And,  if  there  be  fuch  an  antecedent  cer** 
tainty  of  exiftence  of  the  free  alliens  of  men,  they 
cannot  be  free/;2  the  DoClor^s  jenje  of  freedom  y  but, 
muft  of  neceffity  come  into  exiflence  in  connexion 
with  fome  antecedent  caufe.  Witli  much  jufiice, 
tlierefore,  doth  the  Doftor  obferve,  that  the  '*  at- 
"tempt''  to  reconcile  the  divine  prefcience  with  liberty 
in  the  creature,  ^'  hath  been  executed  in  fuch  a  man- 
*'  ner  as  hath  rather  evidenced  the  folly  and  arrogance 
"  of  the  undertakers,  than  cleared  the  fubje£l."* 

Such  difficulties  as  thefe  would,  with  many,  dif- 
courage  every  attempt  to  vindicate  a  fchcme  of  lib- 
erty fo  manifeftly  clogged  and  incumbered  with  them. 
But,  no  objecflions  againfl  the  myflerious  power  in 
men  of  cauiing  their  own  afts  of  will,  feem  to  be  of 
any  weight  with  Gentlemen  who  have  onee  adopted 
the  idea  of  the  exillence  of  fuch  a  pov.'cr,  and  endea- 
voured to  fupport  and  defend  it.  Every  objecStiony 
and  every  argument,  againft  the  exiftence  of  fuch  a 
power,  fail;  or,  are  ahforbed  and  perfecftly  fwallowed 
wp  in  tlie  vortex  of  felf-determination. 

But,  how  the  Doftor  difcavers  that  *'  Prefcience  Is 
"  a  difficulty  that  incunibers  Mr.  Edwards^'s  fcheme 
*'  no  lefs  than  that  of  his  opponents,''  is  rather  diffi- 
cult to  comprehend.  In  order  that  this  may  appear, 
however,  he  quotes  Mr.  Edv^ards  as  faying  that 
*'  there  mnft  be  a  certaintj^  in  things  themfelves,  be* 
"  fore  they  are  certainly  foreknown  ;"  and,  affirming 
the  forrner  to  be  the  ^'  foundation"  of  the  latter. 
Mr.  Edwards  explains  himfelf  to  mean,  not  the  cer- 
tainty of  the  ffnowledp-e  there  may  be  of  the  future  ex- 
iflence of  things  foreknown  ;  but  the  certainty  there 
'i&  in-  reality  of  their  future  exiftence,  afide  from  the 

knowledge 

»  *p.  1)6. 


APPENDIX.  c| 

hioivhd^e  of  this  certainty.  His  words,  are,  **  Meta- 
*'  phyrical  or  philofophical  necelfity  are  nothing  difler- 
"  ent  from  their  certainty.  1  fpeak  not  now  of  the 
*'  certainty  o^ knowledge^  but  tlie  certainty  there  is  in 
*'  things  themfelves."  On  this  the  Doftor  obferves, 
''  if  by  this  certainty  in  tilings  themlclves  be  meant 
*■'-  the  fame  as  the  divine  decrees  and  determinations, 
"  then  thefe  being  the  fuppofed  foundation  of  fore- 
*'  knowledge,  the  latter  cannot  be  the  caufe  of  events, 
*'  as  Mr.  Edwards  reprefents."*  Where  Mr.  Ed- 
wards reprelents  foreknowledge  to  be  the  cmife  of 
events,  the  Do£lor  has  not  told  us.  He  abundantly 
reprefents  foreknotuledge  as  a  proof  of  the  certainty 
that  the  objeds  of  it  will  exiil  :  but,  no  where,  as  we 
have  obferved,  as  cauflng  that  certainty.  And,  how 
Prefcience,  according,  to  this  reprefentation  of  the  na- 
ture of  it,  is  a  diificulty  which  incumbers  Mr.  Ed- 
wards's fcheme  of  neceility,  or  certainty,  no  leis  than 
that  of  his  opponents,  is  hard  to  be  diicovered.  That 
the  exlftence  of  things  ftiould  be  ^vt\'\on^y  foreknoiijn^ 
can,  certainly,  be  no  objection  againft  that  fcheme  of 
neceiiity  M'-hich  Mr.  Edwards  defends. 

The  Docftor  proceeds  in  dating  the  difficulties  which 
arife  from  Prelcience  on  Mr.  Edivards's  Jchenic  ;  and 
fays,  '^  If  the  purpofes  and  decrees  of  God,  or  his 
"  determinations  as  to  futurity,  be  antecedent  to  fore- 
*'  knowledge,  and  the  foundation  thereof,  then  his 
"  will  is  determined  at  random,  by  blind  contingcnce, 
"  without  delign  and  forei'ight — guided  by  no  wifdom, 
*^  no  motive,  no  intelligent  dit^rate  whatever^— he  only 
*'  ac^s  by  an  Hobbijiical  fatality."  But,  is  it  a  di<ftate 
of  the  common  reafon  of  men,  that  if  God  forelee  that 
certain  events  fliall  take  place  in  diitinftion  from 
others^  hecaiije  he  has  determined  that  they  fiall^  there- 
fore his  determinations  were  "  guided  by  no  wildom,'* 
but  were  ''  without  counfel  and  wifdom  V  When  a 
man  contemplates  building  a  manfion-houfe.  Doth  the 
forejight  he  hath    of  its  dimenfions  and  form,  which 

K  k  5  arofe 

*  p.    SCO. 


24  APPENDIX. 

arofe  from  hi*  determination  to  build  of  fuch  apaiticn- 
lar  form  and  llich  dimenfions,  prove  that  his  will,  in 
that  cafe,  was  determined  "  at  random — guided  by 
no  wifdom,  no  motive?"  When  the  Dodor  deter- 
mined to  make  and  publifh  remarks  on  Mr.  Edwards's 
Inquiry,  Sec.  as  a  confeqiLence  of  this  deferminaticn  he 
for  el  aw  that  his  "•  Examination"  would  conlain  cer- 
tain particular  arguments  and  obje<fticns.  Doth  it 
from  thence  follow  that,  in  the  choice  of  his  aro-n- 
ments  and  objections,  his  will  was  determined  at  ran- 
dom— gi'ided  by  no  wifdom  f 

The  divine  knowledge  comprehends  and  embraces 
every  poifible  objeft  and  event.  And,  becaufe  the  di- 
vine mirwi  forelaw  that  certain  particular  events  would 
take  place,  becaufe  he  determined  that  they  (hnuld.^  Doth 
it  from  thence  follow  that  his  mind  was  "  guided  by 
no  wifdom"  in  this  determination  ?  The  reader,  per- 
haps, may  judge  that  it  was  "  through  want  of  reflec- 
tion and  refearch — through  inattention"  to  the  rea- 
fonings  of  Mr.  Edwards,  that  the  'Doclor  has  made 
iiich  an  objetfLion. 

Here,  then,  \ve  have  the  arguments  by  which  the 
Doctor  proves  that  ^'  Prefcience  is  a  dilnculty  which 
''  incumbers  Pt'Ir.  Edwards's  own  fchem.e  no  lefs  than 
"  that  of  his  opponents."  The  //r/?  is,  that  Mr.  Ed- 
wards's Icheme  doth  not  admit  foreknowledge  to  be 
the  cauf'e  of  events,  or  of  their  certainty  :  the  Jecond^ 
that  it  implies  that  the  determinations  of  the  divine 
mind  that  certain  particular  events  in  diftin«ftion  from 
others  fhould  take  place,  were  without  motive  or  wil- 
dom.  AVhether  there  be  any  weight  in  thefe  objec- 
tiouK — any  juflice  in  the  Doctor's  conclufions — the 
candid  and  impartial  public  will  judge.  The  fame 
impartial  public  may,  poffibly,  judge  that  a  candid 
conitruftion  of  Mr.  Edwards's  argument  w^ould  not 
have  permitted  the  Do^llor  to  repreient  him  as  main- 
taining that  the  divine  will  is  determined  prior  to 
KNO IV LEDGE.  People  in  general  will  fee  no  diffi- 
culty in  fuppofmg  that  the  determinaticns  of  the  di- 
vine 


APPENDIX.  25 

vine  mind  refpedring  the  exiflence  of  eventr,,  are  foVm- 
cd  in  infinite  T.ui/do7>i  ;  and,  at  the  fame  tune,  that  the 
Deity  knows  that  certain  events  (hall  take  place  becauje 
he  has  determined  that  they  fhcill.  Should  it  be  con- 
lldered  by  the  public  that  the  Doftor  maintains  the 
divine  fo}-elmoivlcrhe  -oi  the  exiftence  of  events  to  be 
antecedent  to  Gpd's  decrees  that  they  (hall  exifl ;  man- 
kind will  be  liable  to  fnppoie  that  his  dodrine^  not 
Mr.  Edv/ards's,  fubjefts  the  Deity  to  "■  an  Hohhiftical 
fatality."  For,  if  events  have  fixed  certain  futurity 
antecedent  to  the  determinations  of  the  divine  mind 
concerning  them,  it  is  ealy  to  fee  there  is  a  caufe 
fomewhere  operating  fuperior  to  the  divine  v/ill. 

'\.  To  admit  a  povv^er  of  felf-determination.in  men, 
is  inconfiltent  with  the  fuppofition  that  hnly  ajfetiions 
are  the  efi'eft  of  the  imrne:liate  influence  of  the  Spirit  of 
God  on  the  heart.  It  is  as  inconllflent  with  the  exjfl-- 
cnce  of  this  fuppofed  power,  to  admit  the  Deity  to  be 
the  caufe  of  holy ^  as  of  unholy  affeftions.  If  the  moral 
capacity  v/ith  whicli  God'  hath  endowed  us  be  the 
proper  caiije  of  volition^  it  is  as  much  the  proper  caufe 
of  thofe  which  are  holy^  as  of  thofe  which  are  unholy  ; 
and,  men  deterniirie  thenij elves  as  much  to  holinejs  as 
to  (in.  This  the  Doc^lor's  argument  really  admits. 
For,  he  faitli,  "  Were  there  not  a  proper  taufc  i/i  the 
^'  niind^  the  cxcrciies  and  a(fl:ior!S  of  mankind  would 
^'  uniformly  be  luch  as  the  order  of  our  nature  poini:s 
*'  out.  And,  the  fuppofition  of  the  fall  of  ano;els  or 
*'  men  would  be  as  wild,  as  the  fuppofition  of  the 
*'  everlalliiig  mountadns  moving  out  of  their  place,  or 
^'  the  '"nterruption  of  the  harmony  or  the  fpheres.  At: 
lead  it  would  be  viewed  in  no  other  light  than  n-ny 
alter ution  in  the  natural  worlds  or  fufpenfioji  of  the 
Urns  of  nature.  The  latter  might  as  well  be  judged 
criminal  and  morally  evil,  as  the  form.er.  If  the 
caufe  of  \.\\Q  acflions  and  exercifes  of  moral  agents  be 
not  in  thonjelves^  then  the  Deity  is  the  proper,  effi- 
cient caufe  of  them."*     This  implies  the  motions  of 

the 

•  p   11,  aa. 


96  APPENDIX. 

the  human  will,  if  eaufed  by  divine  efficiency,  td  be  a? 
perfe«511y  mechankol  as  tiiole  of  the  heavenly  bodies  ; 
and,  that  neither  virtue  nor  vice  are  any  more  proper- 
ly pred^cable  of  them — tliat  exercil'es  of  love  are  no 
more  of  the  nature  of  virtue,  than  the  harmony  of  the 
fpheres  ;  nor,  of  hatred  of  the  nature  of  vice,  than 
tempells  and  ftorms.  And,  this  mull  evidently  be  the 
truth,  if  it  be  efiential  to  moral  aftion  that  the  "  mind 
*'  of  the  agent  be  the  true  caule  of  his  own  eleftion 
*'  and  actions."  If  no  adlions,  or  ele<n:ions,  are  mor- 
ally free  but  thofe  which  are  caujed  by  the  agents 
themfelves — if  the  moral  capacity  in  men  be  the  proper 
caufe  o£  volition  ;  it  is  as  abfurd  to  fpeak  of  virtue^  or 
kolinffs^  as  an  clfeft  of  divine  efficiency^  as,  vice  and 
viorai  evil.  It  is  as  efTential  to  the  virtuoujnefs  of  hu- 
man a£Vions  that  men  be  the  proper  caufes  of  them,  as 
to  their  vicioujnefs.  An  aft  of  the  will  which  is  eaufed 
by  divine  efficiency,  can  no  more  partake  of  the  nature 
of  holintfs^  than  it  can,  oi  fin.  And  this  is  acknow- 
ledged by  fome  of  the  advocates  for  a  power  of  felf-- 
determination  ;  particularly,  a  late  noted  writer  on 
iiniverfal  falvation.*  He  manifeiliy  fuppoieth  it  to 
be  inconfiftent  with  the  liberty  of  the  creature,  and 
the  morality  of  his  anions,  for  divine  immediate  effi- 
ciency to  be  exerted  for  the  produdion  of  any  exer- 
cifes  of  will  of  anv  kind  whatever.  And,  in  this,  he 
was  perfedly  confillcnt  with  himfelf.  By  the  paffajre 
juil  quoted  from  the  *'  Examination,  &c.  continued," 
we  may  conclude  the  Author  entertained  the  fame 
view  of  the  fubjed  :  nor  could  he,  indeed,  in  any  con- 
fiftency  with  himfelf,  admit  //r;/v,  any  more  than  fuu 
ful^  affeftion,  to  be  the  fruit  of  divine  efficiency.  How, 
then,  are  we  to  underfland  the  Doftor,  when  he  fpeaks 
of  '*  the  firivinos  of  the  divine  J vir  it  ;§  the  efficaciouf- 
**  nefs  of  means  through  the  divine  concurrence  with 
*'  them  ;  II  the  Spirit  ofGod^\\tx\  with  the  gofpel ;  ^  the 
*'  means  and  injluences  of  grace,"  &c.  ?**     Can  it  be 

that 

♦  Dr.  Chauncey.         h.  Examination,  p.  iii.        ||  p.  Ji2,         I  Examination 
cantinued,!  p.  %%•         '**  Examination,  p.  107. 


appendix'.  '        ty 

that  he  meant  to  be  underftood  of  any  immedhte  infiu-* 
ences  of  the  Spirit  of  God  upon  the  minds  of  men,  pro- 
ducing holy  affections  ?  Or,  did  he  ufe  theib  expref- 
fions  as  phrajes  of  coiirfe^  in  conformity  to  cujlom  and 
prevailiug  notions  of  chrillians  I  If  the  Doctor  de- 
figned  to  intimate  any  immeAiate  agency  of  tka  Spirit  of 
Cod  in  the  production  of  holy  affections,  it  was  iii 
perfect  inconfiflency  with  iiis  wiiole  Tcheme  refpeCting 
moral  liberty.  But,  if  this  idea  of  divine  inliiienccs 
be  excluded,  as  it  mufl  be  ii  men  are  the  caufes  of  theif 
own  aCls  of  will ^  What  are  we  to  make  of  thofe  paf- 
fages  of  Scripture  which  fpeak  of  believers  as  being 
*'  born,  not  of  blood,  nor  of  the  w/7/  of  ths  ficjh^  nor 
*'  of  the  loill  ofman^  but  of  God"*-^as  being  born  of 
th^  Jpirit^ — of  all  true  virtue  and  holinefs,  as  being 
fruits  of  the  fpirit^  Sec,  ?||  What  can  be  more  un- 
meaning and  unintelligible  than  fuch  palTages  and  ex- 
preHlons  as  thefe,  if  the  proper  caufe  of  human  exerrifes 
and  adions  be  IN  THE  MIND  f  And,  "  o;z  finy  other 
''  hypothefis^  t\\Q.  fuppofition'  of  the  fall  of  angels  or 
*'  men  would  be  as  wild,  as  that,  of  the  everlafting 
"  mountains  moving  out  of  their  place,  or  the  inter- 
*'  ruption  of  the  harmony  of  the  fpheres." 

Here,  then,  the  reader  hath  a  view  of  fome  of  the 
natural  and  inevitable  confequences  of  the  DoCtor's 
fentiments  rcfpeCting  human  liberty  and  the  powers  of 
WtQn.  They  are  utterly  fubverhve  of  the  doClrines  of 
the  divine  decrees  and  particular  ele6iioTi.  Yea,  To  full 
and  open  is  the  DoCtor  in  rejecting  thefe  doCtrines, 
that  on  the  hypotheiis  of  its  being  determined  before- 
hand that  any  of  the  unregenerate  fliall  not  nie  the 
means  of  grace,  or  (hall  not  lucceed,  he  challengeth 
any  man  to  fliew  how  the  gofpel  can  be  a  privilege  to 
tliem,  or  they  liable  to  a  greater  damnation  for  abuf- 
ingit.^f 

And,  as  to  the  natural  confequences  of  his  fcheme 
of  human  liberty,  as  it  refpeCts  the  frehnowledpe  of 
God,  the  DpCtor  fuppofeth  the  wi/eji  of  men  to  view  it 

as 

*  John,  J.  13.      Vjclin,  iii.  $.      !j  GaJat.  v.  tzr-xj-      H  Examination,  p.  115. 


28  APPEND  1  X. 

as  incapable  of  being  reconciled  with  thcprefcience  of 
God  by  any  Jiunian  under/landing.^ 

Whether,  wiiat  the  Dodlor  hath  advanced  be  not 
equally  irreconcilable  with  the  Icripturc-reprefenta- 
tions  of  the  immediate  infiueuces  of  tiie  ^pirit  of  God, 
OR  the  hearts  of  men,  in  tlie  produftion  of  holy  affec- 
tions^ the  candid  and  intelligent  reader  will  now  judge. 
Tliefe  are  difficulties  which  gj  eatlv  embarrais  the 
Doctor's  fcheme  of  fentiment  ;  nor,  can  he  juftly  ex- 
pe(ft  that  it  will  uoiv^erfally  prevail,  until  he  remove 
them  out  of  the  way. 

But,  left  we  exceed  the  proper  limits  of  an  Appen- 
dix, it  is  time  Xo  proceed  to  obfervations  on  fome  other 
parts  of  the  Dodtor's  "  Examination  of  Mr.  Edwards 
continued.'*  His  leading  objection  to  Mr.  Edwards's, 
fcheme  is,  that  it  implies  the  Decree  or  Pf^ill  of  God 
to  be  the  proper,  original  caufe  of  the  exiflence  of 
moral  evil.  This,  the  Doftoi'  thinks  he  has  abundant- 
ly proved  :  and,  this  being  proved,  he.  fuppofes  it  fuf- 
iicient  to  fubvert  Mr.  Edwards's  whole  fcheme  ;  be- 
qaufe,  as  he  expreifeth  it,  '^  it  deftroys  the  divine 
•"'"^  moral  charadler,  and  renders  it  impollible  that  the 
'^  creature  fnould  be  a  moral  agent.  '''  It  is,"  he  fays, 
"  to  afcribe  the  lin  of  man  to  God  in  fach  a  fenfe  as 
*'  we  cannot  attribute  it  to  the  devil,  without  bringing 
*'•  a  railing  accufation  againfl  him."§  That  Mr.  Ed- 
wards's fciieme  refpefting  the  origin  of  evil  deftroys 
the  divine  moral  charader,  the  Doiftor  infers  from 
this  confideration,  if  we  underlland  him,  that  it  ini-? 
plies  evil  in  tlie  divine  mind  itfelf.  He  fuppofeth  that 
the  cauje  mult  neceilarily  partake  of  the  nature  of  its 
efted;.  He  faith,  ''  Whether,  therefore,  we  fuppofe 
that  fin  arofe  from  the  want  or  withdraw  of  divine 
influence  and  afliflance,  or  from  divine  agency  and 
efficiencv,  or  that  creatures  v^ere  made  wicked  at 
tirft,   the  nature  of  fin  cannot  be  Jcparnted  from  its 

caufe. Tliat  if  one  moral    agent   (whether 

creature  or  creator)    is  luppofed  to  be  the  politive 

*'  caufe 

*  Examination  continuedf  p.  96.  %  p.  66. 


APPENDIX.  !t^ 

**  caiife  of  fin  in  another,  To  much  fm  as  to  be  attri- 
*'  buted  to  the  efficiency  of  the  former,  is  to  be  taken 
*'  from  the  criminality  of  the  latter,  and  fet  to  tlie 
*'  canfe  and  producer  of  it."*  The  Doctor  fuppofes 
that  the  "  caufe  which  produceth  wickednefs,  is  wick- 
ed ',"  that  a  difpofition  produced  in  creatures  by  a 
caufe  extrinfic  of  their  own  minds  "  cannot  partake 
'■^  of  the  nature  of  vice,  viewed  in  relation  to  the  /ub^ 
"y>(f/,  however  it  doth,  viewed  in  relation  to  the  r^.'//^ 
*'  and  producer  of  it. "§ 

That  moral  evil  hath  a  caufe,  yea,  an  efficient  one, 
is  allowed  by  the  Doftor.  He  fays,  "  No-w  if  they" 
(moral  agents)  "  are  not  the  efficients  of  their  own 
'^  fins,  the  Deity  mufl  be  ;  elie  fin  would  have  no 
*'  eificient  caufe  at  all — every  fm  would  be  an  cffec^t 
'•  without  a  caufe — to  fay  which,  we  agree  with  Mr. 
"  Edwards,  would  be  abfurd."{j  On  this  we  remark, 
that  the  exigence  of  fin  muft  be  n€ce[fary^  with  all  tkat 
necsfjity  which  Mr.  Edwards  urgeth,  an-d  to  which  the 
Doftor  objeifreth.  To  fay  that  fin  is  the  cffe<Et  of  a 
caufe,  yea,  an  efficient  one,  is  the  fame  as  to  fay  that 
its  exiftence  is  certainly  and  infallibly  conne^ed  with 
that  caufe.  Nothing  can,  with  propriety,  be  termed 
an  efficient  caufe  of  an  event,  with  which  the  exifi:ence 
of  the  event  is  not  indilTolubly  connecT^ed.  That  with 
which  the  exijftence  and  taking  place  of  fin  is  not  thus 
firmly  and  certainly  connected,  cannot  be  termed  an 
efficient  caufe — -unlefs  a  caufe  may  be  faid  to  be  cffcient 
which  produceth  no  effect.         We  remark  further, 

That  fin  may,  yea  necelTarily  mufc  arife  from  the 
efficiency  of  a  caufe  extrinfic  of  itfclf :  and,  confe- 
quently,  from  the  efficiency  of  a  caufe,  or  from  an 
tfficiency ^  which  is  not,  itjelf  fin.  if  fin  arife  from  a 
caufe  out  of  itfeif,  it  is  abfurd  to  fuppofe  the  canfe 
to  be  fin  or  finful.  Cauje  and  effeCi  are  two  dif- 
tinft  things.  iSin  is  the  eff'eCl.^  the  caufe  of  which 
is  to  be  fouglit.  To  fay  that  the  caufe  of  fin  is  finful., 
is  only  going  back  from  one  effeCl  to  another  ;    and, 

L  1  leaves 

*  ?■  79-        h  P-  75'  1^-        II  P-  6.V 


3©  APPENDIX. 

leaves  us  as  much  in  the  dark  refpec^ing  the  caiife  r»f 
fin  as  we  were  before.  No  efFedl  whatever  can  be 
fuppofed  originally  to  arife  from  a  finful  cauje^  unlefs 
the  firil:  caufe  of  all  things  be  rmful. 

Sin,  it  is  allowed,  is  an  effed.  Wherever,  or  in 
whatever,  fm  be  to  be  found,  we  find  an  effed.  This 
is  the  effe^ft,  of  which  the  couje  is  to  be  fought.  In  the 
inquiry  after  the  caitje  of  fii],  nothing  which  is  finful 
can  be  conlldered  as  fuftaining  the  relation  of  cauje  ; 
or,  with  the  leafl  propriety,  have  the  epithet  of  caufe 
given  it.  We  might  with  as  much  propriety  account 
for  the  exigence  of  light,  by  faying  that  it  arofe  from 
the  efficiency  of  a  liwuricus  caufe,  as  iov  fin^  by  faying 
it  arofe  from  "xf^fnl  cauje. 

To  fay  that  fin  hath  a  caufe,  neceffarily  excludes 
the  idea  of  fm,  or  fmfulnefs,  from  the  caufe.  If  the 
cause  of  fm  be  finful^  What  was  the  cmije  o^  its  finful- 
nels,  or  of  the  fin  which  is  i?2  that  cauje  f  It  is  ''  ab- 
furd"  to  fay  it  hath  no  caufe.  Confequently,  this  fin^ 
fulnefs,  alfo,  hath  a  caufe,  even  an  efficieyit  one.  And, 
upon  the  Do<5tor's  principles,  the  caufe  which  pro- 
duceth  this  ivickednels^  is,  alfo,  itjclf  wicked.  In  this 
way  of  accounting  for  fin,  either  no  caufe  at  all  is 
brought  into  view  ;  or,  caufe  and  efieft  are  perfectly 
confounded  with  each  other. 

To  fuppofe  the  a^eyit.^  or  his  moral  capacity  or  pow^ 
er  of /elf-deter  7hinatio?i.,  or  whatever  elfe  can  be  imagin- 
ed in  the  creature,  to  be  the  cauje  of  his  finfulnefs^' 
will  afford  no  relief.  If  the  oMent  be  the  caufe  of  his 
own  fin,  he  mufl  be  finful  antecedently  to  the  fin  which 
he  caujctk  or  produreth  :■  for,  "  the  caufe  v/hich  pro- 
tluceth  wickednefs  is  wicked.'*  So,  if  owr  moral  ca- 
pacity, or  a  power  of  Jelf-detcrmination ,  be,  either  of 
them,  the  cauje  or  producer  of  the  agent's  fin,  this 
moral  capacity,  or  felf-determining  power,  mufi:,  alfo, 
be  finful.  But,  as  the  Doctor  julUy  obferves,  '^  the 
''  author  of  our  beings  is  the  proper  caufe  of  our 
"  moral  capacity.''*       On   this  plan,    therefore,    the 

author 


APPENDIX.  3t 

author  nf  our  hcin^^s  miifl,  alfo,  be  finful.  The  Doc- 
tor's argument  Hands  thus  :  ^'  llie  author  of  our  be- 
"  ings  is  the  proper  caule  of  our  moral  capacity  :  this 
"  capacity  is  the  proper  caufe  of  volition.  The  voli- 
"  tion  being  fuppofed  to  be  iinfal,  the  capacity  which 
*'  is  the  caufe  of  it,  muft,  alfo,  be  finfui — for,  '*  the 
*'  caufe  which  produceth  v/ickednefs,  is  wicked." 
Bat,  God  being  the  caufe  of  our  capacity^  if  thc.t  be 
wicked,  What,  on  the  Dodlor's  principles,  fhall  be 
faid  of  the  caufe  ? 

Further  ;  the  Doctor  fuppofeth  that  moral  agents 
are  theuifclves  the  efficient  caiije  of  their  own  vicious 
volitions.  He  fays,  "  He  (Mr.  Edwards)  denies  that 
*'  moral  agents  are  themfelves  the  efficient  caufe  of 
-''  their  own  vicious  volitions  ;  as  it  is  certain  that  this 
^'  would  imply  a  power  of  felf-determination  in  them  : 
*'  now  if  they  are  not  the  efficients  of  their  own  fins, 
"  tiie  Deity  mud  be  ;  elfe  fin  would  have  no  efficient 
*'  ca-ufe  at  all — every  fin  would  be  an  effi3<fl  without  a 
"  caufe — to  lay  whicli,  we  agree  with  Mr.  Edwards, 
*'  would  be  abfurd."*  But,  if  there  be  a  diftindlion 
betwixt  caufe  and  effal-^'ii  they  be  not  pcrfedlly  the 
fame,  the  one  neither  preceding  nor  following  the 
other  ;  >noral  agents  mufi:  be  linful  antecedently  to 
thofe  vicious  volitions  of  which  they  are,  themfelves^ 
the  efficient  caufe.  And,  if  raorai  agents  are  finfui 
antecedently  to  their  efFe<n:ing  in  themfelves  vicious 
"volitions^  the  efficient  caufe  of  ?horal  a^^ents  mull",  alfo, 
be  finfui  :  for,  the  caufe  ivhich  produceth  ivickeduejs^  is 
ivicked.  Do  not  the  Doctor's  reafonings  as  certainly 
make  the  Deity  the  efficient  caufe  of  fin  as  Mr.  Ed- 
wards's ?  The  Doftor  alloweth  that  fin  hath  a  caufe  : 
but,  then  urgcth  that  the  caufe  of  it  is,  alfo,  finfui. 
Where  will  he  fi:op  ffiort  of  the  firji  caii/e  f  Why 
then,  in  treating  on  moral  fubjefts,  virtue  and  vice, 
is  it  not  as  neceffary  on  the  Dodor's  principles,  as  on 
Mr.  Edwards's,  to  "  detach  their  caufe  from  their 
nature  ?"§      Had  the  Doftor  carefully  confidcred,the 

L  1  2  confcquences 

*p-  65.       ^  p.  75. 


34  A  P  P  E  N  D  I  X. 

confeqiiences  of  his  own  conceflions  and  reafonings, 
many  of  the  obfervations  he  makes  on  the  ''  futility'' 
of  Mr.  Edwards's  diilinftion  betwixt  the  nature  and 
cauje  of  volition,  in  his  fifth  fc^ftion,  would  have  been 
found  unnecefiary.  If  fin  hath  a  caufe,  and  caufe  and 
eifev.^  be  dillin^t  from  each  other  ;  our  inquiries  will 
jiecefTarily  lead  us  back  to  the  firil  and  original  caufe. 
And,  if  the  caufe  of  fin  be  finful^  there  furely  can  be 
no  Ifop  till  we  get  back  to  the  firji  caiije  of  all  timigs. 
*'  And,  on  this  llippofition,  the  moral  perfeftions  and 
**  government  of  God,  and  revealed  religion,  niufl  be 
''  dillDelieved/'* 

No  fentiment  can  be  more  abfurd  in  itf^f,  or  more 
fubverfive  of  all  principles  of  morality,  tlian  that 
which  implies  the  cmfe  of  fm  to  be,  itfelf,  fihful. 
Wherevdr  finfvlnefs  is  to  be  found,  or  of  whatever  it 
be  predicable,  there  is  an  efredl.  If  fm  be  admitted  to 
be  an  cffcCi^  as  it  is  by  the  Doctor,  we  are  neceffitatcd 
to  look  for  fomething  as  its  caufe  ivJiich  is  not  fui  or 
finfnl :  otherwife,  we  lofe  the  dil1in(f^ion  betwixt  caufe 
and  effe^l.  To  fay  that  fmfLilnefs  is  the  caufe  of  fm- 
fulnefs,  is  no  more  than  faying  that  a  thing  is  the  caufe 
of  itfelf.  Vt  fin  hath  a  caufe,  it  muft  neceilarily  be  a 
caufe  that  is  sinhfs.  \i  felf-determination  be  its  caufe, 
it  muil;  neceffarily  be  a  (inlefs  ov  holy  felf-dtterniinaticn. 
But,  that  a  (inUfs^  holy  fclf-deternnnatior.^  or  a  finlej's^ 
holy  capacity^  ftiould  be  the  caufe  of  a  vicious  a6i  of 
luill^  is  a  fuppofition  pcrfedly  inconfillcnt  with  the 
idea  that  the  caufe  of  wickednefs  is  wicked. 

To  fay  that  the  caife  of  moral  evil,  is,  itfelf,  alfo 
morally  euil^  is  only  laying  that  one  fin  is  the  caufe  of 
G7iother.  In  our  inquiries,  therefore,  into  the  origin 
of  moral  evil,  we  are  uecelfarily  carried  back  to  a 
caufe  which  is  72ot  vioraliy  evil.  If  moral  evil  hath  a 
caufe  of  its  exiflence,  if  it  hath  begijniifig  of  exiftence, 
it  is  in  itfelf  ablm'd  to  fuppofe  the  raz^  of  its  exifi:ence 
to  be  any  otherwife  than  holy  and  finlefs  :  for,  when- 
ever we  Ipeak  of  ary  thing  as  finful,  v/e  only  fpeak  of 

an 
*  p.  60. 


A-  P  P  E  N  D  1  X.  33 

anefaCl.  The  c/T/i/Q"  of  this  cfTct^,  therefore,  in  order 
that  it  may  be  an  eff'cd — yea,  /%  very  effecl  the  cauj's 
of  which  we  are  feeking,  mull  necelfarily  be  confider- 
ed  as  sinlejs  and  holy. 

Ill  order  to  maintain  that  it  is  inconfiRent  with  the 
moral,  character  of  God  for  Him  to  cauje  the  exiltence 
of  moral  evil,  the  Doclor  miift  prove  that  "■  volition, 
fprings  from  itfelf,"'*  and  deny  that  fin  hath  any  caufc 
out  of  itfelf ;  which  is  the  fame  a5  to  deny  that  it  hath 
a  caujc.  For,  if  it  hath  a  cavife  out  of  itfelf,  this  cauje 
is  not  sinful — otiicrwiie,  caufe  and  eifeft  are  the  fame, 
utterly  imdiflinguifhabJe  from  each  other. 

Obj.  "  Vt  it  maft  of  necelTity  he  that  the  caufe  of  sitt 
*'  is  sinlcJs^  or  holy^  Why  will  it  not  follov/  that  the 
*'  criiife  of  virtue  mud  be  vicious — of  holine/s^  sinful  {" 
"  If  J-//Z  in  the  creature  require  a  caufe  of  a  different 
^'  nature  from  itfelf  the  effl-Cl  ;  Why  may  it  not  be 
"  argued  with  equal  juftice  that  holinejs  in  the  crea- 
*'  ture,  alfo,  requires  a  cauje  of  an  oppofite  and  differ- 
"■  ent  nature  ?     And,  if  this  be  but  the  natural  confe- 

quence  -of  the  preceding  reafonings    relpedtlng  sin 

vul  its  canjc^  it  is  fuificient  to  fliow  that  they  are 
a.cious." 

Ans.  Were  it  true  that  the  exigence  of  moral  vir- 
tue, or  holinefs,  in  the  intelligent  fyflem,  had  a  begin^ 
ninn^  the  obje<5tion  would  be  of  weight.  But,  were 
this  true,  it  would  imply  that  that  Being  whole  exig- 
ence is  witho^it  begi?2?2i}jg-i  is  deftitutc  of  holinefs  ;  ;:nd 
is  thercfi^re  fiiiful.  If  the  exillence  of  hoiinels,  in  the 
moral  fylK'm,  hath  a  begiuning^  it  can  be  only  in  crea- 
tures ;  and,  therefore,  its  exillence  muft'have  been 
originated,  if  it  hath  a  cauje^  by  a  being  deilitute  of 
holinefs  :  for,  tiie  being  whofe  exiflence  is  ivithoui  be- 
ginnings who  is  from  everlafting,  on  this  hypothefis 
muft  neceliarily  be  fuppofed  to  be  unholy.  But  this 
is  infinitely  far  from  being  the  truth.  The  exigence 
of  holinefs,  in  the  moral  fyflem,  is  coeval  with  that  of 
the  Deity — yea,  its  exiflence  is  as  neccfjary  as  that  of 

God: 
•p.  42. 


"  fall 


54  APPENDIX. 

God  :  it  is  ciTential  to  the  Deity  *  being  the  very  di- 
vine nature  itfelf,  without  which  no  fuch  being  as  God 
could  poffibly  exift.  And,  it  is  eafy  to  fee  that  a  holy 
God  may  produce  holy  exiftence^  and  give  beginning  to 
creature- holinefs.  Here  we  dlfcern  no  difficulty — no 
appearance  of  abfurdity  or  inconfiftency.  So^  could 
it  be  admitted  that  the  Being  who  is  from  eternity  is 
finful,  it  might  eafily  be  Aippofed  that  he  might  pro- 
duce finful  exiftence  in  creatures  :  and,  in  that  cale,  it 
might  be  faid  that  the  cauje  of  fin  in  creatures  is  sinful—- 
*'  the  caufe  which  produceth  wickednefs,  is  wicked." 
But,  as  this  is  infinitely  far  from  being  the  truth,  there 
can  be  nothing  more  reproachful  to  the  Deity,  in  its 
natural  and  neceiTary  confequence^,  than  the  pofi- 
tion  that  the  caufe  of  the  exifience  of  iiri^  is  sinfil — 
*'  the  caufe  which  produceth  wickednefs^  is  wicked."  If 
wickednefs  hath  both  caufe  and  beginning,  the  confe- 
quence  is  undeniable  that  its  caufe  is  not  wicked  ;  but, 
that  its  exillence  was  originated  by  a  caufe  wliich  is  not 
sinful^  hut  holy. 

Sin  is  moral  being,  or  exiftence.  It  is  not  merely 
fuch  an  attribute  of  the  moral  exifience  where  it  is 
found,  as  that  it  can  be  abfuratled  from  it,  and  yet 
that  exifience  remain.  Hence  it  is  that  holinefs,  in 
men,  is  fpoken  cf,  in  the  fcriptures,  as  the  object  of  a 
new  creation.  <Sin  is  moral  affe<5lion,  an  exercife  of 
the  will.  This  moral  afledlion,  or  exercife  of  will, 
requires  a  cause  of  its  exifience,  and  thnt^  too,  out  of 
itfelf,  as  much  as  any  other  moral  exifience.  But,  to 
fuppofe  its  cause  to  be  sinful  will  neceffarily  lead  to 
the  abfurdity  of  fuppofing  {.hejirfi  cause  of  all  things  to 
be  fmful. 

The  Do£lor*s  obje<n:ion  to  the  fuppofition  that  the 
decree  or  will  of  God  was  properly  the  originating 
caufe  of  the  exifience  of  moral  evil,  is,  that  this  would 
imply  moral  evil  in  God.  This  the  Doftor  afjcrts  : 
but  the  afiertion  needs  the  fupport  of  evidence,  which 
the  Doftor  has  not  brought.  What  he  faith  on  the 
fubjeiH:  confifls  ratlicr  in  addreffes  to  the  imagination, 

than 


APPENDIX.  3jr 

than  reafonings.  He  labours  to  paint  the  doctrine  in 
frightful  colours,  that  men  may  be  deterred  from  em- 
bracing it.  It  Teems  as  though  he  felt  the  want  of  dif- 
cernment  to  difcover  the  fophillry  of  thofe  arguments 
which  are  urged  in  fupport  of  the  obnoxious  tenet. 
Hence  his  quarrel  with  metnphyfics^  to  difgrace  whirh^ 
he  has  written  a  whole  fedion  ;  not  the  leall  remark- 
able part  of  which  is,  that  St.  Paul  *'  disclaims  meta- 
*'  phyfics — not  furely  as  being  above  his  abilities  ;  but, 
''  as  of  no  life  on  the  moft  eilential  point  of  religion — 
**  rather  injuri6us  than  helpful."*  Had  not  the  Doc- 
tor's argument  agaitift  metaphyfical  reafoning  been  in 
diflrefs,  it  never  would  have  fought  aid  from  fuch  a 
quarter  as  this. 

It  is  common  for  gentlemen  who  efpoufe  and  en- 
deavour to  defend  the  dodrine  of  a  power  of  felf-de- 
termination  in  men,  to  raife  an  outcry  againfl  meta- 
phyfical  reafoning.  It  feems  as  though  they  had  felt 
the  difadvantage  of  it  to  their  caufe.  The  ufe  of 
fophifiical  argument atio7i  no  one  will  attempt  to  de- 
fend. But,  are  not  the  gentlemen  whofe  fagacity  en- 
ables them  to  difcover  a  power  of  fflf-motion  in  the 
human  mind,  able  to  dete£t  the  fallacy  of  thofe  rea- 
fonings  which  are  fo  unfriendly  to  their  darling  opin- 
ion ?  Is  there  no  one  able  to  take  off  the  thin  Veil 
which  covers  tlie  fophiftry  of  thole  reafonings  by 
which  the  exiftence  of  fuch  a  power  is  faid  to  be  im- 
poflible  ?  Should  this  be  done,  it  would  be  much 
more  conviftive  and  fatisfadory  to  the  public,  than 
the  mofl  vehement  exclamations  againft  metaphyllcs. 
Should  this  be  done,  the  cor.troveriy  on  this  dijqufifid 
fubjeft  would  be,  at  once,  fettled — at  leafl  until  fome 
metaphyfical  genius  fliall  arife  to  difcover  objeclions 
hitherto  unthought  of  againft  the  exiftence  of  this 
myfterious  power.  This  would  give  the  world  of 
mankind  to  fee  that  the  noble  fentiments  concerning 
liberty,  fo  congenial  to  every  generous  feeling  of  the 
human  mind,    Hand  indeed  on  a  firm  bafis,    and  are 

capable 

*    p.    \Z%. 


^6  A  P  P  E  N  D  I  X. 

capable  of  folid  and  rational  fupport.  But,  until  this 
be  done,  the  Doftor's  fentiments  refpefting  human  lib- 
erty, will  appear,  at  lead  to  many,  problematical  ; 
and  fome  may  poflibly  fufpeft  that  his  exclamations 
againfl  metaphyfics  betray  his  want  of  argument. 

But,  when  the  fubje^l  is  calmly  and  dilpaffionately 
coniidered,  What  is  there  in  the  opinion,  that  the 
iviil  or  decree  of  God  originated  thie  exiftence  of  moral 
evil,  fo  abhorrent  from  the  diftates  of  reafon  and  the 
common  apprehenfions  of  men  ?  It  is,  certainly,  not 
repugnant  to  the  general  apprehenfions  of  mankind  to 
fiippofe  that  nothing  takes  place,  in  the  fyflem,  con- 
trary to  what  God  defigned  ;  or,  which  he  defigned 
and  determined  fhould  never  take  place.  To  imagme 
that  moral  evil  hath  broken  in  upon  the  fyftem,  when 
God  had  determined  that  it  fho^ild  not,  is  an  opinion 
which  would  (liock  the  greater  part  of  men.  It  would 
naturally  excite  diftrull  in  God  ;  and,  beget  ideas 
hardly  reconcileable  with  that  charafter  which  the 
holy  One  of  Ifrael  alTnmes  when  he  declares,  My 
counfel  fJiall  ftand^  and  1  will  do  all  my  pleajure. 

How  God  cauftih  events  to  come  into  exiflence,  is 
not  for  us  to  comprehend.  All  that  we  know  about 
the  matter,  is  that  God  willeth^  for  reafons  in  his  own 
infinite  mind,  that  they  fiiould  exift,  and  they  do  exijl. 
That  human  actions  fnould  come  into  exiflence  in 
common  with  this  divine  will  as  tlieir  caufe,  no  more 
prevents  their  freedom,  than  their  coming  into  exifl- 
ence in  connexion  with  any  thing  elfe  as  their  caufe. 
The  aclion  of  the  human  mind,  it  is  allowed  by  the 
Doctor,  hath  a  caufe.  And,  unlefs  the  m.ind  be  con- 
fcious  of  fomething  befides  its  own  aftion,  it  mufl:  cf 
neceflity  be  unconfcious  of  the  caufe  of  .this  action,  be 
this  caufe  what  it  mny.  We  know,  indeed,  that  the 
human  mind,  over  and  above  the  confcioufnefs  ithatii 
of  its  own  voluntary  exercifes,  is  percipient  in  fpecula- 
tive  ideas.  But  thefe^  it  is  not  urged  by  the  Do(^or, 
are  the  caufes  of  volition'^.  The  moral  part  of  man, 
that  which  is  the  only  objecfV  of  praife,  or  cenfnre,  is 

aftuaily 


APPENDIX.  47 

a^lually  pel'cipient  only  in  exercife.  To  fiippofe  it 
percipient  when  not  in  exercife,  would  be  inconfifl:- 
ent  with  fuppofmg  it,  either  praife-woithy  or  blama- 
ble,  in  thofe  perceptions  ;  as  this  would  imply  virtue 
and  vice  to  be  involuntary — that  we  may  be  virtuous 
and  vicious  without  any  acl  of  will.  Were  tliere, 
therefore,  or  could  there  be,  ?^\-\y  fuck  perceptions^  the 
mind  would  be  as  perfectly  paitive  in  them,  as  in  its 
fpeculative  ideas.  No  more,  therefore,  may  any  luch 
perceptions,  on  the  Doclor^s  plan,  be  allowed  to  be 
the  caufe  of  a(fts  of  will,  than  mere  fpecuiatims* 
Hence  it  muft  appear  abfurd  to  fuppofe  that  men  are 
conjcious  of  the  caujes^  or  of  the  operation  of  the  caufe, 
of  their  own  voluntary  aftion.  Be  this  caufe  what  it 
may,  or  where  it  may,  it  matters  not  i  be  it,  either 
this,  or  that,  men  are  equally  uncqnfcious  of  its  opera- 
tion. And,  if  there  be  a  caufe  of  the  exercifes  of  the 
human  will,  this  caufe  cannot  be  fubjed;  to  the  con-* 
troul  of  volition,  unlefs  caufes  are  under  the  controul 
of  their  effedls.  And,  if  it  be  not  fubjeft  to  the  con- 
troul of  volition^  it  is  not  fubjeft  to  the  controul  of 
the  w;V/— ^unlefs  the  ivill  controul  it,  and  controul  its 
own  exercifes  too  ;  and  that  without  willing^  that  is 
itivoliintarily. 

But,  if  human  volitions  be  connecfl^ed  vi'ith  tlie  ope- 
ration of  a  caufe  involuntary  as  to  thofe  who  are  the 
fubjecSts  of  them  ;  their  connexion  with  one  tiling  as  a 
caufe,  no  more  than  v/ith  another^  deftroyS  their  mo- 
rality, or  takes  away  their  freedom.  They  are  as  per- 
fectly free,  and  fuftain  as  truly  a  moral  nature,  if  tliey 
come  into  e^iftence  in  connexion  with  the  holy  pur- 
pofe  of  God  as  their  caufe,  as  if  they  came  into  being 
in  connexion  with  any  thing  el«^.:  that  can  be  imagined 
as  their  caufe. 

Tlie  Doftor  admits  that  fin  confifts  in  voluntary  ex- 
ercife, and,  that  fin  hath  a  caufe.  He  iilaintains,  with 
Dr.  Watts,  "  that  an  intelligent  fpirit  is  the  caufe  of 
it:;  own  volitions."*     If  fo,  it  rnuft  be  the  involuntary 

M  m  cauje^ 

*  p.  41. 


38  A  P  P  E  N  D  I  X. 

caufe^  or  a  caufc  in  which  the  luill  is  not  cxercifed* 
^Q  that,  en  his  own  conceilions,  it  muft  be  that  the 
volitions  of  men  come  into  exiflence  in  connexion 
-with  a  caufe,  of  the  operations  of  which  they  are  not 
confcious.  And  this,  certainly,  is  agreeable  to  the 
dictates  of  common  lenfe. 

Now,  if  virtue  and  vice  are  predicable  of  volitions 
which  come  into  exiflence  in  connexion  with  a  caufc 
extrinfic  of  themfelves,  which  the  Doftor  admits ; 
and,  in  the  exercifes  of  thefe  volitions  the  mind  hatii 
no  confcioufnefs  of  the  operation  of  their  caufe  ;  it 
muft  be  perfectly  immaterial  to  the  virtuoufnefs  or  vi» 
cioufnefs  of  exercifes  of  the  wiil,  what  or  where  the 
eaufe  is  in  connexion  with  which  they  come  into  ex-* 
iftence  :  and  if,  immaterial  as  to  their  virtuoufnefs  or 
vicioufnefs,  then  equally  fo  to  their  moral  freedom. 

It  is  hence  manifeft  that,  for  human  voluntary  ex- 
ercifes to  come  into  exiftence  in  connexion  with  the 
decree  or  will  of  God  as  their  caufe,  is  in  no  meafure 
inconfiftent  with  their  being,  in  a  moral  fenfe,  free  ; 
and,  in  no  meafure  inconfiftent  with  their  being  wor- 
thy of  cenfure,  or  praife.  This  is  as  evident  upon  the 
principles  and  conceilions  of  the  Doctor  as  on  any  hy- 
pothefis  whatever. 

And,  to  fuppofe  that  all  human  actions,  of  whatever 
nature  or  kind,  be  they  either  virtuous,  or  vicious,  da 
in  facft  come  into  exiftence  in  confequence  of  the  holy 
and  wife  purpofc  of  God,  and  in  connexion  therewith, 
is  perfeeT:ly  agreeable  to  the  rcprefentations  of  the 
word  of  God.  This  is  a  fentiraent  abundantly  taught 
and  inculcated  in  the  holy  fcriptures.  A  great  vari- 
ety of  paftages  might  be  adduced  in  proof  of  this  ; 
but,  for  the  fa]<e  of  brevity,  we  will  mention  only 
two  ;  thofe  are  the  paftages  M'hich  relate  to  the  cruci-* 
fixion  of  Chrift,  and,  hardening  of  Pharaoh's  heart. 
In  the  Dodor's  fecftion  on  texts  of  fcripture  milcon- 
ftrued,  he  remarks  on  both  of  thefe.  On  the  paftages 
which  fpeak  of  Xhe  crucifixion  of  Chrift  as  a  fruit  of 
God's  determinaticuj  or  of  the  determinate  couniel  of 

God, 


APPENDIX.  ^9 

God,  the  Dodlor  obferves,  "  Now  tbefe  texts  cither 
'^  imply  an  efficient  determination  of  the  Deity  in  this 
^^  event,  or  they  do  not  :  if  they  do  not,  they  are  no- 
"  thing  to  the  purpofe  for  wliich  they  are  produced 
*^  by  the  advocates  for  neceffity.  On  the  other  liand, 
"  if  it  can  be  fhown  that  they  really  imply  a  divine 
*'  efficiency  on  the  minds  of  the  murderei'S  of  our 
*'  Lord,  influencing  and  neceiiitating  them  to  this  hor- 
*'  rid  deed  ;  then  we  {hall  not  hefitate  to  admit  that  ev- 
*'  ery  fpecies  and  degree  of  wickednefs  proceeds  from 
*'  the  fame  elticiency."*  Not  to  remark  upon  the  im- 
proper application  of  the  term  neceffitating  in  the  paf- 
fage  now  before  us,  we  only  obferve  upon  the  (liort 
way  the  Do^^or  takes  to  evade  the  evidence  from  the 
holy  fcripturcs  of  the  inconfiflency  of  his  own  fenti^- 
ments  refpedling  human  liberty.  InRead  of  the  dull^ 
rouni-about  way  of  reajoning  and  argunientation  to 
prove  the  fenfe  of  thefe  palTages  not  to  be  what  his 
oppofers  urge  ;  he  fays,  if  it  be  fo,  "  we  (hall  not 
*'  hefitate  to  admit  that  every  fpecies  and  degree  of 
*'  wickednefs  proceeds  from  the  fame  efficiency." 
And,  is  this  any  proof  that  the  advocates  for  nccejjity^ 
as  the  Doftor  terms  them,  mifconftrue  thefe  texts  I 
They  urge  tliem  as  a  proof  that  the  exiftence  of  wick- 
ednefs is  the  object  of  a  divine  decree  ;  and,  that  it 
takes  place  as  a  certain  confequence  of  tiiis  decree, 
and  in  connexion  with  it.  ^'  No,"  faith  the  Do61or, 
*'  they  cannot  mean  any  i'uch  thing  ;  for,  that  would 
*'  imply  that  all  wickednefs  whatever,  which  ever 
'*  takes  place,  was  decreed  by  the  Deity."  Admit  it  ; 
But,  is  this  any  argument  that  the  holy  fcriptures  do 
not  affert  it  ?  The  inquiry  is.  Whether  the  fcriptures 
aflert  this  do^lrine  I  ''To  fay  that  they  do  not^  is  not  to 
argue  ;  or,  to  produce  the  leafl  kind  of  evidence  that 
they  do  not  moll:  certainly  imply  tlie  do<ftrine  fo  flren- 
uoufly  oppoied.  Nor,  is  it  giving  any  reafon  at  all 
why  they  fiiould  be  confidered  as  mifapplied  or  per- 
verted by  the  Do<utor's  oppofers.     According  to  fuch 

Bi  m  2  a 

.  'p.  X07. 


40  A  P  P  E  N  D  I  X, 

a  mode  of  reafoning  upon  the  fcriptures,  every  one 
will  fee  that  it  is  forever  impoflible  to  determine  any 
controverfy  by  their  authority.  'I'his  is  not  to  con- 
form our  fentiments  on  moral  fubjefts  to  the  holy 
fcriptures  ,  but,  to  bend  theie  facred  oracles,  by  the 
weight  of  our  own  affcrtions,  to  our  own  preconceiv- 
ed opinions.  On  fuch  a  ground  it  is  that  the  Doctor 
''  ventures'*  to  take  it  as  "  a  firli  principle"  that  God 
is  not  the  caufe  of  fin  ;  and,  that  mankind  have  an  />?> 
mediate  conlcioulfiejs  oi' liberty ^^  meaning  undoubtedly 
a  power  of  felf- determination.  And,  coufidering  it  as 
dangerous  to  bring  thefe  fentiments  to  the  tefl:  of  meti- 
aphyfical  difcuffion,  he  takes  the  fliorter  way  of  confli- 
tuting  X.\xem.  fir/l  principles  ;  and,  then  no  one  ought  to 
difpute  them. 

But,  poliibiy  it  may  be  thought  injurious  to  the 
Doftor  to  reprefent  him  as  taking/o  /?/w?;/v/ry  a  luny  to 
anfwer  the  argument  from  thofe  palTages  of  fcripture 
which  relate  to  the  cruciiixion  of  Chrifi  5  fmce  he  has 
endeavoured  to  (liow  that  they  may  be  taken  in  a  dif- 
ferent fenfc  from  that  in  which  they  are  underftood 
by  his  oppofers.  The  DoiTtor  fays  there  is  a  twofold 
fenfe  in  which  events  may  be  faid  to  come  to  pafs  by 
the  determinate  counfel  and  foreknowledge  of  God, 
without  implying  any  aftive  concurrence  or  efticiency 
of  his  power.  §  The  firft  is,  when  events  come  to 
pafs  agreeably  to  the  prediciions  of  his  word.  But, 
was  it  not  incumbent  on  the  Doctor,  in  order  to  fup- 
port  his  own  conftruftion  of  thefe  palTages,  to  fliow 
that  God  predicls  certain  events,  and  3^et  exerts  no 
power,  in  order  to  bring  them  into  exiftence  ?  Are 
^divine  predidions  of  events  to  be  confidered  as  mere 
fortune-telling  \  Can  they  juftly  be  confidered  in  any 
other  light  tlian  declarations  of  what  God  defi^ns  and 
wills  /hall  come  to  pafs  f  It  is  unfuppofable  that  the 
will  of  the  Deity  f^iould  be  indifferent  with  refpeft  to 
the  exiftence  of  thofe  events  which  he  lets  hi.s  crea- 
tures know  fliall  certainly  come  to  pafs  :    and,  abfurd 

tc 

*  p.  l^•J.        k  p.  IC7.  ' 


APPENDIX.  41 

to  imagine  tlint  his  will  oppofeth  their  coming  into  ex- 
iitence.  Divine  prediftions  of  future  events  muft, 
therefore,  be  viewed  as  declarations  that  God  wil/s 
and  defigns  that  thofe  events  fhall  come  to  pals.  And, 
it  is  God's  will  aiid  de/ign  thus  revealed,  that  gives  cer- 
t:iinty  to  the  future  exiltence  of  the  events  which  they 
reipeft.  And,  in  connexion  with  this  divine  will  thus 
revealed  it  is  that  the  events  do,  in  facl,  take  place. 
And,  if  this  be  fo,  let  the  candid  reader  judge  whether 
UTiy  event  which  GOD  predldls,  can  be  fuppofed  to 
take  place  "  without  implying  any  acl:ive  concurrence 
of  divine  power.''  But,  further,  the  Dodlor  urgeth 
that  "  fuch  events  as  God  determines  not  to  prevent 
"  by  the  interpoial  of  his  power,  may  alfo  t)e  faid  to 
'^  come  to  pafs  in  the  fame  way."  But,  is  God's  not 
preventing^  and  in  this  fenfe  permitting^  any  caufe  at 
all  of  the  events  thus  permitted  ^  Let  it  be  remem- 
bered that  the  Doctor  himfelf  llippofeth  it  to  be  ab- 
iurd,  as  has  been  before  obfcrved,  to  imagine  that  /in 
has  no  efficient  caufe.  According  to  him,  therefore, 
t/Lnt  luickednefs  voJiicfi  God  dnifi  not ^  by  his  power^  pre-^ 
vent  ynen  from  being  the  efficient  caufe  of]  theinfelves ^ 
'may  be  jaid  to  come  to  pafs  by  tfie  determinate  counfcl^ 
foreknowledge  and  ordination  of  God.  But,  will  not 
every  reader,  at  once,  fee  that  this  conftrudtlon  holds 
for  granted  a  power  of  felf-determination  in  mxn  ; 
and,  that  men  are  the  efficients  of  their  own  acfrs  of 
will  ?  When  it  is  proved  that  men  poffeis  fuch  a 
power,  we  may  allow  that  thofe  pailliges  of  fcripture 
which  foretel  the  crucifixion  of  Chrift,  and  reprefent 
this  event  as  a  fruit  of  the  determinate  counfel  of 
God,  may  intend  no  more  than  that  God  determined 
not  to  interpofe,  by  his  power,  to  fave  his  Son  from 
crucifixion.  But,  until  this  is  proved^  we  fliali  not 
hefitate  to  conclude  that  the  Dod;or  has  faid  nothing 
to  take  oil  the  force  of  the  argument  of  his  oppofers 
drawn  from  the  pafl'ages  under  confideration.  Mo, 
that  all  he  has  faid  really  amounts  to  no  more  than 
thisj  viz.  that  they  do  not^  cannot^  imply  any  efficient 

div'ne 


42  APPENDIX. 

»  ^ 

divine  determination  with  refpe^H:  to  the  taking  place 
©f  this  event. 

As .  to  thole  palTages  of  fcripture  where  God  is 
fpoken  of  as  hardening  Pharaoh's  heart,  the  Doftor 
gets  over  them  in  a  manner  equally  concife  and  eafy. 
He  fays,  *-'  Now  that  God  did  not,  could  not,  thus 
harden  Pharaoh,"  (that  is,  in  the  manner  urged  by 
his  oppofers)  "  is  manifeft  from  the  cleareft  notices  wc 
**  have  of  the  divine  moral  perfections."*  T/ie  clear 
notices  the  Dodlor  hath  of  the  divine  moral  pcrfe<^ions 
are  the  proof  that  God  did  not  harden  Pharaoh's  heart, 
in  fuch  a  manner  as  the  oppofers  of  his  ideas  of  liber- 
ty urge  thefe  pafTages  as  a  proof  that  he  did.  The 
clear  notices,  however,  which  the  Apoflle  Paul  had  of 
the  divine  moral  perfeftions,  feemed  to  be  fomewhat 
different.  For,  alluding  to  the  JVIofaic  hiflory  of 
God's  treatment  of  Pharaoh,  in  hardening  his  heart, 
he  makes  this  conclafion,  '*  Therefore  hath  he  mercy 
*'  on  whom  he  will  have  mercy,  and  whom  he  will 
"  he  hardeneth."§  The  Apo/lle  here  makes  ufc  of  an 
aclive  verh^  he  hardeneth  ;  and,  an  aftive  verb  ufcd 
in  a  manner  as  truly  implying  agency  and  efficiency 
as  words  can  well  exprefs.  When  fuch  pafTages  as 
thefe,  with  a  great  variety  of  others  of  tlie  fame  tenoitr 
which  might  be  mentioned,  were  it  neceflary,  are 
urged  as  a  proof  that  the  will,  or  decree,  of  God  re- 
ally originated  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil,  Is  it  a  fuf- 
ticient  anfwer  to  fay,  that  God  did  not^  could  not^  thus 
do  it^  is  evident  from  the  clear eji  notices  ive  have  of  the 
divine  moral  pcrfedions  f  Is  this  a  fufHcient  authority 
for  determining  that  thefe  texts  are  mifconftrued  and 
mifapplied  by  thofe  who  urge  them  as  a  proof  that  th6 
Deity,  for  wife  reafons,  really  zuilled  that  moral  evil 
fliould  exiit  ?  The  public,  certainly,  have  reafon  to 
expe£t  fome  better  proof  that  the  fentiments  of  Mr, 
Edwards  have  not  the  authority  of  the  word  of  God 
for  their  fnpport. 

Bat.  why  fliould  it  be  thought  nn  reafon  able  to  fup* 

pofe 

*p.  112.        S  Rom.  ix.  iS. 


APPENDIX.  43 

pofe  that  die  Deity  fliould  fo  ordain  that,  for  wife 
realbns,  moral  evil  fhould  exift  in  his  fyflem  ?  Can 
any  one  believe  that  there  is  the  fame  oppofition  of 
will,  in  the  divine  mind,  to  the  taking  place  of  fuch 
an  event,  as  there  is  to  the  real  nature  of  moral  evil  ? 
No  man,  in  his  fenfes,  will  admit  this  :  the  confe- 
quences  would  be  too  repugnant  to  every  idea  of  the 
Juprematy  and  almighty  power  of  God  to  be  allowed. 
And,  if  the  oppofition  of  the  divine  will  to  the  nature 
of  moral  evil^  and  to  its  taking  place  in  the  jyjlein^  are 
not  one  and  the  jame  ;  How  can  it  be  made  to  appear 
that  his  ijoillin^  or  ordaining  that  it  fhould  take  place, 
is  inconfiflent  with  his  hating  it  with  an  infinite  hatred  ? 
And,  if  it  be  confiflent  with  the  infinite  purity  and  ho- 
linefs  of  God,  and  his  mofc  perfect  difapprobation  of 
moral  evil,  that  He  fhould,  neverthelefs,  for  reaions 
in  his  own  eternal  mind,  lee  fit  to  decree  and  ordain 
that  it  fliould  exift  ;  there  will  appear  to  be  no  incon- 
flftency  betwixt  the  decrees  of  God,  and  the  commands 
and  prohibit iuiis  of  his  word.  The  moral  law  is  the 
rule  and  meafure  of  our  conduCi — it  points  out  what  is 
fit  for  us  to  do,  and  what  in  our  charaCiers  the  Deity 
will  viev/  witii  approbation,  or  the  reverfe.  The  de^ 
trees  of  God  TcXaXQ  to  his  oiun  condud  ;  and,  are  the 
rule  and  meafure  of  it  in  his  ordination  and  dijpojal  of 
events.  It  belongs  to  Co^,  and  to  him  alone.,  to  fay 
what  events  fliall  take  place,  and  what,  not.  Nothing 
but  obedience,  and  fubmiffion  to  his  authority,  belong 
to  us.  Nor,  is  it  any  more  inconfiflent  with  the  di- 
vine purity  and  hatred  of  iniquity  for  him  to  ordain, 
than  for  him  to  permit.^  that  it  fliould  take  place.  He 
could  have  prevented  its  exiilencc,  all  agree  :  and,  had 
he  the  fame  infinite  avcrfion  of  will  from  its  taking 
fl'ice^  as  he  hath  from  the  nature  of  it^  he  certainly 
would  have  done  it. 

Moral  evil  mull:,  of  neceflity,  have  a  caufe  of  its 
exigence.  This  is  admitted  by  the  Dodor.  And,  as 
moral  evil  had  beginning  of  exiftcnce,  it  mufl  of  ne- 
ccility  have  been  originated  by  a  caufe  which  is  Jiot 

morally 


44  APPENDIX. 

morally  evil^  but  the  rcverfe.  To  admit  that  moral 
evil  had  beginning  of  exiftence  in  the  fyflem—  tliat  it 
hath  a  caiije — that  it  was  originated  by  any  thing  be  fides 
itjelf ;  and  yet,  to  fay  that  its  caiife  was  morally,  evil^ 
is  a  perfect  abfurdity.  To  fay  that  it  hath  no  canje  of 
its  exigence,  is  the  fame  as  to  fay  tiiat  it  had  no  hegiii^ 
ning — therefore  is  etertinl. 

Whether  moral  evil  be,  itfelf,  beft  for  the  world, 
is  not  afubject  of  debate  amongft  divines  of  any  deno- 
mination. The  affirmative  of  this  no  one  has  ever  at- 
tempted to  defend.  The  Doftor  might  have  omitted 
the  feclion  in  which  he  endeavours  to  prove  that  moral 
evil  is  not  bejl  for  the  world.  He  would  not,  then,  have 
had  occafion  to  affert  that  Mr.  Edwards"  declares  that 
it  is.  He  faith,  "  Now  were  it  admitted,  that  moral 
^'  evil  is  for  the  be fr^  as  Pvlr.  Edwards  declares  he  is 
certain  it  is .'"^  Mr.  Edwards's  words  are,  as  quoted 
by  the  Doflor,  "  I  believe  there  is  no  perfon  of  good 
"  underflanding  who  will  venture  to  fay,  he  is  certain 

*'  that  it    is    impbffible   it  fhould   be    bell, that 

*'  there  fliould  be  fuch  a  thing  as  moral  evil  in  the 
*'  world. "§  The  intervening  part  of  the  fentence,  omit- 
ted by  the  Doctor,  is,  "  taking  in  the  whole  compafs 
*•'  and  extent  of  exiftence,  and  all  confequences  in  the. 
"  endlefs  ferics  of  events.''  Had  the  Doctor  any  au- 
thority from  this  paiTage,  or  from  the  next  immediate- 
ly following,  to  alFert  that  Mr.  Edwards  declares  that 
he  is  ce\'td.\n  ?noral  evil  is  for  the  befi:  ?  •  Would  the 
Dodtor  think  himfelf  candidly  treated,  flioukl  it  be  af- 
ferted  that  he  had  written  a  feftion  to  prove  that  //.// 
not  beft  there  fliould  be  any  fuch  thing  as  moral  evil  in 
the  fyflem  ?  Yet  this  might  be  afferted  with  as  much 
propriety  as  he  tells  his  readers  that  Mr.  Edwards  dc" 
dares  he  is  certain  that  moral  evil  is  for  the  beft.  If 
the  Doctor  would  oppofe  the  real  fentiments  of  Mr. 
Edwards,  as  he  prcfeffeth  to  do,  it  will  lie  upon  him 
to  prove  til  at,  all  things  confidcred^  it  is  not^  on  the 
whole ^    b'jl  that  moral  evil  hath  taken  place.      Andy 

p.    oj.  ,  p.  ISj. 


APPENDIX.  4; 

> 

when  he  has  done  this,  he  will  not  only  have  fubvert- 
ed  Mr.  Edwards's  argument,  but,  alio,  difcovered 
great  imperfeftion  in  the  fyflem  and  government  of 
God.  I'he  queftlon  is  not,  whether  moral  evil  be  for 
tfiif  beffy  but  whether  that  divine  dijpojnl  and  ordination^ 
under  which ^  and  as  a  fruit  ofwhich^  moral  evil  doth  in 
jaCt  take  place ^  be  for  thebef}.  When  it  {hall  be  not 
only  aflcrted,  but  proved,  by  the  Dodlor,  either,  that 
moral  evil  doth  not  take  place  as  a  certain  fruit  and 
confeqiience  of  a  divine  ordination  and  difpofal  of 
things  ;  or,  that  this  divine  ordination  and  dilpofal  of 
things  was  not  moil  psrfedily  wife  and  befl  ;  then,  and 
not  till  then,  it  will  be  neceiTary  to  attempt  a  farther 
vindication  of  Mr.  Edwards  againft  the  reafonings  and 
obje<flions  of  the  DotSlor  in  the  fe^lion  before  us. 

That  the  exiftence  of  moral  evil  could  not,  poiIibl3r, 
have  been  originated  by  the  will  of  God,  the  Dci^op 
feems  to  think  abundantly  evident  from  a  pafTage  in 
the  epjRle  of  James — at  leaft  we  might  conclude 
fo,  from  iiis  frequent  repetition  of  it.  The  pr.fFage  is 
this,  "  Let  no  man  fay,  when  he  is  tempted,  I  am 
*'  tempted  of  God  :  for  God  cannot  be  tempted  with 
*'  evil,  neither  teinpteth  he  any  man""^  A  careful 
attention  to  the  palTage  may,  perhaps,  convince  is 
that  it  is  not  fo  pertinent  to  the  Do<flor'spurpofe  as  he 
feems  to  imagine.  "We  know  that  the  word  tcn.pt  is 
ufed  in  different  fenfes  by  the  facred  writers.  Some- 
times it  means  making  trial  of  as  metals  are  tried  by 
fire.  At  other  times  it  means  inviting  or  folic  it  in  g  to 
fin.  This  latter  is  the  fenfe  in  which  it  is  evidently 
ufed  in  the  paiTage  before  us.  When  fatan  tempts  men 
to  wickedneis,  he  doth  it  by  perverting  the  truth,  and 
repreienting  objeds  under  f^lie  colours,  in  01  der  to 
allure.  Thus  as  to  the  original  temptation  to  our  frft 
parents  ;   *'  Yea,  hath  God  faid  ye  fhall  not  eat  of  e\  e- 

*'  rytree  of  the  garden  ? Ye  fhall  not  farely  die, 

*'  b'or  God  doih  know  that    in    the   day  ye  eat   thereof 
''  then  your  eyes  ffiall  be  opened:  and  ye  fJiall  be  as  yods^ 

N  n  "  knowing 

*  James  i.   13. 


45  APPENDIX. 

"  knovjirt'^  good  and  evil.*'  *  As  it  is  infinitely  far  from 
the  Deity  to  be  capable  of  being  impoied  on  by 
falfehood^nd  miireprefcntation  ;  it  is  equally  far  from 
him  in  fuch  ways  to  impofe  on  his  creatures.  He 
knows  their  entire  dependence  on  him  :  and,  what- 
ever faculties  and  powers  they  poiTeis,  He  knows  they 
are  abfolutely  dependent  on  him  for  knowledge,  and 
for  the  iniuracT:iou  which  is  neccilary  to  their  walking 
in  the  way  of  duty  and  fafety.  God,  accordingly, 
exhibits  things  in  their  true  light,  and  under  their 
proper  colours.  And,  the  exhibitions  are  made  with 
fuch  clearnefs — there  is  fuch  a  fufilciency  of  external 
light  and  means  of  knowledge,  that,  were  it  not  for  the 
ieliifh  biafTes  and  prejudices  of  our  hearts,  we  never 
need  miflake  with  refpecl  to  the  way,  either  of  dutj'', 
or  fafety.  A  great  variety  of  obje<fls  are  fet  before  us  ; 
and,  thofe  of  diiferent  natures  and  qualities.  "We 
know  that  it  is  witliin  tlie  compafs  of  divine  power  to 
caufe  them  to  appear  to  our  undcrftanding  and  judg- 
ment, however  free  from  prepoiTeflion  and  bias,  in 
very  different  colours  from  thofe  in  which,  both  in  his 
word  and  by  the  tenour  of  his  providence,  he  has 
taught  us  to  view  them.  By  fuch  means  we  might  ne- 
celTarily  be  led  into  danger  ar.d  evil,  ivithout  nny  had- in" 
tention.  Were  we  necefTarily  fubjeded,  by  divine 
providence,  though  our  intentioi:s  were  altogether  up- 
right and  honeft,  to  make  a  wrong  judgment  with  re- 
fpedl  to  our  duty  and  interell,  we  might  be  expofed  to 
danger  and  evil  without  any  fault  of  our  own — We 
might  be  liable  to  walk  in  a  way  which  God  forbids, 
and  ftill  not  be  worthy  to  be  blamed.  Then,  indeed, 
there  might  be  a  pretext  ior  faying,  when  ive  are  ternpt" 
cd^  we  are  tempted  of  God,  But,  the  warnings  which 
God  now,  in  facT:,  gives  us,  are  abundantly  fuflicient  to 
arm  us  againfl  danger  from  every  quarter,  if  we 
exercifc  proper  care  and  candour  in  attending  to 
the  ni . 

We  are  wholly  dependent  on  God  for  the  means  of 

knowledge — 

*  Genef.  iii.   i.  41  5. 


APPENDIX,  4^ 

knowledge — for  that  Intelle<5lnal  light  which  is  necef- 
fary  to  prefcrve  us  from  evil  and  dano^er.  But,  if  that 
which  ought  to  be  avoided  Ihould  be  made  to  appear 
eligible  to  our  underfranding  and  jiidgrner.t  ;  or,  that 
which  ought  to  be  chofen,  the  reverfe  ;  and  that^  when 
the  heart,  or  will,  was  free  from  prepofTeilion  and  pre- 
judice ;  we  fhould  neceffarily  be  betrayed  into  evil. 
Then  we  (lionldbe  led  aftray  by  the  rcprefentations  of 
things  made /row  ivithout  us  to  our  underllanding  and 
judgment.  Arid,  in  that  cafe,  it  might  be  {aid  that  we 
were  tempted  and  betrayed  by  thofe  appearances  of 
things  which  they  necelTarily  wear,  and  which  were 
not  given  them  by  our  prejudice.  But,  fuch  is  th6 
goodnefs  and  faithfulnefs  of  God,  that  the  means  of 
knowledge  we  enjoy  are  every  way  equal  to  the  duties 
he  requires  of  us  :  fo  that,  if  we  go  aftray,  the  fault 
maft  be  our  own.  We  never  miflake,  with  refpedl  to 
duty,  unleis  it  be  through  our  own  inattention  and  pre- 
judice. So  that  "  every  man  is  tempted  when  he  i^' 
drawn  away  of  his  own  Luf}^  and  enticed ''  When  pre- 
judice perverts  the  reprefentations  made  to  us  in  the 
word  and  providences  of  God,  then  we  call  evil,  good  ; 
and,  good,  evil — put  darknefs  for  light,  and  light  foi'' 
darknefs.  Tlierefore,  whenever  we  are  teir.pted^  in 
the  fenfe  in  which  the  term  is  ufed  in  thepalTage  under 
confideration,  it  is  by  the  luft  of  our  own-iienris^  and' 
not  by  any  thing  in  the  external  Jiate  of  thinrrs  tending 
to  betray  an  honeft  mind  into  error,  or  miflake.  T.  his 
appears  to  be  the  fenfe  in  which  the  Apoflle  is  to  be 
uncien'lood  when  he  lays,  "  God  cannot  be  tempted 
with  evil  ;  neither  tempt eth  he  any  ninn."  And,  if 
this  be  the  cafe,  let  the  reader  judge  whetlier  it  at  ail 
favours  the  Doctor's  hypotheiis.  What  is  here  faid 
only  denies  that  the  fiate  and  difpofal  of  things  in  di- 
vine providence  necelTarily  expofe  men  to  miflake 
their  duty  ;  or,  that  things  are  calculated,  by  the  wife 
Difpoler,  to  betray  men  into  wrong  w;;ys.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Apoflle  teacheth  us,  tliat  we  ne^  cr 
iliiilake  our  duty,  or  intereft,  but  through  fomc  wicked 

N  n  2  bias- 


4?  APPENDIX. 

bias  or  luft  of  our  own  hearts.  But,  does  fuch  ?n  zC- 
fertion  as  this  determine  any  thing  with  refpedl  to  a 
power  of  felf- determination  in  men  ?  Doth  this  cer- 
tainly imply  that  the  will  of  God  is,  in  the  fame  fenfe, 
oppofed  to  the  taking  place  of  moral  evil,  as  it  is  to 
its  nature  ?  Or,  that  moral  evil  hath  not  come  into 
cxiftence  as  a  fruit  of  the  wife  and  holy  purpofe  of 
God  ?  It  implies  that  fin  confiileth  in  the  exercife  of 
lufl  :  and,  that  without  fome  wicked  bias  of  heart,  we 
never  fhould  miftake  our  duty,  or  be  betrayed  into 
"Wrong  ways.  But,  the  Apoille  is  fsr  from  connefting 
this  ly/}  with  it=?  ran/e  in  order  to  determine  it  to  be 
criminal:  and,  from  faying  any  thing  which  won  Id- 
lead  us  to  fuppole  that  he  ever  had  a  thought  that 
**  the  caufe  of  v/ickednefs  is  wicked.'* 

It  is  now  left  to  the  impartial  public  to  jndpe  what 
degree  of  fupport  the  dodlrine  of  a  power  of  felf-de- 
termination  in  men  hath  received  from  Dr.  Dana's 
publications  5  and,  whether,  after  all  that  the  Doctor 
hath  faid,  the  ground  wliich  Mr.  Edwards  had  taken 
appears  untenable.  To  the  fame  tribunal  muP:  it  be 
appealed  to  determine  on  the  juftice  af  the  remarks 
we  have,  now,  made  on  the  "  Examination  of  Prefi- 
dent  Edwards's  Inquiry  continued." 

It  now  only  remains  that  a  proper  attention  be  paid 
to  the  Doctor's  StriCliires  on  the  Efjay  of?  Moral  Agency y 
Jo  called^  as  he  terms  it.  This  EfTay  the  Doctor  affeds 
to  treat  with  contempt.  The  public  will  judge  how 
far  it  merits  it,  with  more  impartiality  than  the  Doc- 
tor. They  who  maintain  a  public  controveri'y  are 
exceedingly  prone  mutually  to  accufe  each  other  of 
unfairnefs  :  and  this,  probably,  not  wholly  without 
reafon.  Such  are  the  prejudices  of  men,  that  it  is  with 
difficulty  we  give  the  arguments  of  an  opponent  their 
juft  weight.  How  far  the  Doctor  may  have  been  in- 
jured in  this  rerpe(^,  the  public  opinion  will  decide, 
notwithflanding  any  thing  we  may  afiert  upon  the  fub- 
jedb.  But,  whether  he  can  acquit  himfelf  of  injuftice 
in  charging  Mr.  Weft  with  denying  original  righteoitj- 


APPENDIX.  49 

ff'/r,  as  he  cioth  in  the  beginning^  of  his  Strifturcs^  we 
fiiall  refer  to  himfclf.  In  Ibpport  of  this  aflertion,  he 
quotes  page  ^^.  of  the  Eifay.  There  hal>Jt  and  temper 
are  denned  to  mean  a  filled"  connexion  betwixt  our  ^^7/^"- 
Jent  exerciles  of  uc'ill  and  future  evercifes  of  \\\\^  jfvmff 
gcn&ral  nature.  Adam  not  being  confirmed  in  inno- 
cency,  there  was  no  fach  eiiablifhed  connexion  be- 
twixt his  /?^/?  and  future  holy  exercifes  of  mind.  In 
this  feniis  it  was  laid  that  he  had  not  a  holy  temper,  or 
the  habit  of  holinefs.  But,  lell  our  ideas  fhonld  be 
miftaken,  it  was  immediat.fly  added,  that  the  J  ir/I  and 
original  exercifes  of  our  firft  parents  were  holy — pofitivc' 
ly  virtuous  and  good. 

How  far  the  Do(flor's  remarks  on  the  fejflion  on 
povjer^  in  the  EfTay,  are  juit,  we  are  content  to  leave 
to  the  decifion  of  others.  He  conjeilures  that  our  ufe 
of  the  term  power ^  and  the  application  we  make  of  it^ 
are  improper  and  without  authority.  Be  this  as  it  may, 
the  principal  quellion  onght  to  be,  whether  our  rea-s 
Ibnings  upon  the  fubjecl  are  jufl.  However,  we 
imagined  that  the  authority  of  Mr.  Locke,  and  of 
Chamber's  D'cti9nary,  v;ere  fufiicient  to  juftify  our 
application  of  the  term  :  and,  thefe  authorities  we 
had.  The  Doftor  luppofeth  that,  in  the  Eifay  pro- 
felTedly  written  on  Moral  Agency,  "  the  fubjeft  itjelf 
has  been  kept  wholly  out  of  figlit.''*  The  reader 
will  judge  whether  the  ground  of  this  fuppofitioD  be 
not,  that  a  pozuer  ofJelf~deter?jtination  is  excluded.  If 
this  power  be  efiential  to  moral  agency,  we  iYCclf  al- 
low that  v;e  have,  in  our  definition,  left  men  no  power 
that  is  effential  to  it.  Whether  any  thing  we  had  (aid 
in  the  fc^tion  on  power  be  inconfillent  with  the  praiie- 
worthinefs,  or  blame-worthinefs,  of  human  alliens, 
we  leave  to  others  to  determine. 

Upon  a  review  of  the  fccftion  on  motives^  we  do  not 
find  it  liable  to  the  objetftions  the  DoAor  hath  made 
againft  it.  Motives^  coniidered  as  external  objefts  or 
things,  may  be  perceived  by  the  intelkdual  faculty, 

without 
*  p.  144. 


^9         ,  APPENDIX. 

tvithont  any  tendency  to  engage  the  choke.  But  tbnt 
which  the  muid  relifheth  in  an  objeii,  or  apprehends  a5 
agreeable  and  lovely^  cannot  be  perceived  and  rejeded — 
the  relilh,  or  perception  of  agreeablenefs,  being  in  fa(ft 
all  the  choice  v/hich  is  made  of  it.  The  reasons  ex- 
hibited in  the  gofpei  why  men  ought  to  foriake  their 
fi0S,  may  be  clearly  dlfcerned  by  the  intt-llecflnal 
powers  ;  and,  the  will  at  the  fame  time  be  entirely 
oppofed  to  them.  What  the  Doctor's  idea  is  of  the 
tendency  the  gofpei  hath  to  produce  a  change  in  men, 
we  do  not  pretend  to  determine.  But,  that  the  clear- 
eO:  exhibition  of  golpel  truth  to  the  intelleftual  viev/s 
of  men,  is,  always,  attended  with  a  ftrong  and  violent 
opposition  of  the  will  to  it  until  the  heart  be  chonrted 
by  the  immediate  power  of  God^  we  fiippofe  capable  of 
proof,  both  from  the  holy  fcriptures,  and  from  e>:pe« 
rience.  If  the  Do<n:or  infers  from  this  (entiment  that 
**  the  gofpei  is  no  tender  to  the  unregenerate,"  it  will 
lie  npon  him  to  fupport  his  inference. 

The  Dotftor  fuppofeth  injuflice  is  done  him  in  the 
remarks  made  in  the  "  EfTay"  on  what  he  had  writ- 
ten, in  his"  ''  Examination,"  on  the  fubjetfi:  of  vieans^ 
&:c.  particularly  in  page  114 — 116.  He  chargeth  the 
author  of  the  EfTay  with  having  difmembered  his  fen- 
tences,  and  thereby  given  an  unjufl  reprefentation  of 
his  fentiments.  Upon  a  review  of  what  we  had  writ- 
ten, we  do  not  find  that  we  had  mifrepefented  the 
meaning  of  our  author.  \^'g  quite  agree  with  him  in 
what  he  fays  in  the  *'  Examination  continued.'* 
*'  Pofllbly  the  Examiner  did  not  exprefs  his  fentiments 
clearly,"*  upon  this  fubjeft.  Had  we  continued  our 
quotation,  which  the  Dodor  has  fupplied,  p.  152.  we, 
flill,  do  not  fee  that  it  would  have  given  a  different 
afpe<ft  to  his  fentiments.  He  had  faid  that  it  cannot 
be  propofed  th^t  men  fhould  aft  '*•  from  the  highefl 
fpiritual  principles  while  unregenerate."  By  the 
highefl  fpiritual  priiicipies  we  apprehended  he  meant 
thoje  -which   arc  truly  gracious — which  diftinguifh  the 

regenerate 
♦p.  155. 


APPENDIX.  51 

regenerate  from  the  unregenerate.  If  this  were  not 
his  meaning,  it  were  to  be  wifhed  he  had,  now,  ex- 
plained himielf  more  fully.  And,  if  this  were  really 
his  true  meaning,  it  will  Hand  thus,  It  cannot  be  pro" 
pojed  to  the  unregenerate  to  aCi  from  truly  Jpiritiial 
Q-tid  pja'-'ioiis  principles.  Therefore  all  that  can  be 
propofed  to  the  unregenerate  is,  that  they  ihould  a<^ 
from  ihofe  principles  of  *'  ingenuity,  gratitude,  hope, 
fear,  joy,  forrow,  <^c."  of  which  they  are  now,  in 
faft,  polTelTed.  Thefe,  it  is  admitted,  are  not  the 
Jiioh.ft  Jpiritual  principles.  And,  as  there  are  no  higher 
fpiritual  principles,  in  any  man,  than  thofe  which  dif- 
tinguilh  the  regenerate  from  the  unregenerate  ;  we 
had,  we  fuppofed,  fufficient  reafon  to  confider  the  Ex- 
aminer as  denying  that  unregenerate  m.en  are  **  com- 
manded, invited,  exhorted"  to  a«ft  from  truly  gracious 
and  fpiritual  principles.  We  have  no  wifli  to  mifre- 
prcfent  the  fentiments  of  any  one.  Perhaps  the  reader 
will  iind  the  Doctor's  own  explanation  to  be  fatisfac- 
tory.  It  is  this,  viz.  that  it  cannot  be  propofed  to 
unregenerate  men  to  a«St  from  the  highefc  fpiritual 
principles  as  a  medium  of  regeneration.  He  fays, 
*'  Now  to  propofe  any  thing  as  a  inedium  of  converfion, 
**  which  would  imply  that  the  thing  itfelf  hath  taken 
*/  place^  the  Examiner  fuppofed,  and  ftill  believes,  to 
**  be  abfard.  But  to  propnfe  to  the  unregenerate  to 
*'  acl  from  the  highell  fpiritual  principles  as  a  medium 
*'  of  regeneration^  would  be  to  fuppofe  regeneracy  had 
*'  already  taken  place."'*  Having  given  this  explana- 
tion, he  adds,  ''  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  unregene- 
"  rate  to  forfalie  their  fins — that  they  have  no  excufe 
*'  for  making  any  delay  in  turning  to  Go(f — that  they 
*'  are  obliged  to  love  him  with  all  their  heart — and, 
*'  coiifequently,  to  aft  from  moral  ^nd  Jpiritual  princi- 
*'  pies  they  are  not  poflcffed  of,  or  endowed  with,  the 
**  Examiner  fjlly  believes,  nor  hath  he  ever  denied." 
After  all,  the  fubjeft  remains  embarraOed  :  nor  is  it 
cafy  to  fee  the  confillency  of  the  Icveral  things  which 

the 

»p.  t5j.  154, 


51  APPENDIX. 

the  DotTtor  hath  now  faid  upon  it.  It  feems,  bym^iny 
things  he  has  faid,  to  be  his  opinion,  that  there  are 
appointed  means  for  finners  to  ufe  in  order  to  their  re- 
generation. He  fays,  in  the  Examination,  "  It  is  the 
"  united  voice  of  Calviniltic  Divines,  that  there  is  the 
*'  greateft  poflible  encouragement  to  the  endeavours  of 
*'  imconverted  men  in  the  ufe  of  the  means  of  falva-t 
*-'  tion."*  In  his  ^'  Stridures"  he  fays,  ''  Perhaps 
*'  Mr.  Weft's  real  Jentimeyit  is,  that  there  is  no  medi* 
*'  um  of  regeneration. *'§  Vve  fuppcfe  he  means  to 
faggeO:  that  Mr.  Weft's  realjentiment  is,  that  there  is 
nothing  required  to  be  done  by  the  finner  in  order  to 
his  regeneration.  The  Dodor,  we  doubt  not,  would 
reprobate  iuch  a  fentiment  as  this  :  and,  therefore, 
would  confider  the  unregenerate  as  comt/mnded^  invit- 
ed^ See.  to  aft  from  the  natural  principles  of  hope, 
fear,  &c.  fmcc,  in  order  to  regeneration,  it  cannot  be 
required  of  them  to  a£t  from  truly  fpiritual  and  gra-t 
cious  principles. 

But,  if  the  unreoencrnte  have  no  excufe  for  inaking 
any  delay  in  turning  to  God — if  they  are  obliged  to  love 
him  with  all  their  heart — and  confequently  to  aft  from 
Dinral  SiTid  fpiritual  principles  they  are  not  poifeffed  of, 
What  is  ciiere  left  for  them  to  do  in  order  to  conver- 
lion  or  regeneration  ?  If  men  are  obliged  to  aft  from 
moral  and /p/ri/«(7/ principles  they  are  notpofieiTed  of, 
they  cannot  be  obliged  to  z£t  from  72atiiral  and  different 
principles  in  order  to  obtain  Xht^Q  fpiritual  ones.  To 
fay  that  the  unregenerate  are  obliged  to  do,  or  aft, 
any  thing  in  order  to  regeneration,  and  as  a  mean  of 
it  ;  is  the  fan^e  as  to  fay  that  they  are  not  immediately 
bound  to  aft  from  thofe  Jpiritnal  principles  which  dif- 
tinguifh  the  regenerate  :  and,  confequentlv,  that  they 
have  j'ome  excife  for  making  delay  in  turning  to  God. 
How  could  his  readers  avoid  fuppofing  this  to  be  the 
real  fentiment  of  the  Examiner,  when  they  hear  hira 
afTert  that  men  are  not    "  commanded   to  aft  from 

principles  the}^  are  not  endov/ed  with—  that  it  can- 

"  not 
*p.  iij.      ^p.  155. 


t( 


APPENDIX. 


53 


"  not  be  propofed  that  they  fliould  a(5l  from  the  high- 
"  eft  ipirituai  principles  while  unrcgenerate  ;  and  M/> 
*'  notwithftandino;  the  e>;planation  given  in  the  "  Ex- 
"  amination  continued  ?"  He  had  laid,  "  fuch  facul- 
^^  ties,  principles,  powers  and  affedions  as  they  are 
*'  poirelTed  of — are  the  only  principles  they  can  be  re- 
"  quired  to  a6i  from  and  improve/'  Thefe  powders 
iind  principles  he  now  explains  to  mean  fiatural  ones — ■ 
thofe  which  t\\G  imregetiernte  t^o^^cCs,  ;  therefore,  not 
fpiritual.  If  men  can  be  "  commanded,  invited,  ex- 
horted" to  aft  from  no  oilier  principles  than  thefe, 
even  according  to  tlie  Dodor's  own  explanation  of  the 
term  principles'^  Will  he  at  the  fame  time  deny  that 
the  unrcgenerate  are  deftitnte  of  any  power  to  ad: 
from  thefe  principles,  which  the  regenerate  are  en- 
dowed with  for  ading  from  the  principles  which  they 
poiTefs  ? 

The  Dodor  fays,  "  If  it  was  not  with  dedgn,  but 
*'  wholly  for  want  of  underftanding  v/hat  the  opinion 
"  and  real  fentiment  of  the  Examiner  is,  that  Mr. 
**  Weft  hath  fo  ^^rqffly  mifreprefented  him,  he  can  eafily 
"  forgive  this  wrong."*  Whether  we  have  rnilreprt- 
fented  the  opinion  and  real  fentiment  of  the  Examiner, 
is  left  to  the  candid  public  to  jndge. 

But,  for  further  light  refpeding  lii^  fentiments  on 
the  fiibjecl  o'i  means,  the  Doctor  turns  us  to  the  firlt 
iecT-ion  of  the  "  Examination  continued."  Here  he 
tells  us,  that  *'  By  the  gofpel  God  calleth  upon  all 
*'  men  every  where  to  repent,  and  believe  in  his  -Sou 
*'  for  reconciliation  and  falvation" — that  H'e  (God)' 
*'  alfo  gives  his  fpirit  witti  his  gofpel,  of  wdiich  unre-' 
'*  generate  rne^i  receive  a  meafure' :"  and  immediately 
adds,  that  "  to  him  that  hath  fliall  be  given,  and  he 
fliall  have  abundance. "§  If  unrcgenerate  men  receive 
a  meafure  of  the  fpirit,  and  have  promifes  made  to 
them  of  receiving  abundance  tipon  their  alking  in  the 
Cxercife  of  that  fpirit  a  meafure  of  which  they  now 
have,  What  power  can  they  nov»^  w^ant  in  order  to  do 

O  o  every* 


54  A  P  P^  E  N  D  I  X. 

ever}''  thlnp;  th?it  is  required  of  them,  luhkh  the  regen- 
erate poircls  ?  I'he  Dodlor  proceeds  immediately  to 
obferve,  "  We  do  not  afcribe  any  ielf-derived,  inde- 
"  pendent  power,  either  to  luirepenerate  or  regenerate 
"  men,  but  fuch  only  as  they  have  received  from  God, 
"  of  which  they  are  not,  ftricHily  ipeaking,  the  propri- 
"  etors,  but  ftewards."  But,  do  you  not.  Sir,  really 
afcribe  the  fame  powers  to  both  ?  Do  you  afcribe 
any  higher  power  to  the  regenerate  than  one  whereby 
they  may  afk,  with  a  pramije  of  receiving  ?  And,  do 
you  not  afcribe  the  fame  to  the  unregenerate  f  After 
this  no  one  will  be  furprifed  to  hear  the  Doftor  repre- 
lent  common  and  fpecial  grace  as  fcarcely  diflinguifh* 
able.  He  tells  us  that  *•'  preparatory  and  regenerat- 
*'  ing  grace  are  the  operation  of  the  fame  fpirit.  1  he 
*'  tranlition  from  one  to  the  other  is  not  eafily  dif- 
"  cerned.  *Tis  a  nice  thing  to  draw  the  line  exacflly 
"' betv/een  common  and  fpecial  grace,  *  admitting  a 
"  fpeciiic  difference."*  Muft  it  not,  then,  be  a  tiling 
equally  nice  to  diftinguifh  between  the  powers  of  the 
regenerate  and  the  unregenerate  ?  In  a  cafe  of  fuch 
?iicety  as  this,  if  we  had  mifapprehended  the  Examiner 
in  what  he«faid  refped:ing  the  irfe  of  means,  and  the 
powers  of  men,  we  think  we  may  ftand  excufed. 

But,  the  Dodlor  has  not  told  us  upon  what  authori- 
ty he  aiferts  the  tranfition  from  preparatory  to  regene- 
ratinii  grace  to  be  not  eafily  difcerned.  Dotli  he  fup- 
pofe  the  tranfition  from  rebellion  to  Juhnijfion  to  be  fo 
fmall  ?  Is  the  change  in  regeneration  fuch  as  to  be 
fcarcely  difcerniblie  ?  Is  it  fo  nice  a  thing  to  draw  the 
line  of  dif}:ind;ion  between  enmity  and  frienoJ}iip  f 
And,-«i:^  not  the  flnregenerate  univerJaUy  reprefentcd, 
in  the  holy  fcriptures,  as  enemies  to  God  \  It  is  true, 
indeed,  that'we  have  no  other  way  to  diftinguifh  any 
divine  operations,  one  from  another,  than  by  the 
effeils  produced  by  them.  But,  we  attribute  the  fame 
kind  of- diilini^tion,  in  this  regard,  to  the  operations, 
as  are  found  in  the  effefts.     Viev/ed  in  this  light,  the 

trauiition 
♦p.  ii. 


APPENDIX.  5^ 

tranfition  from  every  thiii^  that -takes  place  in  the  iinre- 
gcnerate  iinner,  or  with  relpect  to  him,  to  a  ftate  of 
regencracy,  is  great — yea,  exceedingly  great  ;  he  being 
brought  oat  of  darkncfs  into  7narvcllous  dipjit — olcj 
things  being  clone  away  in  him,  and  all  things  become 
new. 

In  the  clofc  of  his  remarks  upon  onr  mifreprefcnta- 
tion  of  what  he  had  faid  upon  the  fLibjecTt  of  m/^ans^ 
and  the  poivers  of  the  uuregeiiernte^  the  Docftor  ob- 
ferves,  ''  The  Examiner  is  willing,  upon  the  whole, 
"  that  what  is  oifered  on  the  fubjeft  of  means^ 
*'  p.  Ill  —  ii6.  of  the  Examination,  fliould  ftand  as  it 
*'  doth."  We  only  add,  that  we  do  not  find  that,  in 
the  ^'  Examination  continued,"  he  has  thrown  any 
new  light  upon  the  fabjeft,  or  repreiented  it  to  any 
greater  advantage. 

Speaking,  in  the  '"  Examination,"  of  the  powers  of 
the  unre generate^  and  their  capacity  of  l)eing  benefited 
through  their  oiun  endeavours  in  the  life  of  the  means 
of  grace,  the  author  reprobates  the  diillnftion  which 
has  often  been  made  of  7r-oral  from  natural  powers. 
'He  oblerves  that  "  to  fay  that  their  incapacity"  (the 
incapacity  of  the  unregenerate  to  ufe  the  means  of 
grace  futccfsfully)  ''  is  not  natural^  but  i-iioral^  is  fay- 
^'  ing  nothing  to  the  purpofe,  as  we  triill  hath  be^n 
"  {hewn.  If  the  incapacicy  be  rnal^  it  is  no  matter 
*'  under  what  name  it  goes."*  By  the  capacity  of 
unregenerate  men,  of  good"  effect  from  the  means  of 
grace,  through  their  oiun  endeavours  in  the  ujc  of  the/}?  ^ 
and  the  common  Jlrivings  of  God's  Spirit^  whicli  he 
ipeaks  of,  on  the  page  juft  mentioned  ;  we  fuppofe  he 
means  the  iame  as  a  power  to  ufe  thefe  means  to  good 
effedt  :  and,  the  rather,  as  he  had,  jud;  before,  been 
fpeaking  of  the  ''  poiucr"  of  the  unregenerate  "  to 
life  the  means  of  grace."  But  if  unregeiiernte  fmners 
poifels  botli  natural  and  moral  capacity,  or  power, 
through  the  drivings  of  God's  Spirit,  to  ufe  the  mcars 
of  grace  to  good  eifc6l,  By  the  want  of  lohat  power 

O  o  2  are 


S6  APPENDIX. 

are  or  can  they  be  diftinguifned  from  tlie  regenerate  f 
And,  from  what  principles,  of  wihich  they  are  not  now 
poffeiFed,  can  they  be  obliged  to  a<5i:  ?  After  rejeftin^-, 
on  the  lall:  mentioned  psge,  the  diftinftion  between 
natural  and  moral  incapacity,  the  Examiner  proceeds, 
''  Is  it  determined  htforeJiand^  that  any  of  the  unregen- 
^^  crate  fhall  not  ufe  the  means  of  grace,  or  fl:ail  not 
^'  fucceed  ?  Jf  it  is,  let  any  man  ftow  iiow  the  gofpel 
*'  can  be  a  privilege  to  them,  or  they  liable  to  a  great- 
*'  er  damnation  for  abiifing  it."  Can  the  idea  here 
exprelTcd  be  any  other,  than,  that  if  a  fuccefsfui  and 
beneficial  ufe  of  the  means  of  grace,  amongft  men, 
depends  on  the  decree  and  iviil  of  God,  the  goipel  can 
be  no  privilege  ?  And,  if  not,  What  is  the  diflinclion 
betwixt  the  po-wers^  or  capacities^  of  the  regenerate 
^nd  the  unregenerate  ? 

We  will  not  a^ain  prefume  to  luggeft  what  the 
>'Do£lor's  real  Jeniimeuts  are  of  the  powers  of  the  un- 
regenerate, left  we  fhould  be  guilty  of  mifreprefenta-  j 
tion.  If  the  reader  can  colled  them  from  the  '^  Ex-  ^ 
amination,"  with  the  alliftancc  offered  him  in  the 
"  Examination  continued,"  lie  has  our  fall  liberty, 
and  our  wifhes  for  his  fiiccefs.  We  would  remark, 
however,  the  confidence  with  which  the  Examiner  re-- 
je(rts  the  generally  received  doclrine  of  the  divine  de- 
crees 2.x\ili  particular  eleCiion,  Yea,  fo  very  confident 
is  he  that  ^here  is  no  truth  in  this  dodtrine,  that  he 
challengeth  any  man,  on  this  principle,  to  ihow  that 
the  gofpel  is  a  privilege  to  the  unregenerate.  With 
thefe  few  ftrokes  of  his  pen  has  he  thus  annihilated 
this  doftrine  1 

But,  we  proceed  to  fome  further  remarks. 

The  Doftor  tells  his  readers,  in  hij;  Striftures,* 
that  he  is  charged,  by  the  author  of  the  EiTay,  with 
\^  difingenuity  and  unfairnefs,  injuftice  and  want  of 
candour  ;"  with  being  '*  no  lover  of  truth,  nor  an 
^'  honeft  inquirer  after  it — with  writing  from  envy, 
''  to  caft  an  p/J-ium,  and  raife  a  popular  cry  j" — and, 

••  that 


AT  P  E  N  D  I  X.  <;7 

"  that  he  is  condemned  as  a  libertine^  heretic/'  &c. 
Alio,  that  we  have  repreferited  thole  "  who  cannot 
"  believe  that  God  is  tiie  efficient  caule  of  all  the 
"  wickednefs  of  men  and  devils,  as  men  of  corrupt 
"•  minds — dr-fliiute  of  the  Jpirit  of  God^  irritated  with 
"  plain  evangelical  truth ^  of  a  proud  and  haughty 
*''•  jpirit ^'^  &c.'*  On  which  we  only  obferve,  that  the 
"Potior  had  no  need  to  apply  to  himfelf,  or  to  any 
particular  cials  of  men,  tilings  which  we  have  faid  ot 
hmiian  nature  in  general  in  its  prefent  fallen  flate. 
Nor,  had  he  any  authority  to  fay  that  we  reprelented 
\\\ra-A.%  defigning  to  propagate  and  eftabi i in  y/V/i  /r;?//'- 
ments  as  thofe  to  which  xve  believe  the  general  fcheme 
which  he  has  advanced  naturally  tends,  and  in  which 
it  ultimately  terminates.  If  he  can  find  any  palTage  in 
the  Eifay  in  which  all,  who  do  not  believe  the  Deity 
to  be  the  efficient  caule  of  all  wickednefs,  arc  repre- 
lented as  men  of  corrupt  mind — deftitute  of  the  Spirit  of 
God^  Sec.  the  author  will  hold  himfelf  under  obliga- 
tion to  make  the  fullell  retraction. 

Perhaps  the  reader  may  judge  th^t  the  author  of  the 
Efiay  h:is  mifrcprefented  the  Examiner  in  vAM\t  is  faid, 
p.  lo/j.  of  faid  Elfay.  '1  here  we  obferved  that  "  to 
"  deny  t!^e  prefcience  of  God,  or  adopt  a  fcheme  of  doc- 
*'  trine  which  cannot  l^e  reconciled  with  his  certain 
'^  foreknowledge  of  all  events,  carries  an  imputation  o\\ 
'^  God  as  really  diihonourable  to  him,  as  any  of  the  ob- 
"  noxious  fentiments  fnppofed  by  our  a^ithor  to  ha 
*'  contained  in  that  trad  of  Mr.  Edwards  upon  which 
*^'  he  is  animadverting.  And,  yet  this  is  a  difHculty 
*'  with  which  our  author's  fcheme  is  confljedly  em- 
"  barraffed."  It  is  admitted  that  tlie  paffage  vvnll  bear 
this  conftrudion,  viz.  "•  that  the  Docftor's  fcheme  is 
'■'  corifefedlv  embarrafled  with  the  difficulty  of  being  ir- 
'•'  reconcilable  with  the  divine  foreknowledge  of  all  e- 
"  yents  /'  yea,  that  this  is  the  moft  natural  conllruc- 
tion..  In  this  reprefentation  we  frankly  acknowledge 
that  the  Doctor  is  injured  ;  and,  condemn  our  own  inad- 
vertence 
»p.  159,  160- 


58  APPENDIX. 

vertence  in  making  it.  The  "  intimation'*  which  thfr 
Doctor  has  given  ns,  in  his  Striftures,  of  the  miftake, 
has  indeed  made  quite  a  dift'erent  impreihon  on  our 
mind,  from  what  the  mifreprefentation  itfelf  ap- 
pears to  have  made  on  his  ;  as,  we  can  receive  it 
without  thofe  flronp;  fenfations  of  difgud  and  con- 
tempt  with  which  he  Teemed  pofTefled  when  he  gave 
it. 

But,  that  the  Do(n:or's  Icheme  is  embarralTed  with 
difficulties  arifing  from  the  do(Slrine  of  the  foreknow- 
ledge of  God,  he  doth  not  pretend  to  deny.  Yea,  he 
expreilcs  it  as  his  opinion  that  the  ivijeft  of  jntn  con- 
fider  the  divine  prefcience  as  incapable  of  being  re- 
conciled with  (what  he  ftyles)  liberty  in  the  creature, 
by  any  hni7ian  under fiandin^,''^'  The  Do (^ or  ought  to 
have  due  credit  for  fo  frank  a  confeflion  :  and,  we 
may  hence  conclude  that  this  is  a  difficulty  which  he 
will  never  furmount — a  difficulty,  under  the  heavy 
Tveight  of  which  the  Icheme  of  doftrine  he  has  advan- 
ced mnfl  lie  till  a  greater  light  fliines  than  is  ever  e:;';- 
pecled  to  appear  in  our  world. 

T\\Q.  repreientation  which  the  Do£ior  gives,  §  of  the 
hypothecs  advanced  in  the  fecond  part  of  the 
'•■  KfTay,''  we  think  is  unjuft.  However,  the  reader 
will  judge  for  himfelf.  What  authority  he  he'd  to  re- 
prefent  it  as  our  opinion  that  rnnltitiides  will  perifii, 
while  fczv  only  will  be  faved  ;  and,  tl.at  thcl'e  multi- 
tudes \vere  m.ade  finners  in  order  to  fccure  the  future 
obedience  and  promote  the  happinefs  oi'  tJiiJe  ftiu  j 
we  know  not.  When  the  reader  turns  to  th.c  feveral 
places  to  which  the  Dodlor  refers  him  for  liis  authori- 
ties, we  feel  confident,  he  will  find  that  no  fuch  fenti- 
ments  are  there  expreffed.  That  the  awful  manifefla- 
tions  of  the  divine  difpleafare  againlf  fm  in  the  eter- 
nal torments  of  the  damned,  will  greatly  enhance  the 
ideas  of  the  divine  glory,  and  in  that  way  be  a  mean 
of  cftabiiffiing  the  authority  of  the  Deity,  and  Iccur- 
ingthe  future  obedience,  both  of  faints  and  angels  ;  is 

v«^hat 

*  P*  9^-        S  P-  *^4- 


APPENDIX.  S9 

ivhat  we  fully  believe  :  nor,  do  we  find  that  the  Doc- 
tor hath  offered  any  reafonable  objedion  againll  the 
truth  and  juflneis  of  the  fentiment.  Whether  any 
thing  further  than  this  is  advanced  by  the  Ejdayift,  on 
this  head,  the  candid  reader  is  to  determine  for  him- 
fclf.  When  cur  author  aflis,  ''  What  warrant  Mr. 
*'  Weft,  or  any  man,  hath  to  fay  that,  had  not 
*'  moral  evil  exifted,  the  Governor  of  the  world  could 
*'  not  have  exhibited  his  hatred  of  fin,  his  love  of  ho- 
*'  linefs,  his  goodnels  and  authority,  illuflrioup.y  in 
*'  other  ways  ?"*.  He,  prudently  enough  for  himfelf, 
changeth  the  ground  of  the  debate.  Did  Mr.  Wcfl^ 
or  any  other  man,  ever  afTert  that  the  Deity  could  not 
have  manifefted  his  perfeclions  illuftrionfiy^  had  moral 
evil  never  taken  place  ?  The  Dodtor  muft  be  fenfible 
that  this  is  a  point  which  was  never  contefled  by  the 
author  of  the  Effay.  Why  then  doth  he  endeavour  to 
reprcfent  him  to  the  public  as  guilty  of  fuch  prefump- 
tion  \  That  the  taking  place  of  fin  will  be  the  occa- 
/ton  oi  bri^Jiter  manifellations  of  the  divine  glory,  and 
more  illuftrious  dilplays  of  the  perfections  of  God,  is 
what  we  fully  believe  :  any  thing  further  than  this, 
we  dM  not  prefume  to  urge. 

The  Doftor  further,  on  the  laft  quoted  page,  infin- 
uates  to  his  readers  that  we  had  reprelented  all  thofe 
who  do  not  agree  with  us  in  what  we  had  faid  on. the 
prefer ahlanefs  and  dcfirahlcnejs  of  jnoral  ev.il^  as  he 
fhrajeth  it^  as  being  "  prejudiced^  Joiir^  bitter^*'  Sec. 
In  reply  to  this  charge  we  have  only  to  afk  the  reader 
to  turn  to  the  paifage  to  which  the  Doftor  refers  him 
for  its  fupport.  'I'his  is  all  we  need  fay  for  refut- 
ing it. 

The  Dodlor's  abhorreoce  of  the  fentiments  advan- 
ced in  the  ''  Effay,"  exprelTeth  itfelf  much  more  in 
flrong  exclamation,  than  in  Iblid  and  rational  argu- 
ment. He  tells  his  renders,  at  the  cloie  of  his 
*'  Strictures,"  that  the  author  ought  to  be  '*•  withftood 
to  the  face  as  one  who  hatli  fpuken  wickedly  for  God." 

We 
•p.  164 


6o  APPENDIX. 

"We  are  willing  to  be  refilled,  in  any  thing  we  have 
advanced,  with  the  weapons  of  reajun.  and  the  oracUs 
of  Cod.  To  the  force  of  thefe,  we  hope,  we  fhall 
cheerfully  yield.  The  word  of  God  is  the  fole  rule 
by  v/hich  controverfies  of  this  kind  are  ultimately  to 
be  decided.  We  fliall  be  under  obligation  thankfully 
to  acknowledge  the  kindnefs  of  any  man  who  will 
point  out  to  us  in  what  refpeds  we  have  perverted  it. 
The  feftion  "  on  texts  of  fcripture  mifconftrued," 
has  not  furniflied  the  opportunity  for  our  acknowledg- 
ing our  obligations,  in  this  refpeft,  to  the  author. 

The  Doftor  thus  concludes  his  .Striftures,  "  When 
*'  impious  tenets  are  publicly  advanced,  a  vindication 
"  of  the  divine  character  forbids  us  to  be  unconcern- 
ed. If  any  thing  we  have  faid  towards  the  clofe  of 
thefe  Striftures,  fnould  have  the  appearance  of /(?•• 
verity.^  Hint  fc verity  hath  not  the  pe^-fon^  but  the 
opinions  of  our  author  for  its  objeft — opinic#is  to 
which  too  ilrong  a  difiike  cannot  be  exprefied — We 
have,  at  the  fame  time,  aimed  to  keep  in  mind  the 
Apoilolic  advice,  in  vieeknejs  inftrudiug  tJioJ'e  that 
oppnfe  thejnjdves."  The  finccrity  and  warmth  of 
the  Doctor's  oppofition  to  the  fentiments  contai-wed  in 
the  "  EiTay,"  there  is  not  the  lead:  room  to  queftiou. 
But,  he  feems  to  feel  the  need  of  fome  apology  for  the 
appearance  it  may,  poffibly,  be  imagined  there  is  of 
Jeverity^  towards  the  clofe  of  his  Strictures.  TV^/j,  he 
tells  us  however,  hath  not  the  per/on.,  but  the  opitiions 
of  the  author  of  the  EfFay,  for  its  object.  This  apol- 
ogy may  readily  be  admitted  ;  for,  opiniojis  dread  no 
feverity  but  that  vti  fair ^  found  argumentation.  Here 
the  Doftor  (lands  jnflly  excufed.  As  to  the  meafurc 
of  his  mceknefs  in  the  infruCiions  he  has  given  us,  we 
fliall  not  take  upon  us  to  decide.  Had  there  been  a 
greater  mixture  of  argument.,  they  would  not  have 
been  lefs  convincing.  Whether  his  inflrut^ioYis  exceed 
in  the  Jircngth  of  the  rea/onings  tliey  exhibit,  or  r)ie 
ineeknefs  of  the  manner  in  which  they  are  given,  \vt 
profefs  ourfelvts  to  be  unable  to  determine.     All  we 

can 


APPENDIX.  6i 

can  fay,  is,  we  prefume  there  is  room   left   for  im- 
provement in  both. 

Unhappy  it  is,  that  controverfies  on  the  mod  folemn 
and  important  fubje£ts  are  too  frequently  managed 
with  a  fpirit,  an  acrimony,  which  tend  rather  to  dif- 
grace  the  authors,  tlian  to  recommend  the  fentiments 
they  advance.  The  public  will  not  expe«ft  contro- 
verfial  writings  to  be  free  from  thefe  imperfections, 
fo  long  as  the  hearts  of  men  remain  fo  m.ucli  under 
the  pov/er  of  prejudice  as  to  lead  to  fo  great  a  differ- 
ence of  fentiment  as  evidently  runs  through  the  writ- 
ings of  the  Doctor,  now  before  us,  and  the  preceding 
EfTay.  If,  amidil  the  perjonalities  which  may  be  found 
in  each,  the  candid  mind  of  the  reader  can  find  any 
thing  that  is  inllruftivc  ;  while  he  pities  the  failings 
of  the  authors,  he  will  embrace  the  light  which  he 
difcovers  amidll  fo  many  imperfedions.  And,  every 
cordial  friend  to  the  caufe  of  Chrift  will  be  excited 
fervently,  to  wifh  and  pray  for  the  commancement  of 
that  Iiappy  period,  wdien  the  watchmen  fijcill  fee  eye  to 
eye — vrhen  all  the  profeiTed  miniilers  of  Chrift  fhall 
have  the  love  of  the  truth  in  their  hearts  ;  and,  fliall 
unite,  with  one  heart,  and  with  one  voice,  to  proclaim 
that  glorious  fyftem  of  truth  which  is  really  contained 
in  the  gofpel  of  Chriji. 


A  M  E  N, 


ll'iftliiTili  Mliiil 


i'.v.nxJUVWi'»c7:\%'-'r^J»-  'wac^VJS 


ERRATA. 

Page.   Line. 

12.  for  formed,  read /5Kff^. 

for  exercifetb,  read  excvjeth. 
for  and,  read  or. 
for  thought,  read  that. 
from  bottom,  for  And,  read  Any, 
for  inverted,  read  innjented. 
for  denominations,  read  denomination. 
for  formed,  tczi  found. 
for  every,  read  'very. 
from  bottom,  after  i.  e.  infert  are. 
far  o{,  read  in. 

from  bottom,  for  meaning,  read  reafoning, 
for  non-fovc reign,  read  onjun  fovereign. 
after  it,  infert  is. 

from  bottom,  for  confiftent,»read /«fo«,/^f«/. 
for  iindefigned,  read  undefigning. 
for  expofed,  read  exprejftd. 
for  even,  read  e-uer. 
from  bottom,  for  power,  xtzi.  po'Vjers, 
for  fentimentSj  Xfidi/entimejjt. 
for  ?  put ; 

from  bottom,  for  ccnfideratlon,  xz.z.^co7iJideratisns, 
for  is  alfo,  read  //  is  alfo; 
6.  for  fcene,  read/f///?. 


19- 

12. 

26. 

4- 

3i» 

24. 

36. 

18. 

40. 

3- 

44. 

7- 

56. 

19. 

74- 

14. 

«9. 

4- 

92. 

12. 

97. 

T- 

ibid. 

3- 

109. 

I. 

I II. 

8, 

J16. 

13. 

132. 

18. 

146. 

7- 

ibid. 

ih. 

153- 

3- 

162. 

M- 

ibid. 

19. 

172. 

10. 

204. 

17- 

213- 

6. 

5e#  feuje 


fo^e:  ttf^ 


r 


